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 i 
ABSTRACT 
Research shows that many water governance regimes are failing to guide social-
ecological systems away from points, beyond which, damage to social and environmental 
well-being will be difficult to correct. This problem is apparent in regions that face water 
conflicts and climate threats. There remains a need to clarify what is it about governance 
that people need to change in water conflict prone regions, how to collectively go about 
doing that, and how research can actively support this. To address these needs, here I 
present a collaborative research project from the dry tropics of Guanacaste Province, 
Costa Rica. The project addressed the overarching questions: How can water be governed 
sustainably in water-contested and climate-threatened regions? And, how can people 
transition current water governance regimes toward more sustainable ones? In pursuit of 
these questions, a series of individual studies were performed with many partners and 
collaborators. These studies included: a participatory analysis and sustainability 
assessment of current water governance regimes; a case analysis and comparison of water 
conflicts; constructing alternative governance scenarios; and, developing governance 
transition strategies. Results highlight the need for water governance that addresses 
asymmetrical knowledge gaps especially concerning groundwater resources, reconciles 
disenfranchised groups, and supports local leaders. Yet, actions taken based on these 
initial results, despite some success influencing policy, found substantial challenges 
confronting them. In-depth conflict investigations, for example, found that deeply rooted 
issues such friction between opposing local-based and national institutions were key 
conflict drivers in the region. To begin addressing these issues, researchers and 
stakeholders then constructed a set of governing alternatives and devised governance 
 ii 
transition strategies that could actively support people to achieve more sustainable 
alternatives and avoid less sustainable ones. These efforts yielded insight into the 
collective actions needed to implement more sustainable water governance regimes, 
including ways to overcoming barriers that drive harmful water conflicts. Actions based 
on these initial strategies yielded further opportunities, challenges, and lessons. Overall, 
the project addresses the research and policy gap between identifying what is sustainable 
water governance and understanding the strategies needed to implement it successfully in 
regions that experience water conflict and climate impacts. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: How can water be governed sustainably in water-contested and 
climate-threatened regions? And, how can people transition water governance 
regimes from current to sustainable ones in these regions? 
1. The Principal Problem  
Evidence shows that many socio-ecological systems could be nearing thresholds, 
beyond which, system damage may be irreparable (Rockström et al., 2009).  Over the last 
two decades, research has identified key requirements and obstacles for well-designed 
governance regimes (i.e., Ostrom, 1990; Folke et al., 2005). The emphasis on governance 
represents a shift from traditional management paradigms characterized by hierarchical 
state-centric approaches to those with political authority distributed to multi-actor 
alliances and relevant actors from civil society. ‘Governance’ approaches suggest that the 
collective actions of these individuals serve as a steering or guiding function for socio-
ecological systems (Nelson et al., 2005).  These collective actions can guide systems in 
one direction (i.e., toward collective goals) or another over time (Lubell et al., 2008; 
Wiek & Larson, 2012).  Recent research shows that many water governance regimes – in 
their current states - will not be able be to successfully steer societies or socio-ecological 
systems away from these tipping points (Vörösmarty et al., 2010; Biermann et al., 2012; 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). In contrast, many regions now face mounting challenges related 
to, for example, the just distribution of water and its risks and benefits among 
communities, economic actors, and environments (Swatuk, 2008; Biggs et al., 2013; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2013).  
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Put simply, people must ‘govern water differently’ in order to collectively resolve 
and mitigate water problems (Wiek & Larson, 2012). Yet, water governance research to 
date has struggled to adequately support problem-solving efforts (Loucks, 2008; Reed & 
Kaspryszk, 2009; Bakker, 2012). It has generally failed to yield actionable research 
results that can be directly used to help resolve complex problems. These failures have 
led to increasing calls for a ‘solution-orientation’ of water governance research (Wiek & 
Larson, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013; Vörösmarty et al., 2013) that, for example, 
engages the intended ‘users’ of the research throughout the research process (i.e., Lang et 
al. 2012); that avoids one-size fits all solutions/ recommendations for resolving complex 
problems (i.e., Ostrom, 2007; Meinzen-Dick, 2007); and that focuses on collaboratively 
constructing robust solutions to complex problems rather than only analyzing problems 
(i.e., Wiek et al., 2012). In spite of the growing calls for a ‘solution-orientation’ of water 
governance research, to date there remain few, if any, examples in the literature of an 
implemented and comprehensive solution-oriented water governance research project that 
researchers and practitioners can learn from. As a whole, this dissertation aims to fill that 
void. 
The principle problem addressed by the overall dissertation is: people’s failing 
efforts to collectively govern water sustainably and to successfully resolve complex water 
problems in the face of existing water scarcity, climate change, and social tension. In 
other words, many current water governance regimes in these contexts are not resolving 
complex water problems; rather, mounting evidence shows many water governance 
regimes are actually exacerbating these problems and placing people and environments 
under increasing risk (of decreased quality of life, less available water, harm, etc.). On 
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top of this, mounting evidence in the literature has shown that water governance research 
to date has not adequately supported water governance regimes to better tackle complex 
problems. People then, must govern water more sustainably, and research must better 
support people to govern water in more sustainable ways.  
2. Research Objectives and Questions 
The guiding research question of this dissertation is: How can water be governed 
sustainably in water-contested and climate threatened regions? And, how can people 
transition water governance regimes from current to sustainable ones in these regions? 
To answer these questions, three overarching (and overlapping) objectives are pursued. 
Each objective contains a set of sub-questions addressed in individual chapters. Details 
on individual questions and their relevance to the literature and to yielding actionable 
results are described within the appropriate chapter.  
  Objective #1: To clarify the process and design features of sustainable water 
governance and potential barriers to implementation, especially in the context of climate 
threatened, water-contested, and developing regions. 
• How is water currently governed in a water-contested and climate-threatened 
region in the Central American dry tropics? (Chapter 2) 
• How well is water currently governed in this water-contested and climate-
threatened region? (Chapter 3) 
• What common opportunities for advancing toward sustainable water 
governance might we expect to find in such regions? What common barriers 
might we expect to find? (Chapter 2 and 3) 
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• What governing actions can be implemented over time in order to overcome 
those barriers? (Chapter 6) 
 Objective #2: To specify the institutional drivers and mediators of intense and 
intractable water conflicts at regional scales.  
• Why do some water conflicts escalate while others do not? (Chapter 4) 
• What are the implications of current and alternative water governance schemes 
to mitigate or aggravate water conflicts in a water-contested and climate-
threatened context? (Chapter 4) 
• How would particular sets of institutional drivers and mediators play out in 
terms of their effects on conflict outcomes within alternative water governance 
regimes? (Chapter 5) 
Objective #3: To test participatory methods and approaches for developing/ 
evaluating governance alternatives and policy strategies toward sustainable water 
governance, including mitigation of intense and intractable water conflicts in the face of 
climate threats.   
• How can water governance analysis and appraisals best be designed to maximize 
their positive impacts? What are their limitations? (Chapter 2 and 3) 
• How can water conflict research better align with the professional needs of 
decision-makers who aim to mitigate such conflicts? (Chapter 4) 
• What are the strengths and limits in terms of the usability governance scenarios 
and governance transition strategies in collective planning processes? (Chapter 5 
and 6) 
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3. The State of Current Knowledge 
The current state of knowledge pertaining to each of the three sub-objectives is 
explained below. Specific contributions made to the literature/ current knowledge is 
stated in bullet points.  
  Objective #1: To clarify the process and design features of sustainable water 
governance and potential barriers to implementation, especially in the context of climate 
threatened, water-contested, and developing regions. 
To understand the shortcomings and successes of water governance regimes, 
studies have employed common pool resource (CPR) theory - often suggesting that more 
polycentric governance systems (as opposed traditional management schemes) that 
effectively engage stakeholders are best able to achieve sustainability outcomes within 
highly uncertain planning contexts (Pahl-Wostl & Franz, 2010; Ostrom, 2010). 
Polycentric governance systems contain many (as opposed to few) centers of decision-
making authority (Ostrom et al., 1961). They disperse this authority across locations and 
nested scales (McGinnis, 2000; Pahl-Wostl, 2009), and they allow governance actors to 
largely self-organize and to coordinate with each other (Ostrom, 2007). Currently, there 
is a need to constructively build on polycentric governance propositions using multi-scale 
cases within the water sector - especially from regions underrepresented in the literature 
(ISSC/UNESCO, 2013, p605; Neef, 2009) - to help build understanding of how, when, 
and under what contexts polycentric governance, and the way it is implemented, enables 
more effective and sustainable water governance (Molle, 2007; Marshall, 2009; Nagendra 
& Ostrom, 2012). Water governance cases provide the opportunity to examine 
polycentric governance as a more dynamic (vs. static) process, where governing actors 
 6 
exercise control in different parts of water systems from sources to post-use. In Chapter 
2, for example, we constructively examine potential implications for polycentric 
governance propositions in the rural, water-scarce context of the Central American dry 
tropics. This context affords a multi-scale and dynamic (i.e., changes in the governing 
system as water moves through the system) perspective of water governance that offers a 
fresh perspective and use of CPR theory.   
Key dissertation contributions to the literature from meeting Objective #1 
• Improved understanding of the how, when, and under what contexts polycentric-
schemes of water governance promote more sustainable water governance 
regimes and how they cannot (Chapter 2) 
• Demonstration of the potential utility and limits of integrated analytical 
knowledge of water governance regimes using CPR theory (Chapter 2) and 
normative knowledge of how sustainable water governance regimes are currently 
(Chapter 3).  
 Objective #2: To specify the institutional drivers and mediators of intense and 
intractable water conflicts at regional scales.  
Water conflicts are approached in this dissertation from three departure points. 
First, I define conflict as a situation where ‘two or more entities, one or more of which 
perceives a goal as being blocked by another entity, and power of some sort being exerted 
to overcome the perceived blockage’ (Frey, 1993). I focus especially on actions taken 
against other actors with the intent to overcome or harm. Non-cooperative actors are not 
necessarily trying to overcome or harm others (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). Second, I 
view water conflict as a process that occurs with varying degrees of tension among social 
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actors over time (Funder et al. 2010). Many studies view conflict as a single point or 
measurement. A static approach does not account for the more realistic, dynamic nature 
of water conflicts (Sneddon et al., 2002; Böhmelt et al., 2013). Thirdly, the new approach 
for understanding water conflicts (in Chapter 4) aims to improve the links between 
research and the needs of stakeholders that face conflicts (Bakker, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2013). More intense water conflicts most often happen within sub-national regions 
(Postel and Wolf, 2001), yet few studies comprehensively address conflicts within at-
need and at-risk regions (Scheffran et al., 2012).  In contrast, many current water conflict 
studies examine conflicts ‘from a distance’ using large-n samples and with little apparent 
grounding in the actual regions where conflicts occur – which in turn limits the 
accessibility and usability of such studies for those who aim to mitigate conflicts.  
Water governance studies, as noted above, increasingly use common pool 
resource (CPR) theory, which underpins the alternative approach to water conflicts found 
in this dissertation (especially Chapter 4). Polycentric systems are considered different 
from centralized (e.g., rigid) or fragmented (e.g., disparate) systems (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; 
Bakker & Cook, 2011). Fragmented systems contain limited interfaces among 
governance actors who operate in relative seclusion in different locations and scales 
(Molle, 2007; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012). In reality, water governance often includes 
some polycentric aspects, but with widely varying degrees (Huitema et al., 2009). Rogers 
(2002) and Biswas et al., (2009) illustrate that, while water governance schemes across 
Latin America generally fit these three governance types, they are continuously changing 
due to internal and external factors. Huitema et al. (2009) point out that while polycentric 
prescriptions for water governance are theoretically sound and feasible, there remains a 
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need to clarify effective and sustainable water governance schemes for specific and 
urgent problems in specific places (i.e., water conflict in the dry tropics of Central 
America).  Chapter 2 of this dissertation suggests that, in addition to clarifying 
governance schemes to fit problems and places, the manner in which new governing 
schemes are implemented over time (in order to address conflict) will also be important 
for effectiveness. Harmful sub-national water conflict problems however, are typically 
approached very generally in attempts to sort out water supply and demand. Identifying 
the potential of current and alternative water governance regimes that potentially 
aggravate or mitigate harmful water conflicts is then a key research need addressed in this 
dissertation that has important implications for effectively meeting the challenges faced 
in water-contested and climate-threatened regions.  
Key dissertation contributions to the literature from meeting Objective #2 
• Developing and applying fresh/ alternative concepts and tools for understanding 
water governance that is well-grounded to the places where water conflicts are 
actually experienced and thus offers improved study utility in comparison to 
many of current water conflict and climate change studies (Chapter 4) 
• Improved understanding of the institutional mediators and drivers of water 
conflicts at a scale that is relevant and actionable for decision-making and 
collective groups (Chapter 4).  
• Improved understanding of how current and alternative governance regimes might 
be expected to handle water conflict risk and their real-time policy implications 
(in terms of crafting governance strategies to better mitigate conflicts) in critically 
threatened regions such as the dry tropics of Central America (Chapter 4 and 5).  
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Objective #3: To test participatory methods and approaches for developing/ 
evaluating governance alternatives and policy strategies toward sustainable water 
governance, including mitigation of intense and intractable water conflicts in the face of 
climate threats.  
It is now recognized that robust options for addressing complex problems (i.e., 
water governance challenges) cannot be deduced from only analyzing or describing those 
problems (Sarewitz et al., 2012; Wiek et al., 2012). This recognition has led to the 
formation of the new field of sustainability science (Kates et al., 2001; Kemp et al., 
2005). Although still lacking agreement on some fronts the field has generally accepted a 
number of defining aspects. These aspects include: a focus on of the linkages among 
humans and nature through a coupled systems approach (Clark & Dickson, 2003; 
Ostrom, 2009); a focus on the long-term integrity and viability of societies and 
ecosystems (Jerneck et al., 2010); the explicit engagement with (as opposed to avoidance 
of) the normative aspects of problems and their solutions (Gibson, 2006); a recognized 
value of transdisciplinary research methods and of diverse research collaborations across 
society (Gibbons, 1999; Lang et al., 2012); and, a focus on place-based research that is 
grounded in real problems and oriented toward finding robust solutions rather than 
focused on one-size-fits all analyses and subsequent recommendations (Ostrom, 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007). At the core of sustainability science (which in this dissertation I 
will often refer to as solution-oriented water governance research) is the aim to construct 
actionable knowledge. However, there still remains few cases or examples in the water 
governance arena where research efforts analyzed problems, aimed to construct and test 
ways to address those problems with society, and then re-examined what worked and 
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what didn't in terms of producing actionable knowledge and in terms of advancing 
solution-oriented research theories and practices. In the water governance field, most 
studies tend to be based in developed regions in urban settings with relatively high 
quality data available from previous studies (Neef, 2009). Many of those studies though 
do not explicitly aim to produce and test actionable knowledge that is relevant for 
addressing complex water problems. This dissertation offers insights from an integrated 
water governance research project in a unique region that aimed to produce actionable 
knowledge over its 4-year and counting lifespan. Examining the failures and successes in 
doing this over the course of the project offers valuable insights that can help improve 
and advance the design and implementation of solution-oriented research efforts that aim 
to produce actionable knowledge that is useful for addressing complex water problems.  
Key dissertation contributions to the literature from meeting Objective #3 
• Demonstration that descriptive-analytical research efforts are best carefully 
integrated with, rather than separated from, solution-oriented research that focuses 
on producing actionable knowledge (Chapters 3, 5, and 7) 
• Identifying the challenges and opportunities for producing actionable knowledge 
for sustainable water governance in a unique region and context (Chapters 6 and 
7) 
4. The Research Site and Its Relevance 
The Central American dry tropics – featuring water scarcity, social tension, and 
climate impacts and threats - offer a unique and useful setting for research to address a 
how water can be governed more sustainably in water-contested and climate threatened 
regions. Guanacaste Province in the rural and dry NW of Costa Rica in particular, offers 
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a compelling case that is particularly well suited to addressing the three dissertation sub-
objectives: 
Objective #1: To clarify the process and design features of sustainable water 
governance and potential barriers to implementation, especially in the context of climate-
threatened, water-contested, and developing regions.  
The Guanacaste case allows us to constructively examine potential implications 
for polycentric governance propositions in the rural, water-scarce context of the Central 
American dry tropics. This context affords a multi-scale and dynamic (i.e., changes in the 
governing system as water moves through the system) perspective of water governance, 
while contributing to advancing more solution-oriented water governance studies 
(Vörösmarty et al., 2013). Very little existing knowledge of physical water systems was 
available for the selected site, which afforded an opportunity to learn about executing 
water governance analysis in ways that can support effective governing efforts despite the 
high uncertainty common in the broader region and beyond. Many areas in the dry tropics 
of Central America are subject to increasing risk of water scarcity (Anderson et al., 
2008). These areas often experience uneven economic growth and expanding agricultural 
development, which compete for water in contexts that often include relatively weak state 
governments that are now seeking to expand, social injustice, and at times political 
instability (Booth et al., 2010; Madrigal et al., 2011). Water-related laws in Costa Rica, 
some of which date back several decades, generally protect the ability of people and 
communities to organize, including for purposes to protect, and to a limited extent to 
govern, resources. Several avenues for public accountability (i.e., checks and balances), 
and stakeholder engagement (although not always pursued) exist. Yet, below the 
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national-scale in the dry tropics of Guanacaste Province, governance is currently 
inadequate (see point about water conflicts below). The Guanacaste setting includes 
intense dry seasons that are expected to become drier (Anderson et al., 2008), rapid 
political and social change (Casas-Zamora, 2011), and typically very active rural 
populations (Edelman, 1999).   
Objective #2: To specify the institutional drivers and mediators of intense and 
intractable water conflicts at regional scales.  
Over a recent 10-year period, Guanacaste experienced on average one water 
conflict (defined by people or groups taking legal actions against others) every month and 
a half (Cover, 2007) – in a land area slightly smaller than Los Angeles county but with a 
population thirty times smaller. However, as noted in Chapter 1 and examined in-depth in 
Chapter 4, water conflicts have not been experienced uniformly across the region and 
they have played out in different processes over time from one area to another.  
Objective #3: To test participatory methods and approaches for developing/ 
evaluating governance alternatives and policy strategies toward sustainable water 
governance, including mitigation of intense and intractable water conflicts in the face of 
climate threats.   
In spite of the challenges that water governance regimes face in Guanacaste, 
many individuals are active in in the water sector aspire to better perform collectively as 
illustrated throughout the following chapters. Some of these individuals are collectively 
organized and eager to partner with research projects that aim to go beyond only 
extractive-styles of research (as illustrated throughout the following chapters).  Thus, in 
addition to being a case that is well suited to addressing the study objectives, Guanacaste 
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also affords a case to implement and test new solution-oriented approaches to water 
governance research that aim to meaningfully involve research ‘users’ in an effort to 
produce actionable knowledge.  
5. Research Approach 
The project or procedural planning framework used to organize the dissertation is 
based on Wiek (under review) and adapted to water governance and water conflict cases 
(Figure 1.1).  I distinguish between analytical and procedural frameworks. An analytical 
framework identifies the components and general relationships between these 
components that should be considered when analyzing problems (Ostrom, 2011). For 
example, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by 
Elinor Ostrom and colleagues and later iterations of the IAD (i.e., Ostrom, 2009; 
Anderies & Janssen, 2013) links governance and resource systems with resource units, 
governance actors, and action arenas. Two primary analytical frameworks are used in this 
dissertation and are described at length in the relevant chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 employ 
the framework for analyzing and appraising water governance regimes developed by 
Wiek & Larson (2012).  Given the lack of attention to place-based water conflicts and 
little current water conflict research that yields actionable results (Scheffran et al., 2012), 
Chapter 4 develops an exploratory analytical tool for identifying the potential of 
governance regimes to aggravate or mitigate conflicts within specified contexts.  
However, analytical frameworks in themselves are not necessarily integrated with 
subsequent efforts that aim to build on gained analytical knowledge in order to, for 
example, examine alternative ways of governing water and craft collective governing 
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strategies that aim to change current water governance regimes.  Integrating these efforts 
is supported by procedural planning frameworks (Wiek & Lang, 2014).  
The procedural framework used here links three research/ knowledge domains 
within the dissertation (i.e., Wiek & Walter, 2009). (1) Current state analysis domain 
includes knowledge of, for example, how governance works (e.g., why do people do what 
they do with water and why, etc.) (Chapter 2), knowledge of normatively how well water 
governance works currently (Chapter 3), and why conflicts happen (Chapter 4). Research 
in this domain would utilize an appropriate analytical framework as mentioned above. 
The (2a) Governance alternatives domain includes knowledge of what alternative water 
governance regimes might look like and their social and environmental consequences. 
Variables, systemic relationships and key governance features from the current state 
analysis would support constructing robust governance alternatives (see Table 1.1). In the 
domain (2b) Goal identification, these governing alternatives are deliberated in order to 
identify what is a sustainable governance regimes and what is not. The (3) Governance 
transition strategies domain includes knowledge of the actions, barriers to success, and 
policy options that are relevant for collective efforts that aim to transition the current 
governance regime toward more sustainable alternatives while avoiding more detrimental 
and less-desirable alternatives. Developing and implementing governance transition 
strategies is a reflexive and anticipatory process that continuously revisits and reflects on 
current-state conditions, future possibilities and alternatives, implementing collective 
governance goals and strategies, and implementation barriers and actions that can 
overcome those barriers. Specific research designs and methods for each chapter are 
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summarized in the following section and elaborated and justified at length within each 
chapter. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Procedural planning framework used to organize the dissertation research 
components. Adapted from Wiek (under review) in order to fit the water governance and 
conflict application. 
 
 
Table 1.1  
 
Linking and Integrating the Study Chapters 
 
Chapter Research 
Domain 
Chapter summary Link to other chapters 
2 1 Analyzing a regional water 
governance regime in a way that 
is integrated with the regional 
Provided a foundation for 
the normative governance 
appraisal (Chapter 3), 
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water system and that involves 
those people that live, work, and 
take water-related governing 
actions in the system 
provided a list of relevant 
variables needed to 
construct governance 
alternatives (Chapter 5), and 
offered a comparison case 
where no harmful water 
conflicts have been 
experienced (Chapter 4) 
3 1,3 Evaluating how well a regional 
water governance regime 
operates based on a set of 
normative sustainability criteria 
and identifying initial 
opportunities to improve 
governance  
Provided the normative 
framing to identify more 
and less sustainable 
alternatives (Chapter 5) and 
the appraisal process helped 
fortify local partnerships 
and collaborative 
relationships needed to 
execute subsequent chapters 
(Chapter 5, 6) 
4 1,2a, 3 Identifying the institutional 
features of governance regimes 
that drive or help to mitigate 
more intense and intractable 
Provided the needed insight 
for constructing different 
governance alternatives and 
(importantly) identifying 
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water conflicts how those alternatives 
would mitigate or aggravate 
conflicts under different 
climatic conditions and 
impacts (Chapter 5), offered 
insight into what collective 
governance strategies may 
be more or less feasible 
under different types of 
governance regimes 
(Chapter 6 and 7).  
5 2a, 2b, 3 Developing and engaging a set 
of alternative options (via 
scenarios) to current water 
governance regimes  
 
The alternative governance 
scenarios brought to life a 
small set of robust options 
that would help elaborate, 
deliberate and identify 
collective goals, sustainable 
water governance schemes, 
and un-sustainable water 
governance schemes 
(Chapter 6 and 7). 
6 3, 1 Devising collective governance Forming collective 
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strategies for transitioning the 
current water governance regime 
toward more sustainable 
alternatives and away from less 
desirable/ less sustainable 
alternatives 
governance strategies 
provided a means to reflect 
further on current conditions 
with an eye to transform 
(rather than just understand) 
the existing water 
governance regime (link 
back to Chapter 1,2 and 3).  
7 Cross-
cutting 
To use insight from the real-time 
‘testing’ of study applications 
and devised strategies (e.g., 
stakeholders taking action on 
study results, study application, 
and devised strategies) over time 
to initially evaluate, for example, 
the feasibility, the barriers, and 
the opportunities for people to 
collectively change or even 
begin to transform currently 
inadequate water governance 
regimes. 
This concluding chapter 
brings together the insights 
from across the chapters 
(organized by sub-
objectives 1, 2 and 3) in 
order to conclude (1) how 
water can be governed 
sustainably in water-
contested and climate-
threatened regions and (2) 
how research can better 
support this (link back to 
principal problem).  
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6. Individual Chapter Summaries 
6.1 Chapter 2: Integrated and participatory analysis of regional water 
governance regimes: The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Water governance research 
provides ample evidence that many of the persistent water problems worldwide are 
caused by people’s consumer behavior, professional practices, and collective actions. If 
these problems are to be resolved or mitigated, then, in simple words, people need to ‘do 
things differently’ with water. In a first step, this requires systematically mapping what 
people do with water, what the impacts are, and why they do what they do with water. In 
this Chapter, I apply a recently developed framework for such water governance analysis 
to Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica. Data collection included 47 semi-structured 
interviews and several stakeholder meetings with representatives from government 
agencies, non-profit organizations, businesses, and academia. Data analysis combined 
qualitative content analysis, quantitative network analysis, two stakeholder workshops, 
stakeholder mapping, and watershed-scale hydraulic modeling of precipitation-runoff 
processes. Results show regional water governance operates unevenly and is increasingly 
uncoordinated as water moves through the system. Two central actors exercise authority 
in separate domains of the water system with little cooperation between them. Non-state 
actors play a major role driving collaboration in regional Guanacaste water governance, 
in spite of prevailing institutions that limit their involvement in governing processes. 
These results suggest that water governance designs with top-down institutional 
hierarchies, combined with horizontally fragmented or uncoordinated administrative 
units, are likely to exacerbate uncertainty. Governance actors will then struggle to set 
shared goals and make progress toward them. Mutual accountability between hubs of 
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authority and active institutional leadership are two critical design features of sustainable 
water governance in regions that experience water scarcity and conflicts, aggravated 
through climate change. Based on this application, I present guidelines for solution-
oriented water governance analysis, including the framing of critical analysis elements 
with key stakeholders; identifying and involving leaders at the science-policy interface; 
and positioning the analysis within larger problem-solving endeavors.   
6.2 Chapter 3: Sustainability appraisal of water governance regimes: The 
case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Sustainability appraisals produce evidence for how 
well water governance regimes operate and where problems exist. This information is 
particularly relevant for regions that face water scarcity, conflicts, and climate change 
threats. This study presents a criteria-based and participatory sustainability appraisal of 
water governance in a region with such characteristics - the dry tropics of NW Costa 
Rica. Data collection included 47 interviews and three stakeholder workshops. The 
appraisal was conducted through a collaborative and iterative process between 
researchers and stakeholders. Out of the 25 sustainability criteria used, seven posed a 
significant challenge for the governance regime. We found challenges faced by the 
governance regime primarily clustered around: failing coordination related to the use, 
management, and protection of groundwater resources; and, inadequate leadership to 
identify collective goals and to constructively and openly deliberate alternative ways of 
governing water. The appraisal yielded some positive impact in the study area. Yet, its 
application provided only limited strategic information to support problem-solving 
efforts. Insights from this study suggest focal points for sustainable water governance in 
the Central American dry tropics, including: investing in increasingly influential 
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collective organizations that are already active in water governance; and leveraging 
policy windows that can be used to build confidence and disperse more governing 
authority to regional and local governing actors that are in-tune with the challenges faced 
in the dry tropics. We conclude the article with reflections on how to produce research 
results that are actionable for sustainable water governance. 
6.3 Chapter 4: Identifying the potential of governance regimes to aggravate 
or mitigate conflicts in regions threatened by climate change. In this chapter my 
partners and I develop an alternative approach for understanding water conflicts. The 
approach identifies the potential of governance regimes to aggravate or mitigate water 
conflicts within specified settings. We apply the approach using five diverse cases from 
Costa Rica to investigate why some water conflicts escalated while others did not. The 
mixed methods approach included 16 ethnographic interviews, three focus groups, and a 
qualitative cross-case study comparison that aimed to tease out the institutional drivers 
and mediators of escalated conflicts in the region.  We found conflicts were set off in 
contexts of high friction between national-scale and community-based institutions in 
situations with inactive regional leaders. Distrust and poor collective water system 
knowledge, worsened by ineffective stakeholder engagement, were important aggravating 
factors. Self-organized conflict mitigation efforts had difficulty dealing with unresolved 
tension among actors and vague resource rights and governing responsibilities. Yet, even 
in aggravating-contexts, successful mitigation potential existed if face-to-face 
cooperation venues and supportive, successful governing examples from nearby areas 
were accessible to local actors.  The approach and case studies yielded a schematic that 
identifies potential conflict risks, mitigation abilities, and promising mitigation strategies 
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across a range of governance schemes in the dry tropical Central American context. 
Polycentric water governance schemes that are fitted to regional contexts, that feature 
enabling leadership, that fairly resolve water access issues, and that emphasize vertical 
accountability offer conflict mitigation potential. Centralized governance regimes that 
undergo institutional/ administrative fragmentation allow potential risk of aggravated 
conflicts in settings where power is disproportionately held and where local groups are 
not accounted for. Results demonstrate that water conflicts are not uniformly experienced 
within regions nor do conflict processes unfold in consistent manners over time - which 
has implications for realizing effective water governance and useful water conflict 
research. Knowledge transfers within regions, learning by example, and existing leaders 
offer promising starting points for overcoming institutional and political barriers that 
obstruct conflict mitigation potential.  
6.4 Chapter 5: Governance scenarios for addressing water conflicts and 
climate change impacts. Scenarios that outline alternative governance regimes may 
offer one way to support positive change in regions that face persistent water problems. 
Here, I explore this proposition using the case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica – a region that 
faces water conflict and looming climate change impacts. My partners and I developed 
five scenarios over the course of a year using a formative and participatory approach with 
system, consistency, and diversity analyses, and visualization. In one scenario, water 
conflicts surfaced due to opaque governance schemes not accounting for communities 
that opposed suspect alliances of agencies, developers, and investors. In another 
alternative, challenging environmental and social contexts overwhelmed fragmented 
governance schemes causing dissent; which contrasted with another scenario where 
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engaged and vertically accountable governance schemes are fitted to the unique regional 
context and collectively mitigate problems. Governance though, in a return to historical 
precedent, could alternatively implement strong top-down schemes in order to safeguard 
rural communities and lifestyles; or, in contrast, implement more minimalist governance 
that fills technical roles. The scenario study provided diverse stakeholders with 
opportunities to share perspectives, connect with others, and to collaboratively explore 
and articulate alternative water governance schemes. The practical value of the scenarios, 
however, highly depended on efforts before and after the study and the integration of the 
scenarios with those efforts. Previous water governance research in the region facilitated 
partnership building, stakeholder trust, and active participation in the scenario building 
process. Timely follow-up demonstrated the real-time application of the scenarios as 
reference points to help craft collective governance strategies. Governance scenarios, if 
integrated with a broader transformational planning process, can be a constructive step 
toward crafting more sustainable water governance schemes. In spite of their limitations, 
the scenarios played a part in Guanacaste that helped revitalize coordination and 
encouraged experimentation with new water governance efforts in the region.  
6.5 Chapter 6: Governance transition strategies for a water-contested region. 
Building directly on Chapter 5, here I recount the efforts of my partners and I during and 
after the largest stakeholder workshop for water governance in Guanacaste in recent 
years. 46 individuals from 18 Guanacaste communities, from all scales of water 
governance, worked constructively for over 7 hours to help build alternatives to the 
current water governance regime, to evaluate using multi-criteria analysis how 
sustainable or not those alternatives were, and to build collective governance strategies 
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that would transition the current governance regime toward more sustainable alternatives 
and help avoid less-sustainable alternatives.  Participants worked in sub-groups to 
develop strategies based on the five priorities for water governance that were identified 
through scenario evaluation exercises at the workshop. Each sub-group presented its 
strategies, which identified actions to be taken, leaders, resources, and expected barriers 
to successfully taking action. Following the workshop, the research team and partners in 
the Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital synthesized a systematic 
action plan embodying the strategies developed by workshop participants and the insights 
obtained from the group discussions that followed each strategy presentation.  The action 
plan identifies four action items, potential barriers, and ways to overcome those barriers.  
I argue that Guanacaste leaders and communities are in a position now to make a unified 
push for national water reform that better enables sustainable water governance while 
simultaneously implementing actions to advance water sustainability from within the 
region. Progress is already being made as is demonstrated in previous dissertation 
chapters. Though barriers remain, Guanacaste can move forward despite the failure of 
national lawmakers to modify water policies in light of citizens’ needs. When water 
reform does happen—and with enough momentum it eventually will— the action plan 
will position Guanacaste to capitalize on current water sustainability efforts and further 
accelerate sustainable water governance.  
6.6 Chapter 7: Conclusion: How water can be governed sustainably in water-
contested and climate-threatened regions and how people can transition water 
governance regimes from current to sustainable ones in these regions. This 
concluding chapter brings together the insights from across the chapters and re-caps the 
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entire dissertation organized by the sub-objectives 1, 2 and 3 in order to conclude (1) how 
water can be governed sustainably in water-contested and climate-threatened regions, (2) 
how people can transition water governance regimes from current to sustainable ones in 
these regions, and (3) how research can better support sustainable water governance 
efforts.  Much of the conclusion is already stated in the individual chapters, but organized 
by the dissertation objectives here in the conclusion. Some readers may prefer to read the 
relevant chapter, while others may prefer to read here in the conclusion only the answers 
to some questions under certain dissertation objectives. In the conclusion, each question 
stated under the sub-objectives is answered; contributions to the literature are stated 
organized by sub-objective; a discussion and initial reflection on the evolution of the 
project’s research and planning framework is presented in Section 4.2; and a list of 
practical contributions made to water governance efforts in Guanacaste.  The concluding 
chapter also offer a glimpse into other key research activities that have occurred as a part 
of this broader project.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Integrated and participatory analysis of regional water governance regimes - 
The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica 
1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, research has revealed key requirements and obstacles 
for well-designed governance regimes (Ostrom, 1992; Folke et al., 2005).  Evidence also 
shows that many of our natural resource systems could be nearing points beyond which, 
system damage could be irreparable (Rockström et al., 2009; Galaz et al., 2012).  In their 
current states many environmental governance regimes may not be able be to 
successfully steer or guide societies away from these tipping points (Bierman et al., 
2012).  Without significant change to how people govern resources, many social-
ecological systems and the quality of services they provide are at risk of degenerating. 
But where do we start with the changes that are needed – what are promising intervention 
points?  How can analyses of natural resource governance better inform or prepare for 
long-term efforts that seek to transform governance regimes?  
People cause the majority of natural resource problems in general, and water 
problems in particular (Young et al., 2008; Rijke et al., 2012).  Thus, people need to ‘do 
things differently’ with water, including governing water differently, in order to resolve 
and mitigate water problems (Pahl-Wostl, 2008; Kuzdas, 2012).  Yet, water governance 
research often does not focus on people’s water related activities, their impacts, and their 
drivers (Reed & Kaspryszk, 2009).  It struggles to integrate water governance 
components beyond isolated aspects such as legal issues, infrastructure, or material flows 
(Loucks, 2008; Bakker, 2012).  If governance research is to help people govern water 
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differently, we first need to know what people do with water, why they do what they do, 
what the impacts are, and where opportunities for change might exist (Wiek and Larson, 
2012). Many current water governance regimes do not sufficiently account for people-
centered aspects such as (diverging) needs, desires, and values of stakeholders; roles of 
leaders and mediators; incompatibilities between different political and administrative 
structures; imprecise or vague rules and regulations; archaic yet resilient modes of 
resource planning; and conflicts within fragmented governance regimes (Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2012).  
To deal with the shortcomings of many existing water governance regimes, the 
field of adaptive water governance, drawing on common pool resource theory, often 
suggests that polycentric governance systems that effectively engage stakeholders are 
best able to achieve sustainability and adaptability in the face of climate threats and high 
uncertainty, especially in comparison to fragmented or hierarchal governance designs 
(Ostrom, 2007; Pahl-Wostl & Kranz, 2010; Huntjens et al., 2012; Rijke et al., 2012).  
Polycentric governance systems are those systems that contain many independent centers 
of decision-making (Ostrom et al., 1961), that disperse decision-making authority across 
locations and scales (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), and where governance actors are largely self-
organized and coordinated (Ostrom, 2007). However there remains a lack of diverse and 
broadly comparable studies in the field that adequately account for the dynamics of 
authority and coordination within water governance regimes, especially in understudied 
regions where water scarcity and conflicts already exist.  The Guanacaste case also helps 
address current needs to build improved understanding of how, when, and under what 
contexts polycentric governance, and the way it is implemented, enables more effective 
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and sustainable water governance (Molle, 2007; Neef, 2009; Marshall, 2009; Nagendra & 
Ostrom, 2012). Water governance cases also provide the opportunity to examine 
polycentric governance as a more dynamic (vs. static) process, where governing actors 
exercise control in different parts of water systems from sources to post-use.   
In this study, we evaluate the applicability of the polycentric governance system 
hypothesis in the context of developing regions that experience water scarcity, conflicts, 
and high risk of future climate change impacts. Water governance research in general, 
and especially water security research, often struggles with integrating the research 
process and the ensuing results with the professional needs of decision-makers and water 
administrators; and thus, often makes poor contributions in terms of directly aiding 
problem-solving efforts (Bakker, 2012). Following our analysis, we reflect on practical 
methodological guidelines that future water governance analyses might use to help 
maximize their contributions to water problem solving endeavors. In doing so, we aim to 
help build a solution-oriented approach to water governance analysis that considers 
context and place-based problems, but supports generality in terms of both content 
(research results) and methods.   
We present and reflect on an integrated water governance analysis in three 
connected watersheds in Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica. We pursue four research 
questions: 
1. Who are the key actors in the water governance regime? What do they do with 
water and why? (RQ.1) 
 29 
2. How do the key actors in the governance regime relate to each other? In other 
words, what is the structure of the actor network, overall and for each water 
governance domain? (RQ.2) 
3.  How does the structure of the actor network impact coordination within the 
governance regime? (RQ.3) 
4. What common barriers to sustainable water governance should be expected from 
governance regimes with similar design characteristics to Guanacaste’s?  Why (or 
not) are these expected barriers consistent with the polycentric governance system 
hypothesis? (RQ.4) 
5. What can we learn from the Guanacaste case about conducting water governance 
analysis in ways that directly contribute to practical problem solving endeavors? 
(RQ.5) 
In pursuit of these questions, we apply the framework for water governance 
analysis proposed by Wiek & Larson (2012), which is a place-based, activities-oriented 
approach for understanding regional water governance regimes. The framework 
structures water governance into four domains – water supply, delivery, use, and 
outflows – to mimic regional water systems in a way that synchronizes with daily water 
activities (in public, professional, and private settings). The framework is based on a 
mixed methodological approach (Young et al., 2008), including participatory research 
settings with stakeholders. In this study, we expand this framework through social 
network analysis and stakeholder mapping, coupled with watershed-scale hydraulic 
modeling of precipitation runoff processes.  
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2. Framework for Integrated Analysis of Water Governance 
The analytical framework proposed by Wiek & Larson (2012) is mechanically 
similar to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by 
Elinor Ostrom and colleagues (see Ostrom, 2011 for a recent review) and the regime 
analysis framework proposed by Holtz et al. (2008). The IAD framework is widely used 
and has been applied previously to water management situations (Imperial, 1999). The 
regime analysis framework has also been applied to water management (Pahl-Wostl, 
2010). Wiek & Larson (2012) take core components from those frameworks, such as 
institutions (rules, rights, etc.), social actors and activities, and structure those 
components in a way that mimics regional water systems and how they are used and 
governed on a day-to-day basis. Ostrom (2009) employs similar system-mimicking logic 
in developing an approach for analyzing general social-ecological systems that links 
governance systems and resource production systems with resource units and actors. 
Wiek & Larson (2012) translate Ostrom’s (2009) approach specifically for regional water 
systems. By mimicking regional water systems explicitly, the framework aims to resonate 
with stakeholders in the regional water governance regime. 
Not all water-related activities are governing actions. We understand governance 
as a set of collective actions that aim toward a common goal and that are coordinated 
among a diverse set of actors (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Lubell et al., 2008). Governance 
is distinct from government or management, which imply limited sets of actors dealing 
with water such as agencies or utilities. In contrast, water governance includes all people 
affecting and affected by the water system as potential governance actors who might 
coordinate their activities to secure water system integrity and other objectives (Ostrom, 
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2009). The framework aims to provide the base for assessing how the collective actions 
of governance guide the water system toward meeting, or not meeting, water system 
objectives.   
Here I simplify the original Wiek & Larson (2012) framework in order to better 
apply to Guanacaste (specifically) and rural regions (in general), where information 
involving natural systems and water infrastructure tend to be more challenging to obtain 
or may not exist. The water system is structured along two layers (illustrated in Figure 
2.1):  
Framework Layer 1: Actors, institutions, & activities. This layer identifies all 
relevant social actors and their networks, norms, and values; and outlines what they do 
with water, how they interact with each other, what their mandates or intentions are, what 
rules govern their actions and interactions, and what systems of rights and decision-
making processes are in play.  
Framework Layer 2:  Hydrological flows and infrastructure.  This layer captures 
how water is entering, traveling through, and leaving the water system. This includes 
facilities and infrastructure involved in storage, extraction, treatment, and water transfers 
between basins.   
The two layers interface with each other along four governance domains of regional 
water systems: 
1. Water Supply: the physical water sources (the environment) that support, maintain, 
and protect them. In Guanacaste this includes rivers, springs, and groundwater. Also 
included are the social arrangements, including water rights, which govern sources.   
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2. Water Delivery: the distribution of water through infrastructure, such as wells, 
aqueducts, treatment facilities, and post-treatment storage tanks, and water transports 
or inter-basin exchanges. 
3. Water Use: consuming and conserving water by organizations and individuals within 
the region, including residential and commercial, industry, agriculture, ranching, 
forestry, rural domestic, and commercial users.  
4. Water Outflows: discharging wastewater that consumers have used.  In Guanacaste 
this includes septic tanks, oxidation ponds, and run-off that flows back into the 
watershed and environment.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Framework for integrated analysis of regional water governance regimes in 
Guanacaste. Adapted from Wiek & Larson (2012).  
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Site selection. The research site includes three sub-basins located in the 
Nicoya and Hojancha Counties of Guanacaste Province on the interior of the Nicoya 
Peninsula (illustrated in Figure 2.2): the Río Potrero, Río Caimital, and Upper Río 
Nosara.  Regional planning documents and local stakeholders were consulted in order to 
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verify the extent and nature of hydrological connectivity between the watersheds.  The 
Río Potrero and Río Caimital share the Potrero-Caimital Aquifer.  The Upper Nosara 
typically does not flow in the dry season (December – April), so groundwater from the 
Caimital is transported to the town of Hojancha.  The City of Nicoya receives its entire 
water supply from transported Río Potrero surface flows.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Río Potrero, Río Caimital, and Upper Río Nosara sub-basins in Guanacaste.  
Collaborating researchers from the Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y 
Enseñanza (CATIE) in Costa Rica and Arizona State University in the United States 
selected the research site after being invited to attend local and regional meetings in early 
2010. CATIE has a long history of involvement in forest conservation efforts in the area 
and facilitated initial contact with stakeholders. The site was chosen because:  
(1) Little existing knowledge of physical water supplies and predicted climate change 
necessitates governing water effectively in the region despite high uncertainty, 
which provided an opportunity to learn about conducting water governance 
N
!!
!!
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analysis in ways that can inform water governance effectively despite high 
uncertainty (Quay, 2010).  
(2) Well-established conservation networks provided a known quantity of actors 
within the study boundaries, which facilitates accurate methods that rely heavily 
on the human dimensions of social-ecological systems (Ernston et al., 2010). 
(3) Researchers considered the potential of using the case to learn about and inform 
transformative and pro-active water governance to be high. Sharp water conflicts 
in Guanacaste over groundwater reserves have led local and regional managers to 
search for ways to mitigate future conflicts (Herrera, 2009), which encouraged 
willingness on the part of stakeholders to participate in the research process.        
(4) Like many regions in Pacific Mesoamerica and beyond, Guanacaste will be subject 
to increasing risk of water scarcity and climate hazards in the future (Anderson et 
al., 2008). Pacific Mesoamerica is an important region for global agricultural 
exports, is experiencing substantial growth in tourism and real estate that competes 
for water with agriculture, and is often challenged to deal with social inequality 
and political instability. Guanacaste’s economic development parallels that of 
other Pacific Mesoamerican regions that also experience water conflicts (Booth et 
al., 2010; Cañada, 2010). Complex cases with such features are often not 
represented adequately or studied at sufficient detail by water governance scholars 
to allow for cross-case comparisons. The Guanacaste case affords an opportunity 
to examine a case that, to some degree, can serve as a general proxy for Pacific 
Mesoamerica.  The site adds a more diverse analysis case to the water governance 
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field, which accounts for developing regions that experience high climate risks, 
high water scarcity, and existing resource conflicts and tensions.  
3.2 Identification and classification of organizations (actors). Organizations 
were used as the units of analysis within the governance regime because they tended to 
embody institutions; they change relatively slowly (thus allowing for a relevant analysis 
for a period of time); and they are often used relevant units in a range of natural resource 
governance literature (Schneider et al., 2003; Ernston et al., 2010).  We used three 
guidelines to identify relevant organizations: (1) organizations should include those 
affecting water governance, (2) organizations should include those affected by water 
governance, and (3) stakeholders should play a major role in identifying both sets of 
organizations. During stakeholder working groups in Nicoya and Hojancha, we asked 
attendees to use these guidelines to help create a list of important organizations. We also 
asked them to identify affiliated individuals with tenure in their respective organization, 
in order to help us develop an interview listing. Individuals from 45 organizations were 
identified as potential interview candidates (Table 2.1) for data collection. To balance the 
representation of organizations, we used a typology for classifying organizations relevant 
for study in rural areas (Agrawal, 2008). Based on this classification, we selected a mix 
of public organizations (local governments; government agencies), civic organizations 
(membership organizations; cooperatives), and private organizations (service 
organizations; businesses).  
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Table 2.1 
Selected Key Organizations in the Regional Water System  
Key Actor 
 
Classification Description 
Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados (AyA) 
Agency National water utility mandated to supply 
drinking water to the population.  Regional 
office is in Nicoya. 
Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Energía y 
Telecomunicaciones 
(MINAET)  
Agency National environment ministry. Umbrella 
organization for environmental 
management.  Nicoya and Hojancha are 
managed as separate sub-regions.  
Área de Conservación 
Tempisque (ACT)  
Agency A branch of MINAET that coordinates 
protected area management in the region.  
The ACT also has an environmental 
education office.   
Ministerio de Salud  
Agency National health ministry mandated to 
ensure the health of the population.  
Regional offices are in Hojanhca and 
Nicoya.  
Rural aqueduct 
administrators 
(ASADAs)  
Local 
government 
Community groups that manage rural water 
supplies and deliveries.  Granted power to 
set and collect water use tariffs.   
Municipalities Local County-level government that develops 
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government land-use guidelines outside of nationally 
protected areas 
Ministerio de Agricultura 
y Ganadería (MAG) 
Agency Ranching and agricultural ministry 
mandated to promote economic 
competitiveness of Costa Rican agriculture 
Servicio Nacional de 
Aguas Subterráneas 
Riego y Avenamiento 
(SENARA) 
Agency National agency mandated to manage 
irrigation districts and groundwater.  Main 
offices are in Cañas and San José.  
NicoyAgua Foundation  
Service 
organization 
Non-profit water conservation group in 
Nicoya administered by the PCW 
Commission, which functions as a group 
promoting basin management 
CooPilangosta Cooperative Coffee producer cooperative 
Rural development 
associations 
Membership 
organization 
Community organizations dedicated to 
securing rural community well-being and 
financing local projects 
National Training 
Institute 
Service 
organization 
 Agricultural extension office dedicated to 
producer training and education 
Costeña S.A. 
Business Melon producer and largest agricultural 
business in the area 
Monte Alto Foundation Service Non-profit set up to finance land purchases 
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organization to protect the Upper Nosara headwaters  
Ranching commissions 
Membership 
organization 
Local organizations that disseminate 
information to producers and promoting 
collective interests 
Centro Agronómico 
Tropical de Investigación 
y Enseñanza (CATIE) 
Service 
organization 
Higher education organization that 
administers the Finnish Forestry (FinnFor) 
project in Hojanhca that seeks to create 
biological corridors on the Nicoya 
Peninsula 
CoopeGuanacaste 
Cooperative Regional electricity provider, administered 
as a cooperative which also manages retail 
outlets located throughout the region 
 
 
3.3 Data collection. 47 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
individuals representing 40 organizations.  8 additional interviews were conducted with 
micro-scale agricultural farms (businesses).  These micro-farms were not included in the 
formal network analysis described below.  Final interviews covered about 90% of 
organizations originally targeted.  To ensure that as many key actors were included in the 
study as possible, interview participants were asked to list the two most important 
organizations for water governance in the region.  All the resulting organizations listed as 
the most important for water governance in the region were interviewed.  Interviews 
lasted an average of 75 minutes and were done face-to-face.  Interviews were executed in 
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collaboration with the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA) in Nicoya over the 
course of five months. 
After review and pre-tests with stakeholders and prior to conducting final 
interviews, the initial interview protocol was modified (number and type of questions, 
interview length, etc.). In line with interview protocols developed by Wiek et al. (2007), 
interviews were structured into three parts: first, participants were asked about the water-
related responsibilities, objectives, motives, mandates, and activities of the organization 
they represented; respondents then listed all organizations, regardless of size or type, 
which they interact with and described how they interact with each organization they 
listed.  Second, respondents identified where they work and what they specifically do in 
the water system, using a (partly populated) water system map based on the framework 
that had been vetted by stakeholders.  Third, respondents were asked to name the two 
most important regional water governance challenges and to indicate where in the system 
these challenges occur.  
Existing and relevant hydrological information was catalogued and organized in 
order to determine if and how many components of the physical water system could be 
quantified. Existing data were collected from the Instituto Tecnología de Costa Rica 
(ITCR, 2008), the Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones (MINAET, 
2010), and the Instituto Meteorológico Nacional (IMN, 2009).  Data included land cover 
and use, soil type, topography, basin size, rainfall from 1955 to 1995, and water 
concession registrations for individuals and organizations.  
3.4 Data Analysis. We analyzed qualitative interview responses in order to 
determine what individual actors do concerning water and why they do what they do 
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(Q.1).  We used thematic content analysis uncovered a range of existing water-related 
responsibilities, the objectives of actors, their motives, their mandates, and their water-
related activities for each of the four governance domains. Data on how organizations 
relate to each other in the regime were first coded by the research team, which resulted in 
three relation-types: (i) collaboration and coordination, (ii) resource transfers, and (iii) 
information and knowledge exchange (Q.2). The relation types are consistent with other 
network-based studies of regional water governance regimes (e.g., Stein et al., 2011) and 
were triangulated with qualitative interview responses. The research team verified the 
relevance of relation types for the governance regime with key stakeholders. We only 
counted mutual collaborative relations between actors.  Meaning, for two actors to have a 
collaborative relation, both actors were required to acknowledge they collaborate or 
coordinate with each other.   
Social network analysis software UCINet/Netdraw (Borgatti et al., 2002) was 
used to quantitatively reconstruct the social network of the governance regime based on 
how actors in the regime relate to each other (RQ2) (Bodin et al., 2011). Measures from 
social network analysis were also used to help determine key individual actors in the 
regime (Q.1). These actor-level measures are: (a) degree centrality (number of direct 
links), which indicates how directly involved an actor is with other actors; and (b) 
betweenness centrality (number of times an actor lies on the shortest path between two 
other actors), which indicates how central an actor is based on other actors needing to ‘go 
through’ them to reach others in the network. 
To analyze how the governance network responds as water flows through the 
system (Q.2) and to analyze the impact of these responses on the regime’s coordination 
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(Q.3), organizations were coded, based on the mapping exercise conducted in interviews, 
as belonging to one or more of the governance activity domains (supply, delivery, use, or 
outflow). We used 2-mode network analysis (Vance-Borland and Holley, 2011) to re-
construct the actor network for each of the four governance activity domains (Figure 2.3). 
This enables us to examine both the whole governance network, and track how the 
governance network and sub-sets of actors respond as water flows through the system 
from supply to outflows. Five basic network-level measures were used in order to help 
gauge and track the relative degree of coordinated functioning within the water 
governance regime.  Measures were calculated for the entire governance network and for 
each of the four governance domains, which include only the actors involved in that 
particular domain. The five network-level measures are: (i) number of organizations 
involved in the network and in each domain; (ii) number of ties that actors share with 
each other (actor activity indicator); (iii) density, the proportion of all possible ties 
between actors in the network (network activity indicator); (iv) centralization, the percent 
of the network that corresponds to perfect centralization (e.g., one actor in the middle, 
other actors only connected to this actor), which indicates the extent that the network is 
organized around central actors; (v) cohesion, the extent to which the network functions 
as a single unit (connections vs. fragmentation).   
The final data analysis step was to estimate water stocks and flows in order to 
quantify, to the extent possible, a systems map (Figure 2.3) and to demonstrate where key 
uncertainties were present. We estimated water flows and stocks using ArcGIS and HEC-
HMS. Estimations for water stocks and flows were assigned a reliability score of high 
(more than one reliable source including our own calculations), medium (one reliable 
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source but no way to confirm/ triangulate), or low (the source may not be as reliable 
and/or information is contradictory to other observations). 
3.5 Participatory process. An ongoing participatory process occurred throughout 
this study (see Kuzdas et al., 2014 for post-study and assessment efforts). The purpose of 
the participatory processes was to ensure that the analysis and subsequent assessment was 
grounded in the real-time governing system and that the study could over time help 
fortify the ability and will of those involved to address the complex water challenges that 
they faced in the region (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Participatory elements included several 
stakeholder-working groups, with the most prominent group being the Comisión. At the 
time (2010-2012), the Comisión was composed of representatives from Ministerio de 
Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones (MINAET), ASADAs, Universidad Nacional 
de Costa Rica (UNA), and with some involvement with the Municipality of Nicoya. 
During the study design phase, several local representatives vetted the interview protocol 
with researchers. This afforded stakeholders and researchers a platform to communicate 
and align expected results (i.e., the purpose of questions), the study’s potential use in the 
broader context, and to help establish a longer-term collaborative process. Another effort 
of the participatory process was building the systems map (Figure 2.3). This helped 
ensure the map ‘skeleton’ resonated with interviewees (for the third section of 
interviews).  
To expand participation in the study, we organized two afternoon workshops in 
Nicoya and Hojancha in November 2010. In addition to those already engaged with the 
study (mentioned in the previous paragraph), the twenty workshop participants also 
represented community associations, agricultural producers, Instituto Costarricense de 
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Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA), and, Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 
(MAG). Workshop participants vetted the nearly finished systems map and focused on 
the reliability of initial estimations of the map components. Early results of the ongoing 
interviews were also discussed in an open, facilitated format. Many of those attending the 
workshop had already participated in interviews, which afforded individuals a preview of 
how information provided in interviews was being used and allowed input into the 
direction of the longer-term project.   
4. Results 
4.1 The governance network of the regional water system.  The governance 
regime (Figure 2.3) with classified actors mapped onto the regional water system based 
on the governance activity domains, can be characterized as a combination of top-down 
institutional hierarchy with a fragmented administrative scheme that is vertically 
responsible to a degree, yet horizontally disparate. Communications, responsibilities, and 
mandates originate and are dictated in top-down fashion through institutional hierarchies, 
which are then implemented through a set of administrative units. These units are not 
horizontally integrated or collaborative with each other.  Outside of these administrative 
units, which function as hubs of authority within the governance regime, participation 
and engagement of stakeholders and rural communities struggle to be effective.   
Administrative units of the Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y 
Telecomunicaciones (MINAET) and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados (AyA) each hold a large degree of influence and power, which are 
exercised unevenly across governance activity domains (Figure 2.4, Table 2.2). 
Coordinated activity significantly changes from one governance domain to the next 
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(shown in Figure 2.4), as these two actors exchange central roles back and forth in 
governing processes as water moves through the system. High levels of coordination 
activity among governance actors are present in the water supply domain as indicated by 
the network measures of the water supply domain in Table 2.2. In comparison to 
governance of water supplies, the water delivery and outflows domains experience drastic 
decreases in coordinated activity levels and the number of organizations involved, as in 
indicated by the collaboration/ coordination network measures of the water delivery, use 
and outflows domains in Table 2.2 (and graphed for comparison across domains in Figure 
2.4). MINAET and AyA do not execute water-related activities jointly or plan for water 
resources in conjunction with each other, which is a key missing linkage between hubs of 
authority in the regime. Without this linkage, the regime becomes increasingly 
disorganized as water flows through the system, as evidenced by disparate water-use 
education efforts conducted by different organizations.   
Strong linkages between steering actors are likely required if regional water 
governance is to set course on a single direction toward meeting a set of goals or 
objectives. There is poor knowledge of groundwater resources: Table 2.3 shows little 
confidence in estimates of water storage for the Potrero-Caimtial aquifer, and there is not 
enough information to estimate storage of any groundwater reserves in the Nosara basin. 
Efforts that set out to formulate collective goals, which aim to secure the long-term 
integrity of the region’s water resources, are inhibited by low levels of participation from 
rural community water administrators (ASADA) and large water-users. Little knowledge 
of the water needs of forestry activities – the areas most important economic driver – and 
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the water needs (or minimum acceptable flows) of hydro-ecosystems to provide key 
services, pose a challenge to negotiating water allocation.  
In spite of the high degree of control over water resources held by national 
agencies, a key role driving governance collaboration in the regime is still played by non-
state actors, such as the non-profit NicoyAgua and the Potrero Caimital Watershed 
Commission, which is especially evident in the water supply domain. Table 4 shows 
NicoyAgua has more collaborative and information sharing connections than any other 
actor in the water supply domain. Despite prevailing institutions that formally limit what 
locally created organizations can do in water governance, they still play key roles, such as 
effectively driving cooperation, in regional water governance that are unfilled by state 
actors.
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Table 2.2  
Network Measures Based on the Three Relations Actors Share for the Whole Water 
System and for Each Domain of Water Governance.  Measures in Bold and Grey 
Highlight are Graphed in Figure 2.4 
 
 No. of 
organizati
ons 
Densit
y 
No. of 
ties 
Centralizat
ion 
Cohesi
on 
Whole system 40     
Relation #1: Collaboration/ Coordinate 5% 84 19% .16 
Relation #2: Resource transfers 6% 100 40% .19 
Relation #3: Information exchange 18% 290 43% .43 
Domain 1: Supply 17     
Relation #1: Collaboration/ Coordinate 17% 53 26% .43 
Relation #2: Resource transfers 08% 26 27% .16 
Relation #3: Information exchange 33% 102 46% .64 
Domain 2: Delivery 12     
Relation #1: Collaboration/ Coordinate 7% 9 12% .08 
Relation #2: Resource transfers 7% 9 44% .11 
Relation #3: Information exchange 37% 49 58% .65 
Domain 3: Use 29     
Relation #1: Collaboration/ Coordinate 4% 31 4% .07 
Relation #2: Resource transfers 3% 23 3% .04 
Relation #3: Information exchange 12% 101 32% .40 
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Domain 4: Outflows 15     
Relation #1: Collaboration/ Coordinate 3% 6 21% .04 
Relation #2: Resource transfers 8% 16 70% .12 
Relation #3: Information exchange 14% 29 48% .21 
  
	   
Figure 2.4 Scores for selected social network analysis measures using Relation #1: 
Collaboration and cooperation (y-axis) are compared across the four governance domains 
(x-axis).  Scores are relative only to the scores of the other activity domains. Cohesion 
measures are converted to a 1-100 scale.      
 
4.2. Water governance in the four activity domains. 4.2.1 Water supply. 
Ecosystem protection drives governance around water supplies, nearly always in the form 
of reforestation activities around rivers, springs, and recharge zones.  Information 
regarding reforestation and resource protection is historically dictated by MINAET.  The 
departments within MINAET are the most central actors in water supply governance 
processes, and record the highest betweenness centrality scores for information exchange 
and resource transfers with other organizations in the water supply domain of the 
governance regime  (Table 2.4).  MINAET is mandated to coordinate water related 
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activities across organizations; however how this plays out in regions is legally 
unspecified. Article 50 of Costa Rica’s Constitution establishes the human right to a 
healthy environment.  Fulfilling Article 50’s mandate in watersheds falls onto branch 
offices of state agencies; so most water resources are held in trust and publically managed 
by the State. Yet institutional coordination between agencies is often ad hoc. Non-profits, 
such as NicoyAgua and the Monte Alto Foundation, have assumed a role that drives 
water supply related cooperation in the region. NicoyAgua possesses the most 
collaborative ties among actors present in the water supply domain (Table 2.4).  
The most important water sources in the region, which supply water to the 
majority of the 30,000 people, are the PC aquifer and surface flows from the Río Potrero.  
The PC aquifer is shared by ASADA communities in Nicoya county, agricultural users, 
and the Town of Hojancha.  Information on water stocks, flows, and quality is not widely 
shared or known. ASADAs who use the Potrero-Caimital (PC) aquifer do not share 
information or coordinate activities with each other or with private agricultural 
businesses that also share the PC aquifer. Water is transported to the Town of Hojanhca, 
which relies entirely on the PC aquifer during the dry season when the Upper Nosara runs 
mostly dry (as indicated by our estimates of Río Nosara surface flows in the dry season in 
Table 2.3).  AyA is responsible to maintain supplies and monitor flows to Hojancha, but 
information on flow quantities are not conveyed with ASADAs or private businesses that 
also use the PC aquifer.  There has never been a study of groundwater sources in the 
Upper Nosara.  The City of Nicoya (pop. 20,000+/-) receives its entire water supply from 
the Río Potrero. Users in the region that rely on surface flows are very susceptible to 
water shortages if climate variability increases of if dry seasons are prolonged. Our 
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estimations indicate that dry season flows in rivers fluctuate near zero levels as indicated 
in Table 3. Although the aquifer is speculated to be one of the better groundwater sources 
in the region, with current information it is not yet possible to quantify recharge rates or 
how much water can safely be withdrawn from the aquifer.  
Table 2.3  
Estimations of Water Supplies Using Best Available Information (Government Data, 
Reports, and Our Calculations in GIS and HEC-HMS).  Knowledge Gaps are Indicated 
by N/AoOr Low Reliability Ratings.  
 
Supply source Dry 
season 
stock/ 
flow 
Wet 
season 
stock/ 
flow 
Units Source Reliabilit
y 
Río Potrero 0-10 60-90 m³/s HEC-
HMS 
Medium 
Río Caimital 0-10 60-90 m³/s HEC-
HMS 
Medium 
Potrero-Caimital Aquifer  16 x 20 25 x 20 km² x m 
(extent) 
Agudelo 
(2008) 
Medium 
Upper Río Nosara 0-5 30-50 m³/s HEC-
HMS, 
COREN
A (1986) 
High 
Nosara  groundwater N/A N/A − − − 
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Supply transfer Stock Units Source Reliabilit
y 
Rio Potrero to Nicoya 
City 
2,522,880 m³/year 
(max) 
MINAET
, (2010); 
AyA 
High 
Potrero-Caimital Aquifer 
to Hojanhca 
157,680 + m³/year MINAET
, (2010) 
Medium 
 
 
Table 2.4   
Selected Actors in Water Supply and Their Individual Degree Centrality and 
Betweenness Centrality Scores for Each Network Relation. Bold Highlights Indicate 
Highest Scores Among All Actors Involved Iin Water Supplies.  
 
 Degree centrality Betweenness centrality 
Relation Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchange 
Recours
e 
transfer 
Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchang
e 
Recours
e 
Transfer 
Actors   
MINAET - 
Nicoya 
5 20 4 12 14 32 
MINAET – 
Hoja. 
5 30 6 27 9 8 
ACT 7 41 4 10 11 18 
NicoyAgua 7 63 1 0 8 3 
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Monte Alto 3 0 3 35 5 1 
 
4.2.2 Water delivery. In the water delivery domain, the number of organizations 
involved in governance decreases by nearly a third and the number of ties that 
organizations hold with other organizations in the domain decreases by about 85% when 
compared to the water supply domain. The involvement of non-state actors, in 
comparison to the water supply domain, diminishes. All actors holding key positions in 
Table 2.6 are government actors. Consequently coordination decreases, and the regime 
shifts toward a higher degree of central control over resources and information that is 
mostly held by AyA (Table 2.2 in the results section shows the increase in the 
governance network’s centralization scores in the water delivery domain). AyA is legally 
mandated to manage all public water infrastructure. AyA constructs and maintains water 
distribution networks, treatment facilities, and delivery networks that bring potable water 
to larger population centers like the City of Nicoya and Hojancha. Cohesion measures of 
cooperative activity significantly drop in the water delivery domain in comparison to 
water supply, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, which indicate higher degrees of fragmentation 
at this stage of governance. This drop in cohesion is due to autonomous and disconnected 
ASADAs that fulfill AyA’s mandate in rural communities. ASADAs treat water being 
delivered to the same standards as AyA, and are subject to quality monitoring by the 
Health Ministry. The quality of local leadership within ASADAs varies greatly. Some 
ASADAs regularly monitor how much water moves through their distribution networks, 
while others do not. The dual nature of water governance in water delivery – high 
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fragmentation coupled with a single actor (AyA) holding a majority of power – is 
common in Guanacaste.  
Outside of surface flows from the Río Potrero delivered to the City of Nicoya, a 
majority of the water is pumped from groundwater. Most information on water quantities 
flowing through distribution networks is not highly reliable, as indicated in Table 2.5.  
Local governance efforts to organize and use estimated delivery information for 
management and planning are challenged in two ways.  First, applications for private 
water concessions and monitoring of all private and public water concessions is managed 
by MINAET. MINAET does not relay or coordinate this information with AyA, who is 
responsible for day-to-day operation and maintenance of delivery networks. Thus how 
much water is delivered and where may significantly differ than how much water is 
permitted to go where.  This also presents a challenge for AyA water managers to 
sufficiently track how much water private landowners, who obtain water concessions 
from shared sources, are utilizing in water systems that provide public water. Second, the 
fragmented nature ASADA integration in governing processes inhibits collective 
information sharing of how much water ASADA delivery networks are providing to rural 
communities.  Uncertainty within the water delivery domain appears to be increased, or 
at least left unresolved, by governing processes that are unable to organize and share 
critical information among relevant units in a way that facilitates knowledge 
accumulation and proactive decision-making.    
Table 2.5  
Estimations of Water Deliveries Using Best Available Information (Government Data, 
Reports, and Our Calculations in GIS And HEC-HMS).  Knowledge Gaps are Indicated 
by N/A or Low Reliability Ratings.  
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Delivery Delivered 
quantity 
Units Source Reliability 
Potrero wells 1,466,666 m³/year GIS Medium 
Potrero surface 2,572,392 m³/year 
(max) 
GIS, AyA High 
Caimital wells 1,072,479 m³/year GIS, Agudelo 
(2008) 
High 
Caimital surface 0 m³/year GIS Medium 
Upper Nosara wells 489,754 m³/year GIS Medium 
Upper Nosara surface  220,752 m³/year GIS Medium 
Upper Nosara springs 82,624 m³/year GIS Medium 
Nicoya City treatment 2,522,880 m³/year 
(max) 
GIS, AyA High 
Potrero rural treatment N/A - - - 
Caimital rural 
treatment 
- - - - 
Hojanhca treatment 157,680 m³/year MINAET Low 
Hojanhca rural 
treatment 
N/A - - - 
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Table 2.6  
Selected Actors in Water Delivery and Their Individual Degree Centrality and 
Betweenness Centrality Scores for Each Network Relation. Bold Highlights Indicate 
Highest Scores Among All Actors Involved in Water Delivery.  
 
 Degree centrality Betweenness centrality 
Relation Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchange 
Recours
e 
transfer 
Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchang
e 
Recours
e 
Transfer 
Actors   
AyA 1 0 5 10 11 14 
MINAET/Nico
ya 
1 0 1 0 9 6 
Health 
Ministry 
1 0 1 0 9 7 
ASADA 1 2 2 1 0 7 3 
 
 
4.2.3 Water Use. In the water use domain the regime shifts back toward 
MINAET’s sphere of influence. MINAET offices hold all the highest individual actors 
scores in the water use domain as indicated in Table 7. MINAET is legally mandated to 
permit, monitor, and enforce resource-use planning and policies.  The number of 
organizations and the number of ties between organizations operating in the water use 
domain increase in comparison to the water deliveries domain (as indicated in Figure 
2.4).  Information exchange levels increase back up to levels reached in the water supply 
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domain, however the number of cooperative ties between organizations reach only half 
the levels of those found in water supplies as shown in Table 2.3. Despite increasing 
cooperation in comparison to the water delivery domain, the degree of fragmentation in 
the regime stays consistent. Large agricultural businesses, such as Costeña, hold rights to 
nearly two-thirds of the permitted groundwater from the Potrero-Caimital (PC) Aquifer, 
yet are disconnected from central decision-making actors (MINAET, AyA) and ASADA 
communities that share the same groundwater source.  
Many residents in the region are involved in a mix of forestry, agriculture, and 
ranching to support themselves and their families. Along gradients, which characterize a 
majority of the geography, managing pastures for raising cattle in combination with 
growing hardwood trees (primarily teak) is common. Agencies, extension offices, and 
educational organizations practice consistent community engagement efforts targeting a 
variety of water-using activities. The engagement efforts focus on water-use education 
programs, producer training, and water management training programs. However, 
without established goals within the regime, education efforts remain uncoordinated with 
each other and strive for varying and sometimes contradictory objectives. Two primary 
sources of uncertainty that inhibit setting and meting water-use goals through education 
programming are (1) the virtual unknown water needs of local ecosystems or minimum 
flow requirements (indicated by many low reliability scores and water system 
components that cannot be quantified in Table 2.7), and (2) the unknown collective water 
needs of forestry activities (that also cannot be quantified as indicated in Table 2.9), 
which is the area’s most important economic activity. This uncertainty poses a challenge 
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for negotiating new development projects and objectively evaluating water-use trade-offs 
in decision making and planning.   
Table 2.7  
Estimations of Water Use Using Best Available Information (Government Data, Reports, 
And Our Calculations In GIS And HEC-HMS).  Knowledge Gaps Are Indicated by N/A 
or Low Reliability Ratings.  Demand Categories Are Based on the Standard Water-Use 
Categories Used by MINAET.  
 
Use Quantity Units Source Reliability 
City of Nicoya 2,522,880 m³/year MINAET (2010) Medium 
Río Potrero      
AG & ranching 1,346,829 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
Forestry N/A - - - 
Ecosystem N/A - - - 
Industry 2,208 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
Rural domestic/comm. 162,410 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
Caimital      
AG & ranching 730,944 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
Forestry N/A - - - 
Ecosystem N/A - - - 
Rural domestic/comm. 183,855 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
Upper Nosara      
Town of Hojancha 157,680 m³/year MINAET (2010) Medium 
AG & ranching 13,560 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
	  
	  
58 
Forestry N/A - - - 
Ecosystem N/A - - - 
Tourism 15,768 m³/year MINAET (2010) Medium 
Rural domestic/comm. 763,802 m³/year MINAET (2010) Low 
 
 
Table 2.8  
Selected Actors in Water Use And Their Individual Degree Centrality and Betweenness 
Centrality Scores for Each Network Relation. Bold Highlights Indicate Highest Scores 
Among All Actors Involved in Water Use.  
 
 Degree centrality Betweenness centrality 
Relation Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchang
e 
Recours
e 
transfer 
Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchang
e 
Recours
e 
Transfer 
Actors   
MINAET/Nicoy
a 
4 5 16 9 39 126 
MINAET/Hoja. 5 4 11 15 26 50 
ACT/Education 
Division 
2 2 7 0 0 15 
MAG 4 3 6 13 19 7 
Nat. Training 
Inst. 
0 2 9 0 24 19 
Costeña S.A. 0 0 2 0 0 0 
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4.2.4 Water Outflows. In the water outflow domain water governance shifts again 
toward a more centralized governing mode with under half of the actors involved in water 
use being involved in water outflows (indicated the organizations involved column of 
Table 2.2).  AyA largely controls the governance regime in the water outflow domain, as 
indicated by its high centrality scores in Table 2.9.  Compared to other domains, the 
lowest levels of cooperation, and activity in general, in the regime are present in the 
water outflows (as indicated in Figure 2.4). Incentive-based governance of outflows is 
often the norm in the region. AyA manages the Bandera Azul Program which awards 
communities that voluntarily clean up waterways and improve water quality with a public 
designation. Accountability and transparency in terms of follow up, monitoring, and 
compliance are often cited by citizens as major challenges for governing water outflows.  
Who should fill monitoring and enforcement roles in the outflows domain remain vague.  
MINAET is often considered responsible by small producers. However, in practice 
MINAET concentrates its resources in the other governance domains (i.e., supply, 
delivery, and use).  Disputes regarding contamination, though, may go through MINAET 
at a national level or through citizen action groups that take legal action on behalf of local 
communities.  
The City of Nicoya is the only population center in or near the sub-basins with 
centrally managed wastewater treatment facilities.  Wastewater flows to oxidation ponds 
where it is treated and released into the Río Morote, which then flows into the Gulf of 
Nicoya near the mouth of the Rio Tempisque.  AyA administers wastewater treatment in 
	  
	  
60 
the oxidation ponds.   Estimates on post-use flows in the region are not available at this 
time. 
Table 2.9  
Selected Actors in Water Outflows and Their Individual Degree Centrality and 
Betweenness Centrality Scores for Each Network Relation. Bold Highlights Indicate 
Highest Scores Among All Actors Involved in Water Outflows. 
  
 Degree centrality Betweenness centrality 
Relation Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchang
e 
Recour
se 
transfer 
Collaborat
e/ 
coordinate 
Info 
exchange 
Recour
se 
Transfe
r 
Actors   
AyA 3 3 10 44 7 16 
Health Ministry 1 0 1 0 7 16 
Nicoya 
Municipality 
1 0 2 0 9 55 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Regional water governance in Guanacaste.  The study shows that regional 
water governance in Guanacaste is an uneven, asymmetrical process that is difficult to fit 
into singular characterizations. Key actors, such as MINAET and AyA, each hold a large 
degree of power and influence, which is exercised irregularly across the activity domains 
(RQ.1). How the regime functions, especially how actors in the regime coordinate what 
they do with water, shifts as AyA and MINAET exchange central roles in the governing 
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process.  MINAET and AyA do not execute water-related policy-making, planning, or 
management jointly with each other (RQ.2). This gap is a key void in the regime. The 
regime becomes disorganized as water flows through the system (from the water supply 
domain to water outflows), as evidenced by disparate water-use education efforts by 
different organizations (RQ.3). We find that strong linkages between steering actors that 
are prominent in each activity domain are likely required if regional water governance is 
to set course toward developing a set of goals and instituting processes to meet those 
goals over time.   
In spite of the high degree of consolidated control over water resources held by 
national agencies, a surprising role is still played by the locally run non-profit NicoyAgua 
(RQ.1). Despite prevailing institutions that formally limit what locally created 
organizations can do in water governance, organizations like NicoyAgua can still have a 
profound impact on regional water governance. As a result of NicoyAgua’s role driving 
collaboration in the water supply domain (where NicoyAgua operates) (RQ.2), 
governance in water supply is significantly more collaborative and more active than the 
three domains where NicoyAgua does not operate (delivery, use, and outflow) (RQ.3).       
The study confirms the current governance regime will need to undergo 
substantive change if vulnerabilities to extended dry periods and potential water conflicts 
are to be mitigated. The consequences of the missing links between AyA and MINAET 
for the regime become increasingly apparent as water moves through the system. In the 
water delivery domain, these missing links drive uncertainty regarding quantities of water 
moving through distribution networks. In the water use domain, this uncertainty is 
compounded. Virtually no knowledge of the water needs of forestry activities – the areas 
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most important economic driver – and the water needs (or minimum acceptable flows) of 
hydro-ecosystems to provide key services, pose a key challenge to negotiating an agreed-
upon balance between conservation and development. Without this knowledge, it may be 
difficult for managers, decision-makers, and planners to navigate climate change impacts 
and avoid detrimental conflicts.   
The study suggests two initial intervention points may begin to spur substantive 
change within the regime. The first is to remedy the missing (collaborative) link between 
regional offices of AyA and MINAET.  Non-state actors, such as NicoyAgua, might be in 
a role to effectively drive coordination between these two prominent actors. This is a 
promising first step that could give guidance toward sharing and organizing information 
that can be used to set collective objectives and better steer the regime jointly toward 
those objectives.  This effort may even eliminate some degree of uncertainty to aid local 
managers. The second is to take initial steps in securing the highest protection levels 
possible for the area’s groundwater reserves. Nearly everyone in the area relies directly 
on groundwater or indirectly on groundwater (through surface flows fed by groundwater). 
Yet, communities and large agricultural users who share the same groundwater reserves 
do not coordinate groundwater extractions. When these factors are combined with high 
uncertainty of how much groundwater can be safely withdrawn, the regime may be at 
risk.   
5.2 Water governance in climate change threatened regions. The governance 
regime in Guanacaste can be described as a combination of top-down institutional 
hierarchy with a fragmented administrative scheme that is vertically responsible, yet 
horizontally disparate. Administrative units struggle to communicate and coordinate 
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within a given (horizontal) scale. This hybrid type of governance regime can be 
considered as generally characteristic of governance regimes in regions with recent 
histories of centralized resource management (thus remaining hierarchal structures) and 
that have recently experienced rapid population growth and economic or political change 
(thus facilitating a number of disconnected administrative units) (Booth et al., 2010; 
Ribot, 2011). Based on the Guanacaste case, we expect such types of water governance 
regimes to exhibit at least two significant barriers to sustainable water governance 
(RQ.4).  
The design of such hybrid water governance regimes appears to generate, or at 
least exacerbate, uncertainty within the governance regime. The uncertainty generated by 
such designs includes aspects such as how much water is needed by communities, by 
economic actors, and by ecosystems; and how much water is moving through water 
distribution infrastructure. This lack of shared knowledge and learning can impede the 
successful (re-) allocation of water resources to secure community health, economic 
productivity, and ecosystem integrity (Huntjens et al., 2012; Wiek & Larson, 2012). 
Consequently, the ability of such hybrid governance regimes to identify parts of regional 
water systems that are at high risk of climate change threats is limited. Developing 
strategies for more sustainable water governance in this design context will be a 
challenge.  
Hybrid governance regimes also appear to be prohibitive of establishing processes 
that negotiate and set shared goals for sustainable water governance. Rather, goals and 
objectives of water governance are likely to originate in top-down fashion through 
institutional hierarchies, which are then implemented by disparate administrative units at 
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local and regional scales. In this case, community and regional-level constituencies are 
likely unable to share their experiences and knowledge to inform the pursuit of such 
goals. This situation inhibits the ability of the governance regime to monitor, adjust, and 
respond to constituencies to meet their needs (Ostrom, 2007; Schlüter et al., 2010). 
In both cases, we expect a polycentric governance system with effective 
stakeholder participation (Pahl-Wostl & Kranz, 2010) to be more effective at dealing 
with climate threats. Stakeholder participation would require effective horizontal 
integration at both community and regional scales, which would facilitate shared learning 
and knowledge accumulation that would help reduce the uncertainty generated by hybrid 
governance designs (Huitema et al., 2009). The Guanacaste case presents a hybrid 
hierarchical-fragmented governance regime, which would appear to be inferior to 
polycentric governance in climate change contexts. The Guanacaste case, however, 
affords the opportunity to clarify two additional aspects of the polycentric governance 
system hypothesis that appear especially critical for high competition, high scarcity, and 
existing conflict contexts (RQ.4).   
First, the study suggests that coordination consisting of mutual accountability 
between hubs of authority within water governance regimes is important for achieving 
sustainability in the face of climate change threats in such contexts. In high resource 
competition contexts such as Guanacaste, powerful actors may already be maneuvering 
into positions where they can benefit in spite of climate change hazards, while others may 
be at disproportionate risks (Fabricus et al., 2006). The study shows how uncoordinated 
exercise of authority, coming from two primary hubs of powerful actors, impacts the 
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water governance regime. Such hubs of authority will need to coordinate effectively, but 
also be mutually accountable to help ensure fair and equitable adaptation and 
development processes and outcomes.  
Second, the study suggests that active institutional leadership is another critical 
success factor of sustainable water governance in high-risk regions such as Guanacaste. 
Leaders, even non-state leaders such as NicoyAgua in the Guanacaste case, can help 
remedy many of the problems associated with inadequate or ineffective water governance 
designs. Many regimes are not able or equipped to adequately handle navigating climate 
change threats while maintaining community well being, environmental integrity, and 
economic vitality (Biermann et al., 2012).  Such leaders not only support a ‘management-
as-learning’ approach to water governance (Huntjens et al., 2012), but advocate and 
practice ‘learning as doing’. If many environmental governance regimes are considered to 
be struggling or even failing in the face of challenges, then actions will need to be taken 
and leaders will need to take action. Current themes in the paradigm of adaptive water 
governance are structure, agency, and learning – we suggest, based on our analysis 
presented here, the research themes of leadership (where should we go?) and action (how 
do we go there?) to be critical for sustainable and adaptive water governance in climate 
change threatened regions that already experience scarcity and conflicts.  
5.3 Insights for conducting relevant water governance analysis. The analysis 
presented here is part of a broader research effort searching for promising options within 
regional governance that might be changed. We discuss in the following a set of 
principles derived from this study that might guide the development and implementation 
of integrated water governance analysis in a way that (1) might best contribute 
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immediately to the practical needs of water resource managers and decision-makers, and 
(2) might best inform and prepare for solution-oriented endeavors. 
The overarching principle that guides this reflection is how to best assimilate 
integrated water governance analysis into transformational sustainability research efforts 
that aim at generating solution options for water sustainability problems (Wiek et al., 
2012). A great deal of existing literature discusses participatory research dealing with 
water resources; yet relatively few coherent guidelines are established for executing 
water governance analyses that are a part of a broader problem solving effort (Lang et al., 
2012). Being part of an overarching problem solving endeavor, the present case study 
lends itself toward reflection on what aspects of executing the analysis facilitated 
assimilation within the broader effort and what aspects of the analysis could have been 
improved (RQ.5).  
5.3.1. Frame governance study with key stakeholders. Framing the study with 
stakeholders at opportune moments can yield positive benefits. Critical moments 
suggested by this effort include: defining system boundaries and defining who 
participates in the study as subjects, as collaborators, or even as clients (i.e., who is going 
to use results). Raadgever et al. (2012) find that, while in many cases collaborative 
research dealing with complex water problems often does not live up to promises, very 
intensive collaboration under the right circumstances might produce benefits. Likewise 
we suggest intensive collaboration in key parts, such as framing, of analysis. Positive 
benefits of framing exercises can include increased and broadened ownership of analysis 
results and short knowledge diffusion times once results are communicated.  Who 
participates in these exercises should be carefully considered, since power asymmetries, 
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which are present in many resource regimes, could skew or even derail such exercises 
(Voß & Bornemann, 2011).  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: Key stakeholders were involved in defining 
components of the physical water system, determining who relevant stakeholders are, and 
designing some parts of data collection instruments. As a result, research findings were 
easily dispersed once the analysis was coupled with the ensuing assessment.  The analysis 
process itself reinforced strong mutual trust between stakeholders and researchers.  Trust 
was a significant success factor that led to the sustainability assessment, which is based 
on the analysis contained here, being directly incorporated into regional planning and 
policy changes shortly after researchers delivered results to the PCW Commission 
(Kuzdas et al., 2012). 
5.3.2. Identify strategic output venues early in the process. Analyses that 
produces results which mesh easily with the most advantageous output venues have a 
much higher likelihood of generating outputs that lead to positive impacts. Desirable 
output venues should be negotiated early on in analysis planning procedures with key 
stakeholders and the broader research team to ensure realistic expectations are maintained 
(on the part of stakeholders) and that analysis results are salient and optimally packaged 
(on the part of researchers) (Stalwart et al., 2011). Outputs might be a policy memo, 
planning document, presentation, or simply a solid foundation for expanding 
collaborative research. Identifying such output venues should include key stakeholders 
(Krütli et al., 2010).  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: Strategic output venues in the local water 
system were not identified in the planning stages of the analysis beyond the traditional 
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‘report’.  As a result, the sustainability assessment report that was delivered to the PCW 
Commission was not designed to directly sync or apply to any specific policies or 
procedures. Some prospects and opportunities to adjust regional policies and regulations 
may have been missed due to planning shortcomings on the part of the research team.  
The analysis framework proposed by Wiek & Larson (2012) did prove useful in terms of 
packaging results in a flexible way that could apply to several outputs, even though the 
research team did not originally plan for those outputs.   
5.3.3 Adapt to leverage new opportunities during analysis. Executing analysis 
procedures in participatory settings is a learning process (Johnson, 2009). As knowledge 
of opportunities to better and broaden analysis become apparent, procedures should be 
flexible enough to make the most of the opportunity (Stringer et al., 2006). Opportunities 
may be events, the emergence of a local champion or leader, or new research alliances, 
which might require re-assigning research responsibilities or adjusting strategies used to 
execute analysis (Lang et al., 2012).  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: The opportunity to execute analysis 
procedures in collaboration with the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA) was 
important for building credibility, trust, and knowledge dispersion avenues.  UNA holds a 
seat in the PCW Commission along with several other important organizations. The new 
alliance with UNA provided links to individual stakeholders the research team previously 
did not have access to and allowed for greater interview coverage (90%) of targeted 
actors in the system. The alliance with UNA was the most important factor that created a 
strong working relationship with the PCW Commission, which is a key policy advocate 
for water resources in the region. The PCW Commission has made several presentations 
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of the results from the sustainability assessment (Kuzdas et al., 2012) to government 
agencies, commissions, and local governments.  
5.3.4. Aim for mutual understanding of analysis procedures and methods. 
Analysis procedures can be explicitly planed to produce, and help foster, mutual 
understanding between researchers and stakeholders. The analysis process is an 
opportunity to gain mutual understanding of the framework used, methods, or research 
procedures (Shaw et al., 2009). Without understanding how results were arrived at, there 
may be less imperative on behalf of stakeholders to trust those results. How much mutual 
understanding of what part of analysis is critical will vary between contexts.  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: Results of the sustainability assessment, 
based on the analysis here, dispersed and were applied to regional institutions quickly due 
to the level of high mutual understanding between stakeholders and researchers. Mutual 
understanding was arrived by doing the analysis. By the end, key stakeholders understood 
the general methods of analysis, the goals of researchers, what to expect, and some took 
part in interactively creating system maps using the framework. The stakeholder mapping 
conducted in this project was considered to be the strongest element of the analysis by 
local managers, and in retrospect, was key for building quality working relationships.  
5.3.5. Position analysis within broader problem-solving endeavors. Analysis is 
one tool available for complex problem solving endeavors. Problem solving endeavors 
might be local policy or program innovation processes or a solution-oriented research 
program. A key function of analysis in problem solving endeavors for water resources 
should be to act as a foundation that organizes and orients new information as it becomes 
available (Wiek & Larson, 2012).  New information might include knowledge of how 
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well a water governance regime operates now or knowledge of where the regime might 
be headed in the future.  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: The sustainability assessment, built on the 
analysis, which generated new normative knowledge for the region in addition to the new 
analytical knowledge of the water system generated in the governance analysis presented 
here.  However, it is not yet clear if the framework and analysis will be or can be used as 
a foundation for increasing knowledge of regional ecosystem flows over time in the 
region which is critically needed.  Although stakeholders reported that the analysis 
carried out here was the first to coherently synthesize the information it did, it will be a 
major challenge to continue using the framework as a means to structure new 
information.  In public agencies dealing with path dependency and funding and personnel 
cuts, there is likely a low probability such frameworks will be coherently used over the 
long-term.  Enduring leadership, long-term partnerships, and funds to operationally 
support such efforts are needed to overcome this challenge.  However, a valuable 
snapshot of the system was achieved.   
5.3.6. Identify and enhance leaders at the science-policy interface. In many 
natural resource management contexts, the space between scientific analysis and real-
time planning or policy-making is already occupied by existing organizations, 
committees, or individuals (Young, 2008). These boundary objects, leaders, or policy 
entrepreneurs likely hold significant ability to translate and apply analysis results to the 
local system and even potentially inform next research steps (Talwar et al., 2011).  
Insights from the Guanacaste study: The PCW Commission was identified and 
targeted as an important regional leader by researchers early on. Individual members on 
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the commission are often involved in both water-related scientific efforts and policy-
making. The research team maneuvered into a ‘partner-client’ relationship with the 
commission and wrote the assessment results report specifically for the PCW 
Commission. It is not yet apparent whether the report enhanced the capacity of the 
Commission. However, the PCW Commission did advocate for policy changes as a result 
of the results document delivered by researchers, it reports that the document is often 
consulted with before meetings and decision-making, and it has mad several results 
presentations in the region.  
6. Conclusions 
Regional water governance operates unevenly in context-unique stakeholder 
landscapes, which this study captured in three rural watersheds in Guanacaste, Costa Rica 
using an activities-oriented water governance framework that mimics regional water 
systems. A large degree of authority lies within a sub-set of actors in Guanacaste.  This 
creates problems as this set of agencies and offices struggle to coordinate their activities 
with each other in a way that enables collective goal setting, learning to deal with 
uncertainty, and implementing strategies to confront change. The general design of water 
governance in Guanacaste – similar to other regions with histories of central resource 
management and rapid population growth, economic change, or political change – 
consists of an institutional hierarchy combined with administrative fragmentation. This 
design appears to drive, or, at least, perpetuate uncertainty in regional water systems. 
This design also prevents or, at least, hinders governance regimes to steer collectively 
away from threats and toward sustainable futures. Our findings generally support the 
working hypothesis that polycentric governance systems with effective stakeholder 
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participation will be more successful at dealing with climate change threats and working 
toward sustainable states, rather than hierarchal or fragmented designs.  However, the 
Guanacaste case also illustrates the importance of focusing on mutual accountability and 
active institutional leadership when dealing with sustainable water governance in climate 
change threatened regions that already experience water scarcity and conflicts.  
In many parts of Guanacaste, agriculture, tourism, and real estate development are 
economic domains that compete for water resources. Advances in water governance, 
beyond the current state, will need to address this challenge. This study offers optimism 
that new community organizations, such as NicoyAgua and the PCW Commission, are 
increasingly prepared and willing to assume water governance responsibilities and fill 
existing gaps within governance regimes. Technical, personnel, and financial support for 
such organizations will be critical moving forward. Problem solving, like regional water 
governance itself, will be an uneven process. Our case demonstrates that with the right 
analysis approach, this problem solving process can be aided and even accelerated by 
solution-oriented water governance analyses that are explicitly designed to inform 
solution development and implementation efforts.  
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Chapter 3 
Sustainability appraisal of water governance regimes – The case of Guanacaste, 
Costa Rica 
1.  Introduction 
Water governance is a set of collective actions that aim toward a common goal 
and are coordinated among diverse stakeholder groups (Lubell et al., 2008). Sustainable 
water governance coordinates the supply, delivery, use, and outflows of water in a way 
that ensures sufficient and equitable levels of socio-economic welfare without 
compromising the long-term integrity of supporting ecosystems (Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
Langsdale et al., 2009; Wiek & Larson, 2012). Sustainable water governance should also 
adequately address water demand management and conservation (Brooks and Holtz, 
2009). In many cases, stakeholder groups struggle to establish sustainable resource 
governance (Galaz et al., 2012). On the contrary, many existing governance regimes 
drive social-ecological systems toward points beyond which environmental or societal 
damage may very difficult to correct (Rockström et al., 2009). Research suggests that this 
is in part due to inadequate governance.  Inadequate governance struggles to address 
conflicting needs, desires, and values of relevant stakeholders; to reconcile different 
political and administrative structures, with each other and with ecosystem boundaries; to 
simplify and enforce rules and regulations; and to employ participatory modes of 
resource planning and decision-making (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). Efforts to re-design 
water governance regimes are needed in order to avoid systems failures (Young et al., 
2008; Biermann et al., 2012). To aid these efforts, criteria-based and participatory 
appraisals are needed that determine how sustainable water governance regimes operate 
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(Wiek et al., 2007). Such appraisals should help to clarify what features of water 
governance regimes deter or foster sustainability of water systems (i.e., through positive 
and mutually supporting sustainability effects); and in doing so, help to better align water 
governance research with the professional needs of decision-makers to aid problem-
solving efforts (Bakker ,2012).   
Considering the profound insights on resource governance through comparison of 
comprehensive case studies (Ostrom, 2009), there is a need for similarly comprehensive 
and comparable case studies on the sustainability of water governance regimes. This is 
especially relevant for understudied regions where climate change threats are imminent, 
where water conflicts occur, and where impacts from water scarcity are being felt (Pahl-
Wostl & Kranz, 2010). Few studies address the sustainability of water governance 
regimes from a comprehensive and actor-oriented perspective (e.g., Wiek & Larson, 
2012; Larson et al., 2013). Even fewer studies include such high-risk regions where there 
is an urgent need for water governance research that yields actionable results. In this 
paper, we pursue three objectives: 
(1) To provide a sustainability appraisal of the water governance regime in 
Guanacaste, a region that experiences water conflict and scarcity and is threatened 
by climate change 
(2) To determine the general features of governance regimes that are critical for water 
sustainability in regions across Pacific Mesoamerica. 
(3) To reflect on potential impacts resulting from the appraisal in Guanacaste and 
draw conclusions for future water governance and sustainability research efforts. 
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1.1 Case Study Background - Guanacaste Province. Guanacaste is one of the 
most important agricultural regions in Costa Rica and one the more lucrative tourism 
markets in Central America. Agriculture and tourism are prominent economic drivers in 
the dry tropics of Central America. Both have expanded significantly in the last 20 years, 
and they continue to do so (MINAET, 2008; Booth et al., 2010). Guanacaste is a 
seasonally dry, predominantly rural region where virtually no rain falls half the year. 
Water is and will likely be much more scarce in the near future. Climate models predict 
the region will experience drier conditions as soon as the 2020s (Anderson et al., 2008). 
Water governance is challenged to provide a just and fair distribution of water to 
communities and economic actors, to maintain the integrity of supporting ecosystems, 
and to mitigate water conflicts. It has thus far struggled to meet these challenges. Cover 
(2007) documented at least 65 water conflicts in Guanacaste over a recent ten-year 
period.   
During the early years of Costa Rican statehood (e.g., 1950s-1970s), the public 
sector substantially increased in order to meet citizen needs (Edelman, 1999, p70). 
During this time, many public organizations important for water management were 
formed such as the Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications Ministry (Ministerio 
de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones, MINAET), which oversees water 
management and conservation activities in the country. Growing populations in rural 
areas tested the ability of the national water utility - the Costa Rican Institute of Pipes and 
Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, AyA) - to meet its 
responsibility to deliver potable water to citizens. As a result, communities increasingly 
organized in the water sector, with an estimated 1,500+ rural community-run water 
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associations (ASADAs) now operating (Madrigal et al., 2011). ASADAs perform AyA’s 
duties in rural areas, but are governed autonomously by community boards. Two primary 
pieces of legislation provide the substance current water management frameworks. 
Article 50 of the Constitution guarantees healthy and clean environments for citizens. 
The 1942 Water Law prohibits private ownership of water resources. Accordingly, the 
authority to govern water in Costa Rica has largely remained with state agencies that 
have actually expanded their administration through branch offices around the country 
(Rogers, 2002).  
In Guanacaste, the growing public sector combined with increasing numbers of 
ASADAs has helped water governance become increasingly fragmented. There are 
variable technical, financial, administrative, and logistical capacities among actors (i.e., 
agency offices and ASADAs) in different places, and water-related regulations (many of 
which go back several decades) often do not clearly specify who is responsible to do 
what with water (Rogers, 2002). Yet, many individuals from a variety of organizations 
are active in in the water sector. Some of these individuals are collectively organized, 
such as the Commission for the Management of the Potrero-Caimital Watersheds 
(Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital, PC Commission) in Nicoya. 
The PC Commission, despite having limited formal authority, aims to improve water 
management and conservation in the region. Like similar organizations in the region, 
their efforts are challenged due to, at least in part, little being systematically known about 
problems, potential opportunities to expand on, and where both exist in the regional water 
system. Thus, a water governance appraisal that elaborates criteria, helps clarify the water 
governance regime features that deter or that potentially could help expand the 
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sustainability of the water system, and that identifies where in the system those problems 
and opportunities exist (and who is implicated), could be a useful endeavor that we 
explore in this paper.  
In this study, we focus on three connected sub-basins on the Nicoya Peninsula in 
Guanacaste: the Río Potrero, Río Caimital, and Upper Río Nosara in Nicoya and 
Hojancha Municipalities. The Upper Río Nosara and Río Caimital flow west to the 
Pacific coast. The Potrero-Caimital Aquifer is located on the alluvial plain beneath the 
Caimital and Potrero. During the dry season, groundwater from the Potrero-Caimital 
Aquifer is transported to the Town of Hojancha. The semi-urban City of Nicoya receives 
its entire water supply from Río Potrero surface flows. The largest agricultural producer 
in the region lies over a large part of the Potrero-Caimital Aquifer, upstream from where 
the City of Nicoya extracts surface water. About 30,000 people live in the area; most 
reside in the City of Nicoya (INEC, 2011). The Guanacaste case presented here affords 
an opportunity to appraise a water governance regime that shares many features and 
contexts with regions across the Central American dry tropics such as high uncertainty, 
complexity, and potential conflicts under changing climate conditions (Rogers, 2002; 
Biswas et al., 2009), which contributes to the sustainable water governance literature and 
supports governance efforts in arid tropical regions that experience water scarcity, 
conflicts, and climate change threats. 
2. Framework for analyzing and appraising regional water governance regimes 
A broad notion of ‘who is involved’ distinguishes governance from government 
or management, which imply limited sets of actors such as government agencies or 
utilities. Governance includes all people affecting and affected by the water system as 
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potential actors who might coordinate their activities toward collective goals (Ludwig, 
2001; Ostrom, 2007). Actors include diverse sets of state, private, and civil players who 
are “doing things” with water, including governing water, and who hold some degree of 
power, rights, or resources (Rhodes, 1996; Kemp et al. 2005).  This doing that is 
coordinated across groups of actors towards common or collective goals (e.g., 
governance) steers or guides water systems (Lubell et al., 2008). Sustainability 
appraisals, in a water governance context, evaluate how well governance regimes steer 
water systems towards a sustainability direction.  This ‘direction’, based on the definition 
we use for sustainable water governance from Wiek and Larson (2012), should generally 
ensure  ‘...a sufficient and equitable level of social and economic well-being without 
compromising the viability and integrity of the supporting hydro-ecosystems in the long 
term.’  
In this study, we use an actor-oriented approach for analyzing and appraising 
regional water governance regimes proposed by Wiek & Larson (2012). The approach is 
composed of an analytical and a normative component. The analytical part of the 
approach is similar to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
developed by Elinor Ostrom and collaborators (Ostrom (2011) offers a recent review) and 
the regime analysis framework proposed by Holtz et al. (2008). Both frameworks have 
been applied to water systems (e.g., Imperial, 1999; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). Wiek & 
Larson (2012) take components from those frameworks, such as institutions (rules, rights, 
and decision-making processes) and a focus on social actors and their activities, and 
structure those components in a way that mimics regional water systems. The purpose is 
to better synchronize the approach with the day-to-day operations of governance actors. 
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According to a simplified version of this approach, the water governance regime is 
structured into four activity domains:  
5. Water Supply: the physical water sources that support, maintain, and protect. In 
Guanacaste this includes rivers, springs, and groundwater. Also included are the 
social arrangements, including water rights, which govern water sources.   
6. Water Delivery: the distribution of water through infrastructure, like wells, 
aqueducts, treatment facilities, and post-treatment storage tanks. 
7. Water Use: consuming and conserving water by organizations and individuals, 
including residential, commercial, industry, and agriculture.  
8. Water Outflows: includes discharging wastewater and other post water-use sanitation 
related activities and governing institutions. In Guanacaste this includes septic tanks, 
oxidation ponds, and run-off that flows back into the watershed or water table.  
Each of the activity domains contains three inter-linked components:  
Actors, activities, & institutions. This component includes all relevant social 
actors and their networks, norms, and values; and outlines what they do with water, how 
they interact with each other, what their mandates or intentions are, what rules govern 
their actions and interactions, and what decision-making processes are in play.  
Interface with the Natural Environment (hydro-ecology). Water activities rely on 
and impact the natural environment, including the four basic spheres of earth systems: the 
hydrosphere (water and precipitation), the lithosphere (land and soils), the biosphere 
(plants and wildlife), and the atmosphere (air and linked climatological processes). This 
interface captures various geological, hydrological, ecological, and other natural 
attributes and processes. 
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Interface with the Built or Engineered Environment (Infrastructure). Water 
activities require and involve as well as build upon and alter man-made infrastructure and 
facilities. We capture, among others, extraction and retention facilities linked to water 
supplies (e.g., dams and reservoirs); the physical system for water deliveries, along with 
the biological or mechanical systems (e.g., wetlands or treatment plants) for cleaning 
water for various purposes; infrastructure that determines various usages and rates of 
consumption (e.g., irrigation systems); recharge basins or other structures for managing 
outflows from the system or recycling wastewater for direct reuse. 
The second part of the approach suggests a set of normative sustainability criteria 
for appraising the analyzed governance regime, which we focus on here. A range of 
literature details criteria for good resource governance (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom, 1992; 
Folke et al. 2005; Lockwood 2010) and water governance in particular (Rogers & Hall 
2003; Alley & Leake 2004; Pahl-Wostl, 2008; Grigg, 2010). Criteria based on this 
literature were synthesized and vetted with stakeholders in this case and others (see Wiek 
& Larson (2012). These criteria overlap across parts of the water system. Accordingly, 
criteria interact with each other, which can produce either positive or negative cumulative 
effects on sustainability (Gibson, 2006; Larson et al., 2013). Criteria are categorized 
according to Gibson’s (2006) set of sustainability criteria and linked to the framework’s 
activity domains in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
Principles and Criteria for Appraising the Sustainability of Water Governance Regimes, 
Adapted from Wiek & Larson (2012). 
 
Principle Criteria Governance 
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domain  
1. Social-
ecological system 
integrity 
1a. Maintain minimum flows in surface 
water 
1b. Maintain or enhance the quality of water 
resources 
1c. Ensure aquifers are not over-taxed to 
points of instability 
1d. Recognize/ coordinate resource uses/ 
impact within appropriate physical units 
1a. Supply 
1b. All 
1c. Supply  
1d. Use 
2. Resource 
efficiency and 
maintenance 
2a. Reduce water-use or enhance water-use 
efficiency 
2b. Reuse water/ recycle wastewater for 
various uses 
2c. Eliminate water losses   
2d. Groundwater extraction rates should not 
exceed the recharge rate  
2a. Use 
2b. Use / Outflows 
2c. Supply / 
Delivery 
2d. Supply 
3. Livelihood 
Sufficiency and 
Opportunity 
3a. All people pursuing livelihood activities 
have access to sufficient quality and 
quantity of water  
3b. All people pursuing economic activities 
have access to sufficient quality and 
3a. Supply / Use 
 
3b. Supply / Use 
 
3c. Supply / Use 
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quantity of water 
3c. A fair “compensation” for affected 
stakeholders in case of insufficient access 
4. Socio-
ecological civility 
and democratic 
governance 
4a. Involve all groups who affect or are 
affected by water governance efforts in 
decision-making 
4b. Elicit the full array of interests and 
perspectives through various stages of 
governance 
4c. Establish collaborative water 
governance endeavors  
4a. All 
 
4b. All 
 
4c. Supply / 
Delivery 
5. Inter-
generational and 
intra-
generational 
equity 
5a. Make sure all residents have access to 
safe water for eating, drinking and 
sanitation  
5b. Define/ implement a sufficient level of 
water needs beyond “basic needs” 
5c. Ensure fair distribution of benefits and 
costs among stakeholders 
5d. Facilitate involvement among diverse 
stakeholders  
5e. Ensure representation of future 
generations (e.g., via groups who consider 
5a. Supply 
 
5b. Use  
 
5c. All 
 
5d. All 
 
e. Use 
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their interests) 
6. 
Interconnectivity 
from local to 
regional to 
global scales 
6a. Reduce/ eliminate negative impacts on 
other areas 
6b. Plan within the watershed or 
groundwater basin context 
6c. Recognize/ coordinate between local 
and broader scale stakeholders 
6a. Supply / 
Outflows 
6b. Supply 
6c. Supply 
7. Precaution 
(mitigation) and 
adaptability 
7a. Anticipate potential water shortages and 
water quality problems 
7b. Mitigate potential water shortages and 
water quality problems   
7c. Adapt to water shortages and water 
quality problems  
7a. Supply 
7b. All / Use 
7c. All 
 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Appraisal design. The appraisal was planned in Costa Rica with collaborators 
from June through August 2010. This afforded stakeholders and researchers a platform to 
communicate, align expectations, and to establish a long-term collaborative process. 
During this time, a partnership was formed with the PC Commission in Nicoya, which 
was comprised of members from MINET, ASADAs, Nicoya Municipality, and the 
National University. Through several meetings with PC Commission and other 
stakeholders, the appraisal procedure was hashed out. This included vetting the interview 
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protocol, identifying participants, discussing appraisal criteria (which were under 
development in Wiek & Larson (2012) at the time), elaborating an initial ‘skeleton’ 
version of the water system map to be used in interviews (to ensure that it resonated with 
interviewees), and defining the appraisal parameters. Accordingly, a qualitative and 
visual procedure that used a water systems map based on the framework was formulated. 
The goal of the procedure was to identify how well the governance regime worked based 
on a normative set of criteria and to clarify where in the system problems and potential 
opportunities existed.  
3.2 Data collection: Interviews. 47 interviews were conducted with individuals 
from 40 different government agencies, local governments, service organizations, 
cooperatives, membership organizations, and businesses (Table 3.2). Eight additional 
interviews were conducted with small family farms (businesses). 90% of organizations 
originally targeted by researchers were interviewed. Also, to help ensure all key actors 
were interviewed, we asked participants to list who they considered to be the two most 
important organizations (besides their own) for water governance in the region (i.e., Wiek 
et al., 2007). All of those resulting organizations were interviewed. The interviews first 
engaged respondents with the sustainability principles and criteria (allowing for 
comments and alternative suggestions). Each respondent then shared two water-related 
challenges they perceived to be critical for the region and located those challenges on the 
systems map (Figure 3.2 in the results section). Information on perceived challenges was 
used to derive groups of water-related challenges that actors generally saw as prominent 
in the region and to then to visually compare those challenges with the non-compliant 
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criteria in the appraisal. Interviews lasted an average of 75 minutes and were conducted 
face-to-face from August to December 2010.  
Table 3.2  
Selected Organizations Involved in the Sustainability Appraisal Study. Classifications are 
Based on Agrawal (2008). 
 
Key Actors Description 
Agencies 
Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados 
(AyA) 
National water utility mandated to supply drinking water to the 
population.   
Ministerio de 
Ambiente, Energía y 
Telecomunicaciones 
(MINAET)  
Environment ministry. Umbrella organization for 
environmental management.  Nicoya and Hojancha are 
managed as separate sub-regions; ‘Conservation Areas’ 
branches manage protected areas.  The Área de Conservación 
Tempisque (ACT) is the responsible Conservation Area in the 
study site 
Ministerio de 
Agricultura y 
Ganadería (MAG) 
Ranching and agricultural ministry mandated to promote 
economic competitiveness of Costa Rican agriculture 
Local governments 
Rural water 
administrators 
Community-run groups that manage rural water supplies and 
deliveries.  Granted power to set and collect water use tariffs.   
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(ASADAs)  
Municipalities County-level government that develops land-use guidelines 
outside of nationally protected areas 
Service organizations 
NicoyAgua 
Foundation  
Non-profit water conservation group in Nicoya administered 
by the Potrero Caimital Watershed (PCW) Commission, which 
promotes basin management 
National Training 
Institute 
 Extension office dedicated to producer training and education 
Membership organizations 
Rural development 
associations 
Community-run groups dedicated to community well-being 
and financing local projects 
Ranching 
commissions 
Local organizations that disseminate information to producers 
and promoting collective interests 
Cooperatives 
CooPilangosta Coffee producer cooperative 
CoopeGuanacaste Regional electricity provider 
Businesses   
Costeña S.A. Primarily a melon producer and largest agricultural business in 
the area 
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3.3 Data collection and synthesis: Workshops. Three workshops informed the 
appraisal. The first involved mostly researchers studying water issues in Guanacaste. 
Researchers were from Costa Rica, Colombia, and the United States. The workshop was 
held in Palo Verde National Park, Guanacaste in August 2010. Nine participants 
represented: the Organization for Tropical Studies, Universidad de Costa Rica, Centro 
Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza, the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature, and Arizona State University.  Participants broadly evaluated 
water governance in the region using the criteria and outlined water-related challenges. 
The second and third workshops were held in Hojanhca and Nicoya in November 2010. 
The 20 participants in these two workshops represented: AyA, MINAET, ACT, 
ASADAs, MAG, Municipalities, PC Commission, agricultural associations, and 
producers. Early results of the nearly finished interviews were presented and discussed, 
which allowed for additional input. Nearly all workshop attendees had participated in the 
study interviews that had already engaged them with the water system map. This 
experience helped support the diverse groups to frame the water system using a similar 
perspective (i.e., its boundaries were defined and the governance domains were clear). In 
an open discussion format, participants used the criteria across the four domains of the 
water system to begin appraising the governance regime. The research team facilitated 
and participated in the discussion.  
3.4 Appraisal scoring. After the workshops, the research team initially appraised 
the governance regime against each criterion (from Table 3.1). This first involved filling 
in the appraisal score sheet (e.g., Table 3.3 in the results) with evidence from the 
interviews, the workshops, and the parallel governance analysis research effort (of the 
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same system in Kuzdas et al., 2014) for each criterion. As a part of this effort, the 
research team also organized information from publicly available sources (i.e., reports, 
indicators, monitoring data, etc.) for use as additional evidence in the appraisal score 
sheet. To then score the appraisal, we applied a three-tier metric (denoted by asterisks), 
which indicates (one*) non-compliance, (two**) some compliance, or (three***) full or 
nearly full compliance of the governance regime with a given criterion. Relative 
compliance of each sustainability principle was then calculated by dividing the summed 
score of individual criterion within a given principle by the maximum possible score. We 
used the resulting average scores as a way to differentiate three groups of principles that 
were, relative to each other, in either high, medium, or low compliance (Figure 3.1). As 
specified during the appraisal-planning step, the scoring assumed that each criterion is 
equally important for principles, and each principle is equally important for 
sustainability. Averaging scores for each principle was used, despite the categorical 
variables, in order to provide guidance and initial differentiation among principles for 
targeted discussions with stakeholders on the principles/ criteria that may require more 
urgent attention than others. This technique supported the clear communication of 
appraisal results and provided a concise way to summarize the detailed qualitative 
information contained in the appraisal.  
3.5 Mapping the appraisal. Criteria that scored as relatively non-compliant (e.g., 
one*) were then placed onto the finalized systems map. To place criteria onto the map, 
we used the framework that specifies which domain(s) each criteria is relevant, along 
with the detailed information found within the appraisal itself. The perceived water-
related challenges (from interviews) were aggregated and grouped using content analysis 
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techniques. Each of those aggregated groups was then assigned a code (A-F) and paced 
into the part of the water system map where respondents most often mentioned the water-
related challenges (that were included in the grouping) as occurring. This step provided a 
visual picture of the appraisal results in comparison to the perceived water-related 
challenges, as well as providing indications as to where in the water system both tend to 
cluster and which actors (already on the finished map) are implicated.   
3.6 Examining problem clusters, opportunities, and finalizing results. Starting 
in early 2012, appraisal scoring was vetted and finalized in an iterative process with 
partners in the PC Commission in order to promote relevance of the results. The PC 
Commission reviewed a draft document describing the initial appraisal scoring. After 
receiving feedback on the document, we used the marked systems map to visually group 
the challenges and non-compliant criteria into clusters (based on the same actors involved 
in the same part of the water system map) in order to explore underlying problem drivers, 
which if corrected, could help mitigate several non-compliant criteria and water-related 
challenges linked to a particular cluster. Accordingly, this step afforded initial qualitative 
insight into the negative effects of interactions among criteria and water-related 
challenges within ‘problem clusters’ that were relevant for the regional water system. 
This step also provided further insight into existing opportunities that already produced 
positive sustainability effects (as identified in the appraisal) and could potentially be 
capitalized on to further increase those effects. The research team, PC Commission 
members, and a number of other stakeholders from civil society, agricultural businesses, 
and ASADAs examined and synthesized the identified clusters and opportunities in a 
series of meetings. This process occurred throughout March 2012 in Costa Rica. In April 
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2012, an executive summary and final report for the completed appraisal was distributed 
to stakeholders in the region.  
4.  Appraisal Results 
4.1 Overview of appraisal scoring. Of the twenty-five criteria used to appraise 
the sustainability of the water governance regime, for seven criteria the regime was rated 
as non-compliant (*), for fifteen criteria rated as somewhat compliant (**), and for three 
criteria rated as compliant (***). The scoring results are illustrated in Figure 3.1 and 
detailed in the score sheet in Table 3.3. 
The regime scored relatively low (near 50%) compliance against four principles – 
P1: Socio-ecological system integrity, P2: Resource efficiency and maintenance, P6: 
interconnectivity across scales, and P7: Precaution and adaptability (Figure 3.1).   
For two principles – P3: Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity and P4: Socio-
ecological civility and democratic governance – the regime received relatively medium 
(67%) compliance scores. By law Costa Rican citizens are entitled to basic levels of 
social services and well-being. Article 50 of Costa Rica’s constitution guarantees clean 
and healthy environments for every citizen. Implementing the mandate of Article 50, 
however, has become a significant challenge for government agencies below the 
provincial-level that struggle to coordinate with each other and involve local 
communities in decision-making processes. Communities are increasingly seeking the 
power and rights to manage local and regional resources amidst a historical planning 
context of top-down control, which may create friction and, at times, high tension in 
governing processes.  
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For only one principle – P5: Intra and inter-generational equity – the regime 
earned a relatively high (73%) compliance score.  Nearly all citizens have access to clean 
drinking water in the region. Recently formed NGOs such as NicoyAgua and other 
collective organizations (such as those taken by PC Commission) already collaborate 
with and across local branches of government agencies that typically do not coordinate 
with each other, which helps increase general collaborative activities in some places 
within the governance regime. These efforts also allow for the inclusion, although 
informally, of some rural community water-user associations (e.g., ASADAs) within the 
region that would otherwise be disconnected from the governance regime.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Extent of governance regime compliance with sustainability criteria. Arrows 
(green=high; yellow=medium; red=low) represent relative sustainability compliance of 
individual principles. 
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4.2 Problem perceptions, locations, and clusters. In the interviews, governance 
actors identified a variety of water governance challenges ranging from water quality 
issues (contamination, monitoring, etc.) to poor aquifer protection and unjust water 
allocation schemes (Table 3.4). The challenges vary in public awareness (frequency of 
mentions in interview) as well as in location (where they occur in the system). We 
tabulated and grouped those perceptions and where in the system actors marked that they 
occur, (Table 3.4) in order to map them onto the water system map.  
Table 3.4  
Perceived Water Governance Challenges in the Region and Where They Occur in the 
Water System 
 
Perceived Challenge 
% Of 
interviews 
mentioned 
In which domain mentioned 
most? 
A Contamination, water 
quality, monitoring and 
enforcement 
38 Outflows and Supplies 
(especially groundwater) 
B Unregulated demand growth 
& deforestation 
34 Use (Ecosystem, Agriculture) 
C Climate change 9 Supplies (Potrero-Caimital 
Aquifer) 
D Lack of education & 
awareness 
9 Use 
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E Scarcity and drought 6 Supplies  
F Poor aquifer protection 5 Supplies 
- Distribution inequalities 1 Delivery [not mapped in Fig 3.2] 
 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates where in the regional water system non-compliance with 
criteria (from the detailed sustainability appraisal scores; Table 3.3) and the aggregated 
actor perceptions of water governance challenges (compiled from interviews; Table 4) 
occur. Based on a visual inspection of the system map in Figure 3.3, we see generally that 
the perceived water-related challenges (A-F) are well aligned, or at least tend to group, 
with the lower scoring criteria from the appraisal (1a-7c). These identified problem 
‘locations’ or clusters helped identify not only the where, but in particular who is active 
in the part of the water system where problems or challenges tend to occur.  The system 
non-compliance with criteria and the perceived challenges cluster around four features of 
the regional water governance regime (Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5 
  
Problem Clusters in the Regional Water System 
Problem cluster 
Appraisa
l criteria 
Actor 
Perceptio
ns 
Who is implicated on the water 
system map? 
I. Potrero-Caimital 
Aquifer 
1c, 1d, 
2d, 7b 
A, C, E, 
F,  
MINAET, AyA, ASADAs, 
SENARA, Development 
Associations, Costeña, 
NicoyAgua,  
II. Regulating institutions, 
water management 
frameworks 
5b, 7b,  A, B MINAET, AyA, Municipalities, 
ASADAs, MAG, Health Ministry, 
Producer Associations, Private 
enterprise/ agriculture 
III. Institutional 
leadership, goal setting, 
water-use education 
2a D UNA, MINAET, ACT-Education, 
MAG, Education and Culture 
Institution, National Training 
Institute, NGOs, NicoyAgua 
IV. Downstream 
integration 
6c A Rural communities, national 
agencies, Potrero-Caimital Aquifer 
users and ASADAs 
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We qualitatively synthesized the underlying structural and process aspects of the 
regional governance regime that relate to the perceived water-related challenges and non-
compliant criteria that cluster in these four areas. 
4.2.1 Potrero-Caimital (PC) Aquifer. The absence of management coordination 
and poor information sharing of water extractions among communities that share the PC 
Aquifer bring about several challenges. Law mandates that government agencies should 
coordinate with each other (in the water sector) and with local organizations, but how 
exactly this ought to be organized is not defined. This is a major challenge for creating a 
body of accessible and coherent knowledge about water quantities being stored, moved, 
and used in the system. Local actors indicate that the majority of problems in the region 
center on the PC Aquifer (Table 3.4). In the past, stakeholders have struggled to develop 
adequate basin scale management plans for properly managing uses of the aquifer. Levels 
of mutual trust between actors, which is needed to execute collaborative management 
plans, appear to be low. Uncertainty regarding water supply and use potentially makes 
reconciling mistrust and negotiation difficult.   
4.2.2 Regulatory institutions / water management frameworks. Inadequate rules 
that regulate and monitor the system after water is used drive stakeholder concerns 
regarding water quality. A third of interviewees indicated that contamination/ water 
quality is the most important challenge facing water governance (Table 4). In the study 
area, all central actors are government agencies with the exception of NicoyAgua/ PC 
Commission. Institutional frameworks that dictate how these actors operate in relation to 
each other are vague. Vague rules allow for excessive overlap and repetition of the 
institutional responsibilities of government agency actors. As a result, many actors use 
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financial and personnel resources duplicating efforts such as reforestation. In Hojanhca, 
especially, nearly all of the environmental management activities deal with tree farming – 
even promoting tree farming – often without a broader understanding of the larger 
hydrological impacts in the region. There is no standard for cooperation between Nicoya 
and Hojancha, despite Hojancha relying on the PC Aquifer (in Nicoya) for water supplies 
during the dry season. In the study area, the first Management Plan (Morataya, 2004) 
aimed to create stakeholder networks – a critical task considering gaps in broader 
institutional frameworks. Results of the first management plan have been mixed, since 
such plans lack authority and are not legally enforceable.  
4.2.3 Institutional leadership and goal setting. The lack of institutional 
leadership, which helps drive collective goal setting or visioning processes, is evident. 
Results highlight, for example, that the various water-use education efforts in the region 
lack a clear purpose and objective. No actor fills leadership roles that steer environmental 
education efforts in a unified direction, which is a reflection of the larger issue of unclear 
objectives of the governance regime. A coordinated direction for water governance 
requires a process to deliberate and identify collective sustainable development goals, 
which in turn requires extensive engagement of the various sectors involved in the 
regional water system. Effective engagement with stakeholders will require enduring 
leadership and commitment that spans institutional and administrative scales, which is 
currently not present. MINAET and AyA are the two organizations in the positions, at the 
moment, to drive goal setting in the governance regime. However, these two agencies 
operate in different aspects of the water governance regime and do not coordinate their 
activities. Having two prominent public actors that do not coordinate their primary 
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functions in the regime is a major obstacle for efforts that seek to develop collective 
objectives and implement plans to achieve those objectives.   
4.2.4 Downstream and regional integration. Poor integration of downstream 
communities, including unclear vertical accountability mechanisms that are accessible to 
rural communities, is a significant challenge for the region when considering historical 
conflict events and potentially drier futures. There is a reasonable possibility that other 
communities will look for new water sources in the near future if drier or more variable 
climate projections come to fruition. If they do, the PC Aquifer would be an attractive 
prize. If the future does require deliberation processes over water transfers to other 
regions, downstream integration will help ensure the planning of transfers is open, civil, 
and participatory. At the moment, many of these processes in Guanacaste lack an 
adequate considerations of demand management perspectives that could in some cases 
provide an alternative ‘soft’ path to large infrastructure and transfer projects (i.e., Gleick, 
2003). Such a process would stand in contrast to the traditional method of water 
resources planning in Guanacaste, which (as evidenced by recent conflicts) is a process 
that is often closed, exclusive, and seen with suspicion by many communities 
(Benevente, 2010). Building downstream integration, vertical accountability, and an 
adequate focus on demand management may help avoid future conflicts and increase 
sustainability compliance of the regime. 
Investing in actions to address the issues found in these four clusters will likely 
have positive effects on compliance with several sustainability criteria.  
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4.3 Opportunities. The appraisal procedure also yielded four existing opportunities that 
already have positive sustainability effects, but could be further built on to expand those 
positive effects on the water system: 
4.3.1 Emerging partnerships for information sharing. The will to establish 
venues and science-decision maker partnerships by which to formally share information 
on water extractions and needs is demonstrated by recent efforts by the Universidad 
Nacional in Nicoya, which has initiated work to synthesize information of water being 
extracted by ASADAs. UNA has also hosted recent workshops addressing water reuse 
and recycling potential in the region. Active institutional leadership for the region could 
feasibly be fostered in UNA’s programs.  
4.3.2 Opportunities for facilitating coordination. Grassroots NGOs, such as 
NicoyAgua, are well positioned to increase participation and coordination among 
ASADA communities – as well as strengthen ties between AyA and MINAET. 
NicoyAgua in this case is the only actor with connections to both MINAET and AyA. 
Facilitating better coordination and unified leadership between the regional offices of 
these two central actors at the watershed-scale would be one key objective NGOs could 
feasibly strive for in order to encourage the developing of collective goals, which could 
substantially increase sustainability compliance.  
4.3.3 Transfer potential. With adequate strategic planning, the coordination by 
NicoyAgua and other non-state organizations could serve as a model for grassroots water 
governance efforts throughout Guanacaste and beyond. Aiming to be this type of model 
for the region could feasibly be a powerful visioning tool for water governance efforts 
and might inspire new and enduring leadership in the region.  
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4.3.4 Existing management plan as starting point. The 2004 Management Plan 
established the need to include all relevant actors into decision-making, including large 
agricultural businesses in the region. An updated Plan could feasibly be more effective 
and authoritative if developed in conjunction with a variety of actors. The basis of the 
Plan update could establish an open, transparent water governance process that seeks to 
build consensus over management objectives, monitors sustainability compliance, and 
adjusts management strategies as needed in the future. 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Appraisal impacts: Utility, limitations, and ways forward. There is 
increasing recognition that water governance research largely struggles to integrate with 
the needs of decision-makers and practitioners; and thus often makes little contribution in 
terms of directly aiding problem-solving efforts (Bakker, 2012). The Guanacaste case 
demonstrates that with the right local partnerships, and with the right timing, 
sustainability appraisals could be a promising research endeavor that can aid some 
problem-solving efforts. We found that the participatory step of mapping challenges onto 
the water system map resonated well with stakeholders. More exploration of mapping 
challenges, opportunities, and stakeholder groups onto water governance regimes could 
prove beneficial. The criteria-based appraisal was appreciated for its transparency that 
allowed stakeholders to engage in structured and targeted discussions of challenges and 
opportunities. As we discuss and illustrate below, the appraisal was usefully applied in 
the study area. But, its application was also limited in the face of deeply rooted, broader 
water governance issues. We argue below that, for research efforts to adequately address 
these broader issues, integration with subsequent solution-oriented research is required.  
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During the appraisal procedure (2010-2012), the update process to the Regulatory 
Plan for the Municipality of Nicoya was underway. Regulatory Plans contain legally 
enforceable policies and designations for land-use and development in rural and urban 
areas that are not nationally protected.  Under the supervision of the Nicoya Regulatory 
Plan (NRP) Commission, the two-year update process was initially completed in 
February 2012 and followed by a 10-day public comment period. Local communities, 
frustrated by the short period to review the 600-page document, largely deemed the plan 
inadequate. The main point of contention was the vague rules regarding what can and 
cannot be done on land over groundwater resources, which many rural residents rely on 
for their drinking water. In response to these objections, the NRP Commission granted an 
additional 45-day comment period beginning in April.  
During the additional comment period, the PC Commission presented the results 
of the appraisal (in this paper) to the NRP Commission. The focal point of the 
presentation was the PC Aquifer ‘problem cluster’ identified in the appraisal. The PC 
Commission argued for limiting development that utilizes water from the PC Aquifer 
until better coordination could be achieved and neutral studies commissioned to 
accurately determine water supply and needs. As a result, the new Regulatory Plan 
strongly limits new development (for the time being) that uses water from the PC 
Aquifer. The PC Commission considers this step to set the stage for collectively 
formulating goals and alternative ways of governing groundwater resources in the area. 
They are using the momentum for continuing efforts to consolidate a biological corridor 
in the region and to begin identifying standards (information sharing, reporting back, 
transparency, etc.) for future research collaborations (i.e., ‘new partnerships for 
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information sharing’ opportunity in section 4.3) in order to promote the relevance of 
research conducted in the region. However, core issues for water governance remain 
unresolved.  
The root of the contentions over the Regulatory Plan update – the lack of open 
participation and engagement of communities in governing processes – was not resolved. 
Some groups and communities were not able to personally lobby the NRP Commission 
as the PC Commission did. One community group sent a 10-page document to the NRP 
Commission outlining faults within the Plan that might allow for new development that 
the community’s sole (ground) water source could not support. Governing groundwater 
resources – and engaging communities in processes that determine their use, 
conservation, and management – remains a significant challenge after the Plan update. 
The Regulatory Plan update illustrates that, in spite of the moderate successes of the PC 
Commission to put the appraisal to use in policy making, a critical need for long-term and 
sustainable water governance is still missing: the need for diverse groups to 
constructively deliberate, devise, and implement alternative water governance schemes in 
the region.  
The PC Commission noted that the appraisal, while providing focus for their 
efforts through identified challenges and opportunities, did not fully establish how they 
should go about those efforts. The appraisal also did not fully clarify who would need to 
do what, where, when, etc., in order to address problems and ultimately implement 
alternative ways of governing water - which would not only require normative, but 
instructional/ actionable knowledge (Wiek et al., 2012). While the need to constructively 
and openly deliberate alternative governing options, as mentioned in the appraisal, is now 
	   111 
being considered in planning that involves the PC Commission, the appraisal in itself did 
not automatically result in people ‘governing water differently’ (Wiek & Larson, 2012). 
Importantly though, the appraisal did allow the need for ‘governing water differently’ to 
be articulated among a variety of local groups, which offers a valuable starting point for 
subsequent and integrated solution-oriented water governance research (Pahl-Wostl et al., 
2013).   
Linking subsequent solution-oriented water governance research to current, 
engaged research efforts like we presented here, offers a potential path for research to 
better support the re-design of inadequate governance regimes. For example, the PC 
Commission is especially concerned with the identified problem cluster of institutional 
leadership. They argued AyA should lead, since it currently holds a large amount of 
formal legal authority. Although AyA technically holds a seat on the PC Commission, at 
the time of the appraisal AyA was often absent. Efforts were explored to engage with 
AyA in new ways; however, the PC Commission noted that the appraisal provided little 
guidance on how to do this or on how to identify and develop leaders. The point here is 
that the appraisal was limited in its ability to inspire new ways of addressing challenges. 
For example, while AyA might be the default legal choice to lead – it may not be the best 
choice. The best choice may not yet exist. How an innovative leadership scheme, which 
may require an alternative governance regime and other preliminary steps, could best be 
implemented over time is beyond the scope of an appraisal. For this, solution-oriented 
research would be necessary. Research has pointed out that robust options for solving or 
addressing complex problems cannot be deduced from only analyzing or describing 
complex problems (Sarewitz et al., 2012; Wiek et al., 2012). Others have concluded that 
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water governance research in particular would highly benefit, in terms of its impact and 
utility, from a solution-oriented approach (Bakker, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). The 
presented appraisal, which only evaluated the sustainability effects of a regional water 
governance regime, validates these perspectives. The appraisal in Guanacaste proved 
useful for local groups that were closely involved with the appraisal procedure. But, 
further solution-oriented efforts that, for example, investigate what alternative 
governance schemes might best address different problems and steps to implement and 
adjust those schemes over time could offer the actionable knowledge needed to fully 
address complex water problems. We conclude that descriptive-analytical research efforts 
are best carefully integrated with, rather than separated from, subsequent solution-
oriented research (Reed & Kasprysk, 2009).  
5.2 Prospects for sustainable water governance in the climate threatened 
Central American dry tropics. Based on our appraisal in Guanacaste, we would expect 
Principle #1: Social-ecological system integrity to be a focal point for sustainable water 
governance. Coordinating the sustainable use, management, and protection of 
groundwater reserves is a critical challenge for long-term sustainability in the face 
climate change impacts. Like Guanacaste, many parts of the dry tropics in Central 
America already rely on groundwater as an important water resource. Reduced 
precipitation that is expected in much the Central American dry tropics could severely 
affect these resources, while also limiting the viability of relying on alternative surface 
flows for water supplies. Also similar to Guanacaste, the regulatory context of the use, 
management, and protection of groundwater reserves is often vague (Ballestero et al., 
2007). Developing and implementing fair governing processes in line with Principle #4: 
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Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance and that aim to sustain ground water 
resources will be important for the region.  
Principle #4 though also presents challenges for much of Central America, and 
accordingly, should be a relevant focus for sustainable water governance efforts. Water 
governance regimes are challenged to better engage diverse stakeholders and to develop 
improved participatory and responsive governance schemes when planning infrastructure 
and deliberating alternatives. Although not accounted for in our appraisal, damming 
rivers and creating reservoirs for both water storage and power generation is a current 
coping and development strategy of Central American governments. In Guanacaste, 
adequately involving rural, diverse groups in governance where (1) centralized agencies 
are expanding their reach through additional branch offices, (2) drinking water delivery 
schemes are becoming more decentralized in rural areas (e.g., ASADAs), and (3) 
governing responsibilities are vague and local management capacity varies presented 
challenges (as indicated in the problem clusters). Regions in the Central American dry 
tropics with similar governance schemes may expect comparable challenges. For 
example, the poor involvement of especially rural communities in decision-making 
processes, especially those concerning new infrastructure, is an important factor in 
escalated water conflicts in the region (Paniagua and Stocks, 2008; Kuzdas, 2012). 
Sufficiently involving more diverse groups in these processes, in addition to helping 
improve compliance with Principle #4, could also allow for more serious engagement and 
deliberation with alternative demand management strategies that rely less on water 
supply enhancement (Brooks & Holtz, 2009). Such alternatives could in turn offer 
positive, mutually reinforcing benefits related to Principle #1: Socio-ecological system 
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integrity and Principle #2: Resource maintenance and efficiency considering in 
Guanacaste poorly managed groundwater reserves and citizen’s concerns over potentially 
taxed water supplies and demand growth (e.g., Table 3.4).   
To enhance the positive sustainability effects of water governance regimes along 
the lines mentioned above, many governance regimes in Central America will need to 
confront deep social inequalities, lingering poverty, histories of exclusive control – and in 
some cases histories of oppression and rebellion – that have in many areas fostered 
persistent feelings of disenfranchisement and mistrust toward political institutions and 
government agencies (Edelman, 1999; Booth et al., 2010). Strategic, multifaceted efforts 
that aim toward reconciliation, capacity building, and renewed investment (i.e., technical, 
financial, administrative) especially in rural community and regional water governing 
organizations offers a potential path, or at least a start, toward more sustainable water 
governance regimes. The Guanacaste case affords insight into two potential opportunities 
that are relevant for water governance regimes in the Central American dry tropics to 
start on this path. 
While economic liberalization in the broader region has generated concerns over 
public sector capacity (Eakin et al., 2011), there has been a growing influence of private 
enterprise and civil society organizations in decision-making (Bebbington, 2005). In 
Guanacaste, we found that the efforts of organizations such as the PC Commission had 
positive sustainability impacts where public sector roles were diminished. As mentioned 
in the results, these roles involved driving coordination across institutional boundaries 
and facilitating some rural community groups to informally participate in governing 
processes. These actions helped make the governance regime more open, just, and 
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collaborative in the parts where the PC Commission was active. Grassroots organizations 
are common in the broader region (Booth et al., 2010), and although it should be 
expected that their capacities would vary, they do offer a promising investment 
opportunity that, combined with the right partnerships and in appropriate settings, could 
positively impact water governance.  
The second common opportunity that we might expect are ‘policy windows’ that 
can potentially be used to distribute more authority to local, regional, and basin-level 
planning efforts that already occur with limited authority in many places (Rogers, 2002). 
Although not a silver bullet, well-designed and alternative schemes that better disperse 
authority could potentially allow for decision making that is more in-tune and responsive 
to the challenges that more rural, dry tropical regions face such as governing groundwater 
in a climate threatened and socially contested context. These ‘windows’ may come 
unexpectedly and seem limited, as the Regulatory Plan update process in Guanacaste 
illustrates, but nonetheless may be a first step. For example, the PC Commission reported 
its lobbying efforts during the Plan update helped increase its confidence and helped 
solidify its position as a respectable governance actor in the area, which it considers a 
positive a step toward utilizing the ‘transfer potential’ opportunity (Section 4.3). Other 
‘windows’ may take on different forms. For example, Eakin & Lemos (2010) note the 
trend has been for smaller scale managers and administrators to experiment with new 
policy instruments such as ‘risk atlases’ and ‘ecological ordinances.’ Engle and Lemos 
(2010) find resource managers to be experimenting with integrating democratic principles 
into policy. Scenarios and basin-scale plans have been used in Guanacaste communities, 
and they could feasibly build on appraisal efforts in order to help diverse actors 
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constructively engage with alternative ways of governing water (Kuzdas et al., 2013). 
These small-scale ‘policy windows’ offer opportunities that could support the collective 
organization of local actors to more effectively confront and positively influence broader 
governing issues and help strengthen diverse resource planners and managers in the dry 
tropics.  
6.  Conclusion 
The sustainability appraisal was a valuable tool that provided normative insight 
into how well water governance in Guanacaste operated.  While the results suggested 
some well-targeted efforts could help remedy interlinked problems, the appraisal 
provided limited evidence-based instructions that dealt with how to go about resolving 
problems over time. Additional and expanded efforts are critically needed, at the 
provincial scale in Guanacaste, to deliberate and craft alternative ways of governing 
water that can overcome broader governing issues. Water governance research efforts 
where descriptive-analytical components, solution-oriented components, and real-time 
problem-solving components are well integrated are a high priority. Such integrated 
research efforts could well support sustainable water governance in Guanacaste and 
beyond. As a start for these efforts, the Guanacaste appraisal suggested two critical points 
for water governance in the Central American dry tropics: (1) a focus on alternative 
schemes to better manage groundwater; and (2) renewed efforts and investments to 
engage and reconcile with diverse stakeholders and rural communities. Two existing 
opportunities that could be capitalized on include: (1) investing in and granting more 
responsibility to existing grassroots organizations that are already positively impacting 
water governance regimes; and (2) leveraging ‘policy windows’ to disperse more 
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decision-making, planning, regulatory, monitoring, and goal-setting authority to local, 
regional, and basin-scale actors that are already innovating governance practices, 
policies, and normative principles.  
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Chapter 4 
Identifying the potential of governance regimes to aggravate or mitigate water 
conflicts in regions threatened by climate change 
1.  Introduction  
Most of the world’s population faces risks to their water supplies (Vörösmarty et 
al., 2010). Many regions also face challenges related to the just distribution of water and 
its risks and benefits among communities, economic actors, and environments (Swatuk, 
2008; Biggs et al., 2013; Gutiérrez et al., 2013). Fittingly, water conflicts have received 
increasing attention. Yet, we know little about how water governance regimes aggravate 
or mitigate water conflicts. In the dry tropics of Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica, dealing 
with water conflicts is already a challenging reality: on average, one legal water conflict 
every 52 days occurred over a recent 10-year period (Cover, 2007). In this paper, we ask: 
Why do some water conflicts escalate or remain intractable while others do not? And, 
what are the implications of current and alternative water governance schemes to mitigate 
or aggravate water conflicts? To answer these questions, we examine five diverse cases 
from Guanacaste in order to identify how governance regimes potentially aggravate or 
mitigate water conflict within the context of the Central American dry tropics.  
We begin this paper from three departure points. First, we define conflict as a 
situation where ‘two or more entities, one or more of which perceives a goal as being 
blocked by another entity, and power of some sort being exerted to overcome the 
perceived blockage’ (Frey, 1993). We focus especially on actions taken against other 
actors with the intent to overcome or harm. Non-cooperative actors are not necessarily 
trying to overcome or harm others (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). Second, we view water 
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conflict as a process that occurs with varying degrees of tension among social actors over 
time (Funder et al. 2010). Many studies view conflict as a single point or measurement. A 
static approach does not account for the more realistic, dynamic nature of water conflicts 
(Sneddon et al., 2002; Böhmelt et al., 2014). Thirdly, our approach aims to improve the 
links between research and the needs of stakeholders that face conflicts (Bakker, 2012; 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). More intense water conflicts most often happen within sub-
national regions (Postel & Wolf, 2001), yet few studies comprehensively address 
conflicts in at-need and at-risk regions (Scheffran et al., 2012).  
Considering the above questions and departure points, there is a deficiency of 
tools to support water conflict research. To carry out the study presented, we developed 
an analytical tool based on Ostrom’s (2007; 2009) diagnostic framework for analyzing 
socio-ecological systems (SES Framework). The SES Framework links governance 
systems, resource systems, and actors to aid understanding of complex water systems 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Complex water systems resist traditional approaches that view 
water systems as production systems under management control (Pahl-Wostl et al., 
2007). Instead, complex water systems are seen as being governed by intricate sets of 
rules, rights, and decision-making processes (e.g., institutions) that involve state, private, 
and civil actors who operate at different scales and locations (Ostrom, 1990; Andersson 
and Ostrom, 2008). We define water governance as the processes and collective actions 
that steer water systems (Wiek & Larson, 2012).  
Water governance studies increasingly use common pool resource (CPR) theory, 
which underpins our alternative approach to water conflicts. These studies often suggest 
that polycentric governance systems, as opposed to rigid or disparate management 
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schemes, are more effective at coping with uncertainty and change (Neef, 2009; Ostrom, 
2010; Huntjens et al., 2012). Polycentric systems contain many and diverse - as opposed 
to one or alike - centers of decision-making authority (McGinnis, 2000). They disperse 
authority across nested scales and let actors organize (Marshall, 2009; Ostrom, 2012). 
Polycentric systems are considered different from centralized (e.g., rigid) or fragmented 
(e.g., disparate) systems (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Bakker & Cook, 2011). Fragmented systems 
contain limited interfaces among governance actors who operate in relative seclusion 
(Molle, 2007; Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012). In reality, water governance often includes 
some polycentric aspects, but with widely varying degrees (Huitema et al., 2009). Rogers 
(2002) and Biswas et al., (2009) illustrate that, while water governance schemes across 
Latin America generally fit these three governance types, they are continuously changing 
due to internal and external factors. Huitema et al. (2009) point out that while polycentric 
prescriptions for water governance are theoretically sound and feasible, there remains a 
need to clarify effective water governance schemes for specific problems and places. 
Kuzdas et al. (2014a) suggest that, in addition to clarifying governance schemes to fit 
problems and places, the manner in which new governing schemes are implemented over 
time is also important for effectiveness. Harmful sub-national water conflict problems 
however, are typically approached very generally in attempts to sort out water supply and 
demand. Identifying the potential of current and alternative water governance regimes 
that potentially aggravate or mitigate harmful water conflicts is then a key research need 
with important implications for effectively meeting the challenges faced in water-scarce 
regions. The exploratory tool presented below and the case studies that follow offer and 
demonstrate an alternative step towards meeting these challenges.   
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2. Exploratory Framework for Identifying the Potential of Governance Regimes to 
Aggravate or Mitigate Water Conflicts 
2.1 Introduction. The framework organizes a set of system components to 
consider when identifying governance potential to aggravate or mitigate water conflicts 
(Figure 3.1). It provides systematic indications for the governance features that mitigate 
or aggravate water conflicts within specified contexts. Accordingly, it is best understood 
starting with the conflict stages, then linking them to the water governance regime, and 
then considering the wider governing context. Conflicts move through stages of varying 
intensity levels over time, which is directly influenced by the governance regime. The 
governance regime consists of interdependent process features (decision-making, 
collective learning, leadership) and structural features (arrangement, integration, roles). 
We derived these features from the SES Framework and organized them in a way 
specified for water conflict studies. The governance regime influences, and is influenced 
by, the broader governing contexts (political economy, socio-economic, climatic and 
environmental). Conflicts also impact the broader governing context (i.e., environmental 
damage, human migration, etc.) and impact the governance regime (by changes in 
process and/or structure), which can then filter the effects of those governance changes 
back onto the broader context. Governance actors may take actions that modify 
governance processes and/or structures. These modifications change the governance 
regime’s influence on conflict (i.e., reduced or increased intensity) and on the governing 
context. 
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Figure 4.1 Framework to aid identifying the potential of governance regimes to aggravate 
or mitigate water conflicts 
 2.2 Components: Water conflict stages.  Conflicts can move through 
stages of higher or lower intensity over time (Figure 3.1). These stages represent 
categories that reflect tension levels between actors involved (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 
2000). We suggest four general categories: latent conflict, manifest dispute, civic dissent, 
and destabilization (i.e., Priscoli & Wolf, 2009). Latent conflicts include professional, 
normative, or other differences between actors that may or may not be visible. Manifest 
disputes occur when one actor takes action, such as political, legal, or economic actions, 
against one or more actors, which is often followed by a period of escalated tensions. 
Tensions are not violent in the manifest dispute category (Kramer, 2004). If disputes are 
not resolved, the situation might escalate and some actors may take actions of civic 
dissent. Civic dissent includes isolated or sporadic acts of violence, threats of harm, 
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protests, vandalism, or other subversive acts. If no resolution is reached, the situation 
may escalate toward the final stage, which we label destabilization. In destabilization, 
civic dissent increases in frequency and in intensity. Destabilization may include regular 
violence, routine lawlessness, prolonged states of fear, or a breakdown of governing 
institutions. For example, the 1999-2000 water conflicts in Cochabamba, Bolivia 
destabilized some parts of the country, which led the federal government to declare a 
state of emergency (Davis, 2005).  
 2.3 Components: Water governance regime features. We identified six 
features of water governance regimes that include three process features and three 
structural features (Figure 3.1). Inclusion of these features was supported by the research 
team’s work in Guanacaste. The features account for the insights of Guanacaste water 
administrators while also reflecting a review of relevant water governance literature (i.e., 
Rogers & Hall, 2003; Wiek & Larson, 2012) and resource conflict studies (i.e., Wolf, 
2007; Eriksen & Lind, 2009), which suggests the identified features are applicable in 
various contexts. Accordingly, a number of empirically testable propositions that are 
relevant for an improved understanding of water governance and conflict are articulated. 
These propositions are generally supported by water governance-related studies, but they 
often remain insufficiently explored in a diverse array of contexts and in conflict-specific 
cases. We address a number of these propositions in the case studies that follow.   
2.3.1 Process features. Decision-making: Transparent, inclusive, and fair 
decision-making processes are commonly proposed as a conflict buffer. Internationally, 
disputes may result after a state takes unilateral decisions concerning internationally 
shared watercourses (Priscoli & Wolf, 2009). Regionally, social tension may surface 
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when decisions are taken without sufficient representation of local groups or economic 
actors, especially when decisions concern water infrastructure or water transport (Gleik, 
2003). When citizens suspect decisions will divert water-related benefits for private gain 
or will unfairly increase risks to some, tensions may also increase (Davis, 2005; Lafragua 
et al., 2008). Decision-making in centralized regimes can be efficient; although if 
decisions are not appropriate to local contexts inefficiencies may result (Eakin et al., 
2011). Inclusive decision-making may encourage social learning and allow opportunities 
for enabling, as opposed to controlling, leadership (Gosnell & Kelly, 2010). 
Decentralized regimes may make decisions less efficiently, but engagement with 
decision-making can potentially be broad (Brooks & Holtz, 2008). Decentralized and 
well-integrated regimes can make efficient decisions, often with opportunities for 
stakeholder input and participation in the decision process, although this does not 
necessarily guarantee that opportunities for participation in decision processes are fair 
(Eakin & Lemos, 2006).  
Learning: Interactions among diverse actors or communities are often cited as 
critical for producing social learning, although those interactions must be sustained over 
time to be effective (Folke, 2006). Learning that is relevant for water conflicts includes 
capacity building to enhance mitigation abilities and awareness, information sharing 
practices to enhance collective knowledge of water systems, and the testing of new ideas 
to solve problems (Olsson et al., 2008). Shared learning processes have helped produce 
innovative water treaties and agreements (Wolf, 2007). Transparent and fair decision 
processes can encourage social learning, as can supportive leadership (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). 
Social learning though may only produce outcomes after considerable stakeholder 
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investment and commitment (van Herk et al., 2011). Decentralized structures may allow 
for more effective learning processes as opposed to very rigid structures, as can higher 
degrees of integration that facilitate knowledge exchange among actors and across scales 
and locations - although there likely must be multiple available avenues (including face-
to-face) for such exchanges to be effective (O’Toole et al., 2009).  
Leadership: Governance should lead water systems away from conflicts that 
cause harm, fear, injustice, or deprivation. Leadership may refer to the transformational 
aspects of individuals, such as motivation, inspiration, and challenging the status quo 
(Bass, 1999; Avolio et al., 2009). Leadership can be characterized as either controlling or 
enabling (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). Enabling leadership can compliment and encourage 
social learning, both of which can be facilitated through accessible decision-making 
processes (Furgeson et al., 2013). Leadership may become more controlling in 
centralized structures, which in turn could affect outcomes on learning potential. 
Research has shown that in the right contexts more decentralized as opposed to more 
rigid structures may allow for enabling-types of leadership to grow and mature (Rijke et 
al., 2012).  
2.3.2 Structural features. Arrangement (networks): Actors in water governance 
regimes may be arraigned or networked in a variety of ways (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006), 
including more centralized structures with few actors in the center and all other actors 
subject to the central actor(s). Such structures are common in the Central American water 
sector (Rogers, 2002). Centralized governance regimes may solve simple problems 
efficiently and may coordinate actions with some actors effectively through controlling 
mechanisms (Bodin & Crona, 2009). Alternatively, water governance may be structurally 
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more dispersed or decentralized. In these structures, there may be several hubs of highly 
connected actors, with less intense connections between hubs (Andersson and Ostrom, 
2008). In many contexts, more decentralized arrangements are potentially positioned to 
account for more diverse constituencies in decision-making processes when addressing 
more complex problems (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008).  
Integration: Structural mechanisms should allow governance at different scales or 
locations to address problems that surface in another location or scale (e.g., river basin, 
community, etc.) (Ostrom, 2010; Poteete, 2012). Integrated governance regimes allow for 
quick feedback from the governance actor(s) at the source of an issue, problem, or 
innovation to the rest of the regime; and for efficient response of other governance actors 
to assist with the problem or implement new ideas (Rogers & Hall, 2003). Integration 
may be vertical or horizontal. Vertical integration refers to the degree governance actors 
and institutions at different scales are accountable, coordinated, and engage in 
complimentary rather than contradictory governance activities. Horizontal integration 
refers to the degree governance actors and institutions within one scale (e.g., regional) are 
accountable and coordinated in their responsibilities and actions. Effective integration, 
although potentially difficult to achieve, can support legitimate decision-making, help 
prevent confusing fragmentation, and encourage mutually supportive (as opposed to 
divergent) governance roles (Rijke et al., 2012).  
Roles: The distribution and clarity of water governance roles and responsibilities 
(and appropriate legal frameworks) are important to balance competing interests and for 
efficient and legitimate dispute resolution processes (Gleick, 1998). Poorly defined roles 
or responsibilities can produce contradictory governance schemes, which may generate 
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institutional uncertainty that allows opportunities for elite actors to unfairly dominate 
(Kramer, 2004). Stakeholder commitment to governing processes can support effective 
and mutually clear roles and governing responsibilities (Larson et al., 2009).  
2.4 Tool components: Governing contexts. Climatic and environmental context: 
Studies have found that wet or dry periods may be linked to conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen, 
1998; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012) or that climate has no relation to conflict (Witsenburg 
& Adano, 2009). Generally, studies that examine this link are inconclusive (Fjelde & von 
Uexkull, 2012). However, if climate change does push governance regimes beyond 
environmental boundaries that have been previously experienced, the climatic and 
environmental context will be important for mitigation efforts (Scheffran et al., 2012). 
Socio-economic context: Contexts that include populations with relatively high 
unemployment numbers and poverty have been speculated to be at risk of conflict, 
especially in settings of declining agricultural productivity (Soysa & Gleditsch, 1999; 
Ohlsson, 2000). In such contexts, for example, may allow for elites to disproportionately 
benefit from water resources while leaving others at risk (Kramer, 2004). Contexts that 
include sudden demographic shifts, which can quickly put pressure on resource, may also 
play roles in some conflicts. Rapid change from rural to urban landscapes, for example, 
can put pressure on maintaining quality water infrastructure to meet increasing demand.  
Political economy context: The political economy context is important for 
contextualizing water conflict analyses, especially in areas that are dependent on global 
markets and commodity exports. Political economy contexts concern economic markets 
and their relations to laws and government (Booth et al., 2010). In Guanacaste, relevant 
markets for water conflict include real estate (which requires water for development and 
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use) and irrigated agriculture (which requires water during dry seasons). These markets 
are historically controlled by agencies, yet increasingly open to national and international 
investors, businesses, and trade. Literature that focuses on the broader political 
economies surrounding water conflicts in Central America includes Cover (2007), 
Herrera (2009), and Cruz (2009). Generally, this literature suggests that trade 
liberalization has weakened state agencies (i.e., fewer personnel, lower budgets), which 
limits the extent that agencies can manage effective programs and offices in rural areas 
that historically received strong, responsive pubic sector support. Edelman (1999) finds 
that trade liberalization in Costa Rica has fostered individual feelings of disappointment 
and disengagement with state agencies and politics. In the past, many residents viewed 
the State as supportive or even as a protectorate of rural lifestyles. This shift in citizen’s 
attitudes, Edelman (1999) notes, was potentially the most significant driver of organized 
farmer resistance toward the State in the 1980s.  
3.  Case Background 
Two primary pieces of national legislation provide the current water resources 
management framework in Costa Rica. Article 50 of the Constitution guarantees healthy 
and clean environments for all citizens. The 1942 Water Law prohibits private ownership 
of public water resources. Water management duties are historically performed by state 
agencies. Early years of Costa Rican statehood were characterized by legitimate, 
representative democracy and small, centrally located populations (Booth et al. 2010). By 
2011, the population of rural Guanacaste increased over five fold, in comparison to 1950, 
to about 325,000 people (INEC, 2011). During this time, the number of public 
organizations also increased exponentially. For example, Edelman (1999, p.70) notes that 
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over a 30-year period the number of public organizations within the agricultural sector 
nearly tripled.  
Decades of state-led neo-liberal economic reform helped facilitate a real estate 
boom in Guanacaste from roughly 2000 to 2008. A growing and dispersed rural 
population tested the ability of agencies, especially the water agency Instituto 
Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA), to fulfill social responsibilities. 
Communities increasingly organized in the water sector, with en estimated 1,500+ rural 
community-run water associations (ASADAs) now operating in the country (Madrigal et 
al., 2011). ASADAs are affiliated with AyA, but are governed autonomously by locally 
elected boards. By the year 2000, studies documented declining public trust in State 
institutions (Seligson, 2002). Agriculture and tourism are prominent economic drivers in 
Guanacaste and the Central American dry tropics. Both have expanded in contexts that 
often involve social inequality (Booth et al., 2010). The region is seasonally dry where 
little rain falls half the year. Downscaled climate models for the region predict drier and 
hotter climate conditions will likely continue in the near future (Anderson et al. 2008).  In 
general, the rural dry tropics along Central America’s Pacific Coast present similar 
institutional and environmental contexts for water management (Rogers, 2002; Biswas et 
al., 2009). The Guanacaste case is an important proxy for the broader region, while 
offering insights and potential starting points for other water-scarce or arid regions.  
4. Study design 
4.1 Case selection. We selected five cases (Figure 4.2) to account for variability 
in conflict processes and outcomes. Some cases feature escalated conflict while others 
feature less intense conflicts over several years. In other cases conflict mitigation has 
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been mostly successful or has improved over time, while in others, no conclusion was 
reached, or historically successful mitigating efforts are now facing conflict.   
 
Figure 4.2 The location of the five cases in Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica 
4.2 Data collection and analysis. Data collection and analyses involved multiple 
sources and case study methods that occurred over two years in Costa Rica (Table 4.1). 
We aimed to balance and validate information among the cases and across timespans of 
individual cases. Analysis generally followed a ‘multiple case study comparison 
approach’ (Yin, 2013). In this approach, we employed what Tortajada (2010) terms 
‘reverse engineering’ to reconstruct each case over time based on collected information. 
In re-constructing cases, we primarily focused on the six governance features and how 
they changed over time.  
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Obtaining challenging information from each case (i.e., information on threats, 
subversive actions, and various perspectives), and piecing it together over the lifespan of 
each case, required a multifaceted approach. First, from 2012 to 2013 we conducted 17 
ethnographic interviews based on a grounded approach (Savage, 2000). Interviews were 
conducted in Spanish and lasted 1-4 hours. Individuals selected for interviews were those 
directly involved with the cases and/ or who were experts in those cases. Interview 
protocols slightly differed depending on the case. For example, in cases where conflict 
was experienced, more-structured interviews focused on how conflict evolved over time. 
Questions also elicited which actors were involved, what actions were taken, and the 
consequences or outcomes (Lewicki et al., 2003). In cases where conflict mitigation was 
mostly successful, interviews protocols were flexible. We also organized four focus 
groups to better understand the more successful cases. These focus groups afforded a 
more vibrant setting (vs. a structured interview) where diverse parties (from cases where 
there was relatively little conflict) could relate insights that could be validated by their 
peers. Three focus groups for Case #1 included mostly farmers and some public sector 
employees. One focus group for Case #4 included the members of the collective 
organization the Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital. We 
triangulated information obtained via interviews and focus groups with relevant case 
documents. Integrating this additional information, which included ‘non-peer reviewed 
reports’ (i.e., government reports) and ‘other material’ (i.e., meeting logs and legal 
documents) (Table 4.1), allowed for case enhancement and verification. Triangulation 
also afforded supplemental information for instances where potential informants were no 
longer for cases that had run their course.   
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Table 4.1   
Information Sources Used for the Case Studies 
 
  DRAT Nimboyores Mala Noche Nicoya Sardinal 
# Of 
interviews 
4 (Feb-April 
2013) 
3 (March-
May 2012) 
3 (March-
May, 2013/ 
Sept. 2013) 
4 (Jan-April 
2013/ Aug 
2013) 
3 (March-
May 2012) 
Focus groups 
3 (Feb-March 
2013) 
 - -  1 (Aug 2013)  - 
Reports 5 17 12 10 10 
Other 
material  
11 27 20 7 5 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Case briefings.  5.1.1 Case #1: Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District 
(DRAT). The 28,000-hectare DRAT is the largest irrigation system in Central America. It 
was built to improve living conditions and to increase agricultural production and 
regional economic output. Since 1980, a series of multi-million dollar loans have been 
extended to the state to build the DRAT, which provides up to 65m3/s of water to farmers 
through gravity-fed irrigation channels. The responsibility to allocate water and to 
construct/ maintain irrigation channels falls to the Cañas branch of the National 
Subterranean Waters, Irrigation, and Drainage Service (Servicio Nacional de Aguas 
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Subterráneas, Riego y Avenamiento - SENARA). Larger commercial farms use irrigation 
water to produce export rice, sugar cane, and tilapia; and smallholder farmers grow rice, 
fruits, and vegetables for domestic markets and personal use. DRAT managers and 
farmers would seem to be at odds with organizations that aim protect the Palo Verde 
National Park, the first internationally recognized wetlands in Central America, which 
lies in the middle of the DRAT. However, beyond some contamination issues, no 
significant water conflicts occurred during the first two decades of the DRAT. The 
DRAT was designed during a period of relatively more rainfall, about 100mm (8-10%) 
more per year on average in comparison to 2003-13.  
SENARA began operating the DRAT under water scarcity conditions for the first 
time in 2006. Having never experienced scarcity before, SENARA developed a new 
scheme to allocate limited water supplies to different user groups. The new scheme 
determined that each hectare of land would receive the same amount of water regardless 
of its ownership or usage. Different types of farmers have responded in different ways. 
Commercial farms have acquired smallholder farmers’ land and water rights, and then re-
distributed their water as needed. Farms with sufficient capital also increasingly pump 
water from rivers or drill unregistered wells to supplement their irrigated water. 
Smallholder farmers, lacking the resources to drill wells, have resorted to destroying and 
illegally damming irrigation infrastructure to gain access to supplies - leaving their 
downstream neighbors with less water. On one recent occasion, a SENARA official was 
intentionally injured by a farmer’s moving vehicle in an altercation. Since 2006, the 
makeup of water-users in the DRAT has changed now favoring larger and better-
resourced landholders.   
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5.1.2 Case #2: Nimboyores.  In 1998, Desarrollos Hoteleros de Guanacaste 
(DHG) was granted permits to build four wells over the Nimboyores aquifer near the 
town of Lorena to supply water for tourism development 16km away on the Pacific 
Coast. The ASADA in Lorena and local organizations were not informed of the project.  
By 2001, the pipeline was halfway finished when water scarcity concerns were brought 
up during mass at local parishes. Community organizations responded by blocking access 
to the pipeline’s construction site and filed formal complaints with agencies and 
watchdog groups. AyA and MINAET determined to resolve the issue with communities, 
rather than through the courts. All parties agreed to establish a steering committee that 
consisted of community groups, AyA, MINAET, the County, and the ASADA; and they 
committed to meet regularly in order to reach a resolution. Agency officials were 
cautious at the initial meetings, and reported being fearful of intimidating residents who 
carried clubs. Parties could not agree on how much groundwater could be safely 
withdrawn. In reaction, AyA performed a study of the aquifer and concluded that 600 l/s 
could be safely withdrawn. But community groups questioned whether AyA was the 
legitimate authority of groundwater resources. Opposition leaders approached SENARA, 
whose responsibility is to manage irrigation systems and their groundwater supplies, 
about studying the local aquifer. SENARA agreed and concluded that 170 l/s was 
maximum safe yield. All parties accepted SENARAs estimate and agreed the project 
could be completed as long as transported water was made available to coastal 
communities (in additional to tourism development) as well. However DHG, who was 
not involved in the resolution process, was no longer interested in the project and had 
secured water for the project on their coastal property. Following the conflict case, the 
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County of Santa Cruz, under an agreement with national agencies, established an 
ASADA coordinator position (despite not being officially responsible for ASADAs) that 
aimed to mediate between rural communities and broader governance actors. The 
coordinator position has been largely successful, although its scope is limited to within 
the County. And, how well ASADAs represent communities or effectively manage 
resources varies even within the Municipality.  
5.1.3 Case #3: Río Mala Noche. Three ASADA communities – Sámara, El 
Torito, and Santo Domingo - share water resources in the Mala Noche. Groundwater in 
lower basin is the only water source for Sámara and El Torito. In the upper basin, Santo 
Domingo relies on springs. The ASADAs manage water in the basin with little 
interference or direction from national agencies. Since the 1960s, a lumber company has 
owned much of the land outside of townships in the Mala Noche. Santo Domingo has 
water rights to springs in the upper basin. Since the 1970s, Sámara has been allowed to 
operate wells on private land in the lower basin. El Torito though has been unable to 
secure access better parts of the aquifer that lie below private land in the lower basin.   
Persistent conflict started in the early 2000s, when Sámara took legal action to 
halt a condominium project suspected of draining contaminants into the Mala Noche. 
Although the project proceeded, the defeat spurred Sámara’s leadership to take a pro-
active approach to secure its water supplies. Sámara successfully lobbied SENARA to 
study the Mala Noche and began attempts to gain rights to the land surrounding its well. 
SENARAs study, which labeled groundwater in the Mala Noche as ‘extremely 
vulnerable, was used by Samara as a basis to legally challenge land rights in the basin 
and to halt development projects that infringed on the Mala Noche. A Regional court 
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eventually prohibited development on the private land immediately around Samara’s 
well, although the land remained privately owned. Tensions among ASADAs surfaced 
when the company holding land rights in the upper basin proceeded with plans to 
transport water out of the upper basin. Developers agreed to share water with Santo 
Domingo in exchange for support, which divided ASADA interests. AyA, seeing the 
persistent problems in the Mala Noche, organized a committee with all ASADAs 
participating, but the committee quickly dissolved.  
With increasing tension, an individual, targeted act of dissent disbanded Sámara’s 
pro-active leadership. With less-visible leadership and no new projects to contest after the 
2008 economic crisis, conflict cooled. In 2012, the Municipalidad de Nicoya, who is 
responsible for land-use planning in the area, updated zoning guidelines in the County. 
The update was challenged by Sámara, which again sought total protection of the Mala 
Noche. The update did not ultimately settle land rights issues, but new leadership began 
interacting with other water governance schemes in nearby Nicoya. Following a 2013 
workshop in Nicoya where all ASADAs participated, new leaders orchestrated the first 
self-organized ASADA meeting to discuss improving collaboration and the potential of 
forming a single governing body. In this process, local managers noted that collaboration 
and trust increased, including with the private company in the upper basin.  
5.1.4 Case #4: Nicoya. About 30,000 people use water from the Río Potrero and 
nearby groundwater. The City of Nicoya relies entirely on surface water; several 
community ASADAs pump groundwater; the largest agricultural producer in the area lies 
directly over groundwater (and upstream from where Nicoya takes surface water); and 
the Town of Hojancha uses transported groundwater. Despite seasonal scarcity and the 
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seeming potential for conflicts, the area has not seen any. Recognizing the potential for 
severe water problems in Niocya and after witnessing the conflict in nearby Nimboyores, 
a group of leaders from a local MINAET office, the Universidad Nacional, and local 
ASADAs drafted the first management plan for the area in 2004. The plan helped 
establish the Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital and it’s 
affiliated non-profit NicoyAgua. Although the Comisión cannot implement formal rules, 
its actions and its growing influence have mitigated water challenges that many other 
areas in Guanacaste have struggled to address: very little was known about available 
water supplies; mediation among actors who share groundwater resources is required at 
times; and engagement with surrounding rural communities disconnected from formal 
governing efforts can be logistically difficult.  
The Comisión has been increasingly successful at facilitating communication 
among agencies that typically do not interact and has reached out to rural community 
groups. They have also negotiated land swaps with businesses to reforest some 
groundwater recharge areas. Comisión members, who now include a diverse set of actors, 
meet once a month to discuss problems and potential solutions. Current (2012-13) efforts, 
which grew out of a collaborative assessment effort with local and international 
researchers, seek to grow the Comisión toward a regional water management group 
(which in 2013 covered four sub-basins vs. one sub-basin in 2004) to secure water 
supplies for the future and avoid conflicts. As a part of this effort, the Comisión supports 
communities to better organize and offers education on resources that are available to 
help meet water challenges. In 2013, they began a new partnership to study water 
systems. Water governance in Nicoya has become more inclusive, better coordinated, and 
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the involved actors are keen to leverage collaboration to increase water system 
knowledge.  
5.1.5 Case #5: Sardinal. By January 2008, a 23km pipeline that would transfer 
groundwater below the community of Sardinal to tourism development in El Coco on the 
Pacific Coast was three-quarters complete. Prior to constructing the pipeline, the 
developers formed Costa Rica’s first public-private partnership for water resources 
development. The developers fronted money to construct the pipeline and planned to 
transfer pipeline ownership to AyA after it was complete. In this way, developers aimed to 
bypass the long wait for building new public water infrastructure while still complying 
with water laws. AyA held a public meeting in Sardinal to announce the nearly finished 
project and expected a positive (even thankful) reception by the local community. 
Instead, shocked AyA officials and developer representatives had to be escorted out of the 
contentious meeting for their safety. Concerned Sardinal residents then formed the Water 
Defense Committee to organize resistance. The Committee received substantial support 
from the pastoral social of the Diocese from nearby Tilaran and Liberia. These groups 
were involved in opposition to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (which was 
still being deliberated in Costa Rica at the time). In March 2008, the Committee 
organized two protests. The first protest was peaceful. In the more raucous second 
protest, riot police tear gassed the crowd of about 600 protestors. Five demonstrators 
were arrested and the case landed in the Constitutional Court.  
The Court initially ruled that the community must be involved in the project. So 
AyA created another committee with selected representatives from the community to 
manage the project. No one who opposed the project was selected for the new committee, 
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and negotiations continued as they had before. The opposition did not trust AyA’s reports 
that concluded water supplies were sufficient for the project to proceed. AyA then 
proposed to halve the pipeline’s flow rate, which the opposition deemed to be suspect 
since the pipeline was nearly finished.  Negotiations stalled as parties awaited another 
Court ruling. The Court eventually ruled there was not sufficient evidence of adequate 
water supplies to warrant the pipeline, which seemingly ended the dispute. However, in 
non-typical fashion, the Court issued a series of clarifications to their initial decision, 
which removed legal obstacles for completing the pipeline. During an annual public 
holiday period, the Municipalidad de Carrillo quietly granted the final approval for the 
project to resume. However, the developer consortium had dispersed following the 2008 
economic recession and the pipeline was not finished.  
 
Table 4.2 
Basic Case Information  
 DRAT Nimboyores Mala 
Noche 
Nicoya Sardinal 
Duration  1980-2013 2001-2006 2002-2013 2004-2013 2008-2011 
Sub-basins Tempisque/ 
Bebedero 
Cañas/ 
Nimboyores 
Mala Noche Potrero, 
Upper 
Nosara, 
Quiriman/ 
Caimital 
Sardinal 
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Municipality 
population, 
2011 
Cañas 
(26,201), 
Bagaces 
(19,536) 
Santa Cruz 
(55,184) 
Nicoya 
(50,825) 
Nicoya 
(50,825), 
Hojancha 
(7,197) 
Carrillo 
(37,122) 
 
5.2 Case synthesis: Why did some conflicts escalate while others did not? More 
intense conflicts were set off in settings of high friction between agencies and 
disconnected community-based institutions and without active regional-scale leaders. 
This friction materialized through escalated conflicts when local groups aimed to 
influence decision-making despite limited available avenues to do so – such as in 
Sardinal and Nimboyores (P1 row, Table 4.3). In the DRAT case, some farmers without 
the means to cope with reduced water deliveries or to reach governing actors, damaged 
irrigation infrastructure to secure water. In contrast, well-coordinated and accessible 
multi-level governance with effective regional leadership supported actor’s efforts to 
resolve or mitigate water conflicts. For example, in the Nimboyores resolution, a new 
municipal position was established to provide leadership and convey information to and 
from rural water-user groups. Learning from Nimboyores, actors in Nicoya established 
collective efforts that provided avenues for rural communities to access governing 
processes that otherwise remained unreachable. Although these avenues were largely 
informal since the PC Commission is not a formal decision-making organization 
(although it does substantially influence decisions), they did help facilitate successful 
conflict mitigation. In the Mala Noche, we see differing aspects of leadership. Early 
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leadership guided actions against private actors that sought to utilize or potentially affect 
poorly understood groundwater resources. More recent leadership has sought to enable 
cooperation in the basin in spite of historical tension and other challenges.   
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Even in challenged settings that feature high friction between disconnected 
institutions that operate at different levels, the presence of individuals with the drive and 
will to address shortcomings of water management allowed for conflict mitigation 
potential (P3 row, Table 4.3). We detected a surprisingly large degree of interactions and 
learning among actors across some cases. Learning from leading individuals across three 
cases - starting with Nimboyores, to Nicoya, and then to the Mala Noche occurred. 
However, Table 4.3 shows the most recent Sardinal case follows a similar trajectory as 
Nimboyores, which occurred nearly 10 years prior. Thus some areas within Guanacaste 
used nearby water conflicts as learning opportunities to improve governing efforts while 
other areas did not. While pro-active individuals in Nicoya strengthened the Comisión 
after Nimboyores, little changed in Sardinal where unresolved friction remained a risk. 
Although the Sardinal case went quietly unresolved, more successful efforts in Nicoya 
were validated. Shortly after Sardinal, efforts in Nicoya aimed to further improve through 
new partnerships that assessed water governance and started building a more effective 
regional presence (e.g., Kuzdas et al., 2013; 2014b) that was reached by interested actors 
in the Mala Noche.   
Distrust among actors, institutional legitimacy issues, and poor water system 
knowledge predicated conflict intractability in the cases (P2 row, Table 4.3). The 
underlying factor within these aggravating factors was often current and historically 
ineffective stakeholder engagement (S1, S2 P1 rows in Table 4.3). Poor engagement 
often coincided with legitimacy issues concerning who was responsible or had the 
authority to govern what (S3 row, Table 4.3). In the DRAT, a state employee was 
targeted during an act of dissent. In Sardinal and Nimboyores, local groups rejected water 
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system studies performed by national agencies. In the Nimboyores case, resolution 
processes advanced after parties sufficiently addressed how water-benefits would be re-
distributed to communities and created a new governing role to better account for rural 
communities. In Nicoya, effective stakeholder engagement processes organized by a 
collective group (which had the backing of agencies) reached some otherwise 
disconnected rural communities. In the Mala Noche though, we saw self-organized basin 
planning by local actors had difficulty overcoming histories of tension among actors, 
vague resource rights, and unclear governing responsibilities. The progression of the 
Mala Noche conflict shows however that self-organized conflict resolution and mitigation 
is viable if face-to-face cooperation venues are logistically available and if supportive, 
successful governing examples are accessible and visible to local actors (see trajectory of 
Mala Noche in Table 4.3).  
5.3 Governing contexts: Water scarcity, access and political economy 
conditions. While we do not provide in-depth analysis of the potentially wide range of 
governing contexts here, we do illustrate some of the linked, broader context issues we 
found to be relevant. Scarcity that involved water access issues closely tied to political 
economy conditions were important. One intense altercation involved access to limited 
irrigation water in the DRAT under extenuating circumstances where a smallholder 
farmer had no alternative access options. In the Mala Noche, the economically poorest of 
the three ASADAs was unable to access quality groundwater below privately held land 
(that was deeded prior to modern coastal development regulations implemented in the 
1970s) that another, better resourced ASADA was able to secure through legal actions. 
Consequently, the former ASADA must rely on suspect sources and experiences seasonal 
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shortages. Over time, this situation increased the former ASADAs suspicion of and even 
animosity toward governing attempts in the basin. The former ASADA felt the latter was 
better able to capitalize on tourism and real estate investment in the area (which required 
sufficient water for development). While a vast majority of the water disputes in the Mala 
Noche involved ASADAs taking actions against developers, the key factor in the most 
escalated point in the Mala Noche conflict was this feeling of disparity among ASADAs. 
Generally ineffective governance combined with broader political economy trends had 
over time allowed increases in disparate water access and economic well-being in the 
area. In Sardinal, we saw another aspect of the link between scarcity, access and political 
economies. Here, developers attempted to access water sources used by local 
communities where the perceived threat of scarcity, combined with distrust, precedents of 
poor stakeholder engagement, and low political legitimacy contributed to the escalation 
of the conflicts. While features such as distrust, poor engagement, and low political 
legitimacy directly impacted conflict outcomes, they are also (as we noted in the case 
introduction - Section 3) deeply rooted in social, political, and economic trends involving 
weakened state governments and feelings of disenfranchisement especially within rural 
groups. However, water governance played a role mitigating these broader context issues 
in some cases. The resolution process of Nimboyores aimed to correct eroded trust and 
rural disenfranchisement issues present in the areas. Actors in Nicoya improved on these 
issues over several years through a collective organization and have yet to experience 
harmful conflict. 
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6. Discussion  
6.1 Implications for current and alternative water governance regimes to 
aggravate or mitigate conflicts. In Table 4.4, we use case insights to identify potential 
water conflict risk factors, mitigation abilities, and promising mitigation strategies within 
three general types of water governance regimes (centralized, polycentric, fragmented) 
within the context of the Central American dry tropics (left side of Table 4.4). We use the 
exploratory framework (Figure 4.1) and evidence from the cases to assign expected 
values of water governance process features (P1-3 in Table 4.4) and structural features 
(S1-3 in Table 4.4) for each hypothetical regime-type. As expected, no one case offered a 
perfect example of one governance scheme or another (i.e., Huitema et al., 2009). 
However the diversity of governance schemes within the cases, the different processes or 
changes experienced in each case, and the different degrees that each case exhibited 
fragmented, centralized, or polycentric patterns allowed for sufficient breadth of evidence 
within the given context. We also use insights from the cases to identify potential conflict 
risks, conflict mitigation abilities, and offer promising initial strategies for each 
hypothetical governance scheme (S1-3 and P1-3 in Table 4.4) within the defined 
governing context (described on left side of Table 4.4). The schematic in Table 4.4 
facilitates a structured discussion of the potential implications of current and alternative 
water governance regimes for effectively mitigating harmful water conflict in the Central 
American dry tropics.  
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6.1.1 Centralized governance regimes: Water governance in Central America 
was highly centralized and many still are today (Booth et al., 2010; Rogers, 2002). We 
would expect such governance regimes to be at potential risk of water conflicts due to 
their limited ability to include diverse, especially rural, stakeholders in governance 
processes and their lower tendency to promote collective learning regarding water 
systems and the water needs of stakeholders from unique regions. Successful conflict 
mitigation in these contexts potentially depends on securing sufficient trust from 
stakeholders and the fair allocation of administrative resources that are needed to 
efficiently solve local problems. Relevant issues such as disenfranchised constituencies 
(Edelman, 1999) and corrupt and weakened states (Eakin & Lemos, 2010) may hinder 
conflict mitigation. Short-term mitigation strategies within centralized regimes could 
focus on improving transparency, encouraging joint fact-finding ventures with local 
stakeholders to increase collective water system knowledge, and repairing trust. Long-
term success may require more shared decision-making authority to be distributed to 
regional-to-local levels in order to better account for unique conditions faced in the rural, 
dry tropics (Eakin et al., 2011).  
6.1.2 Polycentric governance regimes: Polycentric water governance designs that 
are fitted to regional contexts, feature committed leadership, and emphasize vertical 
accountability offer reasonably high conflict mitigation potential. Mitigation abilities 
potentially benefit from mutually reinforcing processes: open decision-making, learning, 
and enabling leadership. Possible conflict risk may be present if historical tensions 
between actors and vague resource rights and governing responsibilities exist. If not 
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addressed, these risks may allow for some elites to gain disproportionate power if 
accountability mechanisms are not effective (i.e., Persha & Andersson, 2013). In some 
polycentric settings, self-organized actors may struggle to initiate conflict resolution and 
mitigation processes. Here, more centralized mechanisms and well-resourced actors may 
help begin effective mediation processes in some tense situations. Promising mitigation 
strategies for more polycentric configurations potentially include reinforcing 
commitments face-to-face basin planning processes that are logistically feasible 
(especially for governing actors that may be poorly resourced) and alignment or open 
discourses of actor expectations. Long-term efforts could fortify processes that elaborate 
collective goals, monitor progress toward goals, and ensure the continued effectiveness of 
stakeholder engagement.    
6.1.3 Fragmented governance regimes: Lower abilities to anticipate, recognize, 
and coordinate diverse actions to solve problems allows risks for fragmented governance 
schemes. Here, little or logistically challenged communication among actors might be 
expected as well as unclear governing responsibilities and less-effective accountability 
mechanisms. These conditions potentially allow for actors to take unilateral governing 
actions – especially without input from disadvantaged or disconnected rural groups. 
Strategies might initially focus on identifying existing and securing new financial, 
personnel, and technical investments in regional-scale governance and securing 
commitments to face-to-face planning processes. Such investments and commitments 
may initially help build regional mediators between opposing national and community-
scale institutions and discourage governance actors from taking unilateral actions or 
circumventing fair governing processes. Available resources for new efforts might be 
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found in local university programs, which were used to support good water governance in 
Nicoya, as in other places (i.e., Atkinson-Palombo and Gebremichael, 2012). Long-term 
efforts are challenged to devise feasible action plans that are amenable to diverse actors 
(some of whom may be benefiting from current conditions) in order to practice and 
legitimatize cooperation and coordination.   
6.1.4 Dynamic governance regimes in the Central American dry tropics. 
Guanacaste as a whole affords a proxy for centralized water governance regimes that, due 
in part to various pressures (i.e., from global economies, public funding cuts), are shifting 
towards more institutionally and administratively fragmented regimes without well-
coordinated nor well-defined governing responsibilities below the national-level 
(Edelman, 1999; Kuzdas et al., 2014a). In Guanacaste, this hybrid water governance 
scheme retained some risks of centralized schemes (i.e., non-transparent, poorly fitted to 
local contexts) while assuming additional risks associated with more fragmented 
schemes. Accordingly, these change processes within governing schemes could allow for 
potential conflict risk in settings where power (i.e., through water allocation mandates, 
rights, or political access) is disproportionately held and acted on by relatively few and 
where local groups are not accounted for. Here, long-term strategies that aim for more 
responsive, vertically accountable, and polycentric governance schemes are important for 
mitigation efforts. Within Guanacaste, each case played out and was resolved (or not) in 
different fashion, so a measured and multi-faceted approach to conflict mitigation and 
ultimately, to changing governance regimes, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach will 
be important. Involving groups – especially those who are not included within current 
water governance regimes – will be a key logistical effort for devising and implementing 
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alternative governance schemes. Strategies that initially reduce governing uncertainty 
(i.e., who has rights to what and responsibility to do what?) and that deploy strong, 
legitimate leaders to potentially offset interests that are willing to use economic or 
political power to circumvent fair processes may be an effective first step to help re-
organize institutions and actors prior to implementing or testing more polycentric 
schemes.   
6.2 Implications for future water conflict research. In spite of tough challenges 
facing the region, prospects for successfully mitigating harmful water conflicts remain 
reasonable. Importantly, water conflicts were not uniformly experienced within the 
region, a number of individuals committed to solving water-related issues were active, 
and each case unfolded in a unique manner. Knowledge transfers within regions, learning 
by example, and existing leaders could offer reasonable starting points for strategies 
within a variety of contexts that aim to overcome institutional and political challenges 
that matter for successful conflict mitigation – such as better accounting for rural 
community interests and power imbalances that negatively affect within multi-level 
governance schemes. Accordingly, water conflict research that addresses problems and 
their potential solutions within meaningful and decision-relevant contexts offers an 
alternative approach to support water conflict-prone regions. This thread of research 
offers potentially useful and improved links to water administrators and policy makers 
that aim to avoid water conflicts in their professional efforts. How to do so, and clarifying 
what that step sequence would look like in various contexts, and learning from diverse 
cases, is an important future research need.   
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7. Conclusion 
Aggravated water conflicts in Guanacaste are driven by the friction between 
fragmented institutions for governing water resources that operate at different – local and 
national – scales in the absence of effective regional-scale governance schemes. These 
institutional schemes have been shaped by Costa Rican political and economic trends that 
are increasingly oriented toward global markets and often times leaving rural groups out 
of key decision and planning processes. Once a conflict materializes, the mixture of 
citizen mistrust and the poor state of regional water system knowledge – especially 
concerning groundwater - is a primary aggravating factor. The common denominator in 
this mix of conflict aggravating factors is ineffective stakeholder and citizen engagement. 
Initiating basin-oriented, cooperative planning in areas that feature self-organized local 
actors, histories of conflict, and poorly defined land and water rights can be a significant 
challenge. Committed and legitimate central actors with sufficient resources may be 
needed to initiate cooperation and resolution processes in such cases.  
Yet, even in aggravating-contexts, successful mitigation potential existed if face-
to-face cooperation venues and supportive, successful governing examples from nearby 
areas were accessible to local actors.  The approach and case studies yielded a schematic 
that identifies potential conflict risks, mitigation abilities, and promising mitigation 
strategies across a range of governance schemes in the dry tropical Central American 
context. Polycentric water governance schemes that are fitted to regional contexts, that 
feature enabling leadership, that fairly resolve water access issues, and that emphasize 
vertical accountability offer conflict mitigation potential. Centralized governance regimes 
that undergo institutional/ administrative fragmentation allow potential risk of aggravated 
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conflicts in settings where power is disproportionately held and where local groups are 
not accounted for. Results demonstrate that water conflicts are not uniformly experienced 
within regions nor do conflict processes unfold in consistent manners over time - which 
has implications for realizing effective water governance and useful water conflict 
research. Knowledge transfers within regions, learning by example, and existing leaders 
offer promising starting points for overcoming institutional and political barriers that 
obstruct conflict mitigation potential. Such efforts might focus on governance strategies 
that intentionally avoid fragmentation and institute transition processes and strategies that 
seek to implement more balanced, polycentric water governance designs over time. How 
do so, and clarifying what that step sequence would look like, in various contexts is an 
important research need. Such strategies will be critical for achieving sustainable water 
governance in conflict prone, climate threatened regions.  
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Chapter 5 
Governance scenarios for addressing water conflicts and climate change impacts 
1. Introduction  
The persistence of complex water problems is often attributed to deficiencies in 
how water governance regimes are designed, implemented, and changed (Uhlendhal et 
al., 2011; Wiek & Larson, 2012; Biggs et al., 2013; Gutiérrez et al., 2013). We refer to 
governance as the set of collective actions that steer socio-ecological systems toward 
shared goals and are coordinated among diverse actors (Lubell et al., 2008). Successful 
steering requires, among other things, the anticipation of future developments and acting 
on the results of that ‘anticipation’ though decisions and policies (Nelson et al., 2007; 
Guston, 2008; Fuerth, 2009).  Research often concludes that an anticipatory approach to 
governance is needed to adequately confront complex water challenges (Schneider & 
Homewood, 2013). And, scenarios are proposed as a practical tool to aid these 
anticipation efforts (Quay, 2010). Governance scenarios portray alternatives to current 
governance regimes and inform people about what they could do differently in governing 
water. Governance scenarios that are integrated within transformational planning 
processes (i.e., Wiek, in review) intend to support actors to positively change and 
improve upon inadequate governance. Yet, current water-related scenarios often do not 
portray alternative governance regimes nor are they integrated within such efforts (Dong 
et al., 2013; Haasnoot & Middelkoop, 2012). If governance scenarios are to support 
people to articulate and implement alternative, more sustainable governance regimes, this 
presumably requires them to also be well integrated within real time governing processes. 
Yet, there remains a lack of clarity on what scenario features facilitate or hinder their 
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integration into governing processes (Wright et al., 2013) and there remains few 
examples by which to learn about how water governance scenarios are built, applied, and 
fit within transformational planning processes. Such clarity and learning examples are 
critical if anticipatory approaches, and scenarios studies in particular, are potentially able 
to successfully meet their intentions to support change in untenable governance regimes 
(Hulme & Dessai, 2008; Wiek et al., 2006).  
In this study, we developed scenarios in order to ‘bring to life’ alternative water 
governance regimes in Guanacaste, Costa Rica. The study was integrated into a broader 
transformational research and planning process and, accordingly, was built on previous 
water governance research in the region (i.e., Kuzdas, 2012; Kuzdas et al., 2014a; 
2014b). Through implementing these previous studies since 2009, the need for and 
interest in re-imagining and re-designing water governance was established and grew 
with stakeholders in the region up until the scenario study we present here was initiated 
in 2012. This afforded the research team an opportunity to focus on how to optimally 
deploy alternative governance scenarios to support change towards more sustainable 
water governance regimes in the region. The guiding questions of the study were: What 
are consistent and alternative scenarios of the water governance regime in Guanacaste? 
And, how can scenarios support the re-design of currently unsustainable water 
governance schemes? What are their limitations? 
The Guanacaste case offers insights into the opportunities and challenges of 
developing and applying anticipatory approaches in regions that experience water 
conflict, climate threats, and governance regimes that often fail to adequately resolve 
challenges. This scenario study, although tailored specifically to Guanacaste, 
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demonstrates how regions facing water challenges can use scenarios, in spite of their 
limitations and if integrated into a larger transformational planning process, as a 
constructive step towards sustainable water governance.   
2. Study Context 
Guanacaste Province is a traditionally rural region that experiences a distinct 6-
month annual dry season. By 2011, Guanacaste’s population increased five times, in 
comparison to 1950, to 325,000 people (INEC, 2011). In its early years (1950s ff.), Costa 
Rican democracy was known as responsive and progressive (Booth et al., 2010). During 
this time, the public sector substantially increased in order to meet citizen needs. For 
example, Edelman (1999, p.70) notes that over a 30-year period the number of public 
agricultural organizations nearly tripled. During this time, many public organizations 
important for water management were formed such as the Environment, Energy, and 
Telecommunications Ministry (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones, 
MINAET), which oversees general water management and conservation activities in the 
country. Growing populations in rural areas tested the ability of the national water utility 
- the Costa Rican Institute of Pipes and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados, AyA) - to meet its responsibility to deliver potable water to citizens. As 
a result, communities increasingly organized in the water sector, with an estimated 
1,500+ rural community-run water associations (ASADAs) now operating (Madrigal et 
al., 2011).  ASADAs perform AyA’s duties in rural areas, but are governed 
autonomously by community boards. Two primary pieces of legislation provide the 
substance current water management frameworks. Article 50 of the Constitution 
guarantees healthy and clean environments for citizens. The 1942 Water Law prohibits 
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private ownership of water resources. Accordingly, water management is carried out by 
agencies in a context that typically protects citizen’s rights to organize and to generally 
influence environmental management.  
Decades of State-led neoliberal economic reform helped enable a real estate boom 
in Guanacaste from roughly 2000 to 2008. This boom stressed increasingly fragmented 
water governance regimes that were already struggling to meaningfully involve sub-
provincial actors and rural water users. In contrast to other countries in Latin America 
that heavily pursued decentralization schemes in the water sector, the authority to govern 
water in Costa Rica has largely remained with state agencies (Rogers, 2002; Biswas et 
al., 2009).  In Guanacaste, water governance operates as a hybrid centralized institutional 
scheme that is increasingly fragmented below the national-level with highly variable 
technical, financial, administrative, and logistical capacities among actors (i.e., agency 
offices and ASADAs) in different places. Edelman (1999) found that neoliberal economic 
reform created widespread feelings of disengagement toward agencies in rural areas. In 
the past, many communities viewed the State as a supporter of rural lifestyles. This shift 
in citizen’s attitudes, Edelman (1999) notes, was an important driver of organized farmer 
resistance toward the State in the 1980s. Much of this resistance originated in 
Guanacaste, with Municipality of Nicoya (2011 population: 51,000) being a stronghold. 
In a similar thread, Seligson (2002) documented widespread declining trust towards 
public institutions, speculating that this trend could indicate “trouble in paradise.”  
Agriculture and tourism are both prominent economic drivers in Guanacaste that 
have expanded within this dynamic political-economic context that also often includes 
deepening social inequalities and unfair water access issues (Booth et al., 2010). Cover 
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(2007) identified, on average, one water conflict occurred every 52 days over a recent 10-
year period in Guanacaste.  Kuzdas et al. (2014c) found that more intense conflicts 
resulted from factors such as unmediated friction between disconnected governing scales, 
inactive regional leaders, distrust among actors, poor collective knowledge of water 
systems, and ineffective stakeholder engagement. To make matters more urgent, the 
region faces drier and hotter climatic conditions in the near future (Anderson et al., 
2008). Accordingly, many water managers and administrators in Guanacaste consider 
mitigating water conflicts to be a top priority.   
Despite the persistence of inadequate governance regimes in the region, many 
individuals from a variety of organizations are active in in the water sector. Similar to 
past eras of organized resistance, Nicoya remains a geographic hub for tenacious efforts 
that aim to govern water more effectively, collaboratively, and justly in spite of broader 
institutional and political barriers (Kuzdas et al., 2013). Many of these efforts are 
undertaken or supported by the Commission for the Management of the Potrero-Caimital 
Watersheds (Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital, PC 
Commission) that is based in Nicoya. Because of Nicoya’s historical and cultural 
importance in the region, its relatively easy access from a variety of areas, and the 
research team’s track record of collaborating with Nicoya-based stakeholders, it was the 
primary location for the scenario building process. 	  
3. Scenario Method 
We applied formative scenario analysis (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Wiek et al., 2006; 
Wiek et al., 2009) to construct alternative water governance scenarios for Guanacaste 
using the following steps:  
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3.1 Selecting system variables and performing system analysis. Previous 
research was used to initially narrow down potential variables relevant for water 
governance in the region. Researchers and partners from public agencies, local 
governments, civil society, and businesses selected final variables from that list and 
identified the impact relationships among all pairs of variables in both directions (e.g, A 
to B and B to A) in two working group meetings in Costa Rica in March and May 2012. 
In the meetings, we explicitly focused on using evidence from a recently completed water 
governance analysis and assessment in the region as the basis to finalize variables and 
assign impact relationships. These previous research results were delivered to 
stakeholders in April 2012 via a report designed specifically for them (Kuzdas et al., 
2014a). This report helped ensure the impact relationships were assigned using a shared 
‘framing’ of regional governance (i.e., what is the regional water governance regime? 
How does it work?). Participants had already engaged with previous research and seen 
the results that this scenario study would build on. Impact relationship types were pre-
defined using a simplified scale from 0 (no impact) to 2 (strong impact) (i.e., Wiek et al., 
2008). We then performed the system analysis using Systaim software with the 17 final 
variables. The analysis mathematically evaluated the impact relationships among 
variables and the relative strength of those relationships. The system analysis provided 
insight into the underlying structure comprised in the scenarios, which helped interpret 
scenarios in a way that ensures the scenarios represented systemically different 
governance alternatives (Wiek et al., 2008; 2009).  
3.2 Defining future projections and consistency analysis. From March-April 
2012, the research team initially determined a small range of reasonable future 
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projections for each variable in consultation with the aforementioned report. Consistency 
analysis evaluates the prospect that a pair of future projections could occur at the same 
time and helps identify scenarios that are without significant contradictions and more 
plausible e.g., “holding sufficient evidence to be considered occurable” (Wiek et al., 
2013). We used a matrix approach to describe the consistency relations between future 
projections (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Tietje, 2005). We assigned standardized values for 
the simultaneous occurrence of a pair of projections (Table 5.1) through a working-group 
meeting with the PC Commission in April 2012. The PC Commission has members that 
represent agencies, municipal governments, rural water-user associations, and businesses. 
It is one of the more successful grassroots water-related organizations in Guanacaste and 
has played an important role mitigating water conflicts in Nicoya that other areas have 
struggled to avoid (Kuzdas et al., 2014c). The PC Commission offered a fairly well 
representative but manageable group that could efficiently contribute to the consistency 
analysis. The filled-in consistency matrix was analyzed using consistency analysis 
software to help identify the most internally consistent scenarios (Tiejte, 2005).  
 
Table 5.1  
Assigned Standardized Values for the Simultaneous Occurrence of a Pair of Projections 
Relation-
type 
Consistency value and 
description  
# of 
occurrences  
% of 
occurrences 
Conditional 
2 – The occurrence of one 
projection would require or cause 
34 6% 
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the occurrence of another 
Supportive 
1 - The occurrence of one 
projection would support the 
occurrence of another 
159 28% 
Independent 
0 – The occurrence of one 
projection would not affect the 
occurrence of another 
307 53% 
Obstructive 
-1 - The occurrence of one 
projection would hinder or block 
the occurrence of another 
76 13% 
 Total: 576 Total: 100% 
 
 
3.3 Diversity analysis. We then statistically grouped all scenarios that were either 
completely consistent or that contained one inconsistent relation in order to select the 
most distinctive ones. To do this, we performed a cluster analysis procedure in SPSS 
software up to the point where an additional ‘clustering’ of scenarios no longer 
significantly differentiated from the previous clusters. We then calculated diversity 
values (e.g., number of differing projections divided by overall number of projections) to 
ensure representative scenarios from each cluster were significantly different from each 
other (Wiek et al., 2009).   
3.4 Scenario selection. We selected final scenarios based on the following 
technical criteria common to the formative scenario method : 
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• Few obstructive relations. Considering the complexity of water governance, we 
allowed the inclusion of one obstructive relation in eligible scenarios.  
• Sufficiently high consistency. We defined the cut off for eligible scenarios to have a 
consistency value of greater than two thirds of the highest consistency value present 
in the set of scenarios (i.e., Consistency value>72, with the highest being 
Consistency value=108).  
• Sufficiently high diversity. We defined the diversity value of an eligible scenario to 
be more than one third of future projections differing from other scenarios.  We 
calculated this for each scenario in comparison to the other scenarios collectively 
and individually.  
3.5 Scenario interpretation and validation. Interpretation and visualization are 
required to effectively communicate scenarios to different groups (Shaw et al., 2009). 
Scenario interpretation included a stakeholder workshop held in March 2013 at the 
Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica in Nicoya. In preparation, we named the scenarios, 
elaborated themes, developed descriptions, created newspaper front pages (dated March 
2037) using the logo (obtained with permission) of a local newspaper, crafted day-in-the-
life-of stories of people from government, community groups, and businesses, and 
located illustrative photographs for each scenario (Figure 5.1). The research team initially 
formulated the stories for each scenario, which were then vetted and revised by members 
of the PC Commission in unstructured meetings from January-March 2013.  
Forty-six individuals from eighteen Guanacaste communities participated in the 
workshop. These individuals represented eleven rural water administrators (ASADAs), 
six public agencies (including representation from regional and national offices), regional 
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governments (e.g., Municipalities and irrigation district managers), tourism businesses, 
agricultural businesses, community groups, environmental groups, and the media. 
Participants were invited in order to ensure adequate representation from across water-
use sectors, from across the public water management sector, and from organizations that 
have been in tension over water issues in the past. Workshop participants engaged with 
five scenario exhibits in order to help interpret and to validate the scenarios - and to 
prepare for workshop activities later in the day. At each scenario exhibit, a team member 
guided and documented discussions. Prior to the scenario exhibit exercise, the research 
team provided prep material and gave an introduction to the group. For the scenario 
exhibits, each scenario was presented on 2x0.8m freestanding posters (Figure 5.1). 
Participants placed sticky notes on designated white boards near each poster to answer 
prompting questions: what is missing from this scenario? And, what would make this 
scenario more tangible? The aim of the questions was to spur thought and discussion that 
would address and help improve the adequacy of the scenarios and their relevance/ 
meaningfulness to people. Participants also commented, critiqued, and added information 
to the scenario components, which was structured similarly using sticky notes and nearby 
whiteboards in each exhibit. Participants were free read and comment on each other’s 
notes.  
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Figure 5.1 The scenarios were presented on 2x0.8m posters (like this one of Scenario 
#3). We structured information identically (but with unique color schemes and photos) on 
each poster to promote comparison and discussion of the set of scenarios. All photos on 
the poster were taken by Christopher Kuzdas. Newspaper logo is used with permission.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Selected system variables, identified variable projections, and system 
analysis. The final variables, their descriptions, and their future projections are listed in 
Table 5.2. The system analysis classified the variables as governance drivers (4 
variables), governance mediators (4 variables), governing context features (5 variables), 
and passive governing features (4 variables) (Figures 5.2 to 5.6).   
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4.2 Selected scenarios. Of the 196,698 possible scenarios, 45 contained no 
obstructive consistency relationships and 69 contained one obstructive relationship. Out 
of these 114 (e.g., 45+69) potential scenarios, the cluster analysis five statistically 
different clusters. From these clusters, representative scenarios from each cluster were 
chosen based on their diversity values and selection criteria shown in Table 5.3. We made 
some justified exceptions. Scenario #4 contains one obstructive consistency relationship; 
yet contains unique features that were deemed important in working groups for a scenario 
featuring citizen apathy. For Scenario #5, we accepted two lower than optimal diversity 
index values in order to include a scenario featuring a large hacienda-oriented economy 
that is contextually relevant. 
Table 5.3 
Scenario Selection Results and Criteria Values; *Indicates Non-Compliance with 
Selection Criteria 
 Scenario 1 
(#199) 
Scenario 2 
(#196,410) 
Scenario 3 
(#12) 
Scenario 4 
(#95,040) 
Scenario 5 
(#196,409) 
No. of 
inconsistencies  
0 0 0 1 0 
Diversity index 
value 
.59 .43 .59 .40 .43 
Diversity index 
relative to other 
selected 
scenarios 
Sc2 (0.88) Sc1 (0.88) Sc1 
(0.19)* 
Sc1 (0.71) Sc1 (1.00) 
Sc3 
(0.18)* 
Sc3 (0.94) Sc2 (0.94) Sc2 (0.35) Sc2 (0.18)* 
	   179 
Sc4 (0.71) Sc4 (0.35) Sc4 (0.71) Sc3 (0.71) Sc3 (0.88) 
Sc5 (1.00) Sc5 (0.18)* Sc5 (0.24) Sc5 
(0.24)* 
Sc4 (0.24)* 
Additive 
consistency  
98 102 88 81 107 
No. (%) of other 
scenarios in 
cluster  
25 (17%) 5 (4%) 16 (14%) 46 (40%) 22 (19%) 
 
 
4.3 Interpreted scenarios. 4.3.1 Distinguishing systemic features of the 
scenarios. Table 5.4 provides the basic ‘skeleton’ of each scenario and shows basic 
differences among variables across the scenarios.   
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Figures 5.2 to 5.7 provide illustrations of the systemic nature the scenarios. The 
figures include short descriptions of the variables and a brief synopsis of interpreted 
conflict outcomes (e.g., “water conflict?” box). Bolded-grey boxes and solid arrows 
indicate key aspects and unique systemic relationships used in scenario interpretation 
(i.e., to craft stories, etc.). Note that dotted lines in the figures indicate a systemic 
relationship between variables exists, but a is less prominent in its systemic composition 
and in terms of use in interpretation.  
Scenario #1: “Mandated to prepare” shows a centrally controlled water 
governance scheme that aims to secure rural community well-being in the face of scarcity 
- although important feedbacks coming from the governing context (outcome 
distributions, water quality, competition, etc.) on to the decision making processes and 
other drivers are missing (in contrast to Scenario #3, for example (Figure 5.4). While this 
missing linkage potentially allows conflict risks by limiting the effectiveness and 
responsiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms (which we see in Scenario #2 and #5), 
no conflict occurs in Scenario #1. With people trusting government (i.e., high legitimacy) 
and little scarcity or water access issues that challenge the governance regime (i.e., less 
competition, water supplies are not decreasing), governance schemes are able to 
successfully avoid harmful conflicts. Scenario #1 allowed for weaving of stories that 
hailed back to the early years of Costa Rican progressive democracy (prior to the 1980s). 
These years saw a far-reaching presence of a highly legitimate State that sought to 
support rural, smallholder farmer lifestyles often through top-down mandates.   
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Figure 5.2 
Systemic representation of Scenario #1: “Mandated preparation” 
In Scenario #2: “Closed-door alliances”, inadequate water governance primarily 
drives (as opposed to challenging contexts) conflict, environmental decline, and unfair 
water access, which negatively reinforces unresponsive and ineffective water governance 
schemes (Figure 5.3). The systemic nature of Scenario #2 is similar to Scenario #3, but 
with features that are negatively rather than positively reinforced.  In contrast to Scenario 
#5, conflict outcomes in Scenario #2 stem primarily from the governance regime itself, 
which takes purposeful actions against the interest of rural communities. Consequently, 
Scenario #2 allowed for storylines of actors that deal with ‘closed-door alliances’ of 
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government agencies, developers, and investors - reminiscent of recent Guanacaste water 
conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 5.3  
Systemic representation of Scenario #2: “Closed-door alliances” 
Responsive civil democracy, active regional leadership, and open decision-
making processes were most effective (in terms of positive governance outcomes) when 
mutually reinforced by each other and by established dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
Scenario #3: “Responsive and engaged”, these drivers positively reinforce each other 
while also supporting institutional legitimacy (e.g., people trust governance) that in turn 
helps facilitate active regional-scale governance and vertical accountability, which are 
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conducive for improved collective water system knowledge and groundwater security 
(Figure 5.4). This distinguishing system of positively reinforcing impact relationships in 
Scenario #3 allows effective mitigation of water conflict in spite of challenging contexts.   
  
Figure 5.4 
Systemic representation of Scenario #3: “Responsive and engaged” 
Scenario #4: “Unnoticed in the background” demonstrates how a prominence of 
mediation with very efficient water infrastructure, combined with a low water-allocation 
priority for natural (forested) systems, allowed for rapid economic development and 
growth. Like Scenario #1, many important systemic feedbacks are missing which allows 
for risk due to low responsiveness and less accountability of the governance regime to 
stakeholders. These missing features would support effective conflict resolution 
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mechanisms, as is the case in Scenario #3. Rather, the governance scheme in Scenario #4 
is similar to Scenario #5 - but with key differences being population growth (in contrast 
to decline), well-maintained water infrastructure, and accessible good quality water, 
which allows for a more economically prosperous scenario that features a decline of 
natural systems and a less active or more apathetic role for civil society organizations 
(such as the PC Commission (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5 
Systemic representation of Scenario #4: “Unnoticed in the background” 
In Scenario #5: Overwhelmed and out of touch, the governing context (i.e., poor 
water quality, dry conditions, etc.) overwhelms weaker governance schemes that lack 
active regional governance actors and institutions, accountability mechanisms, accessible 
decision-making, and a responsive, engaged civil democracy (Figure 5.6).  This 
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overwhelmed situation that also features drier climates and unfair water access helps stem 
population growth in the region. Governance that is overwhelmed by the challenging 
contexts that it faces is a distinguishing systemic feature of Scenario #5.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 
Systemic representation of Scenario #5: “Overwhelmed and out of touch” 
4.3.2 Integrated scenario descriptions. The following scenario descriptions are 
short, integrated summaries of the story lines based on the systemic scenario structures 
highlighted above. The scenario descriptions and their storylines helps animate the 
distinguishing aspects of alternative governance regimes in a way that helped effectively 
communicate the scenarios to diverse groups.  
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Scenario #1: Mandated to prepare  
Guanacaste context: Government emphasizes controlled economic sector 
diversification and streamlined resource management as a mitigation strategy for water 
scarcity.  As a result, many regional and local organizations in the water sector have been 
consolidated in an effort to increase efficiency. Agencies focus on investments and 
stimulus for small to medium size farms. Consequently, the number of multinational 
farms has been reduced. This trend has decreased the overall hectares under irrigation in 
the region, and allowed water quality in many places to remain high. Water-related 
decisions sometimes involve actors outside of central agencies. Despite its dominating 
presence, there is a sense that the public sector is working for the collective good as it did 
during the early years of Costa Rican statehood.. Water reform remains a discussion 
topic; however modifying water policy is difficult if groups outside of central 
government propose modifications.  
In Nicoya: As a part of public sector efficiency improvements, ASADAs in the 
area have been unified under AyA. Consequently, local water management activities 
must be approved by AyA if they are not specified through officially designated 
responsibilities. Consequently, the degree of autonomy that ASADAs had experienced in 
the past has been greatly reduced.  To improve efficiency of water governance in rural 
Guanacaste, local water managers are trained in a specialized program in the 
Capitol.  After which, they are assigned posts based on agency needs. Accordingly, the 
PC Commission no longer coordinates watershed management in Nicoya. With little 
scarcity and a large public sector that largely looks out for rural interests, local 
agricultural businesses are doing well and many tourists still pass through the area.  
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These conditions have helped water competition levels to remain low. Some retired 
members of the PC Commission are skeptical of the ever-present public sector’s ability to 
keep the peace if water scarcity were to become an issue again or if agency leaders were 
to change priorities since accountability mechanisms are not always clear. For now, water 
governance is making efforts to ensure that Nicoyanos have their needs met.   
Scenario #2: Closed-door alliances  
Guanacaste context: The first 50 years of modern Costa Rican (1948-98) 
statehood were characterized by open democracy, strong social support, and high trust in 
government. However recent decades are known for unaccountable, backroom deals 
between alliances consisting of government, investors, and developers and the growing 
separation between national leadership with local communities. The real estate market in 
Guanacaste is booming and, as a result, residential tourism accounts for much the 
region’s economic output which – when combined with a State that is largely 
unresponsive to transitionally rural communities and less rainfall – has led to a decline in 
agriculture in the region. Consequently, dry forest and increasingly more savannas (due 
to drier conditions) are taking back a good portion of the previously irrigated land and 
ranches. Protests over water allocations are common in Guanacaste communities, since 
leaders are still active, and the coast is full of pipelines transporting water to various 
developments. When one water source is gone more pipes are built. Like historic 
conflicts from the early 2000s that were considered anomalies by some, these pipes are 
built overnight to avoid detection by concerned citizens and other active groups.   
In Nicoya: Attempts at water policy reform are made, but unresponsive and 
unengaged governance allows powerful interests to circumvent new initiatives. 10 years 
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ago the PC Commission was a leader advocating for reform, but those efforts were 
fruitless. Frustrated, the PC Commission now supports communities who illegally divert 
water from large developments and oppose closed-door alliances. To avoid potential 
bankruptcy due to very limited support from unreliable broader governance and the 
dominant agencies, ASADAs have pooled resources with other community-based groups 
to self-finance local water projects. Accordingly, ASADAs function as platforms for 
citizens to voice dissatisfaction with inaccessible decision-making processes and with the 
unfair allocation of water, and financial resources and infrastructure resources for 
regional development.  As result of less irrigated agriculture and thus more natural land 
cover in the interior, the area still attracts many international visitors.  After observing 
common water protests and water access issues, many of these visitors end up supporting 
local communities. Consequently, residents are concerned about the increasing number of 
national and international visitors who use the area’s challenges as a platform to promote 
their own agendas. Citizens wonder how long the ‘most peaceful country in the 
America’s’ label is going to last.  
Scenario #3: Responsive and engaged  
Guanacaste: 20 years ago, one of the most comprehensive and internationally-
watched water reform efforts occurred in Costa Rica. Guanacasteco leaders are credited 
for pushing the reform. Over time, the authority to govern water resources in the country 
was gradually distributed over a network of new regional organizations called ‘regional 
institutes for water sustainability (RIWS)’ to better account for the unique challenges 
faced in the dry tropics. A new system of accountability and coordination among 
agencies, private industry, and community groups helped combat once-common 
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corruption. As a result, the transparency of decision-making in the Guanacaste water 
sector is well known - international observers come in order to take lessons back to their 
own countries. The reform however did come with some costs. A deeply entrenched 
economy struggled initially after the reform as international real estate investment fell. 
Initially training personnel was also costly. But the effort paid off. Climate change has 
required tough decisions over development priorities. But, priorities and tough decision 
process are conducted in open and accessible venues. Consequently, Guanacastecos feel 
like valued citizens who have respected input into governing their resources.  
In Nicoya: After the period of water reform, the PC Commission members were 
elected to head the RIWS for Guanacaste.  While each RIWS is free to govern ASADAs 
in their region as they see fit, the Guanacaste RIWS chose to give ASADAs large 
autonomy and invest heavily in their training and their start-up capital. Droughts come 
and go, but due to new collective initiatives there is a high level of shared water system 
knowledge in the region. Consequently, regional development plans, water-use, and 
demand management priorities are publicly negotiated. While the forests that remain in 
protected areas are healthy, some areas are beginning to resemble savannas due to 
changing climatic conditions. However, community and industry representatives meet 
regularly with land managers to discuss the future of the area and its ecosystems. In spite 
of challenges, Nicoyanos are confident they can handle any water-related challenge that 
the future might hold.   
Scenario #4: Unnoticed in the background 
Guanacaste context: Following an unprecedented period of economic 
development Guanacastecos are one of the most economically prosperous groups in 
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Central America. This period felt a lot like the real estate boom on the early 2000’s, but 
without the persistent water conflicts. The voices and leaders of the old environmental 
movements that often contested new development projects have now faded. Backroom 
deals and corruption are no longer an issue like it was at the turn of the century because 
there is largely no need to be publically cautious about new, large development projects 
like there was in the past. Some say this change in community attitudes is due to the long 
period of economic prosperity in Guanacaste, which caused citizens to become apathetic 
to water issues. As a result of this trend, few ecosystems exist in their natural state. Water 
governance mostly functions as a catalyst for economic development. Water managers 
argue there is not enough interest from stakeholders to warrant transparency, and 
accordingly, water-related decisions are taken without broad input. Managers point out 
that if no one is talking about water, then it means they are doing their job - they just keep 
the faucets running.   
In Nicoya: An elaborately engineered system of pipes and treatment plants is 
hidden from view behind the hills that surround Nicoya. Water infrastructure effectively 
buffers most citizens from any impacts from recent development or potential water 
scarcity issues.  Many ASADAs were no longer able to manage the sophisticated water 
infrastructure needs of communities, so the Guanacaste branch of AyA assumed control 
of important water infrastructure in the area.  Following economic catalyst mandates, 
ASADAs are typically left to manage the water needs of less economically important 
areas. Due to increasing demand and environments that have largely diminished in 
quality, water is increasingly expensive to treat and transport, although most residents 
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have regular access to clean water. How water gets to Nicoya, or where it comes from is 
a mystery to residents. For most residents though, the living is easy.    
Scenario #5: Overwhelmed and out of touch 
Guanacaste context: Years ago the State was unable to fulfill social obligations, 
to mediate water conflicts, or to adequately respond to citizen needs. With a weakened 
state and a superficially representative electorate, large agricultural producers 
substantially increased their holdings. Consequently, many large haciendas and their 
politically powerful landowners are found in the lowlands. Years ago the fragmented 
government and powerful few landowners in Guanacaste alarmed foreign investors, 
which eventually pulled their investments from the region. Accordingly, international 
tourism has slowed similar to the economic recession of 2008. Without competition from 
tourism and many communities often disconnected from confusing and water governance 
schemes, large landowners secured large water allocations. Over years of power politics 
being played on the national stage, water agencies eventually became public-private 
organizations, with many Guanacasteco elites holding large influence over them. As a 
result, most water infrastructure is poorly maintained for many communities without 
vested interests in the ruling elite. Most say the climate is drier, but no one has studied 
water systems in the region in many years.    
In Nicoya: Similar to mobilization against trade liberalization in the 1980’s, the 
highlands around Nicoya are a stronghold for small farmer opposition. The more rugged 
terrain is less conducive to effective, large hacienda-style ranches.  ASADAs around 
Nicoya are disconnected from AyA and are consequently very poorly resourced. 
Consequently, ASADA water distribution networks are a patchwork of tubes and pumps 
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that are maintained best they can be. Numerous petitions and envoys are sent to the 
Capitol in attempts to bring attention to water disparities in Guanacaste.  But water 
governance is too fragmented and out of touch with local and regional challenges for any 
meaningful action to be taken. Because many of Guanacaste’s landowning elites have 
large investments in public agencies, Nicoyanos are doubtful that even if actions or new 
policies were taken, that they would effectively resolve water issues.    
4.4 Validated scenarios. The newspaper front page in Scenario #1: “Mandated 
to prepare” told the story of a new central office for water management opening in the 
Capitol being the last step in the centralization of water governance. Other stories told of 
the high numbers of Guanacastecos that trust government and of a member of an 
ASADA doing a training rotation in the Capitol. Most participants generally commented 
that, although seemingly possible, it was a difficult scenario to imagine due to recent 
histories of disengagement between communities and agencies. On the other hand, some 
participants related well to this scenario as a potentially disheartening example of 
confusing current bureaucratic systems that some participants noted were a challenge for 
water managers – especially in terms of securing financial, technical, and administrative 
resources. Overall, a centralized yet benevolent governance system was something that 
participants generally found to be suspicious.  Other participants pointed out that the 
current governance regime struggles to develop policies fit to the unique dry tropical 
context in Guanacaste, and that a more extremely centralized regime like the one 
portrayed in Scenario #1 would likely also struggle with this. Relatively few notes (16% 
of 191 total) placed and discussion involved Scenario #1.   
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Scenario #2: “Closed-door alliances” (combined with Scenario #5) accounted 
for nearly half (48%) of all notes placed and much discussion among participants. Both 
scenarios extend prominent historical and current events into the future. The newspaper 
headlines in Scenario #2 told the story of ASADAs organizing large protests over the 
allocation of water, reminiscent of recent conflicts in the region. Participants generally 
commented that this scenario seemed very real and that the idea of ‘secret agreements’ 
and ‘closed decision-making’ resonated strongly with their current experience. Similar to 
Scenario #5, participants were interested in building connections between the Scenario 
content to their personal experiences. Many participants wanted to contribute ideas to 
help specify why this governance regime in the Scenario #2 led to conflict. For example, 
an agency representative noted how the current lack of collective goals for development 
in the region might factor into such a scenario. Some participants were uncomfortable 
with Scenario #2, but many found it to be the most identifiable and some considered it 
eerily similar to the current state of water governance.  
In contrast to Scenarios #2 and #5, Scenario #3: “Responsive and engaged” 
evoked fewer (16% of notes placed) but much more positive responses from participants.  
The headline told the story of international leaders coming to Guanacaste to observe and 
take lessons from its responsive, accountable, and collaborative water governance model. 
The day-in-the-life of stories related vignettes of citizens from different sectors and their 
involvement in the water governance regime. Participants generally commented that 
more information would be helpful in this scenario – especially regarding how change in 
the governance regime came about through time. Many participants were interested in 
exploring more about the reconciliation between communities and government agencies 
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that would be required in such a scenario. Other participants were interested in seeing 
more details on the decision-making processes and laying out how it works and who is 
involved and at what stage. Overall, participants were enthusiastic about Scenario #3, but 
wanted to see more about the roles that communities (e.g., ASADAs, community groups) 
and other actors would play in helping bring such a governance regime about over time.   
Some participants considered Scenario #4: “Unnoticed in the background” to 
lack information on where the water required for the rapid development portrayed in the 
scenario would come from. The front-page headline in Scenario #4 told the story of 
controversy resulting from water agencies that suggested lowering water consumption 
and commercial interests in the region. Historically, Guanacasteco communities are 
environmentally active and well organized. Considering this, participants expressed 
interest in seeing more detail regarding the ‘taming’ of these communities in the scenario, 
specifically how a change from being active currently to being complacent came about. 
Some thought this scenario would fit well with a water privatization storyline, since 
privatization recently occurred in the energy and communications industries in Costa 
Rica. Yet others countered that under current constitutional laws that water privatization 
was unlikely and may make the scenario seem less real. Some participants saw this as a 
potential scenario if water education, conservation, and demand management activities 
were to subside and they commented that making a link between (poor) education and the 
outcomes in the scenario would improve the scenario’s effectiveness.  
Scenario #5: “Overwhelmed and out of touch”, along with Scenario #2, was one 
of the most discussed scenarios at the workshop. The newspaper headline told of an 
expanding sugar cane empire in the Guanacaste lowlands and the growing social 
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inequalities that resulted from unjust water distributions in the face of challenging climate 
and environmental contexts. Participants commented that, although the outcomes in this 
scenario were extreme, the politics, corruption, and disconnectedness within the 
governance regime was reminiscent of the current politics. Some participants noted that 
the Latifundio doesn’t need to necessarily return, because it still exists today in disguise 
in the Capitol (San José) where it is about vying for political power.  Other participants 
thought this scenario would be a good place to describe superficial national-level political 
processes that fail to make decisions on water reform issues – which is often the case 
currently. Overall, the failed politics described in Scenario #5 struck a chord with 
participants – many of which (often with a sense of humor) linked the scenario to current 
political events and politicians.   
Table 5.5 
Summary of Key Scenario Differences 
 Scenario #1 Scenario #2 Scenario 
#3 
Scenario #4 Scenario #5 
Quick title 
Mandated to 
prepare 
Closed-door 
alliances 
Responsive 
and 
engaged 
Unnoticed 
in the 
background 
Overwhelme
d and out of 
touch 
Theme Cautious  Deception Innovation Apathy  Disconnecti
on 
How water 
governance 
Agency-led 
and top-down 
Governance 
is dominated 
Responsive 
governance 
Governance 
weathers 
Overwhelme
d 
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operates implemented 
mandate to 
prepare for 
water scarcity 
and secure 
rural, 
potentially 
vulnerable 
communities  
 
by closed 
and 
unaccountab
le alliances 
and back-
door 
dealings  
 
emphasizes 
autonomy, 
coordinatio
n, and 
regional-fit 
 
apathy and 
environment
al risk while 
staying out 
of the way 
of economic 
prosperity 
 
governance 
is out of 
touch with 
regional 
challenges 
while elites 
multiply 
landholdings 
 
Distinguishi
ng systemic 
features  
A highly 
controlled 
governance 
schemes that 
has the trust 
of local 
communities 
avoid 
conflicts due 
to more 
accommodati
ng contexts 
Negative 
reinforcing 
feedback 
loops among 
governance 
drivers and 
mediating 
features 
allow for 
governance 
schemes that 
cater to 
Positive 
reinforcing 
feedback 
loops 
between 
governance 
drivers and 
mediating 
features in 
spite of 
challenging 
contexts  
Efficient 
water 
management 
buffers 
potential 
risks while 
less active 
leadership 
allows 
governance 
to operate 
without 
Challenging 
governing 
contexts 
overwhelm 
governance 
schemes that 
are poorly 
adapted to 
regional 
contexts and 
disconnecte
d from local 
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where 
scarcity, 
water access, 
and 
competition 
are not 
prevalent  
interest-
based 
alliances 
that tend to 
circumvent 
due 
processes  
public 
interest 
constituenci
es 
Interpreted 
scenario 
components 
The ever 
present nature 
of central 
government  
Organized 
community 
opposition, 
resistance 
Problem- 
solving, 
confidence, 
trying new 
ideas 
Progress, 
technical 
water 
management
, failed 
demand 
management  
The return 
of the 
Latifundio, 
power 
imbalances, 
power 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Scenario content: Measuring up to the water governance literature.  
Scenario #3: “Responsive and engaged” would, in practice, be a new governance regime 
for Central America - and in many parts of Latin America (Rogers, 2002). In this sense, 
the scenario could offer the general makeup of a ‘business unusual’ approach to water 
governance that Biswas et al. (2009) call for in their review of water management in 
Latin America. The scheme portrayed though is not necessarily new in other regions nor 
is it new theoretically. Scenario #3 could be seen, on the one hand, as an approach to 
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governance described in Meinzen-Dick (2007) where authority and financial 
responsibilities are shared (e.g., co-managed) across groups. On the other hand, the 
scenario could be seen a polycentric approach to water governance – where authority to 
govern water is distributed across nested actors and scales (i.e., local, regional, and 
national) as described in Huitema et al. (2009) and Ostrom (2009; 2010). In theory, these 
types of governance schemes are often prescribed to more adequately cope with 
uncertainty and change (Pahl-Wostl & Kranz, 2010) in comparison to traditional water 
management schemes. Scenario #4: “Unnoticed in the background” portrayed a 
traditional management scheme that was approaching its limit and ability to cope with 
problems using a narrow infrastructure and technological development approach. As 
displayed in Scenario #4, traditional schemes allow for risk in the face of change and 
confronting complex ‘wicked’ problems (Reed & Kasprzyk, 2009) and lack effective 
demand management mechanisms (Brooks & Holtz, 2009).  
Despite known shortcomings of traditional management schemes there remains 
less understanding how exactly alternative propositions - such as the polycentric and 
more responsive water governance prescriptions outlined in Scenario #3 - work or can be 
implemented (or not) in different areas and contexts to best fit to meet certain problems 
(Neef, 2009). Thus, since we did not focus on how each scenario came about, the 
challenge in devising content for Scenario #3 was to allude to a reasonably believable 
implementation path of such a new governance regime. We attempted to do this through 
highlighting the challenges faced over the years of implementation (for example, 
decreased foreign real estate investment and some large commercial farms moving 
initially) and the role ASADAs and existing leaders (i.e., the PC Commission) played in 
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forming the new organizations. We were moderately successful in this regard. As noted, 
relatively little discussion involved Scenario #3 and some participants thought the 
scenario was difficult to imagine. But, the quality of that discussion was generally high 
and not all found the scenario difficult to imagine. For example, a group of ASADA 
representatives identified with Scenario #3’s content because they had previously 
discussed off and on a regional–type of ASADA leadership organization. They viewed 
the scenario as a helpful platform to help articulate the long-term goals of such an effort.   
Scenario #3, however, did not necessarily delve into the political issues and power 
asymmetries (which played out in the form of corrupted alliances, protests, and 
marginalized communities) that are readily apparent in Scenario #2: “Closed-door 
alliances” and Scenario #5: “Overwhelmed and out of touch”. Another major 
governance challenge portrayed in Scenario #2 and #5 was the lack of Guanacaste-
specific water governance schemes that accounted for the unique water challenges 
present in a dry tropical region. Participants were also quick to point that this was a major 
shortcoming of the supposed benevolent governance regime portrayed in Scenario #1: 
“Mandated to prepare”. The scenario content that highlighted these political challenges 
felt the most real to participants. It was also the most concerning to them. For Scenario #2 
in particular, many participants affiliated with locally based organizations commented 
that not only did the scenario seem real or plausible, but it also had closely articulated 
how they personally felt about current water governance. Many examples illustrate water 
governance that does not account for political power, regional contexts and specific 
problems, and other power asymmetries in society (like the water governance portrayed 
in Scenario #2 and #5) will struggle to effectively mitigate complex problems and 
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achieve just outcomes (Swatuk, 2008; Giordano & Shah, 2014). This has important 
implications for the region: in order to make progress toward a more effective and just 
water governance regime that more resembles Scenario #3, realities that may be 
reminiscent to Scenarios #2 and #5 will need to be addressed and overcome. There is no 
quick fix that will make this change (as indicated by the vast differences among the 
scenarios) and making progress on this endeavor will require collective, multifaceted 
governance strategies and new processes. The scenario exercises in themselves did not 
directly address this need. It could even be argued, looking at recent water governance 
analyses and assessments (Kuzdas et al. 2014a; 2014b) that this key need was not newly 
‘discovered’. However the scenarios did offer a profound contribution and advantage: the 
scenario study ultimately allowed an exceptionally large and diverse group of 
stakeholders to collectively articulate and validate this need in an understandable (and 
even fun) way; and it encouraged them to continue and improve collective efforts to 
address this need (which many did - Section 5.3).  
5.2 Strengths and limitations of the formative scenario methodology.  
Flexibility was an important strength of the formative scenario methodology. It allowed 
the scenarios to be tailored to meet the needs of a mostly rural, developing region. 
Importantly, it allowed the scenarios to represent local context, challenges, and 
alternative governance regimes in ways that evoked meaningful responses from diverse 
stakeholders in order to deliberate goals and actions (in later workshop activities) without 
costly, unavailable computerized simulations (i.e., Sheppard et al. 2011; Gober & 
Kirkwood 2010). Flexibility also allowed the scenario building process and the 
communication of scenarios to be tailored to the needs of those involved at different 
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stages. For example, the research team and PC Commission negotiated the contents of the 
scenario posters and agreed not to include scenario system diagrams for the broader 
audience at the workshop – many of whom had not previously worked within such 
models. Additionally, pre-testing in Guanacaste with the diagrams revealed that they 
were most effective (in terms of communicating systemic differences) if compared 
directly and immediately, which the large exhibit-style event did not allow for. However, 
the exhibit-style event was able to effectively involve a very large number of diverse 
stakeholders who typically are not involved in these planning activities. Nevertheless, the 
system diagrams were valuable for helping construct scenario storylines that aligned 
logically within each scenario’s underlying structure. This flexible approach to 
communicating scenarios to different groups worked well in Guanacaste.  
Integrating thorough current state analysis and assessment of governance regimes 
in Guanacaste - that was already engaged and publically visible - with scenario building 
was beneficial. It provided a shared frame of reference for the scenario building process. 
In this case, this shared frame of reference was important in the consultation meetings 
with local partners and stakeholders during the system and consistency analyses steps. 
Compared to the workshop event, relatively few people participated in the system and 
consistency analyses steps - which is typical in these more expert-driven steps of the 
formative approach (Walz et al., 2013). In Guanacaste, these smaller groups were more 
effective in these steps than larger groups. The purpose of these smaller groups was to 
perform the above steps in close consultation with previous current-state research that 
had already engaged and involved many people from the area. In this sense, we aimed for 
the system and constancy analysis steps to reflect, as much as possible (given the limited 
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set of variables), the real-time governance system. In contrast, a purely judgment-based 
approach may be more appropriate in some cases or settings (von Wirth et al., 2013). In 
contexts like Guanacaste with heterogeneous stakeholder groups and potentially 
significant power imbalances within those groups, our slightly modified approach to the 
early steps of the formative scenario approach may be worth considering. The key 
success factor here is that stakeholders already trusted the results of those previous 
studies because they had been highly engaged with them. Tangible current state research 
that directly addresses real problems (that are likely highly visible in regions like 
Guanacaste, i.e., water conflict) offers a valuable starting point to building trust, to 
organizing a sufficient body of current-state evidence that is seen as valid by diverse 
groups, and to understanding diverse stakeholder groups – all of which were key 
precursors to successfully employing the formative scenario steps in Guanacaste.  
In this case, having a small but diverse stakeholder group – the PC Commission – 
central in the scenario building process was key. Importantly, the PC Commission is 
highly respected in the region, and positioning them in a way where they essentially 
became the intended users of the scenarios helped to avoid any potential legitimacy 
issues with the scenarios coming into the large stakeholder workshop. With the PC 
Commission in a central role, stakeholders were open to discuss even controversial 
scenario content at the workshop. A subtle benefit of this was the willingness of the PC 
Commission to be a named actor in each scenario. Workshop participants knew the PC 
Commission, and seeing/ comparing its different roles and activities in the scenarios was 
an effective communication strategy. We received many comments directly mentioning 
the PC Commission’s activities in the scenarios. Thus in the Guanacaste context, the 
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limited but effective participation scheme at the start of the scenario building, combined 
with key partnerships, and followed by a very open participation scheme towards the end 
seemed optimal. Other cases will require different approaches to participation at different 
stages that fit the context.  
We did not use the method to explore development pathways, i.e., how different 
alternatives could happen over time, which was pointed out by workshop participants. 
We found that scenarios alone cannot adequately support necessary change processes and 
activities, which is in line with previous findings and concepts (i.e., Wiek et al., 2006). 
Scenarios must then be incorporated into collective strategy building activities (ideally as 
a part of a broader transformational planning process) in order to have practical relevance 
for stakeholders. We found that quickly demonstrating this application in later workshop 
activities with stakeholders was important. As an critical step to prime for these later 
‘application demonstration’ activities in the workshop, deliberating scenario content in an 
open format with a representative and diverse group of stakeholders effectively supported 
people to articulate what futures were desirable (or not) as a first step to planning and 
taking coordinated action. In this sense, motivating workshop participants who 
collectively could change regional water governance was a success of the workshop that 
was supported by the formative scenario method that was slightly adapted to fit the 
Guanacaste context. The general lesson here is that engagement, commitment over a 
sufficient period of time, and trust matter, methods can be adapted in transparent ways to 
fit problems and contexts, and that in water contested-regions like Guanacaste that face 
urgent and complex problems, there is significant opportunity for research that does these 
things to make positive impacts.  For scenarios specifically, a timely demonstration of 
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their real application for governance actors, ideally situated within a transformational 
planning process (i.e., Wiek, in review), can help maximize these positive impacts.  
5.3 Practical use of scenarios in follow-up activities: Successes and 
challenges. Workshop activities that followed the scenario building and validation 
exercise evaluated scenarios, identified priorities, and created strategies to avoid negative 
futures and achieve more positive ones. These follow-up activities quickly demonstrated 
the practical value of the scenarios. During this latter part of the workshop, participants, 
many of whom had not worked together before, exchanged contact information, 
suggested ideas, and offered to share resources and data with those who needed them. 
Many collaborative invitations were extended, including one to join a new coordination 
platform in Nicoya. After the workshop, several new efforts aimed to improve 
governance cooperation within the region. Much focus is now placed on leadership 
development in Nicoya, with the PC Commission assuming an important role. Several 
ASADAs, who have experienced conflict in the past, implemented a series of meetings to 
address ideas to share resources and to consolidate their organizations (the same 
ASADAs mentioned at the end of Section 5.1 that discussed Scenario #3: “Responsive 
and engaged”.) These ASADAs started emphasizing internal human resources 
development, which is a significant paradigm shift for organizations that are historically 
only concerned with service-area infrastructure and collecting water-use fees. The 
scenarios were important reference points for stakeholders around Nicoya in the several 
months that followed the workshop. These efforts though have encountered barriers. 
Political corruption, lack of transportation, and low investment in communications 
infrastructure are a few examples. But recognizing, locating, and defining those barriers 
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has been beneficial. It has allowed new leaders to begin planning how to overcome 
barriers. As local leadership has grown, as new actions have been taken, and barriers 
discovered, there is less frequent operational reliance on the scenarios (i.e., being 
referenced in planning meetings).  
The marked deficiency of reliable and accessible hydro-climatological 
information (and monitoring systems) remains a substantial void for Guanacaste water 
governance that presents acute challenges. Yet the governance scenarios, to some extent, 
initially helped revitalize regional organization and coordination around Nicoya to the 
point where collective strategies and the re-allocation of some personnel, financial, and 
technical resources to address this key knowledge gap could be more efficient. In turn, 
once new information is obtained and processed, the improved organization of the 
governance regime (assuming it stays improved or keeps improving) will potentially 
provide opportunities to capitalize on more effective avenues to formulate and implement 
adapted policies that will better position the region to meet complex water challenges. In 
this sense, the jump-start that the governance scenarios provided to better organize a very 
fragmented water governance regime was their most valuable application.   
6. Conclusion  
In Guanacaste, we found governance scenarios were well-equipped tools to 
initially support the mending of the fragmented parts of a regional water governance 
regime. The scenarios provided a means for actors to contribute their perspectives, to 
connect with each other, and to collectively examine which ‘direction’ Guanacaste water 
governance could go and what that could mean for the region. Local history, context, and 
challenges resonated with participants in the scenarios. Engaged and linked current-state 
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research, the timely demonstration of scenario application (i.e., goal setting and strategy 
building) with stakeholders, and a constructive, participatory scenario building approach 
were important factors that helped boost scenario value. If many water governance 
regimes are proving inadequate, as they have been in Guanacaste, then understanding 
alternative governing options is critical. Also critical, is that people who can collectively 
change governance understand key needs in order to realize alternative, more just water 
governance schemes. In Guanacaste - a developing context featuring low data 
availability, high urgency, and water conflict - governance scenarios were an effective 
step in this direction.  
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Chapter 6 
Governance transition strategies for a water-contested and climate-threatened 
region 
1. Introduction  
Effective and sustainable water governance is a priority for Costa Rica, and the 
need is most apparent in the dry tropics of Guanacaste Province. At least 65 water 
conflicts (defined by legal action taken by one or more parties against another party) 
between 1997 and 2006 were documented in Guanacaste (Ramírez, 2007)—one water 
conflict every 56 days in a land area only slightly smaller than Los Angeles County but 
with a population thirty times smaller.  
Guanacaste was Costa Rica’s last frontier for development. It was known for its 
cowboys, heat, and bumpy roads. Today, a population that has increased five-fold since 
1950, an economy that is increasingly open to global markets, and the continued 
expansion of irrigated agriculture and tourism infrastructure have created intense 
competition for water resources. Guanacaste also accounts for a large amount of Costa 
Rica’s foreign direct investment, agricultural production, and electricity generation. A 
more sidelined province on the national political stage (Edelman, 1999), Guanacaste may 
not have the influence it should with the capitol’s water politics. Regardless, how water is 
governed in Guanacaste will play an important role that helps determine how sustainable 
Costa Rica’s future will be.  
Table 6.1  
Hoping for a Water Solution in La Esperanza (Loaiza, 2013; Bran, 2013) 
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The rural community of La Esperanza (pop. 800) in the Municipalidad de Nicoya has 
been without running water for months. The water problem in La Esperanza illustrates 
the inefficiencies of water governance in Guanacaste and in Costa Rica generally. An 
earthquake in September 2012 damaged the community’s aquifer and wells. In 
December, when the rains stopped, the damaged wells ran dry.  Response has been 
slow.  There is a large well nearby, but it is on private land, and the local rural water 
administrator (ASADA) does not have the technical or financial resources to resolve 
the issue. Poorly coordinated public agencies with overlapping responsibilities have 
been slow to find a resolution. The Municipalidad, under direction of the mayor, is 
now leading efforts with public agencies to resolve the issue, though the case is outside 
its responsibilities. Regional governments have been increasingly active and willing to 
lead resource governance, which may indicate that positive change is on the horizon. 
Note: The above table appeared as an insert box in the original published article.  
An institutional and regulatory framework that has not changed significantly in 
over half a century largely determines water governance in Costa Rica. The legal 
backbone of water resources management in Costa Rica, the Ley de Agua (Water Law), 
has remained virtually unchanged since 1942. The Ley de Agua defines water as a public 
good and the Constitution protects citizens’ rights to a healthy and clean environment. 
However, legal loopholes (e.g., water is not currently defined as a human right, despite 
being a public good), the proliferation of public organizations, confusion over agency 
responsibilities, and ill-defined governing roles have created a fragmented system of 
water governance (Ballestero et al., 2007). The system is prone to corruption, is 
unresponsive to citizens, and is disconnected with many basin- and community-based 
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water managers. These troubles combine to make the current water governance system 
poorly equipped to handle the urgent and multi-faceted water challenges of the twenty-
first century (Calvo, 1990). Despite repeated efforts at reform in recent years, each one 
has stalled in the Asamblea Legislativa, which makes the final decision on reform 
proposals (Arias, 2011).  
The 2008 economic recession and, the ensuing slow down of development in 
Guanacaste, have offered a chance to revisit and re-imagine water governance. Despite 
hurdles at the national level, efforts to create a new model of water governance in 
Guanacaste are underway. Here we recount the progress and insights from one of these 
efforts - a project titled: Toward Sustainable Governance of Water Resources in 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica. This project, based out of Arizona State University and in 
partnership with the Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital (Potrero-
Caimital Watershed Management Commission), focuses on quality water governance 
research that is integrated with outreach to engage citizens and decision-makers and the 
promotion of project findings and material for water administrators, citizens, scientists, 
and lawmakers. A major effort of the project was organizing and leading a collaborative 
workshop—one the largest events for regional water governance in recent years – to help 
inform a proposed action plan for sustainable water governance in Guanacaste.  
2. The Collaborative Workshop 
On March 14, 2013, 46 individuals from 18 Guanacaste communities participated 
in the first collaborative workshop for water governance in the region.  Participants 
represented eleven rural water administrators (ASADAs), six public agencies, regional 
governments, tourism, agriculture, community groups, and environmental groups. The 
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positions that participants held in the public water sector ranged from agency directors to 
part-time water administrators in communities with fewer than 1,000 people. Participants 
worked together for over seven hours to help build five future scenarios of water 
governance, assess the sustainability of each, identify water governance priorities that 
determined whether a scenario was sustainable or not, and develop strategies to avoid 
negative scenarios and achieve the best outcomes. 
Workshop participants agreed on five governance priorities needed to achieve 
water sustainability in the region. First, governance must be initially well coordinated 
among different local and regional actors. Second, decisions must be made in transparent 
and open arenas. Third, policies should be modifiable based on changing human needs 
and environmental conditions. Fourth, groundwater resources should be secured within 
natural limits. Finally, commitments must be obtained to support effective regional and 
basin-scale organizations. These priorities were considered key to bringing about a 
sustainable model of water governance in Guanacaste to support healthy communities, 
distribute water fairly, and help ensure ecosystem integrity and equal economic 
opportunity.  
Table 6.2  
A New Era for Cooperation in the Mala Noche? 
There is nearly one autonomous rural water administrator (ASADA) for every 2000 
people in Costa Rica, so cooperation among river basins can be a challenge. The 28 
km2 Mala Noche Sub-basin, located near the town of Sámara in Nicoya County on the 
Pacific Coast has three ASADAs, which have been in conflict with one other over 
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issues such as development projects, water rights, and private interests (Kuzdas, 2012). 
All the Mala Noche ASADAs, along with eight others, attended the workshop. The 
ASADA representatives exchanged contact information and a new leader volunteered 
to serve as the central contact for under-funded ASADAs that lack adequate 
communications equipment. During the workshop, the Mala Noche ASADAs were 
also invited to participate in the County of Nicoya’s new Coordination Platform. The 
future looks positive for water cooperation in the Mala Noche. But the question 
remains: will pubic agencies and lawmakers fully commit to and invest in these 
grassroots water governance efforts? 
 
Note: The above table appeared as an insert box in the original published article.  
3. An Action Plan 
Participants worked in sub-groups to develop strategies based on the five 
priorities for water governance that were identified through scenario evaluation exercises 
at the workshop. Each sub-group presented its strategies, which identified actions to be 
taken, leaders, resources, and expected barriers to successfully taking action. Following 
the workshop, the research team and partners in the Comisión para el Manejo de las 
Cuencas Potrero-Caimital synthesized the following systematic action plan embodying 
the strategies developed by workshop participants and the insights obtained from the 
group discussions that followed each strategy presentation.  The action plan identifies 
four action items, potential barriers, and ways to overcome those barriers. 
3.1 Investment in the human element of water governance.  Progress toward 
sustainable and effective water governance depends on investment in human resources. 
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There are at least two opportunities for investment in the human aspect of water 
governance in Guanacaste. Communications equipment: Coordination requires effective 
communication. Many ASADAs in Guanacaste lack basic communication equipment.  
Water governance in Guanacaste would look very different if every ASADA could be 
reached (and reach others) through email, phone, or social media.  National leadership 
must consider investing in communications equipment for Guanacaste ASADAs. 
Cooperation venues: Coordination requires effective cooperation, and effective 
cooperation requires healthy professional and working relationships.  The workshop we 
led could be replicated for less than $1,000. The cost could be split between participating 
organizations and led annually by regional and community actors.  The event could help 
participants refine water governance strategies for communication and cooperation, 
report on strategy implementation, and solidify working relationships.  
Admittedly, use of some communications equipment, especially the Internet, 
email, and social media, might be a challenge for ASADA personnel who are 
unaccustomed to it. But effective communication is an important precursor to new 
cooperation venues.   
One initial way to address communication barriers is to use interns as 
office/professional aides for ASADAs while new communications equipment is being 
integrated into management practices.  Interns could learn valuable professional skills as 
well as science, and perhaps also earn class credit.  Over time these internships could turn 
into highly competitive and desired learning opportunities for young citizens. Until a 
water-specific venue is institutionalized in the region, the new public sector coordination 
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platform in Nicoya, led by the mayor’s office, could function as a cooperation venue for 
the water sector. 
3.2 Investment in small-scale monitoring equipment. Though effectively 
discussing and negotiating water needs is critical for basin-scale cooperation in 
Guanacaste, this is very difficult to do without knowing how much water is going where 
and for what purpose. National and regional leadership should fund and distribute water 
meters for Guanacaste ASADAs and openly share information with community and 
regional leaders on how much water is being allocated to tourism and agriculture. 
A core barrier is likely to be the weak political will of national organizations to 
fund monitoring equipment for small-scale water management in rural areas. The open 
sharing of water-use information with communities may also be seen as a political risk in 
light of recent conflicts between large water users and communities. Nevertheless, a 
unified voice from ASADAs would be politically difficult to ignore.  
To initially overcome barriers related to lacking political will, regional offices of 
agencies often have equipment that is available for shared use.  ASADAs within a basin 
or sub-basin could also pool resources to purchase shared water meters. Water use data 
for large-scale tourism and agriculture exists, but not in one place.  Sharing this 
information in real time would require ASADAs to have access to an open database and 
the Internet (e.g., communications equipment). To help defray the investment in 
communications infrastructure, a regional task force for ASADAs could help locate new 
revenue opportunities, like fee or tax restructuring at the municipal level or stiffer 
penalties for individuals that do not pay ASADA water bills.  
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3.3 Legal commitment to basin-scale planning for water resources. If people 
in Guanacaste are to govern their water resources sustainably, they must have the legal 
backing and authority to do so. National leadership should embark on a transparent 
process that explicitly involves leaders from the Guanacaste water sector to delineate 
more authority and resources to basin-wide and regional water managers. 
Changing laws at a national scale often requires dealing with corruption, the 
influence of powerful interest groups, and significant bureaucratic red tape. Also, 
delineating authority or power to basin-scale managers might seem threatening to special 
interests that benefit politically or financially from weak basin-scale management.  
Municipalidades, many of which are allies with ASADAs and community groups, 
could modify the purpose and implementation process of regional Regulatory Plans that 
are already in place and undergo regular updates. Such actions could help to avoid the 
barriers related to national-level bureaucracy and powerful special interests. With some 
legal adjustments, these Plans could be used to begin laying the initial groundwork for 
basin-oriented water resource planning. National allies, such as the Programa de Gestión 
Integral del Recurso Hídrico have been pushing for basin-scale planning in Costa Rica 
and could be called upon to support these efforts in Guanacaste.  
3.4 Investment in a pilot project that incorporates the above three points in 
Nicoya. A pilot project in Nicoya County would be inexpensive and provide valuable 
insight into successfully implementing these actions across Guanacaste in the most 
effective and feasible way.  
However, a pilot project would face certain implementation barriers. Uncertainty 
about the ability to communicate, coordinate, and disseminate the results of such a 
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project could inhibit commitment from some actors who may not yet trust governing 
processes. Potentially divided interests within the region might also hinder the 
willingness of local stakeholders to invest their effort, time, and resources into these 
collaborative projects.  
To overcome these barriers to trust and commitment, already vested communities 
could identify leadership teams to pool their resources. They could start small, and then 
develop a system of accountability and expectations, like attending meetings regularly, 
following through, and responsiveness, in order to secure full commitment from 
stakeholders. The Mayor’s Office in Nicoya recently implemented a new accountability 
system to ensure participation in regional meetings. That could serve as a model. 
Investment in communications infrastructure is a key synergistic action to help improving 
the potential participants’ trust in and commitment to new governing processes and 
experiments.  
4. Looking Ahead  
Progress is already evident in Guanacaste. Participants at the workshop, many of 
whom had not worked together before, exchanged contact information with each other, 
suggested ideas, and offered resources to those who needed them throughout the day. 
One regional agency offered its extra water meters to several ASADA representatives. 
Another group offered access to extensive studies of groundwater reserves in one 
particular area. A contact list of participants was distributed to those in the group. 
Potential new leadership for the region was identified, and one participant offered to 
serve as the primary point of contact for ASADAs that could not be easily reached in the 
region. Another participant extended invitations to the larger group to join the new 
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Coordination Platform in Nicoya. Nevertheless, much work remains.   
Table 6.3  
An Engaged and Integrated Research Approach.  
Major progress has been made in recent decades to identify the common success 
factors of resource governance systems (Ostrom, 2009; Allen, 2012). In the water 
sector, decision-makers are increasingly facing daunting challenges driven by 
dwindling water supplies, growing demand, and highly complex institutions. As a 
result, research on water governance may be out of sync with the professional needs of 
decision-makers (2012). In Costa Rica, we found that decision-makers are enthusiastic 
about research results that offer actionable knowledge (Kuzdas et al., 2012). In 2012, 
we delivered a report to the Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital 
that was used to secure some protection of a groundwater reserve in one area. But our 
partners in the commission reminded us that the research contained in the report, 
although helpful, was not necessarily informative about ways to address the more 
challenging water issues in the region over time. We have since integrated research on 
the current state (how things are), possible future states (to identify goals), and 
governance strategies (to help achieve goals). Our partners in the Comisión now model 
this integrated approach in their watershed planning efforts, which in 2013 will be 
expanded to also cover the Río Quirimán in Nicoya.   
 
Note: The above table appeared as an insert box in the original published article.  
Water governance is understood as the set of collective actions that aim toward a 
common goal and are coordinated among diverse stakeholder groups (Lubell et al., 
	  
	  
221 
2008). The recent efforts in Guanacaste, then, are positive steps toward reconfiguring 
water governance in the region. But the broader push for water reform in Costa Rica is 
not yet coherent. Some reform measures compete with one other at the national level, and 
many of the grossly underfunded ASADAs in Guanacaste petition for various things at 
different times. A key step to move forward will be to unify, to some extent, the water 
reform efforts at both a regional (Guanacaste) and national scale. To help jumpstart this 
step, our team distributed a document outlining the four action items to workshop 
participants, to national water sector leaders, and to members of the Asamblea 
Legislativa. Our team has also distributed material based on our research to a variety of 
groups through fax, newspaper, radio, email, social media, and community events in 
close collaboration with leaders in the region.  These efforts have shed light on key 
considerations for leadership in the region, which will take on the responsibility to: 
(1) Balance the need for new organizations and institutions in an already saturated and 
complex public (water) sector. Creating new organizations that are effective may 
require an initial reduction in or a consolidation of some existing organizations. 
(2) Make available processes that identify the resources (financial, personnel, and 
technical) that already exist in the region. Existing resources and opportunities to 
secure new resources must be made clear to those who are spearheading action on 
the items listed above.  
(3) Make a joint, timely effort to push for amending the Constitution to define water as a 
universal human right. Defining water as an explicit human right has often been the 
cornerstone of water reform efforts that fall short. Thus, some preliminary steps 
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might be needed before such a Constitutional amendment can be successfully 
achieved. 
(4) Establish processes to define development goals at the regional or local scale.  
Communities, especially those along the Pacific Coast in Guanacaste, must begin 
these collective discussions before the real estate market begins growing again 
which will put additional pressure on water governance in the region.  
(5) Document, evaluate, and modify action plans and strategies as needed. Partnerships 
with universities will provide opportunities for action plans and strategy evaluations.  
Guanacaste leaders and communities are in a position to make a unified push for 
national water reform while simultaneously implementing actions to advance water 
sustainability from within the region. Progress is already being made. Though barriers 
remain, Guanacaste can move forward despite the failure of national lawmakers to 
modify water policies in light of citizens’ needs. When water reform does happen—and 
with enough momentum it eventually will—Guanacaste will be in a position to capitalize 
on current water sustainability efforts. 
The path to a sustainable water future in Costa Rica therefore must go through 
Guanacaste.  Guanacastecos know that. They are working to create new model of water 
governance.  But the question still remains: when will the rest of the country—and its 
national leaders—realize this and get on board? 
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Table 6.4  
A Systematic Action Plan to Advance Sustainable Water Governance in Guanacaste 
Action item #1 
Investment in the 
human element of 
water governance 
(communications 
equipment and 
cooperation venues) 
Action item #2 
Investment in 
small scale 
monitoring 
equipment 
Action item #3 
Legal commitment 
to basin-scale 
planning for water 
resources 
Action item #4 
Investment in a 
Pilot Project (Test 
#1-3) in Nicoya 
Barrier(s): Low 
professional 
communication 
expectations; 
cultures of poor 
communication; 
Little experience 
with newer 
communication 
modes  
Barrier(s):  Low 
political will of 
national-scale 
funders; perception 
of political risk to 
share water-use 
info 
Barrier(s): 
Corruption; 
powerful interest 
group influences; 
difficulty of 
penetrating 
national-level 
bureaucracies 
Barrier(s): 
Potential divided 
interests within 
region and 
uncertainty about 
ability to 
disseminate / 
communicate 
results 
To overcome 
barrier: ASADA 
To overcome 
barrier: Allies in 
To overcome 
barrier: Modify 
To overcome 
barrier: Identify 
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internship program; 
regular workshops 
funded by 
participating 
organizations; use 
new Coordination 
Platform 
agency branch 
offices; pooling 
resources; task 
force to define new 
revenue sources for 
ASADAs 
the purpose and 
implementation 
process of regional 
Regulatory Plans to 
circumvent wait 
time to change 
national water 
policy 
and fully commit to 
regional leadership 
team; pool 
resources; 
investment in 
communications 
equipment 
Existing resources: 
Nicoya 
Coordination 
Platform; New 
ASADA leadership; 
Regional political 
allies (mayors) 
Existing 
resources: 
University 
information 
infrastructure; 
development 
association allies 
Existing 
resources: Media 
allies (political 
pressure); 
Regulatory Plan 
funds; Regional 
political allies 
(mayors); National 
allies 
Existing resources: 
New ASADA 
leadership; Nicoya 
Coordination 
Platform;  
 
Key considerations/ responsibilities for local and regional leaders to move 
forward 
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Balancing the creation of new organizations with the need to reduce institutional 
complexity/ consolidate  
Identifying resources in the region and channeling those resources toward priority 
actions 
Detecting the right time to push efforts that aim to explicitly define water as a 
Constitutional human right 
Establishing processes that define and re-define goals for development at regional or 
smaller scales 
Partnering with research organizations to document, evaluate, modify strategies in real-
time 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: How water can be governed sustainably in water-contested and climate-
threatened regions and how people can transition water governance regimes from 
current to sustainable ones in these regions 
1. Introduction 
In this final chapter, I first (in Section 2) briefly report on other project activities 
and explain their role and importance in the broader project.  In Section 3, I recap how 
the three objectives of the dissertation were met by addressing the individual sub-
questions (outlined in the introduction) under each objective.  This information is 
reported in the individual dissertation chapters, but is re-organized here for the purposes 
of this concluding dissertation chapter. Some readers may prefer to read the relevant 
chapter, while others may prefer to read here only the answers to some questions under 
certain dissertation objectives. Section 4 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation 
to the current state of knowledge following each of the three dissertation objectives. A 
discussion and initial reflection on the evolution of the project’s research and planning 
framework is presented in Section 4.2.  Section 5 outlines practical contributions made to 
water governance efforts in Guanacaste.   
2. Brief Summary of Other Key Research Activities  
 A number of relevant research activities occurred which are not presented in full 
chapter detail in this dissertation. Two such activities included a multi-criteria evaluation 
of the sustainability of the scenarios/ alternative water governance regimes developed in 
Chapter 5 and the initial real-time testing of governance transition strategies that were 
developed and outlined in Chapter 6.  
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2.1 Summary of the multi criteria scenario/ governance alternative 
evaluation and its role.  Research from Guanacaste has made it clear that current water 
governance regimes are not sufficiently addressing complex challenges (Chapter 2).  By 
investigating these issues with stakeholders, efforts from project partners have attempted 
to re-orient governance regimes toward more sustainable pathways; and, these efforts 
have been met with some, but limited success (Chapter 3).  Chapter 5 (partially informed 
by Chapter 4, i.e., how conflict could play out in alternative governance regimes) 
developed a coherent and consistent set of alternative water governance regimes in 
Guanacaste.  However just developing alternatives does not necessarily place normative 
values on those scenarios. In other words, which scenarios should governance processes 
and actors aim for and which should be avoided?  The multi criteria evaluation of the 
alternative governance scenarios addressed this question and occurred immediately after 
the scenario development activity with the 46 participants (divided into sub-groups) in 
the March 2013 workshop.  The formative scenario methodology described in Chapter 5 
allowed for a unique opportunity to assess the scenarios using a multi-criteria analysis 
approach. The approach focused on defining ‘sustainability thresholds’ for a small set of 
variables and then comparing the sustainability performances of each scenario and the 
current state based on ‘distances’ from those defined thresholds.  The discussion after the 
evaluation activity focused on the key parts of those scenarios that systemically helped 
determine how far the scenarios were from those ‘thresholds’. Details on the methods and 
procedures are contained in Appendix E.  This evaluation exercise was one of the first 
collaborative and collective efforts in the study area to attempt to sort out goals, aspects 
to avoid, etc. across such a diverse group of stakeholders. Decision support tools, 
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including scenarios and multi criteria analysis, are often proposed by researchers to 
support such collective efforts. Results of these efforts though are often mixed: scenarios 
tend to overlook current challenges; multi criteria approaches often only include a 
handful of experts; and approaches that combine scenarios, multi criteria analysis, and 
other decision support tools often lack a strategic (e.g., how to we go that direction while 
avoiding those directions starting from here and right now) imperative.  The largest 
contribution of the scenario evaluation was to support an initial identification of goals - 
through comparing the sustainability performances of alternative governance regime, in a 
novel and very strategic way. The evaluation exercise fed directly into governance 
transition strategy building.  
2.2 Summary of further building and beginning to test strategies and their 
role. Governance transition strategies refer to the coordinated actions of governing actors 
that aim to overcome problems, to identify barriers to success, to locate and secure 
resources needed to act and overcome barriers, and to devise alternative courses of action 
as needed. Developing and, to some extent testing, governance strategies in Costa Rica 
found direct and indirect pathways through which diverse governance actors could over 
time address a politically stubborn and often-unjust water governance regime that is 
largely controlled by actors located away from the unique, dry tropical context of rural 
Guanacaste.  In the March 2013 workshop, sub-groups selected a workable set of key 
aspects of the governance regimes  (that were discussed in the previous activity as 
important components that determined the sustainability performances of the governance 
scenarios and the current state) in order to build governance transition strategies.  The 
purpose of this activity had two parts: (1) to introduce governing actors to the 
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components and concept of transition strategies, and (2) to actually build transition 
strategies.  Six sub groups worked on a large ‘building a governance transition strategy 
template” (See Appendix F) and then presented their strategies. In doing so, leaders for 
the principal actions were discussed and identified, resources needed to carry out the 
actions were discussed and identified (and in some cases offered to others), barriers were 
identified and discussed, and further actions were discussed.  In total, participants created 
six transition strategies ,which were then synthesized by researchers and partners in the 
PC Commission into the strategies presented in Chapter 6.   
Various actors have since attempted to implement components of the strategies.  
Some have been successful, others have not, and others have found mixed results.  For 
example, members of the Potrero-Caimital Watershed Management Commission 
(Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital, PC Commission) were 
invited to contribute to water reform talks in February 2014. Attempting to engage with 
and contribute to currently inadequate, broader water governance schemes that negatively 
affect Guanacaste was an important component of the proposed transition strategies in 
Chapter 6.  In another case, a small group of community-run drinking water associations 
(ASADAs) successfully implemented standing regional meetings in order to begin 
formation and unification of a coastal water managing body. Addressing the lack of 
effective regional governance, which has negative affects on water governance in 
Guanacaste, was an important component of the transition strategies developed in 
Chapter 6. These efforts by the ASADAs were successful over their first months and 
improved the previously poor collaboration in the area that was at least in part driving 
conflict.  However an unexpected leadership changes in one ASADA has hampered 
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progress and presented new barriers concerning leadership development.  Other efforts to 
build more effective regional scales of water governance though have moved forward, as 
illustrated by the recent efforts of the PC Commission which now operate and help lead 
the governance efforts in four watersheds near Nicoya. This real-time testing of the 
strategies (e.g., trying them and seeing how they work or not) has provided new insights 
into what it will take to actually implement successful sustainable water governance in 
the region.  This work on testing strategies continues beyond this dissertation.  
3. Meeting the Dissertation Objectives and Addressing Questions  
Below I provide a recap of the answers for questions stated under each objective 
in the dissertation introduction.  Note that this information is found in the chapters above 
and more detail can found in the indicated chapters.  
  3.1 Dissertation Objective #1. To clarify the process and design features of 
sustainable water governance and potential barriers to implementation, especially in the 
context of climate threatened, water-contested, and developing regions. 
  How is water currently governed in a water-contested and climate-threatened 
region in the Central American dry tropics? (Chapter 2) 
  Regional water governance in Guanacaste operates within a hybrid institutional 
structure that features several national agencies at higher levels, a handful of regional-
scale actors, and many sub-regional to local actors that are mostly arraigned around 
agency offices in semi-rural areas (i.e. provincial capitols) or that are often disconnected 
in the more rural areas. Institutional responsibilities are dictated through formal 
organizational hierarchies, which are then implemented through a set of increasingly 
disconnected administrative units as the scale changes to more rural contexts. Nationally, 
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the Environment Ministry (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones, 
MINAET) MINAET and the national water agency (Instituto Costarricense de 
Acueductos y Alcantarillados, AyA) are legally obligated to coordinate with each other 
and with other agencies in order to execute broader efforts, rule making, and new water-
related initiatives. Article 50 of Costa Rica’s Constitution establishes citizen’s rights to a 
healthy and clean environment. Since water sources and major infrastructure are held in 
trust by the State in accordance to the 1942 Water Law, fulfilling Article 50’s mandate 
falls onto agencies. Yet, there is little institutional clarity of who should be involved with 
implementing, and enforcing rules at regional to local scales. Regionally, MINAET and 
AyA did not execute water-related activities in coordination with each other, while other 
water governance-related agencies (such as the Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas 
Riego y Avenamiento, SENARA) were often not present. AyA and MINAET, who hold a 
large degree of power through water management and allocation mandates, operated in 
separate governing domains (although with overlapping responsibilities). Accordingly, 
the characteristics of regional water governance changed significantly as AyA (mainly 
influencing water delivery and outflows domains) and MINAET (mainly influencing 
water supply and use domains) exchanged prominent positions as water governance 
unfolded from sourcing water to delivery, use, and post-use within the regional water 
system.  
  Notably, the actions and presence of non-state community and collective leaders 
increased collaborative activity within the governance regime. High levels of coordinated 
activity among governance actors are present in the water supply domain, where the PC 
Commission and its affiliate NicoyAgua were most active. In spite of challenges, 
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cooperation is still significantly boosted in comparison to the other governance domains 
because the presence of the PC Commission allows involvement of some rural ASADA 
communities in governing processes - although, ASADA involvement also depends on 
individual abilities, will, and operating resources.  
Results in Chapter 2 show surface flows in rivers substantially fluctuate and 
decrease during dry seasons, indicating the importance of adequately maintaining 
groundwater sources – which is a notable challenge given little is known about 
groundwater capacity and the minimal management and use coordination. Chapter 2 also 
notes that collective knowledge does exist to initially estimate surface flows with 
moderate confidence. However, as noted in workshops, some more rural water user 
groups do not necessarily have access to this knowledge. Additionally, independent rural 
smallholder farmers who rely on springs and feeder streams often do not have the capital 
to drill wells, leaving them potentially vulnerable to water scarcity during dry periods. 
Although moderate knowledge exists regarding surface flows, we found that very little 
was collectively known about how much is used or needed by different economic sectors 
and groups and minimum needed flows for healthy ecosystems, both of which were cited 
by some interviewees as posing major challenges for governance to fairly negotiate just 
water allocations and for improving overall environmental quality.  
In rural Guanacaste, the de-concentrated water administrative scheme became 
functionally fragmented as scale was reduced. De-concentrated refers to the physical 
expansion of public agencies outside of a central/ capitol location (Meinzen-Dick & 
Knox, 1999). Within watersheds, formal administrative units struggled to communicate 
across and within jurisdictions and to coordinate their localized actions. Decentralization 
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schemes (referring to actual transferred decision-making and financing responsibilities to 
local units such as ASADAs) were simultaneously present with the more centralized, de-
concentrated schemes. Eakin et al. (2011) use evidence from Mexico to demonstrate that 
centralized water governance can struggle to make decisions that are appropriate to local 
contexts and needs. Similarly, here we saw that responsibilities for water governance in 
Guanacaste often fell on agency branches that follow directives from higher-ups in Costa 
Rica’s capitol region, an area that faces a different set of water-related problems (i.e., 
urban runoff, increased diversity of users, more complex distribution and collection 
infrastructure) that notably involves less pronounced dry seasons and less reliance on 
groundwater for both domestic and economic purposes (Ballestero et al., 2007). Agency 
branches in Nicoya struggled to collectively organize with each other and with other 
groups in order to address the complex problems faced in the rural dry tropics due to, at 
least in part, to this structural issue (i.e., Biswas et al., 2009). For example, results 
illustrated the negative impacts of the uneven exercise of authority and lack of 
accountability between the two primary or more-central governing actors (AyA and 
MINAET) in the water system. Relevant issues that the current water governance regime 
has thus far poorly addressed include: well-coordinated groundwater management and 
use, low capital investment in decentralized community water-user associations, and 
potentially critically less available surface water for independent and small farms during 
dry periods.  
The limited decentralized scheme within the rural drinking water sector of the 
governance regime did not help remedy these challenges. Decentralized rural drinking 
water groups (e.g. ASADAs) were often too disconnected (and often poorly resourced in 
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more rural areas) from the rest of the governance regime (mostly located in the city of 
Nicoya) to provide formal input, or in some cases, to access important information (i.e., 
available surface flow information) which led to asymmetrical knowledge gaps of key 
parts of the water system. Broader trends, such the tendencies of some Latin American 
states to re-centralize after past periods of compulsory decentralization (Dickovick & 
Eaton, 2013), are also being realized in Costa Rica’s water sector as agencies have begun 
attempts to gain and tighten control on some rural water-user groups (Madrigal et al., 
2011).  Despite seemingly polycentric-inspired efforts and schemes at the national level 
in the Costa Rican water and environmental sectors (Calvo, 1990; Calvo-Alvarado et al., 
2009), these efforts have not translated into similar water governance schemes in the rural 
dry tropics of Guanacaste. Indeed, it appears from the literature that the current trend is 
for agencies instead to seek to increase their control in the rural water sector in some 
places in Costa Rica (Madrigal et al., 2013) and in other areas with fewer administrative 
and financial resources, the rural water sector functions in a largely uncoordinated and 
fragmented fashion.  
  How well is water currently governed in this water-contested and climate-
threatened region? (Chapter 3) 
  Out of the 25 normative sustainability criteria used to appraise the water 
governance regime in Guanacaste, seven were found to pose a significant challenge for 
the governance regime (for details on the performance of individual criteria and 
sustainability principles see Chapter 3). Below I recap the results via the problem clusters 
and opportunities identified in Chapter 3.   
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Potrero-Caimital (PC) Aquifer – The absence of management coordination and 
poor information sharing of water extractions among communities that share the PC 
Aquifer bring about several challenges. Law mandates that government agencies should 
coordinate with each other (in the water sector) and with local organizations, but how 
exactly this ought to be organized and who is responsible to do what is not defined. This 
is a challenge for creating a body of accessible and coherent knowledge about water 
quantities being stored, moved, and used in the system. Local actors indicated that the 
majority of perceived water-related challenges in the region involve the PC Aquifer. In 
the past, stakeholders have struggled to develop adequate basin scale management plans 
for properly managing groundwater use. As indicated in interviews and the appraisal (in 
Chapter 3) levels of mutual trust between actors (especially among rural community 
groups and agencies), which would be needed to execute collaborative management plans 
in rural areas, appear to be low. Uncertainty regarding water supply and use potentially 
makes reconciling mistrust and negotiation difficult as demonstrated in recent nearby 
water conflicts.  
Regulatory institutions / water management frameworks – Inadequate rules that 
regulate and monitor groundwater and post water-use drive stakeholder concerns 
regarding water quality. A third of interviewees indicated that contamination/ water 
quality (especially dealing with groundwater and in the water outflows domain) is the 
most important water-related challenge in the region. In the study area, all actors central 
in the regional governance regime are national agencies with the exception of the PC 
Commission. Institutional frameworks that dictate how these central actors operate in 
relation to each other are vague in terms of specifying who is responsible to do what in 
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the region. This vagueness allows excessive repetition of some institutional 
responsibilities of agencies and leaves voids concerning others. For example, in Hojancha 
many actors use organizational resources duplicating efforts such as reforestation-related 
activities - and promoting tree farming - often without a broader understanding of its 
hydrological impacts in the area while few or no efforts address groundwater or relevant 
issues in water outflows. There is no standard for cooperation between Nicoya and 
Hojancha, despite Hojancha relying on the PC Aquifer (in Nicoya) for water supplies. In 
the study area, the first Management Plan (Morataya 2004) aimed to create stakeholder 
networks - a critical task considering gaps in broader institutional frameworks. Results of 
the first management plan have been mixed though, since such plans are not legally 
enforceable.  
Institutional leadership and goal setting – The lack of institutional leadership, 
which helps drive collective goal setting and deliberation across boundaries, is evident. 
Results highlight, for example, that various water-use education efforts in the region lack 
a clear objective. No actor fills leadership roles that guide environmental education 
efforts in a unified direction, which is a reflection of the larger issue of unclear governing 
objectives. A coordinated effort for sustainable water governance would involve a 
constructive process to deliberate and identify collective goals and alternative ways of 
governing water, which in turn requires engagement of diverse stakeholder groups. 
Effective stakeholder engagement will require enduring leadership and commitment that 
spans institutional and administrative scales, which is currently not present. MINAET 
and AyA are the two organizations in the positions, at the moment, to drive goal setting 
in the governance regime. However, these two agencies operate (as mentioned in the 
	  
	  
237 
previous section) in different aspects of the water governance regime and do not 
coordinate their activities. Having two prominent public actors that do not coordinate 
their primary functions is an obstacle for efforts that seek to develop collective objectives 
and to deliberate and implement collective actions to achieve those objectives.    
Downstream and regional integration – Poor integration of downstream 
communities, including unclear vertical accountability mechanisms that are accessible to 
rural communities presents challenges, especially when considering recent conflict events 
involving rural communities and potentially drier futures. There is a reasonable 
possibility that other communities will look for new water sources if drier or more 
variable climate projections come to fruition. If they do, the PC Aquifer would be an 
attractive prize. If the future does require deliberation processes over new infrastructure, 
downstream integration will be important for open and fair deliberation processes. At the 
moment, many of these processes in Guanacaste lack an adequate considerations of 
demand management perspectives that could in some cases provide an alternative ‘soft’ 
path to large water infrastructure and transfer projects (i.e., Gleick, 2003). Such 
approaches would stand in contrast to the traditional method of water resources planning 
in Guanacaste, which (as evidenced by recent conflicts) is a process that is often closed 
and seen with suspicion by many communities (Kuzdas, 2012). Building downstream 
integration, especially through vertical accountability and through open deliberation and 
testing of demand management alternatives, may help avoid future conflicts and prove 
important for sustainability efforts.  
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The appraisal procedure also yielded four existing opportunities that already have 
positive sustainability effects (as noted in the appraisal in Chapter 3), but could be further 
built on to expand those positive effects on the water system: 
New partnerships for information sharing – The will to establish venues and 
science-decision maker partnerships by which to formally share information on, for 
example, water extractions and needs is demonstrated by recent efforts by the 
Universidad Nacional in Nicoya, which has initiated work to synthesize information of 
water being extracted by ASADAs. UNA has also hosted recent workshops addressing 
water reuse and recycling potential in the region. Active institutional leadership for the 
region could feasibly be fostered or developed in partnership with UNA’s programs.  
Opportunities for facilitating coordination – Grassroots efforts, such as the PC 
Commission and its affiliate NicoyAgua, are in a unique position to increase participation 
and coordination among ASADA communities – as well as strengthen ties between AyA 
and MINAET. The PC Commission/ NicoyAgua is the only actor in the study area with 
professional ties to both MINAET and AyA, and it attempts to better include more rural 
community groups in water governance through more informal means. Facilitating better 
coordination and unified leadership between the regional offices of two central actors 
(AyA and MINAET) would be one feasible near-term objective that collective efforts 
could strive for in order to encourage developing collective goals and deliberating 
alternative governing options, which could increase sustainability compliance on a 
number of fronts.  
Transfer potential – With adequate strategic planning, the coordination efforts by 
the PC Commission, NicoyAgua and other non-state organizations could serve as a 
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model for grassroots water governance efforts throughout Guanacaste and beyond. 
Aiming to be this type of model for the region could feasibly be a powerful motivation 
and visioning tool for devising alternative ways of governing water. It could also function 
as a learning platform for water governance efforts and it might inspire new and enduring 
leadership in the region.  
Existing management plan as starting point – The 2004 Management Plan, 
despite not being a legally binding document, established the need to include more 
diverse actors into decision-making, including large agricultural businesses. An updated 
Plan could feasibly be more effective and authoritative if developed in conjunction with 
more diverse actors. The basis of a new Plan update could establish an open, transparent 
governance process that formally includes rural community groups and offers them 
practical avenues to participate and provide input. A modified governing process 
established by a new Plan could also aim to build consensus through open deliberation of 
management objectives, to outline responsibilities to monitor system sustainability 
compliance, and provide the means to adjust management strategies as needed. 
  What common opportunities for advancing toward sustainable water governance 
might we expect to find in such regions? What common barriers might we expect to find? 
(Chapter 2 and 3)  
  Given the evidenced limitations of the current water governance regime in 
Guanacaste, governing efforts that protect or enhance already successful collectives and 
effective local leaders, such as the PC Commission in Nicoya, potentially offer a initial 
promising start since these organizations currently maintain the trust of and connections 
to rural communities that agencies and other governing actors currently do not have. Such 
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collective leaders were also found to be key drivers of community-agency collaborations 
in rural Brazil (Abers, 2007). In contrast to other rural water governance regimes, where 
organizational costs and activities are shared between government agencies and water-
user groups (i.e., Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002), in Guanacaste we found less formal sharing 
among diverse groups. Consequently, as results show, rural community water providers 
(ASADAs) were often left out of governing processes. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) found 
in rural India that quality leadership boosted farmer’s participation in water user 
associations and the collective activity levels of those organizations. Despite the 
differences in terms of how governance operates between rural Brazil, India, and Costa 
Rica, the positive influence of effective local leaders were evident in all cases. 
Overcoming formal limitations, local leaders in Guanacaste still facilitated the inclusion 
of some otherwise disconnected rural groups. Among other things, Chapter 2 argues that 
these local leaders could be promising starting points for water governance regimes to 
move forward in the Central American dry tropics.  
Chapter 3 identified two challenges and two starting points for advancing 
sustainable water governance in the Central American dry tropics.  
Based on the appraisal in Guanacaste, it would be expected that Principle #1: 
Social-ecological system integrity to be a focal point for sustainable water governance. 
Coordinating the sustainable use, management, and protection of groundwater reserves is 
a critical challenge for long-term sustainability in the face climate change impacts. Like 
Guanacaste, many parts of the dry tropics in Central America already rely on 
groundwater as an important water resource. Reduced precipitation that is expected in 
much the Central American dry tropics could severely affect these resources, while also 
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limiting the viability of relying on alternative surface flows for water supplies. Also 
similar to Guanacaste, the regulatory context of the use, management, and protection of 
groundwater reserves is often vague (Ballestero et al., 2007). Developing and 
implementing fair governing processes in line with Principle #4: Socio-ecological civility 
and democratic governance and that aim to sustain ground water resources will be 
important for the region.  
Principle #4 though also presents challenges for much of Central America, and 
accordingly, should be a relevant focus for sustainable water governance efforts. Water 
governance regimes are challenged to better engage diverse stakeholders and to develop 
improved participatory and responsive governance schemes when planning infrastructure 
and deliberating alternatives. Although not accounted for in our appraisal, damming 
rivers and creating reservoirs for both water storage and power generation is a current 
coping and development strategy of Central American governments. In Guanacaste, 
adequately involving rural, diverse groups in governance where (1) centralized agencies 
are expanding their reach through additional branch offices, (2) drinking water delivery 
schemes are becoming more decentralized in rural areas (e.g., ASADAs), and (3) 
governing responsibilities are vague and local management capacity varies presented 
challenges (as indicated in the problem clusters). Regions in the Central American dry 
tropics with similar governance schemes may expect comparable challenges. For 
example, the poor involvement of especially rural communities in decision-making 
processes, especially those concerning new infrastructure, is an important factor in 
escalated water conflicts in the region (Paniagua & Stocks, 2008; Kuzdas, 2012). 
Sufficiently involving more diverse groups in these processes, in addition to helping 
	  
	  
242 
improve compliance with Principle #4, could also allow for more serious engagement and 
deliberation with alternative demand management strategies that rely less on water 
supply enhancement (Brooks and Holtz, 2009). Such alternatives could in turn offer 
positive, mutually reinforcing benefits related to Principle #1: Socio-ecological system 
integrity and Principle #2: Resource maintenance and efficiency considering in 
Guanacaste poorly managed groundwater reserves and citizen’s concerns over potentially 
taxed water supplies and demand growth.  
To enhance the positive sustainability effects of water governance regimes along 
the lines mentioned above, many governance regimes in Central America will need to 
confront deep social inequalities, lingering poverty, histories of exclusive control – and in 
some cases histories of oppression and rebellion – that have in many areas fostered 
persistent feelings of disenfranchisement and mistrust toward political institutions and 
government agencies (Edelman, 1999; Booth et al., 2010). Strategic, multifaceted efforts 
that aim toward reconciliation, capacity building, and renewed investment (i.e., technical, 
financial, administrative) especially in rural community and regional water governing 
organizations offers a potential path, or at least a start, toward more sustainable water 
governance regimes. The Guanacaste case affords insight into two potential opportunities 
that are relevant for water governance regimes in the Central American dry tropics to 
start on this path. 
While economic liberalization in the broader region has generated concerns over 
public sector capacity (Eakin et al., 2011), there has been a growing influence of private 
enterprise and civil society organizations in decision-making (Bebbington, 2005). In 
Guanacaste, we found that the efforts of organizations such as the PC Commission had 
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positive sustainability impacts where public sector roles were diminished. As mentioned 
in the results, these roles involved driving coordination across institutional boundaries 
and facilitating some rural community groups to informally participate in governing 
processes. These actions helped make the governance regime more open, just, and 
collaborative in the parts where the PC Commission was active. Grassroots organizations 
are common in the broader region (Booth et al., 2010), and although it should be 
expected that their capacities would vary, they do offer a promising investment 
opportunity that, combined with the right partnerships and in appropriate settings, could 
positively impact water governance.  
The second common opportunity that we might expect are ‘policy windows’ that 
can potentially be used to distribute more authority to local, regional, and basin-level 
planning efforts that already occur with limited authority in many places (Rogers, 2002). 
Although not a silver bullet, well-designed and alternative schemes that better disperse 
authority could potentially allow for decision making that is more in-tune and responsive 
to the challenges that more rural, dry tropical regions face such as governing groundwater 
in a climate threatened and socially contested context. These ‘windows’ may come 
unexpectedly and seem limited, as the 2012 Regulatory Plan update process in 
Guanacaste illustrates, but nonetheless may be a first step. For example, the PC 
Commission reported its lobbying efforts during the Plan update helped increase its 
confidence and helped solidify its position as a respectable governance actor in the area, 
which it considers a positive a step toward utilizing the ‘transfer potential’ opportunity 
(Section 4.3). Other ‘windows’ may take on different forms. For example, Eakin & 
Lemos (2010) note the trend has been for smaller scale managers and administrators to 
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experiment with new policy instruments such as ‘risk atlases’ and ‘ecological 
ordinances.’ Engle & Lemos (2010) find resource managers to be experimenting with 
integrating democratic principles into policy. Scenarios and basin-scale plans have been 
used in Guanacaste communities, and they could feasibly build on appraisal efforts in 
order to help diverse actors constructively engage with alternative ways of governing 
water (i.e., see Chapters 5 and 6). These small-scale ‘policy windows’ offer opportunities 
that could support the collective organization of local actors to more effectively confront 
and positively influence broader governing issues and help strengthen diverse resource 
planners and managers in the dry tropics.  
What governing actions can be implemented over time in order to overcome those 
barriers? (Chapter 6) 
(#1) Primary Action - Investment in the human element of water governance.  
Effectively mitigating water conflicts depends on investment in human resources. There 
are at least two opportunities for investment in the human aspect of water governance in 
Guanacaste. Communications equipment: Coordination requires effective 
communication. Many rural water administrators lack basic communication equipment.  
Water governance in Guanacaste would function very differently if every rural water 
administrator could be reached (and reach others) through email, phone, or social media. 
Cooperation venues: Coordination requires effective cooperation, and effective 
cooperation requires healthy professional and working relationships.  The workshop we 
led could be replicated with a reasonable budget. The cost could be split between 
participating organizations and led annually by regional and community actors.  The 
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event could help participants refine water governance strategies for communication and 
cooperation, report on strategy implementation, and solidify working relationships.  
(#1) Barrier: Admittedly, use of some communications equipment, especially the 
Internet, email, and social media, might be a challenge for rural water administrator 
personnel who are unaccustomed to it. But effective communication is an important 
precursor to new cooperation venues.   
(#1) Action to overcome barrier: One initial way to address communication 
barriers is to use local student interns as office/ professional aides for rural water 
administrators while new communications equipment is being integrated into 
management practices.  Interns could learn valuable professional skills as well as science, 
and perhaps also earn class credit.  Over time these internships could turn into highly 
competitive and desired learning opportunities for young citizens. Until a water-specific 
venue is institutionalized in the region, the new public sector coordination platform in 
Nicoya, led by the mayor’s office, could function as a cooperation venue for the water 
sector. 
(#2) Primary Action - Investment in small-scale monitoring equipment. Though 
effectively discussing and negotiating water needs is critical for basin-scale cooperation 
in Guanacaste, this is very difficult to do without knowing how much water is going 
where and for what purpose. National and regional leadership should fund and distribute 
water meters for Guanacaste rural water administrators and openly share information 
with community and regional leaders on how much water is being allocated to tourism 
and agriculture. 
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(#2) Barrier: A core barrier is likely to be the weak political will of national 
organizations to fund monitoring equipment for small-scale water management in rural 
areas. The open sharing of water-use information with communities may also be seen as a 
political risk in light of recent conflicts between large water users and communities. 
Nevertheless, a unified voice from Guanacaste water administrators would be politically 
difficult to ignore.  
(#2) Action to overcome barrier: To initially overcome barriers related to lacking 
political will, regional offices of agencies often have equipment that is available for 
shared use. Rural water administrators within a basin or sub-basin could also pool 
resources to purchase shared water meters. Water use data for large-scale tourism and 
agriculture exists, but not in one place.  Sharing this information in real time would 
require rural water administrators to have access to an open database and the Internet 
(e.g., communications equipment). To help defray the investment in communications 
infrastructure, a regional task force for rural water administrators could help locate new 
revenue opportunities, like fee or tax restructuring at the municipal level or stiffer 
penalties for individuals that do not pay water bills.  
(#3) Primary Action - Secure legal commitment to basin-scale planning for water 
resources. If people in Guanacaste are to govern their water resources sustainably, they 
must have the legal backing and authority to do so. National leadership should embark on 
a transparent process that explicitly involves leaders from the Guanacaste water sector to 
delineate more authority and resources to basin-wide and regional water managers. 
(#3) Barrier: Changing laws at a national scale often requires dealing with 
corruption, the influence of powerful interest groups, and significant bureaucratic red 
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tape. Also, delineating authority or power to basin-scale managers might seem 
threatening to special interests that benefit politically or financially from weak basin-
scale management.  
(#3) Action to overcome barrier: Municipalities, many of which are allies with 
rural water administrators and community groups, could modify the purpose and 
implementation process of regional Regulatory Plans that are already in place and 
undergo regular updates. Such actions could help to avoid the barriers related to national-
level bureaucracy and powerful special interests. With some legal adjustments, these 
Plans could be used to begin laying the initial groundwork for basin-oriented water 
resource planning. National allies, such as the Programa de Gestión Integral del Recurso 
Hídrico have been pushing for basin-scale planning in Costa Rica and could be called 
upon to support these efforts in Guanacaste.  
(#4) Primary Action - Implement a pilot project that incorporates the above three 
Primary Actions. A pilot project in Nicoya County would be inexpensive and provide 
valuable insight into successfully implementing these actions across Guanacaste in the 
most effective and feasible way.  
(#4) Barrier: However, a pilot project would face certain implementation barriers. 
Uncertainty about the ability to communicate, coordinate, and disseminate the results of 
such a project could inhibit commitment from some actors who may not yet trust 
governing processes. Potentially divided interests within the region might also hinder the 
willingness of local stakeholders to invest their effort, time, and resources into these 
collaborative projects.  
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(#4) Action to overcome barrier: To overcome these barriers to trust and 
commitment, already vested communities could identify leadership teams to pool their 
resources. They could start small, and then develop a system of accountability and 
expectations, like attending meetings regularly, following through, and responsiveness, in 
order to secure full commitment from stakeholders. The Mayor’s Office in Nicoya 
recently implemented a new accountability system to ensure participation in regional 
meetings. That could serve as a model. Investment in communications infrastructure is a 
key synergistic action to help improving the potential participants’ trust in and 
commitment to new governing processes and experiments.  
The recent efforts to govern water more effectively and mitigate water conflicts in 
Guanacaste are positive steps toward reconfiguring water governance in the region. But 
the broader push for water reform in Costa Rica – which we found to be ultimately 
needed if local and regional actors are to access the resources needed to mitigate water 
conflict - is not yet coherent. Some reform measures compete with one other at the 
national level, and many of the grossly underfunded water administrators in Guanacaste 
petition for various things at different times.  
We found that a key step to move forward with water conflict mitigation strategies 
will be to unify, to some extent, the water reform efforts at both a regional (Guanacaste) 
and national scale. To help jumpstart this step, our team distributed a document outlining 
the above four action items to workshop participants, to national water sector leaders, and 
to members of the Asamblea Legislativa (national congress). Our team has also 
distributed material based on our research to a variety of groups through fax, newspaper, 
radio, email, social media, and community events in close collaboration with leaders in 
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the region.  These efforts have shed light on key considerations for leadership in the 
region, which will take on the responsibility to: 
(6) Balance the need for new organizations and institutions in an already saturated and 
complex public (water) sector. Creating new organizations that are effective may 
require an initial reduction in or a consolidation of some existing organizations. 
(7) Make available processes that identify the resources (financial, personnel, and 
technical) that already exist in the region. Existing resources and opportunities to 
secure new resources must be made clear to those who are spearheading action on 
the items listed above.  
(8) Make a joint, timely effort to push for amending the Constitution to define water as a 
universal human right. Defining water as an explicit human right has often been the 
cornerstone of water reform efforts that fall short. Thus, some preliminary steps 
might be needed before such a Constitutional amendment can be successfully 
achieved. 
(9) Establish processes to define development goals at the regional or local scale.  
Communities, especially those along the Pacific Coast in Guanacaste, must begin 
these collective discussions before the real estate market begins growing again 
which will put additional pressure on water governance in the region.  
(10) Document, evaluate, and modify action plans and strategies as needed. Partnerships 
with universities will provide opportunities for action plans and strategy evaluations.  
Guanacaste leaders and communities are in a position to make a unified push for national 
water reform while simultaneously implementing actions to advance water sustainability 
from within the region. Progress is already being made. Though barriers remain, 
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Guanacaste can move forward despite the failure of national lawmakers to modify water 
policies in light of citizens’ needs. 
 3.2 Dissertation objective #2. To specify the institutional drivers and mediators of 
intense and intractable water conflicts at regional scales.  
  Why do some water conflicts escalate while others do not? (Chapter 4)  
  More intense conflicts were often in cases of high friction between agencies and 
disconnected community-based institutions and without active regional-scale leaders. 
This friction materialized through escalated conflicts when local groups aimed to 
influence decision-making despite limited available avenues to do so – such as in the 
Sardinal and Nimboyores conflict cases. In the DRAT case, those farmers without the 
means to cope with reduced water deliveries or to reach governing actors, damaged 
irrigation infrastructure to secure water. In contrast, well-coordinated and accessible 
multi-level governance with effective regional leadership supported actor’s efforts to 
resolve or mitigate water conflicts. For example, in the Nimboyores resolution, a new 
municipal position was established to provide leadership and convey information to and 
from rural water-user groups. Learning from Nimboyores, actors in Nicoya established 
collective efforts that provided avenues for rural communities to access governing 
processes that otherwise remained unreachable. Although these avenues were largely 
informal since the PC Commission is not a formal decision-making organization 
(although it does substantially influence decisions), they did help facilitate successful 
conflict mitigation. In the Mala Noche, we see differing aspects of leadership. Early 
leadership guided actions against private actors that sought to utilize or potentially affect 
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poorly understood groundwater resources. More recent leadership sought to enable 
cooperation in the basin in spite of historical tension and other challenged.  
  Even in challenged settings that feature high friction between disconnected 
institutions that operate at different levels, the presence of individuals with the drive and 
will to address shortcomings of water management allowed for conflict mitigation 
potential. We detected a surprisingly large degree of interactions and learning among 
actors across some cases. Learning from leading individuals across three cases - starting 
with Nimboyores, to Nicoya, and then to the Mala Noche occurred. However, the most 
recent conflict case in Sardinal follows a similar trajectory as Nimboyores, which 
occurred nearly 10 years prior. Thus some areas within Guanacaste used nearby water 
conflicts as learning opportunities to improve governing efforts while other areas did not. 
While pro-active individuals in Nicoya strengthened the PC Commission after 
Nimboyores, little changed in Sardinal where unresolved friction remained a risk. 
Although the Sardinal case went quietly unresolved, more successful efforts in Nicoya 
were validated. Shortly after Sardinal, efforts in Nicoya aimed to further improve through 
new partnerships that assessed water governance and started building a more effective 
regional presence (e.g., Kuzdas et al., 2013; 2014a) that was reached by interested actors 
in the Mala Noche.   
  Distrust among actors, institutional legitimacy issues, and poor water system 
knowledge predicated conflict intractability in the cases. The underlying issue within 
these aggravating factors was often current and historically ineffective stakeholder 
engagement. Poor engagement often coincided with legitimacy issues concerning who 
was responsible or had the authority to govern what. In the DRAT case for example, a 
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state employee was targeted during an act of dissent. In Sardinal and Nimboyores, local 
groups rejected water system studies performed by national agencies. In the Nimboyores 
case, resolution processes only advanced after parties sufficiently addressed how water-
benefits would be re-distributed to communities and created a new governing role to 
better account for rural communities. In Nicoya, effective stakeholder engagement 
processes organized by a collective group (which had the backing of agencies) reached 
some otherwise disconnected rural communities. In the Mala Noche though, we saw self-
organized basin planning by local actors had difficulty overcoming histories of tension 
among actors, vague resource rights, and unclear governing responsibilities. The 
progression of the Mala Noche conflict shows however that self-organized conflict 
resolution and mitigation is viable if face-to-face cooperation venues are logistically 
available and if supportive, successful governing examples are accessible and visible to 
local actors.  
  While the dissertation does not provide in-depth analysis of the potentially wide 
range of governing contexts that are relevant for water conflicts here, it does illustrate 
some of the linked, broader context issues found to be relevant for identifying the 
potential of governance regimes to aggravate or mitigate water conflicts. Scarcity that 
involved water access issues closely tied to political economy conditions were important. 
For example, one intense altercation involved access to limited irrigation water in the 
DRAT under extenuating circumstances where a smallholder farmer had no alternative 
access options. In the Mala Noche, the economically poorest of the three ASADAs was 
unable to access quality groundwater below privately held land (that was deeded prior to 
modern coastal development regulations implemented in the 1970s) that another, better 
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resourced ASADA was able to secure through legal actions. Consequently, the former 
ASADA must rely on suspect sources and experiences seasonal shortages. Over time, this 
situation increased the former ASADAs suspicion of and even animosity toward 
governing attempts in the basin. The former ASADA felt the latter was better able to 
capitalize on tourism and real estate investment in the area (which required sufficient 
water for development). While a vast majority of the water disputes in the Mala Noche 
involved ASADAs taking actions against developers, the key factor in the most escalated 
point in the Mala Noche conflict was this feeling of disparity among ASADAs. Generally 
ineffective governance combined with broader political economy trends had over time 
allowed increases in disparate water access and economic well-being in the area. In 
Sardinal, we saw another aspect of the link between scarcity, access and political 
economies. Here, developers attempted to access water sources used by local 
communities where the perceived threat of scarcity, combined with distrust, precedents of 
poor stakeholder engagement, and low political legitimacy contributed to the escalation 
of the conflicts. While features such as distrust, poor engagement, and low political 
legitimacy directly impacted conflict outcomes, they are also (as we noted in the case 
introduction - Section 3) deeply rooted in social, political, and economic trends involving 
weakened state governments and feelings of disenfranchisement especially within rural 
groups. However, water governance played a role mitigating these broader context issues 
in some cases. The resolution process of Nimboyores aimed to correct eroded trust and 
rural disenfranchisement issues present in the areas. Actors in Nicoya improved on these 
issues over several years through a collective organization and have yet to experience 
harmful conflict. 
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  What are the implications of current and alternative water governance schemes to 
mitigate or aggravate water conflicts in a water-contested and climate-threatened 
context? (Chapter 4) 
  This dissertation used case insights to identify potential water conflict risk factors, 
mitigation abilities, and promising mitigation strategies within three general types of 
water governance regimes (centralized, polycentric, fragmented) within the context of the 
Central American dry tropics. The framework in Chapter 5 and evidence from the cases 
were used to assign expected values of water governance components for each 
hypothetical regime-type. As expected, no one case offered a perfect example of any one 
governance scheme (i.e., Huitema et al., 2009). However the diversity of governance 
schemes within the cases, the different processes or changes experienced in each case, 
and the different degrees that each case exhibited fragmented, centralized, or polycentric 
patterns allowed for sufficient breadth of evidence within the given dry tropical context. 
The dissertation also used insights from the cases to identify potential conflict risks, 
conflict mitigation abilities, and offered promising initial strategies for each hypothetical 
governance scheme within the defined governing context. The resulting schematic 
facilitates a structured discussion of the potential implications of current and alternative 
water governance regimes for effectively mitigating harmful water conflict in the Central 
American dry tropics.    
Centralized governance regimes: Water governance in Central America was 
highly centralized and many still are today (Booth et al., 2010; Rogers, 2002).  It could be 
expected that such governance regimes to be at potential risk of water conflicts due to 
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their limited ability to include diverse, especially rural, stakeholders in governance 
processes and their lower tendency to promote collective learning regarding water 
systems and the water needs of stakeholders from unique regions. Successful conflict 
mitigation in these contexts depend on securing sufficient trust from stakeholders and the 
fair allocation of administrative resources that are needed to efficiently solve local 
problems. Relevant issues such as disenfranchised constituencies (Edelman, 1999) and 
corrupt and weakened States (Eakin and Lemos, 2010) may hinder conflict mitigation. 
Short-term mitigation strategies within centralized regimes could focus on improving 
transparency, encouraging joint fact-finding ventures with local stakeholders to increase 
collective water system knowledge, and repairing trust. Long-term success may require 
more shared decision-making authority to be distributed to regional-to-local levels in 
order to better account for unique conditions faced in the rural, dry tropics (Eakin et al., 
2011).  
Polycentric governance regimes: Polycentric water governance designs that are 
fitted to regional contexts, feature committed leadership, and emphasize vertical 
accountability offer reasonably high conflict mitigation potential. Mitigation abilities may 
benefit from mutually reinforcing processes: open decision-making, learning, and 
enabling leadership. Possible conflict risk may be present if historical tensions between 
actors and vague resource rights and governing responsibilities. If not addressed, these 
risks may allow for some elites to gain disproportionate power if accountability 
mechanisms are not effective (i.e., Persha and Andersson, 2013). In some polycentric 
settings, self-organized actors may struggle to initiate conflict resolution and mitigation 
processes. Here, more centralized mechanisms and well-resourced actors may help begin 
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effective mediation processes in some tense situations. Promising mitigation strategies 
for more polycentric configurations include reinforcing commitments, basin planning, 
that involves face-to-face processes that are logistically feasible (especially for governing 
actors that may be poorly resourced) and alignment or open discourses of actor 
expectations. Long-term efforts could fortify processes that elaborate collective goals, 
monitor progress toward goals, and ensure the continued effectiveness of stakeholder 
engagement.    
Fragmented governance regimes: Lower abilities to anticipate, recognize, and 
coordinate diverse actions to solve problems allows risks for fragmented governance 
schemes. Here, little or logistically challenged communication among actors might be 
expected as well as unclear governing responsibilities and less-effective accountability 
mechanisms. These conditions potentially allow for actors to take unilateral governing 
actions – especially without input from disadvantaged or disconnected rural groups. 
Strategies may initially focus on identifying existing and securing new financial, 
personnel, and technical investments in regional-scale governance and securing 
commitments to face-to-face planning processes. Such investments and commitments 
may initially help build regional mediators between opposing national and community-
scale institutions and discourage governance actors from taking unilateral actions or 
circumventing fair governing processes. Available resources for new efforts might be 
found in local university programs, which were used to support good water governance in 
Nicoya, as in other places (i.e., Atkinson-Palombo and Gebremichael, 2012). Long-term 
efforts are challenged to devise feasible action plans that are amenable to diverse actors 
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(some of whom may be benefiting from current conditions) in order to practice and 
legitimatize cooperation and coordination.   
Guanacaste as a whole affords a proxy for centralized water governance regimes 
that, due in part to various pressures (i.e., from global economies, public funding cuts), 
are shifting towards more institutionally and administratively fragmented regimes 
without well-coordinated nor well-defined governing responsibilities below the national-
level (Edelman, 1999; Kuzdas et al., 2014b). In Guanacaste, this hybrid water governance 
scheme retained some risks of centralized schemes (i.e., non-transparent, poorly fitted to 
local contexts) while assuming additional risks associated with more fragmented 
schemes. Accordingly, these change processes within governing schemes could allow for 
potential conflict risk in settings where power, given through water allocation mandates, 
rights, or political access, is disproportionately held and acted on by relatively few and 
where local groups are not accounted for. Here, long-term strategies that aim for more 
responsive, vertically accountable, and polycentric governance schemes are important for 
mitigation efforts. Within Guanacaste, each case played out and was resolved (or not) in 
different fashion, so a measured and multi-faceted approach to conflict mitigation and 
ultimately, to changing governance regimes, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach is 
important. Involving groups – especially those who are not included within current water 
governance regimes – will be a key logistical effort for devising and implementing 
alternative governance schemes. Strategies that initially reduce governing uncertainty 
(i.e., who has rights to what and responsibility to do what?) and that deploy strong, 
legitimate leaders to potentially offset interests that are willing to use economic or 
political power to circumvent fair processes may be an effective first step to help re-
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organize institutions and actors prior to implementing or testing more polycentric 
schemes.   
  How would particular sets of institutional drivers and mediators play out in terms 
of their effects on conflict outcomes within alternative water governance regimes? 
(Chapter 5) 
  Alternative water governance regimes in the dissertation were developed and 
engaged with as a set of five scenarios.  
Scenario #1: “Mandated to prepare” shows a centrally controlled water 
governance scheme that aims to secure rural community well-being in the face of scarcity 
- although important feedbacks coming from the governing context (outcome 
distributions, water quality, competition, etc.) on to the decision making processes and 
other drivers are missing (in contrast to Scenario #3, for example). While this missing 
linkage potentially allows conflict risks by limiting the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of dispute resolution mechanisms (which we see in Scenario #2 and #5), no conflict 
occurs in Scenario #1. With people trusting government (i.e., high legitimacy) and little 
scarcity or water access issues that challenge the governance regime (i.e., less 
competition, water supplies are not decreasing), governance schemes are able to 
successfully avoid harmful conflicts. Scenario #1 allowed for weaving of stories that 
hailed back to the early years of Costa Rican progressive democracy (prior to the 1980s). 
These years saw a far-reaching presence of a highly legitimate State that sought to 
support rural, smallholder farmer lifestyles often through top-down mandates.    
In Scenario #2: “Closed-door alliances”, inadequate water governance primarily 
drives (as opposed to challenging contexts) conflict, environmental decline, and unfair 
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water access, which negatively reinforces unresponsive and ineffective water governance 
schemes. The systemic nature of Scenario #2 is similar to Scenario #3, but with features 
that are negatively rather than positively reinforced.  In contrast to Scenario #5, conflict 
outcomes in Scenario #2 stem primarily from the governance regime itself, which takes 
purposeful actions against the interest of rural communities. Consequently, Scenario #2 
allowed for storylines of actors that deal with ‘closed-door alliances’ of government 
agencies, developers, and investors - reminiscent of recent Guanacaste water conflicts. 
Responsive civil democracy, active regional leadership, and open decision-
making processes were most effective (in terms of positive governance outcomes) when 
mutually reinforced by each other and by established dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
Scenario #3: “Responsive and engaged”, these drivers positively reinforce each other 
while also supporting institutional legitimacy (e.g., people trust governance) that in turn 
helps facilitate active regional-scale governance and vertical accountability, which are 
conducive for improved collective water system knowledge and groundwater security. 
This distinguishing system of positively reinforcing impact relationships in Scenario #3 
allows effective mitigation of water conflict in spite of challenging contexts.   
Scenario #4: “Unnoticed in the background” demonstrates how a prominence of 
mediation with very efficient water infrastructure, combined with a low water-allocation 
priority for natural (forested) systems, allowed for rapid economic development and 
growth. Like Scenario #1, many important systemic feedbacks are missing which allows 
for risk due to low responsiveness and less accountability of the governance regime to 
stakeholders. These missing features would support effective conflict resolution 
mechanisms, as is the case in Scenario #3. Rather, the governance scheme in Scenario #4 
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is similar to Scenario #5 - but with key differences being population growth (in contrast 
to decline), well-maintained water infrastructure, and accessible good quality water, 
which allows for a more economically prosperous scenario that features a decline of 
natural systems and a less active or more apathetic role for civil society organizations 
(such as the PC Commission).  
In Scenario #5: Overwhelmed and out of touch, the governing context (i.e., poor 
water quality, dry conditions, etc.) overwhelms weaker governance schemes that lack 
active regional governance actors and institutions, accountability mechanisms, accessible 
decision-making, and a responsive, engaged civil democracy.  This overwhelmed 
situation that also features drier climates and unfair water access helps stem population 
growth in the region. Governance that is overwhelmed by the challenging contexts that it 
faces is a distinguishing systemic feature of Scenario #5.  
3.3 Dissertation objective #3: To test participatory methods and approaches for 
developing/ evaluating governance alternatives and policy strategies toward sustainable 
water governance, including mitigation of intense and intractable water conflicts in the 
face of climate threats.   
  How can water governance analysis and appraisals best be designed to maximize 
their positive impacts? What are their limitations? (Chapter 2 and 3) 
The overarching principle that guides this reflection is how to best assimilate 
integrated water governance analysis into transformational sustainability research efforts 
that aim at generating solution options for water sustainability problems (Wiek et al., 
2012). A great deal of existing literature discusses participatory research dealing with 
water resources; yet relatively few coherent guidelines are established for executing 
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water governance analyses that are a part of a broader problem solving effort (Lang et al. 
2012). Being part of an overarching problem solving endeavor, the Guanacaste water 
governance analysis lends itself toward reflection on what aspects of executing the 
analysis facilitated assimilation within the broader effort and what aspects of the analysis 
could have been improved. More details and explanation on the points in italics below is 
found in Chapter 2.  
1. Frame the governance study with key stakeholders. Insights from the 
Guanacaste study: Key stakeholders were involved in defining components of the 
physical water system, determining who relevant stakeholders are, and designing some 
parts of data collection instruments. As a result, research findings were easily dispersed 
once the analysis was coupled with the ensuing assessment.  The analysis process itself 
reinforced strong mutual trust between stakeholders and researchers.  Trust was a 
significant success factor that led to the sustainability assessment, which is based on the 
analysis contained here, being directly incorporated into regional planning and policy 
changes shortly after researchers delivered results to the PCW Commission (Kuzdas et al. 
2012). 
2. Identify strategic output venues early in the process. Insights from the 
Guanacaste study: Strategic output venues in the local water system were not identified in 
the planning stages of the analysis beyond the traditional ‘report’.  As a result, the 
sustainability assessment report that was delivered to the PCW Commission was not 
designed to directly sync or apply to any specific policies or procedures. Some prospects 
and opportunities to adjust regional policies and regulations may have been missed due to 
planning shortcomings on the part of the research team.  The analysis framework 
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proposed by Wiek and Larson (2012) did prove useful in terms of packaging results in a 
flexible way that could apply to several outputs, even though the research team did not 
originally plan for those outputs.   
3. Adapt to leverage new opportunities during analysis. Insights from the 
Guanacaste study: The opportunity to execute analysis procedures in collaboration with 
the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA) was important for building credibility, 
trust, and knowledge dispersion avenues.  UNA holds a seat in the PCW Commission 
along with several other important organizations. The new alliance with UNA provided 
links to individual stakeholders the research team previously did not have access to and 
allowed for greater interview coverage (90%) of targeted actors in the system. The 
alliance with UNA was the most important factor that created a strong working 
relationship with the PCW Commission, which is a key policy advocate for water 
resources in the region. The PCW Commission has made several presentations of the 
results from the sustainability assessment (in Chapter 3) to government agencies, 
commissions, and local governments.  
4. Aim for mutual understanding of analysis procedures and methods. Insights 
from the Guanacaste study: Results of the sustainability assessment, based on the analysis 
here, dispersed and were applied to regional institutions quickly due to the level of high 
mutual understanding between stakeholders and researchers. Mutual understanding was 
arrived by doing the analysis. By the end, key stakeholders understood the general 
methods of analysis, the goals of researchers, what to expect, and some took part in 
interactively creating system maps using the framework. The stakeholder mapping 
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conducted in this project was considered to be the strongest element of the analysis by 
local managers, and in retrospect, was key for building quality working relationships.  
5. Position analysis within broader problem-solving endeavors. Insights from the 
Guanacaste study: The sustainability assessment, built on the analysis, which generated 
new normative knowledge for the region in addition to the new analytical knowledge of 
the water system generated in the governance analysis presented here.  However, it is not 
yet clear if the framework and analysis will be or can be used as a foundation for 
increasing knowledge of regional ecosystem flows over time in the region which is 
critically needed.  Although stakeholders reported that the analysis carried out here was 
the first to coherently synthesize the information it did, it will be a major challenge to 
continue using the framework as a means to structure new information.  In public 
agencies dealing with path dependency and funding and personnel cuts, there is likely a 
low probability such frameworks will be coherently used over the long-term.  Enduring 
leadership, long-term partnerships, and funds to operationally support such efforts are 
needed to overcome this challenge.  However, a valuable snapshot of the system was 
achieved.   
6. Identify and leaders at the science-policy interface. Insights from the 
Guanacaste study: The PC Commission was identified and targeted as an important 
regional leader by researchers early on. Individual members on the commission are often 
involved in both water-related scientific efforts and policy-making. The research team 
maneuvered into a ‘partner-client’ relationship with the commission and wrote the 
assessment results report specifically for the PC Commission.  
	  
	  
264 
In Chapter 3, the sustainability appraisal was a valuable tool that provided 
normative insight into how well water governance in Guanacaste operated.  While the 
results suggested some well-targeted efforts could help remedy interlinked problems, the 
appraisal provided limited evidence-based instructions that dealt with how to go about 
resolving problems over time. Additional and expanded efforts are critically needed, at 
the provincial scale in Guanacaste, to deliberate and craft alternative ways of governing 
water that can overcome broader governing issues. Water governance research efforts 
where descriptive-analytical components, solution-oriented components, and real-time 
problem-solving components are well integrated are a high priority. Such integrated 
research efforts could well support sustainable water governance in Guanacaste and 
beyond. 
On the one hand, Chapter 3 offers encouragement that the sustainability effects of 
water governance regimes can be reasonably monitored even in contexts that exhibit high 
uncertainty and low information/data availability such as Guanacaste.  Even in these 
contexts, appraisal efforts can have a role that may help increase compliance under the 
right conditions. On the other hand, the appraisal demonstrates room for improvement. 
An important future research endeavor will involve establishing far better means to 
communicate and measure impacts from actually doing the appraisal and other 
subsequent research efforts. The appraisal method and criteria used, for example, do not 
easily capture potential context-unique trade-offs that may be critical to deliberate and 
negotiate in order to make progress toward sustainable water governance alternatives.  
Also in Chapter 3, the principles we use, although synthesized from several 
relevant streams of literature and confirmed by stakeholders, largely suffer from poor or 
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vague operational distinctions between the practices of sustainable water governance and 
the goals of sustainable water governance. Practices would include operational aspects 
such as deliberation, negotiation, or monitoring. Goals would include objectives such as 
equity, self-sufficiency, or sustainable yield. Distinguishing practice criteria and goal 
criteria, while utilizing a system mapping activity in appraisal procedures like we develop 
here, may be a promising way to improve the effectiveness of future sustainability 
appraisals and better integrate governance appraisals with problem-solving and solution-
research. This distinction would potentially yield a clearer picture of what operational 
practices of governance regimes are deficient and which are compliant (and where in 
water systems they occur), which could better set up and integrate with problem-solving 
efforts and solution-oriented research that ultimately seeks to address options and 
strategies for governing water resources differently – and more sustainably – than is done 
currently.   
  How can water conflict research better align with the professional needs of 
decision-makers who aim to mitigate such conflicts? (Chapter 4) 
To align with the professional needs of decision makers who aim to mitigate 
conflicts, research must address the conflicts that matter to people, it must address 
conflicts within a scale that is usable for mitigating conflicts, and it must address the 
conflicts that have real/ felt negative impacts on people and environments. In cases such 
as the Central American dry tropics where very little existing knowledge exists 
surrounding water conflicts, research required an intimate and place-based approach that 
involved months and even years of living and working in the region. The variability of 
conflict events and the differences in the specific places where they occurred – including 
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even significant differences in how conflict events played out over time - within regions 
(that was illustrated in this dissertation) would support this perspective. In other words, 
one conflict event in even a small area like Guanacaste could not be accurately 
considered ‘representative’ of Guanacaste or Costa Rica. In contrast, research that seeks 
generalities of the link between climate change and water conflict across even multiple 
continents with no apparent engagement of those who aim to mitigate water conflicts in 
any particular region have so far proven to yield little knowledge that can be acted on 
within a given context.  This issue is pointed out in a variety of relevant literature (Reed 
& Kaspryzk, 2009; Funder et al., 2010; Bakker, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). Also key 
for water conflict research that aims to better sync with the needs of decision-makers, is 
locating and identifying the number of active individuals within regions that are 
committed to solving water-related issues. These individuals highly influenced 
knowledge transfers concerning water conflict mitigation within Guanacaste, they 
encouraged learning by example, and they have helped developing leaders. All of these 
aspects were found to be conflict-mitigating factors. These individuals could offer 
reasonable starting points for further building relevant water conflict research and 
strategies within a variety of contexts that aim to overcome institutional and political 
challenges that matter for successful conflict mitigation. Accordingly, water conflict 
research that addresses problems and their potential solutions within tangible, meaningful 
and decision-relevant context offers an alternative approach to support water conflict-
prone regions. This thread of research offers useful and improved links to water 
administrators and policy makers that aim in their professional activities to avoid water 
conflicts.  
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  What are the strengths and limits in terms of the usability governance scenarios 
and governance transition strategies in collective planning processes? (Chapter 5 and 6) 
Flexibility was an important strength of the formative scenario methodology. It 
allowed the scenarios to be tailored to meet the needs of a mostly rural, developing 
region. Importantly, it allowed the scenarios to represent local context, challenges, and 
alternative governance regimes in ways that evoked meaningful responses from diverse 
stakeholders in order to deliberate goals and actions (in later workshop activities) without 
costly, unavailable computerized simulations (i.e., Sheppard et al., 2011; Gober & 
Kirkwood, 2010). Flexibility also allowed the scenario building process and the 
communication of scenarios to be tailored to the needs of those involved at different 
stages. For example, the research team and PC Commission negotiated the contents of the 
scenario posters and agreed not to include scenario system diagrams for the broader 
audience at the workshop – many of whom had not previously worked within such 
models. Additionally, pre-testing in Guanacaste with the diagrams revealed that they 
were most effective (in terms of communicating systemic differences) if compared 
directly and immediately, which the large exhibit-style event did not allow for. However, 
the exhibit-style event was able to effectively involve a very large number of diverse 
stakeholders who typically are not involved in these planning activities. Nevertheless, the 
system diagrams were valuable for helping construct scenario storylines that aligned 
logically within each scenario’s underlying structure. This flexible approach to 
communicating scenarios to different groups worked well in Guanacaste.  
Integrating thorough current state analysis and assessment of governance regimes 
in Guanacaste - that was already engaged and publically visible - with scenario building 
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was beneficial. It provided a shared frame of reference for the scenario building process. 
In this case, this shared frame of reference was important in the consultation meetings 
with local partners and stakeholders during the system and consistency analyses steps. 
Compared to the workshop event, relatively few people participated in the system and 
consistency analyses steps - which is typical in these more expert-driven steps of the 
formative approach (Walz et al., 2013). In Guanacaste, these smaller groups were more 
effective in these steps than larger groups. The purpose of these smaller groups was to 
perform the above steps in close consultation with previous current-state research that 
had already engaged and involved many people from the area. In this sense, we aimed for 
the system and constancy analysis steps to reflect, as much as possible (given the limited 
set of variables), the real-time governance system. In contrast, a purely judgment-based 
approach may be more appropriate in some cases or settings (von Wirth et al., 2013). In 
contexts like Guanacaste with heterogeneous stakeholder groups and potentially 
significant power imbalances within those groups, our slightly modified approach to the 
early steps of the formative scenario approach may be worth considering. The key 
success factor here is that stakeholders already trusted the results of those previous 
studies because they had been highly engaged with them. Tangible current state research 
that directly addresses real problems (that are likely highly visible in regions like 
Guanacaste, i.e., water conflict) offers a valuable starting point to building trust, to 
organizing a sufficient body of current-state evidence that is seen as valid by diverse 
groups, and to understanding diverse stakeholder groups – all of which were key 
precursors to successfully employing the formative scenario steps in Guanacaste.  
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In this case, having a small but diverse stakeholder group – the PC Commission – 
central in the scenario building process was key. Importantly, the PC Commission is 
highly respected in the region, and positioning them in a way where they essentially 
became the intended users of the scenarios helped to avoid any potential legitimacy 
issues with the scenarios coming into the large stakeholder workshop. With the PC 
Commission in a central role, stakeholders were open to discuss even controversial 
scenario content at the workshop. A subtle benefit of this was the willingness of the PC 
Commission to be a named actor in each scenario. Workshop participants knew the PC 
Commission, and seeing/ comparing its different roles and activities in the scenarios was 
an effective communication strategy. We received many comments directly mentioning 
the PC Commission’s activities in the scenarios. Thus in the Guanacaste context, the 
limited but effective participation scheme at the start of the scenario building, combined 
with key partnerships, and followed by a very open participation scheme towards the end 
seemed optimal. Other cases will require different approaches to participation at different 
stages that fit the context.  
We did not use the method to explore development pathways, i.e., how different 
alternatives could happen over time, which was pointed out by workshop participants. 
We found that scenarios alone cannot adequately support necessary change processes and 
activities, which is in line with previous findings and concepts (i.e., Wiek et al., 2006). 
Scenarios must then be incorporated into collective strategy building activities (ideally as 
a part of a broader transformational planning process) in order to have practical relevance 
for stakeholders. We found that quickly demonstrating this application in later workshop 
activities with stakeholders was important. As an critical step to prime for these later 
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‘application demonstration’ activities in the workshop, deliberating scenario content in an 
open format with a representative and diverse group of stakeholders effectively supported 
people to articulate what futures were desirable (or not) as a first step to planning and 
taking coordinated action. In this sense, motivating workshop participants who 
collectively could change regional water governance was a success of the workshop that 
was supported by the formative scenario method that was slightly adapted to fit the 
Guanacaste context. The general lesson here is that engagement, commitment over a 
sufficient period of time, and trust matter, methods can be adapted in transparent ways to 
fit problems and contexts, and that in water contested-regions like Guanacaste that face 
urgent and complex problems, there is significant opportunity for research that does these 
things to make positive impacts.  For scenarios specifically, a timely demonstration of 
their real application for governance actors, ideally situated within a transformational 
planning process (i.e., Wiek, in review), can help maximize these positive impacts.  
Workshop activities that followed the scenario building and validation exercise 
evaluated scenarios, identified priorities, and created strategies to avoid negative futures 
and achieve more positive ones. These follow-up activities quickly demonstrated the 
practical value of the scenarios. During this latter part of the workshop, participants, 
many of whom had not worked together before, exchanged contact information, 
suggested ideas, and offered to share resources and data with those who needed them. 
Many collaborative invitations were extended, including one to join a new coordination 
platform in Nicoya. After the workshop, several new efforts aimed to improve 
governance cooperation within the region. Much focus is now placed on leadership 
development in Nicoya, with the PC Commission assuming an important role. Several 
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ASADAs, who have experienced conflict in the past, implemented a series of meetings to 
address ideas to share resources and to consolidate their organizations (the same 
ASADAs mentioned at the end of Section 5.1 that discussed Scenario #3: “Responsive 
and engaged”.) These ASADAs started emphasizing internal human resources 
development, which is a significant paradigm shift for organizations that are historically 
only concerned with service-area infrastructure and collecting water-use fees. The 
scenarios were important reference points for stakeholders around Nicoya in the several 
months that followed the workshop. These efforts though have encountered barriers. 
Political corruption, lack of transportation, and low investment in communications 
infrastructure are a few examples. But recognizing, locating, and defining those barriers 
has been beneficial. It has allowed new leaders to begin planning how to overcome 
barriers. As local leadership has grown, as new actions have been taken, and barriers 
discovered, there is less frequent operational reliance on the scenarios (i.e., being 
referenced in planning meetings).  
The marked deficiency of reliable and accessible hydro-climatological 
information (and monitoring systems) remains a substantial void for Guanacaste water 
governance that presents acute challenges. Yet the governance scenarios, to some extent, 
initially helped revitalize regional organization and coordination around Nicoya to the 
point where collective strategies and the re-allocation of some personnel, financial, and 
technical resources to address this key knowledge gap could be more efficient. In turn, 
once new information is obtained and processed, the improved organization of the 
governance regime (assuming it stays improved or keeps improving) will potentially 
provide opportunities to capitalize on more effective avenues to formulate and implement 
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adapted policies that will better position the region to meet complex water challenges. In 
this sense, the jump-start that the governance scenarios provided to better organize a very 
fragmented water governance regime was their most valuable application.   
4. Contributions to the State of Current Knowledge 
The current state of knowledge pertaining to each of the three sub-objectives is 
explained below. Specific contributions made to the literature/ current knowledge is 
stated in bullet points.  
  Objective #1: To clarify the process and design features of sustainable water 
governance and potential barriers to implementation, especially in the context of climate 
threatened, water-contested, and developing regions. 
Results suggest that superior and more sustainable alternatives to water 
governance in the Central American dry tropics would: be fitted to the social and 
hydrological dynamics of regional water systems (from supplies to post-use); address 
asymmetrical and collective knowledge gaps in those dynamic water systems; reconcile 
disenfranchised rural groups and governing agencies; and, operationally support currently 
effective local leaders.  Yet in terms of abilities to address these specific aspects, e.g., 
implement them, in the given context, we saw that many deeply rooted uncertainties and 
complexities inhibit and complicate implementation pathways. Implementation of 
improved governance design features becomes even less straightforward when 
considering current water-related conflicts in the broader region, water scarcity, and 
climate change impacts. The dissertation demonstrates the practical value of more 
intimate, multi-faceted water governance analysis within critically challenged regions. 
Yet, it also demonstrates that within critically challenged regions such as the Central 
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American dry tropics, getting started on advancing toward more sustainable alternatives 
is urgent. Here, only identifying or specifying the key features of superior or alternative 
governance regimes cannot remedy the complex challenges facing the region. To remedy 
these challenges would require developing and testing governance strategies that aim to, 
over time, transition currently inadequate governance regimes toward alternative, more 
sustainable ones.  This presents a significant contribution to the literature which, to this 
point, has most often only identified and success factors of resource governance regimes 
with little focus on how to actually implement these factors in exceptionally challenging 
cases where change is urgently needed.  Illustrating this disconnect in both analysis 
(Chapter 2) and in normative assessment (Chapter 3) and highlighting a potential way 
forward by developing governance transition strategies (Chapter 6), offers an important 
contribution to the literature concerned with resource governance, common pool 
resources, and collective actions.  
  Objective #2: To specify the institutional drivers and mediators of intense and 
intractable water conflicts at regional scales.  
The dissertation developed and applied fresh/ alternative concepts and tools for 
understanding water governance that are well-grounded to the places where water 
conflicts are actually experienced and where people seek to mitigate them; and, thus 
offers improved utility in comparison to many of current water conflict and climate 
change studies.  The framework proposed in Chapter 5 is unique in the literature that 
deals with water conflicts.  Much of the literature that deals with water conflicts, up to 
this point, is largely detached from the places of interest with no visible connections to 
those who could actually take action to mitigate those water conflicts.  The current 
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literature also is still largely focused on approaching conflicts by sorting out supply and 
demand, which this dissertation (Chapter 4) demonstrates does not adequately explain 
why conflicts occur in climate-threatened and water-contested regions. Accordingly, the 
dissertation offers Improved understanding of the institutional mediators and drivers of 
water conflicts at a scale that is relevant and actionable for decision-making and 
collective actions. In addition, the dissertation clarifies how current and alternative 
governance regimes might be expected to handle water conflict risk and their real-time 
policy implications (in terms of crafting governance strategies to better mitigate conflicts) 
in critically threatened regions such as the dry tropics of Central America (Chapter 4 and 
5).  Results demonstrate that water conflicts are not uniformly experienced within regions 
nor do conflict processes unfold in consistent manners over time - which has critical 
implications for realizing effective water governance and useful water conflict research. 
Knowledge transfers within regions, learning by example, and existing leaders offer 
promising starting points for overcoming institutional and political barriers that obstruct 
conflict mitigation potential. Such efforts might focus on governance strategies that 
intentionally avoid fragmentation and institute transition processes and strategies that 
seek to implement more balanced, polycentric water governance designs over time. How 
do so, and clarifying what that step sequence would look like, in various contexts is an 
important research need. Such strategies will be critical for achieving sustainable water 
governance in conflict prone, climate threatened regions.  
Objective #3: To test participatory methods and approaches for developing/ 
evaluating governance alternatives and policy strategies toward sustainable water 
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governance, including mitigation of intense and intractable water conflicts in the face of 
climate threats.  
In Guanacaste, we found governance scenarios were well-equipped tools to 
initially support the mending of the fragmented parts of a regional water governance 
regime. The scenarios provided a means for actors to contribute their perspectives, to 
connect with each other, and to collectively examine which ‘direction’ Guanacaste water 
governance could go and what that could mean for the region. Local history, context, and 
challenges resonated with participants in the scenarios. Engaged and linked current-state 
research, the timely demonstration of scenario application (i.e., goal setting and strategy 
building) with stakeholders, and a constructive, participatory scenario building approach 
were important factors that helped boost scenario value. If many water governance 
regimes are proving inadequate, as they have been in Guanacaste, then understanding 
alternative governing options is critical. Also critical, is that people who can collectively 
change governance understand key needs in order to realize alternative, more just water 
governance schemes. In Guanacaste - a developing context featuring low data 
availability, high urgency, and water conflict - governance scenarios were an effective 
step in this direction.  
Among other things, the Guanacaste case demonstrates that to develop, to 
deliberate, to test, and to implement governance transition strategies demands a focused - 
even distinctive - research effort with certain logistical needs and challenges. This new 
type of research stands in contrast to strategies or policy prescriptions that only result 
from descriptions or analyses of current water problems. We argue and demonstrate that a 
solution-orientation of water governance studies can be fittingly organized in 
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comprehensive research projects. To help maximize impact, these projects can consider 
using a transformational planning approach that aims to integrate research on current 
water problems with the collective governance strategies that are needed to overcome 
those problems over time. Results highlight the need for governance that fits dynamic 
water systems; addresses asymmetrical knowledge gaps; reconciles disenfranchised 
groups; and, supports currently effective local leaders. To move forward though, research 
and policy-making must address how to implement/ test governing alternatives in ways 
that account for multiple institutions, actors, challenges, and opportunities in addition to 
deliberating what alternatives to aim for and which to avoid. 
In spite of tough challenges facing the region, prospects for successfully 
mitigating harmful water conflicts remain reasonable. Importantly, water conflicts were 
not uniformly experienced within the region, a number of individuals committed to 
solving water-related issues were active, and each case unfolded in a unique manner. 
Knowledge transfers within regions, learning by example, and existing leaders could 
offer reasonable starting points for strategies within a variety of contexts that aim to 
overcome institutional and political challenges that matter for successful conflict 
mitigation – such as better accounting for rural community interests and power 
imbalances (especially in terms of allocating water and land rights) within multi-level 
governance schemes. Accordingly, water conflict research that addresses problems and 
their potential solutions within meaningful and decision-relevant contexts offers an 
alternative approach to support water conflict-prone regions. This thread of research 
offers potentially useful and improved links to water administrators and policy makers 
that aim to avoid water conflicts in their professional efforts. How to do so, and clarifying 
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what that step sequence would look like in various contexts, and learning from diverse 
cases, is an important future research need.   
The regional and local orientation of this project produced useful information to 
improve water governance and management schemes. We found that focused investments 
in the human resources of water administering organizations - including communications 
equipment, professional development, civic space, and means of transportation - to be 
key initial steps to help mitigate future water conflicts.  Other management priorities 
include securing small-scale water monitoring equipment and legal commitments for 
legitimate basin-scale planning processes. We found that a promising way forward to 
effectively mitigating water conflicts to be a constructive process of identifying 
collaborative actions for water governance, selecting leaders, identifying existing 
resources, recognizing barriers to success, and deriving other actions to overcome those 
barriers. Results offer insight for other researchers, decision-makers, and development 
practitioners in other regions (that also face current resource conflict and climate threats) 
who are interested in understanding how water conflicts might best be mitigated.   
4.1 Evolution of the project’s research and planning frameworks and lessons 
learned from their application.  Figure 7.1-3 demonstrates how this project’s 
organizing research and planning framework has evolved, and how the research team has 
learned, over the last five years.  Figure 7.1 was the original research and planning 
framework used to organize research activities starting in 2009 (based on Wiek & Lang, 
2011 and Wiek & Walter, 2009).  Figure 7.2 (described in this dissertation’s 
introduction), was developed starting late 2012 to better reflect the issues being addressed 
by the project (namely conflict and a focus on governing alternatives rather than 
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scenarios directly informed by broader climate change scenarios). Figure 7.3 utilizes 
insights from the whole dissertation project in order to reflect on another related 
perspective for organizing research and governance efforts that aim to realize transitions 
toward sustainable water governance from current conditions.  The main difference in 
Figure 7.3 is that actions, and consequently learning from those actions, occurs in an 
explicitly organic process that is not necessarily structured or conceptualized in a linear 
fashion. Notably, not all important and useful actions are transformational in nature (e.g., 
resulting directly from developed governance transition strategies), but these actions 
nonetheless play a role informing other knowledge domains and potentially making some 
changes in the current state (this is illustrated from the Guanacaste experience after the 
Figures below). This further conceptualization of research and planning approaches still 
maintains the original ideas that each knowledge domain (1-3) should be integrated with 
the others (i.e., Wiek & Walter, 2009; Wiek & Lang, 2011). Figures 7.1-3 all 
communicate that research and planning should address the need for current water 
governance regimes to ultimately transition toward more sustainable alternatives, i.e., 
Wiek et al., 2012). Key insights, differences, and lessons are explained below. 
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Figure 7.1  
 
The initial project research and planning framework from 2009. Adapted from Wiek & 
Lang (2011) and Wiek & Walter (2009). 
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Figure 7.2 
 
Project research and planning framework developed in late 2012. Adapted from Wiek 
(under review) 
 
 The main advancements from Figure 7.1 to Figure 7.2 are more content-related. 
These content related shifts offer important lessons for research that aims to produce 
actionable knowledge for regions that face climate-threats and sharp water completion.  
Once the research team began this project, and especially dug into the water conflict 
cases, it was apparent that water conflicts were not merely the result of governance 
regimes poor attempts to sort out or match water demands with available and/or expected 
water supplies – as is illustrated at length in Chapter 4. Consequently we concluded that it 
would be unlikely that domains/ parts 2,3, and 4 in Figure 7.1 would adequately support 
governance transition strategies if based on such content in Guanacaste. The original idea 
in Figure 7.1 was (I state this very simply here) to essentially create a system model that 
mimicked the current system, to then incorporate a range of plausible climate impacts 
derived from broader climate change scenarios on that system, and – largely based on 
balances between supply and demand – to then assess the sustainability effects of those 
options and craft transition strategies.  While this would potentially work and be very 
beneficial in other places, the Guanacaste case required different content in order to 
develop actionable knowledge and, especially, meaningful transition strategies. The way 
forward that we took in Guanacaste was to instead developing governance alternatives – 
that captured a range of more sustainable to less sustainable alternative governance 
regimes - that were first and foremost based on how water conflicts played out across a 
range of institutional schemes. We mostly dropped the explicit focus on climate change 
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‘possibilities’ and rather assumed that climate change impacts were largely happening or 
were going to happen in the near future. Our initial calculations of unpublished rainfall 
data from government agencies found that the last 10 years in Guanacaste have averaged 
about 8-10% less annual rainfall than the previous year average of the last fifty years or 
so.  And, considering virtually no rain falls in much of the Province for six months a year 
anyway - which already often results in a number of scarcity issues (see for example the 
story of the community of La Esperanza in Chapter 6) – it is reasonable to assume that 
responding to current and climate impacts involving reduced precipitation would be a 
wise thing to do right now.  Indeed, partners in the PC Commission are already taking 
actions based on less rainfall (as illustrated in Chapter 3). This slightly adjusted approach 
to the scenarios – which is reflected in the change from Figure 7.1 to 7.2 - proved to be 
an interesting discussion topic among researchers and some stakeholders in the scenario 
development. Ultimately no ‘climate utopia’ scenario, i.e., plenty of rainfall every year 
and water supplies for people and environments are never taxed, was developed although 
the extent of climate change impacts varies within the scenarios.  Initially, some 
stakeholders (notably this included stakeholders from San José and not any stakeholders 
working on a daily basis in Guanacaste) deemed the lack of a climate utopian scenario to 
be a negative aspect of the scenarios. However after the scenario event, these 
stakeholders agreed on the value of scenario set, especially discussing an alternative 
scenario such as Scenario 3: Responsive and Engaged which portrayed tradeoffs that 
occurred as climate dried, and how open and fair decision processes responded and 
mitigated conflict. This adjustment in the research and planning approach highlights the 
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increasing recognition gained over the course of the project that people will ultimately 
need to transition governance regimes from the current state to more sustainable ones.  
 
Figure 7.3  
 
An illustration of ideas and potential future concepts for the next iterations of integrated 
research and planning approaches for transforming water governance regimes.  
 
The baseline assumption in all three diagrams is that the efforts of the research 
project or program are embedded in a transformational planning approach (i.e., Wiek et 
al., 2012; Wiek, under review). This approach requires, among other things, the close 
integration of governance and research efforts (which then requires collaboration, 
participation, etc.). In this sense, here I am discussing approaches that start with this 
underpinning and advance from there.  
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A significant take away from Figure 7.3 - in comparison to Figures 7.1 and 7.2 - 
is the explicit focus and differentiation of actions being taken and, as a result of those 
actions, lessons being learnt and consequential adjustments taken in the water governance 
system or in other research and planning domains.  These actions (X functions), and the 
learning (Y functions) that results from their implementation, affects and is affected by all 
of the domains in the framework (e.g., current state analysis, governing alternatives/ goal 
ID/ Vision, and governance transition strategies).  Figure 7.3 also significantly puts the 
domains of current state analysis and governance alternatives/ goal ID and vision 
squarely within the overarching domain of governance transition strategies. The explicit 
assumption here is to highlight that all research and planning efforts should ultimately 
contribute to fundamentally changing current governance regimes to more sustainable 
regimes in urgently challenged regions like Guanacaste. For example, in this project 
actions were taken at different stages/ domains regardless of whether transition strategies 
had been developed or not.  Even having discussions and reporting (see last section of 
Appendix C) to stakeholders on potential or initial starting points for governance 
strategies (that result from current state analysis) proved to be a key factor that helped 
build a high quality partnership between researchers and stakeholders.  The point here is 
that stakeholders in Guanacaste wanted to see how research, regardless of its domain, 
could ultimately support their governing actions.  This didn’t need to be a direct link in 
all cases, but it needed to be somehow linked to informing their actions in some way. 
Ideally and in retrospect, research and planning within the governance transition 
strategies domain would occur simultaneously with current state research in research 
projects and programs.   
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In this project, the research team, for a number of practical reasons, started with 
only current state research as illustrated in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. This resulted in a 
number of important lessons and insights that are communicated through Figure 7.3.  
Xtc Actions (in Figure 7.3) are taken in the current state based on developed 
transition strategies. For example, a major component of the developed transition 
strategies in this dissertation were actions toward reconciliation between national 
agencies and community interests and their opposing institutions. This gap between 
agencies and communities was found to be a problem that led to fragmented water 
governance schemes that were often unresponsive to the needs of rural and local 
communities in Guanacaste (Chapter 2).  It was found to have negative sustainability 
effects in the region (Chapter 3), and it was found to be an important driver of escalated 
water conflicts (Chapter 4).  An example of an Xtc Action taken within this project would 
be the PC Commission’s actions to engage with national level water governance and 
politics and positioning itself in a way to be invited to contribute to national water reform 
meetings.  Xtc Actions would aim to systemically address the underlying causal structures 
and mechanisms of complex problems over time.  Other examples of Xtc Actions include 
new collaborative efforts (as of 2014) by the PC Commission that aim to completely alter 
the economic and agricultural landscape on the Nicoya Peninsula.  These efforts are 
building new private sector partnerships in order to experiment and implement new crops 
and alternative agricultural schemes that do not rely on mass wood-producing tree farms. 
The clear cutting of large tree plot every 10-20 years has seriously damaged 
environments and water sources. The PC Commission argues that clear-cutting in the 
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near future, when combined with increasing impacts from climate change, presents high 
risk of socio-ecological damage that must be mitigated.  
In contrast, Xct Actions (in Figure 7.3) are taken only based on current state 
research. While the lessons learned from taking these actions can inform governance 
transition strategies, these actions are not in themselves the result of a governance 
transition strategy. For example, as described in Chapter 3 the PC Commission used the 
results of the sustainability appraisal (which would be in the current-state analysis 
domain in Figure 7.3) to successfully secure some degree of protection of a local 
groundwater resource through a local Regulatory Plan update.  However, the same 
Regulatory Plan update process that the PC Commission was able to utilize for positive 
gain also demonstrated the deeper underlying issues of water governance in the region. 
Local ASADAs from other areas in Nicoya voiced significant concern over the 
Regulatory Plan update process, which did not include any insight from local 
communities who sought to protect their groundwater resources. This issue had critical 
implications for many coastal communities that struggled to manage limited groundwater 
reserves in spite of poor broader level, official protection of those reserves. From the 
experiences of this dissertation, the success of Xct Actions would seem to be limited to the 
immediate area where partnerships, collaborations, and other research collaborations are 
immediately based (i.e., Nicoya).  However, those Xtc Actions taken by the PC 
Commission resulted in important lessons about what the research team would need to do 
in order to build governance transition strategies, namely who (i.e., more ASADAs and 
organizations that have experienced water conflicts) needed to be in the same room in 
order to do this.  
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Other components and the content of Figure 7.3 is essentially the same as Figure 
7.2 with a few exceptions.  One minor content adjustment is the specification of harmful 
water conflicts.  Harmful implies the normative stance that people should not be 
personally harmed (i.e., become injured, become fearful, receive threats, etc.).  These are 
the types of conflicts that this dissertation engaged with, which is very different from 
most of the water conflict literature and it described at length in Chapter 4.  This framing 
attempts to intentionally leave the door open for further water conflict research that 
follows these types of transformational planning frameworks: what is the potential role of 
organized social opposition in water governance transition strategies? When are these 
types of strategies needed and how can research integrate with these strategies? To what 
extent and how severely should opposition measures proceed? The history of Guanacaste 
shows that organized opposition against unsuitable governing institutions is undertaken in 
intense cases and even in less intense cases.  Challenging question remain here for 
sustainability-oriented research that seeks to address real conflicts: If governance regimes 
must change in order to resolve complex problems, who is likely to lose along the way of 
doing this? Who should or who must lose for these changes to happen (and what are the 
alternatives) – are academic institutions prepared to address these questions and perhaps 
even help make these judgments via professional outputs? And, what would be the 
consequences of research doing this?   
The other exception regarding the content of Figure 7.3 vs. Figure 7.2 is the more 
explicit inclusion of complementary research and planning that constructs a 
comprehensive vision (as a part of domain 2b in Figure 7.3) for water governance in 
regions, or perhaps more appropriately, for several different parts of regions (i.e., a vision 
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for the DRAT in Guanacaste would not be a readily applicable planning tool for the small 
coastal town of Sámara). In this project, we elaborated goals for water governance, but 
did not fully construct a vision for water governance.  In some cases during the project, a 
vision seemed like it would have been a potentially fruitful research endeavor – as 
indicated by some stakeholder’s comments regarding the explicit lack of a purely 
utopian-climate scenario or even pure utopian-type of governing alternative. On the other 
hand, in climate-threatened and water-contested regions with logistical constraints and 
other challenges on organizing collaborative events and processes, using such rare events 
to achieve the highest need at that time for the region is required.  In this sense, 
elaborating initial goals for water governance based on comparing alternative governance 
regimes - and discussing what about the governance regime brought about sustainable 
outcomes or not – offered a feasible alternative method that sufficiently set up the 
development of governance transition strategies. Ultimately the development, 
application, and learning from governance transition strategies is needed. Applying, 
testing, and comparing the lessons and outcomes of these types of research and planning 
frameworks in different cases offers much to learn about actively transitioning water 
governance regimes toward more sustainable alternatives.  The key is that we now start 
from this point: in order to resolve complex water problems in challenged regions like 
Guanacaste, people need to transition current water governance regimes toward more 
sustainable alternatives. This dissertation offers a first step on how to go about doing that 
and how research can actively contribute to these efforts.  
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5. Practical Contributions and Efforts for Advancing Toward Sustainable Water 
Governance in Guanacaste 
A number of practical contributions and efforts were made for advancing toward 
sustainable water governance on the ground in Guanacaste. Some of these include:  
(1) The PC Commission is now experimenting with assuming a role as a regional water 
governance organization.  They aim to expand their role beyond a river basin 
organization in order to be a model for good regional water governance in 
Guanacaste that can mediate between national and local/ community scale water 
governance which this project found to be a key structural issue in the region.  
(2) 150+ individuals were directly engaged in project activities (interviews, workshops, 
working groups, meetings). Many more people were exposed to project to the 
through newspaper, social media, and radio programs.  
(3) Starting in 2013, several autonomous rural water administrators along the coast near 
Nicoya are meeting regularly in a new process to begin laying the groundwork to 
combine resources/ unite into a better-coordinated regional water administrative 
organization.  Although these efforts have encountered hurdles (i.e., leadership 
changes), many of these organizations now focus on human resource development.  
This is a major paradigm shift in organizations that are typically only concerned with 
delivering water to users in their service area.  
(4) Governing processes in many parts of the region are using a planning model similar 
to the one employed in the project (Current State Analysis – Future State/ 
Alternative State Analysis – Strategy Development).  A new ‘Science Committee’ 
was formed in Nicoya to help train others on this process and to ensure that 
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relationships with future research teams productive and yield usable results.  
(5) Local actors in Nicoya regularly used the scenarios in planning efforts immediately 
after the March 2013 workshop.  Since then, however, efforts have shifted toward 
strategy development and testing with less reliance on the scenarios.  
(6) Local water managers are building a ‘resource map’ to continue work that identifies 
human, technical, and financial resources that are dispersed in various organizations 
in the region 
(7) Local actors and organizations are using the results to advocate to national 
organizations and politicians on behalf of under funded rural water administrators to 
secure financial, technical, and communications resources that are key to help 
mitigate future water conflict in the region.  Members of the PC Commission were 
invited to participate in water reform talks in San José in February 2014.  
(8) Two important organizations for water governance in the Nicoya zone – the 
Environment Ministry and the Water Agency - now attempt to coordinate with each 
other.  An official from AyA now regularly attends PC Commission monthly 
meetings.  
(9) A major effort to understand and quantify water resource availability in the area is 
now building on the work presented in this dissertation in cooperation with the PC 
Commission.  
(10) In 2012, the report presented in Appendix C was used by the PC Commission during 
a Municipal Regulatory Plan update process to secure some protection (via land-use 
and development guidelines and zoning) of a nearby groundwater reserve.  
(11) Chapter 6 of this dissertation was published online in the journal Solutions in 
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English and Spanish. The Spanish version was distributed to a wide range of 
stakeholders and people involved in water governance in Costa Rica.  Some of these 
groups include: workshop/ study participants, to water law reform groups, agency 
directors, congressmen, and other decision-makers.  
(12) The report contained in Appendix D was distributed to workshop participants, local 
and regional decision makers, community groups, and environmental groups via e-
mail and in-person hard copies.  Many recipients stated that they had never received 
the results of such scientific studies before.  Efforts were made a to deliver the report 
to underfunded rural water administrators in Guanacaste that could not be contacted 
by email.   
(13) In November 2012, the research team wrote a guest editorial on water conflicts in 
the Monthly newspaper Voz de Nosara (now called Voz de Guanacaste).  The article 
focuses on water conflict cases. The newspaper article is available freely online and 
was distributed in print around Guanacaste Province. The article was picked up and 
re-published by three other news outlets including the national Costa Rican 
newspaper El Día.  
(14) On March 14, 2013, 46 individuals from 18 Guanacaste communities participated in 
the first collaborative workshop for water governance in the region.  Participants 
represented eleven rural water administrators (ASADAs), six public agencies, 
regional governments, tourism, agriculture, community groups, and environmental 
groups. The positions that participants held in the public water sector ranged from 
agency directors to part-time water administrators in communities with fewer than 
1,000 people. Participants worked together for over seven hours.  The workshop was 
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a significant research activity (i.e., data collection, some data analysis with 
participants, validating data/ results), but it also served as a major outreach activity 
in the sense that it dramatically increased the visibility of the project and that it 
included many people who have not been exposed to or been involved with such a 
project before. Many people have requested results from the workshop – even those 
who did not attend the workshop. Many of the rural water administrators who 
attended had never been involved with a research project before.   
(15) In late March 2013, the Voz de Nosara published an article on the March 2013 
workshop. A reporter was invited to participate and write an article on the workshop. 
The article is available freely online and was distributed in print around the Province 
of Guanacaste.  
(16) On March 22, 2013, the research team was invited by the Comisión para el Manejo 
de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital to participate in a community event 
commemorating World Water Day in the City of Nicoya. Hundreds of people from 
the City came and heard a summary of the research activities and results. The 
research team was invited to join a radio program and discuss the project and water 
governance and water conflict in general in Guanacaste.  The research team was also 
invited to the 2014 event.  
(17) Also in March 2013, the research drafted an initial 2-page summary of key results 
and action items for water governance.  The PC Commission reviewed the 2-page 
summary.  The PC Commission presented the summary at the March 22nd World 
Water Day event and asked people from the community to sign the summery in 
order to send the summery to politician and law makers. The summary was also 
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distributed in hard copy form to interested people at the event in Nicoya. The copy 
with the signatures was delivered to the Mayor’s Office, to over 50 national 
politicians via email and social media, and to rural water administrators in either 
hard copy or via fax.  The purpose of sending the a copy to the rural water 
administrators was to assist in any outreach or advocacy activities concerning water 
reform.  
(18) In early 2014, SENARA began re-doing the rural development plan for the DRAT 
and has asked the research team to support assessment effort to ensure fair and just 
water allocations across groups of farmers  
(19) The PC Commission asked for and received from the research team a draft an outline 
of key lessons for doing collaborative research in the region. This document’s 
purpose was to be the basis for a new Science Committee in the area around Nicoya.  
The PC Commission views the project as a model of collaboration with researchers, 
of results dissemination, and of communication with stakeholders – and wanted a 
document to guide them in their future relationship with other researchers.  
The contributions and efforts listed above should not be taken as a ‘work finished’ 
section.  On the contrary, they should be taken as a start that – in close collaboration with 
many other researchers and local partners - has helped modestly contribute to building 
some initial momentum for sustainable water governance in a small part of Guanacaste. 
As I write these last paragraphs of the dissertation, in rural Guanacaste, it is apparent that 
much more work remains. For example: A few weeks ago (in February 2014) another 
escalated water conflict occurred in Playa Potrero (north of Nicoya).  Shortly after that 
event, 11 people were violently arrested in a demonstration for the support of proposed 
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legislation that would distribute more governing authority of land and water resources to 
coastal communities. This last event has since prompted an investigation by a human 
rights watchdog group into the police actions and arrests.  And, since the dry season 
started here, a strange amount of calcium and other minerals is constantly clogging my 
shower and sink.  We receive water from a small ASADA who cannot figure out what is 
going on with the groundwater that supplies our neighborhood. Which, accordingly, has 
prompted my wife and I to stop drinking from the tap. Much work remains in Guanacaste 
and in other climate-threatened and water-contested regions.  In the last two years, the 
literature on water governance has begun to take a major shift in its paradigm and 
perspective towards solution-oriented water governance studies. This shift is highlighted 
and engaged with in a variety of ways in all of the dissertation chapters.  This shift has 
resulted in a number of recent academic papers calling for more solution-oriented water 
governance studies that aim to yield actionable knowledge for critical regions. Yet, there 
are currently few examples available where we can learn about how exactly to do this 
type of research and what the opportunities and challenges are. This dissertation provides 
an early example to learn about the opportunities and challenges of doing such use-
inspired research that is well integrated across its research components and in the place 
where research is being conducted. The presented project ultimately offers the insights 
and lessons – from its successes and failures - for designing and implementing several 
aspects of solution-oriented water governance research that is coupled with real-time 
efforts that, simultaneously with research efforts, take actions in attempts to advance 
toward sustainable water governance.  
  
	  
	  
294 
REFERENCES 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Anderson, E. R., Cherrington, E. A., Flores, A. I., Pérez, J. B., Carrillo, R., & Sempris, E. 
(2008). Potential impacts of climate change on biodiversity in Central America, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. CATHALAC/USAID, Panama City, 105.  
 
Anderies, M. & Janssen, M. (2013). Robustness of social-ecological systems: 
Implications for public policy. Policy Studies Journal, 41(3), 513-536.  
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water management. Water security: Research challenges and 
opportunities. Science, 337(6097). 914-915. 
 
Bakker, K., & Cook, C. (2011). Water governance in Canada: Innovation and 
Fragmentation. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 27(2), 275-
289.  
 
Biermann, F., Abbott, K., Andresen, et al. (2012). Transforming governance and 
institutions for global sustainability: Key insights from the earth system governance 
project. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 4(1), 51-60.  
 
Biggs, E. M., Duncan, J. M., Atkinson, P. M., & Dash, J. (2013). Plenty of water, not 
enough strategy. Environmental Science & Policy, 33, 388-394.  
 
Biswas, A.K., Rached, E., & Tortajada, C. Eds. (2009). Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Latin America. Routledge: New York.  
 
Böhmelt, T., Bernauer, T., Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, N. P., Tribaldos, T., & Wischnath, G. 
(2013). Demand, supply, and restraint: Determinants of domestic water conflict and 
cooperation. Global Environmental Change. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.018 
 
Booth, J.A., Wade, C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th edition. Westview, Boulder. 
 
Casas-Zamora, K. (2011). The travails of development and democratic governance in 
Central America. Policy Paper #28, June. Foreign Policy at Brookings.  
 
Costanza, R. (2011). Needed: The solutions generation. Solutions, 2(5), October 2011.  
 
Cover, A. R. (2007). Conflictos socioambientales y recursos hídricos en guanacaste; una 
descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo (1997-2006). Anuario De 
Estudios Centroamericanos, 359-385.   
 
	  
	  
295 
Clark, W. C., & Dickson, N. M. (2003). Sustainability science: the emerging research 
program. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 100(14), 8059–61.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants against globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.  
 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive Governance of Social-
Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1), 441-473. 
 
Frey, F.W. (1993). The political context of conflict and cooperation over international 
river basins. Water International 18(1), 54-68.  
 
Funder, M., Mweemba, C., Nyambe, I., van Koppen, B., & Ravnborg, H. M. (2010). 
Understanding local water conflict and cooperation: The case of Namwala district, 
Zambia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 35(13-14), 758-764. 
 
Gibbons, M. (1999). Science’s new social contract with society. Nature, 402, C81-C84.  
 
Gibson, R.B. (2006). Sustainability assessment: Basic components of a practical 
approach. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 24, 170-182.  
 
Gutiérrez, E.G., Gómez, F.G., & Guardiola, J. (2013). Water access in Sucre, Bolivia: a 
case of governance deficit. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
29(4), 636-649.  
 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. 
(2009). Adaptive water governance: assessing the institutional prescriptions of 
adaptive (co-) management from a governance perspective and defining a research 
agenda. Ecology and Society, 14(1), article 26.  
 
ISSC/UNESCO (2013). World Social Science Report 2013: Changing Global 
Environments. OECD Publishing and UNESCO Publishing, Paris. 
 
Imperial, M.T. (1999). Institutional analysis and ecosystem-based management: The 
institutional analysis and development framework. Environmental Management, 
24(4), 449-465.  
 
INEC. (2011). Costa Rica Census. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa 
Rica 
 
Jerneck, A., Olsson, L., Ness, B., Anderberg, S., Baier, M., Clark, E., … Hickler, T. 
(2010). Structuring sustainability science. Sustainability Science, 6(1), 69–82.  
 
	  
	  
296 
Kates, R., Clark, W.C., Corell, R., Hall, J.M., Jaeger, C.C., et al. (2001).  Sustainability 
Science. Science, 292(5517), 641-642.  
 
Kemp, R., Parto, S., & Gibson, R.B. (2005). Governance for sustainable development: 
Moving from theory to practice. International Journal of Sustainable Development, 
8(1/2): 12-30. 
 
Lang, D.J., Wiek, A., Bergmann, M., Stauffacher, M., Martens, P., Moll, P., Swilling, M., 
Thomas, C. (2012). Transdisciplinary research in Sustainability Science – practice, 
principles, and challenges. Sustainability Science, 7(supplement), 25-43. 
 
Loucks, D. P. (2008). Educating future water resources managers. Journal of 
Contemporary Water Research & Education, 139(1), 17-22.  
 
Lubell, M., Leach, W., & Sabatier, P.A. (2008.) Collaborative watershed partnerships in 
the epoch of sustainability. In: Mazmanian D, Kraft ME (eds). (2008). Toward 
sustainable communities, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MIT, p 255–288.  
 
Madrigal, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2011). Determinants of performance of 
community-based drinking water organizations. World Development, 39(9), 1663-
1675.  
 
Marshall, G. R. (2009). Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation 
practices under community-based governance. Ecological Economics, 68(5), 1507-
1520.  
 
McGinnis, M. D., editor. 2000. Polycentric games and institutions: readings from the 
workshop in political theory and policy analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan.  
 
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007). Beyond panaceas in water institutions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15200-15205 
 
Molle, F., Wester, P., & Hirsch, P. (2007). River basin development and management. In 
Water for Food, Water for Life: A comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture. (pp585-625). Earthscan/ IWMA.  
 
Nagendra, H., & Ostrom, E. (2012). Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested 
landscapes. International Journal of the Commons, 6(2), 104-133.  
 
Neef, A. (2009). Transforming rural water governance: Towards deliberative and 
polycentric models. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 53-60. 
 
	  
	  
297 
Nelson, D. R., Adger, W. N., & Brown, K. (2007). Adaptation to environmental change: 
Contributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources, 32(1), 395.  
 
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.H., & Warren, R. (1961). The organization of government in 
metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry. American Political Science Review, 55, 
831–842.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15181-15187. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Science, 325:419–422 
 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 
environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550-557.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. 
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 7-27  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2009). A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and 
multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global 
Environmental Change, 19(3), 354-365.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., & Kranz, N. (2010). Water governance in times of change. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 13(7), 567-570. 
 
Pahl-Wostl C, Vörösmarty C, Bhaduri A, Bogardi J, Rockström J, Alcamo J (2013) 
Towards a sustainable water future: Shaping the next decade of global water 
research. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 5: 1-7.  
 
Postel, S.L., & Wolf, A.T. (2001). Dehydrating conflict. Foreign Policy, (126), 60.  
 
Reed, P. M., & Kasprzyk, J. (2009). Water resources management: The myth, the wicked, 
and the future. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135(6), 411-
413.  
 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, et al. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity. 
Nature, 461(7263), 472-475.  
 
Rogers, P. (2002). Water governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Draft for 
presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank’s Annual Meetings in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, March 7.  
 
	  
	  
298 
Sarewitz, D., Clapp, R., Crumbley, C., Kriebel, D., & Tickner, J. (2012). The Sustainable 
Solutions Agenda. New Solutions, 22(2), 139-151. 
 
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P. M., & Schilling, J. (2012). Climate 
change and violent conflict. Science (New York, N.Y.), 336(6083), 869-71. 
 
Sneddon, C., Harris, L., Dimitrov, R., & Özesmi, U. (2002). Contested waters: Conflict, 
scale, and sustainability in aquatic socioecological systems. Society &Natural 
Resources, 15(8), 663-675.  
 
Swatuk, L.A. (2008). A political economy of water in Southern Africa. Water 
Alternatives, 1(1): 24-47.  
 
Vörösmarty, C. J., McIntyre, P. B., Gessner, M. O., Dudgeon, D., Prusevich, et al. 
(2010). Nature, 467, 555-561.  
 
Vörösmarty, C.J., Pahl-Wostl, C., Bunn, S.E. Lawford, R. (2013). Global water, the 
anthropocene and the transformation of a science. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability, 5(6), 539-550.  
 
Wiek, A., in review. Transformational planning for sustainable cities. Journal of 
Landscape and Urban Planning. 
 
Wiek, A., & Walter, A. I. (2009). A transdisciplinary approach for formalized integrated 
planning and decision-making in complex systems. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 197(1), 360-370. 
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K. L. (2012). Water, people, and sustainability—A systems 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26(11), 3153-3171.  
 
Wiek, A. & Lang, D. (2014). Methodology for Transformational Sustainability Science. 
School of Sustainability, Arizona State University.  
 
Wiek, A., Ness, B., Brand, F.S., Schweizer-Ries, P., & Farioli, F. (2012). From complex 
systems analysis to transformational change: A comparative appraisal of 
sustainability science projects. Sustainability Science, 7(Supplement), 5-24. 
 
Zeitoun, M., & Mirumachi, N. (2008). Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering 
conflict and cooperation. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics, 8(4), 297-316.  
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
299 
Chapter 2 
 
Agrawal, A. (2008). The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. Paper 
prepared for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Social Development 
Department, World Bank. Washington D.C. 
 
Agudelo, C.A. (2008). Vulnerabilidad a la contaminación del Acuífero Potrero-Caimital, 
Nicoya, Guanacaste. SENARA, San José, Costa Rica.  
 
Anderson, E. R., Cherrington, E. A., Flores, A. I., Pérez, J. B., Carrillo, R., & Sempris, E. 
(2008). Potential impacts of climate change on biodiversity in Central America, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. CATHALAC/USAID, Panama City.  
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water management. Water security: Research challenges and 
opportunities. Science, 337(6097). 914-915. 
 
Biermann, F., Abbott, K., Andresen, et al. (2012). Transforming governance and 
institutions for global sustainability: Key insights from the earth system governance 
project. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 4(1), 51-60.  
 
Bodin, O., & Prell, C.  (2011). Social Networks and Natural Resource Management: 
Uncovering the Social Fabric of Environmental Governance. Cambridge University 
Press, UK.  
 
Booth, J.A., Wade C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: Global 
Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th ed. Westview, Boulder.  
 
Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G., & Freeman, L.C. (2002). UCINet: Software for Social 
Network Analysis. Analytic Technologies, Harvard.  
 
Cañada, E. (2010). Tourism in Central America: Social conflict in a new setting. 
Fundación PRISMA/ Abul Sud. Managua, Nicaragua.  
 
CORENA. (1986).  Plan de Manejo de la Cuenca Superior del Río Nosara, Hojancha, 
Guanacaste. MAG/DGF/FAO/USAID.  Hojancha, Costa Rica 
 
Ernstson, H., Barthel, S., Andersson, E., & Borgström, S. T. (2010). Scale-crossing 
brokers and network governance of urban ecosystem services: The case of 
Stockholm. Ecology and Society, 15(4), article #28 
 
Fabricius, C., Folke, C., Cundill, G., & Schultz, L. (2007). Powerless spectators, coping 
actors, and adaptive co-managers: A synthesis of the role of communities in 
ecosystem management. Ecology and Society, 12(1), article #29   
 
	  
	  
300 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive Governance of Social-
Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1), 441-473.  
 
Galaz, V., Biermann, F., Folke, C., Nilsson, M., & Olsson, P. (2012). Global 
environmental governance and planetary boundaries: An introduction. Ecological 
Economics, 81,1-3.  
 
Herrera, H.M. (2009). Informe Final: Implicaciones del proyecto de ampliación del 
acueducto el Coco-Octal, Guanacaste, Conocido “Como Sardinal.” Universidad de 
Costa Rica, San José.  
 
Holtz, G., Brugnach, M., & Pahl-Wostl, C. (2008). Specifying “regime” – A framework 
for defining and describing regimes in transition research. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 75, 623-643.  
 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. 
(2009). Adaptive water governance: assessing the institutional prescriptions of 
adaptive (co-) management from a governance perspective and defining a research 
agenda. Ecology and Society, 14(1), article 26.  
 
Huntjens, H., Lebel, L., Pahl-Wostl, C., Camkin, J., Schulze, R., & Kranz, N. (2012). 
Institutional design propositions for the governance of adaptation to climate change 
in the water sector. Global Environmental Change, 22, 67-81.  
 
IMN. (2009). Estación Meteorológica de Santa Cruz. Instituto Nacional Meteorológico, 
Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, Costa Rica.  
 
Imperial, M.T. (1999). Institutional analysis and ecosystem-based management: The 
institutional analysis and development framework. Environmental Management, 
24(4), 449-465.  
 
ITCR. (2008). Costa Rica Atlas. Instituto Tecnología Costa Rica. San José, Costa Rica.  
 
Johnson, M.S. (2009). Public participation and perceptions of watershed modeling. 
Society and Natural Resources, 22, 79-87. 
 
Kuzdas, C. (2012). Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.  
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Moratoya, R. (2014). Sustainability 
appraisal of water governance regimes: The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. 
Environmental Management, forthcoming.  
 
	  
	  
301 
Krütli, P., Stauffacher, M., Flüeler, T., & Scholz, R.W. (2010). Functional dynamic 
public participation in technological decisión-making: Site selection process of 
nuclear waste repositories. Journal of Risk Research, 13(7), 861-875.  
 
Lang, D.J., A. Wiek, M. Bergmann, M. Stauffacher, P. Martens, P. Moll, M. Swilling, & 
C. Thomas. (2012). Transdisciplinary research in Sustainability Science – practice, 
principles, and challenges. Sustainability Science, 7(suppl): 25-43.  
 
Lemos, M.C. & Agrawal, A. (2006) Environmental governance. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 31, 297-325.   
 
Loucks, D.P. (2008). Educating future water resources managers. Journal of 
Contemporary Watre Resources Research and Education,139, 17-22 
 
Lubell, M., Leach, W., & Sabatier, P.A. (2008). Collaborative watershed partnerships in 
the epoch of sustainability. In: Mazmanian, D., & Kraft, M.E. Eds. Toward 
sustainable communities, 2nd edition. (pp255-288) MIT, Cambridge.  
 
Marshall, G. R. (2009). Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation 
practices under community-based governance. Ecological Economics, 68(5), 1507-
1520.  
 
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007). Beyond panaceas in water institutions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15200-15205.  
 
MINAET. (2010).  Registro de Concesiones de Agua, Nicoya, Hojancha, and Belen de 
Nosarita Cantones. Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones, San 
José, Costa Rica.  
 
Molle, F., Wester, P., & Hirsch, P. (2007). River basin development and management. In 
Water for Food, Water for Life: A comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture. (pp585-625). Earthscan/ IWMA.  
 
Nagendra, H., & Ostrom, E. (2012). Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested 
landscapes. International Journal of the Commons, 6(2), 104-133.  
 
Neef, A. (2009). Transforming rural water governance: Towards deliberative and 
polycentric models. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 53-60. 
 
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.H., & Warren, R. (1961). The organization of government in 
metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry. American Political Science Review, 55, 
831–842.  
 
Ostrom, E. (1992). Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems. Institute 
for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco.  
	  
	  
302 
 
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15181-15187. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Science, 325:419–422 
 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. 
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 7-27  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2008). Requirements for adaptive water management. In: Pahl-Wostl, C., 
P. Kabat,. & J. Moltgen. editors. (2008).  Adaptive and Integrated Water 
Management: Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty. Springer, Berlin, pp. 1-22.   
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2009). A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and 
multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global 
Environmental Change, 19(3), 354-365.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Holtz, G., Kastens, B., & Knieper, C. (2010). Analyzing complex water 
governance regimes: the management and transition framework. Environmental 
Science and Policy, 13(7):571–581.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., & Kranz, N. (2010). Water governance in times of change. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 13(7), 567-570. 
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Lebel, L., Knieper, C., & Nikitina, E. (2012). From applying panaceas to 
mastering complexity: Toward adaptive water governance in river basins. 
Environmental Science and Policy, 23, 24-34.  
 
Raadgever, G.T., Mostet, E., & van de Giesen, N.C. (2012). Learning from collaborative 
research in water management practice. Water Resources Management, in press.  
 
Reed, P. M., & Kasprzyk, J. (2009). Water resources management: The myth, the wicked, 
and the future. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135(6), 411-
413.  
 
Ribot, J.C. (2011). Choice, recognition, and the democracy effects of decentralization. 
Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy, Working Paper #5.  
 
Rijke, J., Brown, R., Zevenbergen, C., Ashley, R., Farrelly, M., Morison, P., & van Herk, 
S. (2012). Fit-for-purpose governance: A framework to make adaptive capacity 
operational.  Environmental Science and Policy, 22, 73-84.  
 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, et al. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity. 
Nature, 461(7263), 472-475.  
	  
	  
303 
 
Schneider, M., Scholz, J., Lubell, M., Mindruta, D., & Edwardsen, M. (2003). Building 
consensual institutions: Networks and the national estuary program. American 
Journal of Political Science, 47(1), 143-158.  
 
Schlüter, M., Hirsch, D., Pahl-Wostl, C. (2010). Coping with change – responses of the 
Uzbek water management regime to socio-economic transition and global change.  
Environmental Science and Policy, 13(7), 620–636.  
 
Shaw, A., Sheppard, S., Burch, S., Flanders, D., Wiek, A., Carmichael, J., Robinson, J., 
Cohen, S. (2009). Making local futures tangible – Synthesizing, downscaling, and 
visualizing climate change scenarios for participatory capacity building. Global 
Environmental Change, 19, 447-463.  
 
Stein, C., Ernstson, H., & Barron, J. (2011). A social network approach to analyzing 
water governance: The case of the Mkindo catchment, Tanzania. Physics and 
Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 36(14), 1085-1092.  
 
Stringer, L.C., Dougill, A.J., Fraser, E., Hubacek, K., Prell, C., & Reed, M.S. (2006). 
Unpacking “participation” in the adaptive management of social–ecological systems: 
a critical review. Ecology and Society, 11(2), article 39. 
 
Talwar, S., Wiek, A., & Robinson, J. (2011) User engagement in sustainability research. 
Science and Public Policy, 38, 379-390.  
 
Vance-Borland, K., & Holley, J. (2011). Conservation stakeholder network mapping, 
analysis, and weaving. Conservation Letters, 4(4), 278-288.  
 
Voß, J., & Bornemann, B. (2011). The politics of reflexive governance: Challenges for 
designing adaptive management and transition management. Ecology and Society, 
16(2): Article 9.  
 
Wiek, A., Zemp, S., Siegrist, M., & Walter, A. (2007). Sustainable governance of 
emerging technologies – Critical constellations in the agent network of 
nanotechnology. Technology and Society, 29(4), 388–406.   
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K. L. (2012). Water, people, and sustainability—A systems 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26(11), 3153-3171.  
 
Wiek, A., Ness, B., Brand, F.S., Schweizer-Ries, P., & Farioli, F. (2012). From complex 
systems analysis to transformational change: A comparative appraisal of 
sustainability science projects. Sustainability Science, 7(Supplement), 5-24. 
 
	  
	  
304 
Young, O.R., King, L.A., & Schroeder, H. (2008). Institutions and Environmental 
Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers. MIT Press, 
Cambridge.  
 
Chapter 3 
 
Agrawal, A. (2008). The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. Paper 
prepared for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Social Development 
Department, World Bank. Washington D.C. 
 
Alley, W.M., & Leake, S.A. (2004). The journey from safe yield to sustainability. 
Ground Water, 42(1), 12–16.  
 
Anderson, E., Flores, E., Perez, A.E., Carrillo, J., & Sempris, E. (2008). Potential impacts 
of climate change on biodiversity in Central America, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic. CATHALAC/ USAID, Panama City.  
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water security: Research challenges and opportunities. Science, 337, 
914-915 
 
Ballestero, M., Reyes, V., & Astorga, Y. (2007). Groundwater in Central America: Its 
importance, development and use with particular reference to its role in irrigated 
agriculture In: The Agricultural Revolution: Opportunities and Threats to 
Development. CAB International, pp. 100-128.  
 
Bebbington, A, (2005), Donor-NGO relations and representations of livelihood in 
nongovernmental aid chains. World Development, 33, 937–950.  
 
Benavente, A. (2010). Water to survive on but not to grow on. Utopia Magazine and 
Guanacaste Travel Guide.  
 
Biermann, F., Abbott, K., Andresen, S., Backstrand, K., & Bernstein, K., et al. (2012). 
Navigating the anthropocene: Improving Earth System Governance. Science, 
335(6074), 1306-1307.  
 
Biswas, A.K., Rached, E., & Tortajada, C. Eds. (2009). Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Latin America. Routledge: New York.  
 
Booth, J.A., Wade, C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th edition. Westview, Boulder.  
 
Brooks, D. B., & Holtz, S. (2009). Water soft path analysis: From principles to practice. 
Water International, 34(2), 158-169.  
 
	  
	  
305 
Cartagena, R.E.C. (2009). Metabolismo socio-natural y conflictos ambientales en Costa 
Rica y El Salvador; 1992 – 2007. Facultad Latinoamérica de Ciencias Sociales / 
Programa Centroamericano de Posgrado, Costa Rica. PhD Dissertation.  
 
Cover, A. R. (2007). Conflictos socioambientales y recursos hídricos en guanacaste; una 
descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo (1997-2006). Anuario De 
Estudios Centroamericanos, 359-385.   
 
Eakin, H., Eriksen, S., Eikeland, P.O., & Oyen, C. (2011). Public sector reform and 
governance for adaptation: Implications of New Public Management for adaptive 
capacity in Mexico and Norway. Environmental Management, 47, 338-351.  
 
Eakin, E., & Lemos, M.C. (2010). Institutions and change: The challenge of building 
adaptive capacity in Latin America. Global Environmental Change, 20, 1-3.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants against globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press: Stanford.  
 
Engle, N.L., & Lemos, M.C. (2010). Unpacking governance: Building adaptive capacity 
to climate change of river basins in Brazil. Global Environmental Change, 20, 4-13. 
 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive governance of social-
ecological systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30, 441-73. 
 
Galaz V., Biermann, F., Folke, C., Nilsson, M., & Olsson, P. (2012) Global 
environmental governance and planetary boundaries: An introduction. Ecological 
Economics, 81, 1-3. 
 
Gibson, R.B. (2006). Sustainability assessment: Basic components of a practical 
approach. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 24, 170-182  
 
Gleick, P. H. (2003). Global freshwater resources: Soft-path solutions for the 21st 
century. Science, 302(5650), 1524-8. 
 
Grigg, N.S. (2010). Governance and Management for Sustainable Water Systems. IWA, 
London 
 
Holtz, G., Brugnach, M., & Pahl-Wostl, C. (2008). Specifying “regime” – A framework 
for defining and describing regimes in transition research. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 75, 623-643. 
 
Imperial, M.T. (1999). Institutional analysis and ecosystem-based management: The 
institutional analysis and development framework. Environmental Management, 
24(4), 449-465.  
 
	  
	  
306 
INEC. (2011). Costa Rica Census. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa 
Rica 
 
Kemp, R., Parto, S., & Gibson, R.B. (2005). Governance for sustainable development: 
Moving from theory to practice. International Journal of Sustainable Development, 
8, 12-30 
 
Kuzdas, C. (2012). Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.  
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2012a)  Integrated and 
participatory analysis of regional water governance regimes – The case of 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica.  School of Sustainability working paper, Arizona State 
University 
 
Kuzdas, C., Yglesias, M., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R.  (2012b) 
Evaluación de Sostenibilidad del Sistema Regional de Agua y el Manejo de Agua en 
las Sub-Cuencas Potrero, Caimital, y Nosara Alta.  Comisión para el Manejo de las 
Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Nicoya, Guanacaste, Costa Rica 
 
Langsdale, S.M., Beall, A., Carmichael, J., Cohen, S.J., Forster, C.B., & Neale, T. (2009). 
Exploring the implications of climate change on water resources through 
participatory modeling: Case study of the Okanagan Basin, British Columbia. 
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135(5), 373-381.  
 
Larson, K.L., Wiek, A., & Keeler, L.W. (2013). A comprehensive sustainability appraisal 
of water governance in Phoenix, AZ.  Journal of Environmental Management, 116, 
58-71.   
 
Loaiza, V.N. (2010). AyA requiere un presupuesto de 6 anos para reconstruir acueductos. 
La Nación, September  27, 2010, pp. 6A.  
 
Lockwood, M. (2010). Good governance for terrestrial protected areas: A framework, 
principles, and performance outcomes. Journal of Environmental Management, 
91,754-766 
 
Lubell, M., Leach, W., & Sabatier, P.A. (2008). Collaborative watershed partnerships in 
the epoch of sustainability. In: Mazmanian, D., & Kraft, M.E. Eds. Toward 
sustainable communities, 2nd edition. (pp255-288) MIT, Cambridge.  
 
Ludwig, D. (2001). The era of management is over. Ecosystems, 4, 758–764 
 
	  
	  
307 
Madrigal, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2011). Determinants of performance of 
community-based drinking water organizations. World Development, 39(9), 1663-
1675.  
 
MINAET. (2008). Plan Nacional de Gestión Integrada de los Recursos Hídricos. 
Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones. San José, Costa Rica. 
 
Morataya, R. (2004). Plan de Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Comisión para 
el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Nicoya, Costa Rica. 
 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Ostrom, E. (1992). Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems. Institute 
for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco 
 
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences USA, 104(39), 15181-15187.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Science, 325, 419-422. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. 
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 7-27.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2008). Requirements for adaptive water management. In: Pahl-Wostl C, 
Kabat P, & Moltgen, J. (Eds.) (2008). Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: 
Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty. Springer, Berlin, pp. 1-22.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Holtz, G., Kastens, B,, & Knieper, C. (2010). Analyzing complex water 
governance regimes: the management and transition framework. Environmental 
Science and Policy, 13(7), 571–581.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., & Kranz, N. (2010). Water governance in times of change. Environ Sci 
Policy 13,  567-570 
 
Pahl-Wostl C, Lebel L, Knieper C, Nikitina E (2012) From applying panaceas to 
mastering complexity: Toward adaptive water governance in river basins. 
Environmental Science and Policy, 23, 24-34. 
 
Paniagua, F., & Stocks, G. (2008). Conflict in Sardinal: The case of Costa Rica’s first 
public-private partnership for water infrastructure development.  Bob Graham Center 
for Public Service, University of Florida. 
 
	  
	  
308 
Reed, P.M., & Kaspryzk, J. (2009). Water resources management: the myth, the wicked, 
and the future. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135, 411-
413  
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996). The new governance: Governing without Government. Political 
Studies, XLIV, 612-667 
 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin, F.S. et al. (2009). A safe 
operating space for humanity. Nature, 461, 472–475. 
 
Rogers, P. (2002). Water governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Draft for 
presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank’s Annual Meetings in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, March 7.  
 
Rogers, P., Hall, A.W. (2003). Effective Water Governance. Global Water Partnership 
Technical Committee. Novum, Sweden.   
 
Sarewitz, D., Clapp, R., Crumbley, C., Kriebel, D., & Tickner, J. (2012). The Sustainable 
Solutions Agenda. New Solutions, 22(2), 139-151 
 
Wiek, A., Zemp, S., Siegrist, M., & Walter, A. (2007). Sustainable governance of 
emerging technologies – Critical constellations in the agent network of 
nanotechnology. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 29, 388–406.  
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K.L. (2012). Water systems, people, and sustainability – a 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26, 3153-3171.  
 
Wiek, A., Ness, B., Brand, F.S., Schweizer-Ries, P., & Farioli, F. (2012). From complex 
systems analysis to transformational change: A comparative appraisal of 
sustainability science projects. Sustainability Science, 7, 5-24  
 
Young, O.R., King, L.A., & Schroeder, H. (2008). Institutions and Environmental 
Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers. MIT Press, 
Cambridge.    
 
Chapter 4 
Anderson, E. R., Cherrington, E. A., Flores, A. I., Pérez, J. B., Carrillo, R., & Sempris, E. 
(2008). Potential impacts of climate change on biodiversity in central america, 
mexico, and the dominican republic. CATHALAC/USAID, Panama City, 105pp.  
 
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a 
polycentric perspective. Policy Sciences, 41(1), 71-93.  
 
	  
	  
309 
Atkinson-Palombo, C., & Gebremichael, M. (2012). Creating a learning organization to 
promote sustainable water resources management in Ethiopia. Journal of 
Sustainability Education, 3.  
 
Avolio, B., Walumbwa, F., & Weber, T. (2009). Leadership: current theories, research, 
and future directions. Annual Review of Psychology 60, 421–449. 
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water management. Water security: Research challenges and 
opportunities. Science, 337(6097), 914-5.  
 
Bakker, K., & Cook, C. (2011). Water governance in Canada: Innovation and 
Fragmentation. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 27(2), 275-
289.  
 
Bass, B. (1999). Two decades of research and development in transformational 
leadership. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 8, 9–32. 
 
Biggs, E. M., Duncan, J. M., Atkinson, P. M., & Dash, J. (2013). Plenty of water, not 
enough strategy. Environmental Science & Policy, 33, 388-394.  
 
Biswas, A.K., Rached, E., & Tortajada, C. Eds. (2009). Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Latin America. Routledge: New York.  
 
Bodin, Ö., & Crona, B. I. (2009). The role of social networks in natural resource 
governance: What relational patterns make a difference? Global Environmental 
Change, 19(3), 366-374.  
 
Böhmelt, T., Bernauer, T., Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, N. P., Tribaldos, T., & Wischnath, G. 
(2013). Demand, supply, and restraint: Determinants of domestic water conflict and 
cooperation. Global Environmental Change.  
 
Booth, J.A., Wade, C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th edition. Westview, Boulder. 
 
Brooks, D. B., & Holtz, S. (2009). Water soft path analysis: From principles to practice. 
Water International, 34(2), 158-169.  
 
Carlsson, L. G., & Sandström, A. C. (2008). Network governance of the commons. 
International Journal of the Commons, 2(1), 33-54.  
 
Cover, A. R. (2007). Conflictos socioambientales y recursos hídricos en guanacaste; una 
descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo (1997-2006). Anuario De 
Estudios Centroamericanos, 359-385.  
 
	  
	  
310 
Cruz, R.E.C. (2009). Metabolismo socio-natural y conflictos ambientales en Costa Rica y 
El Salvador; 1992 – 2007. Programa Centroamericano de Posgrado, Costa Rica. PhD 
dissertation.  
 
Davis, J. (2005). Private-sector participation in the water and sanitation sector. Annual 
Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1), 145-183.  
 
Eakin, H., & Lemos, M. C. (2006). Adaptation and the state: Latin America and the 
challenge of capacity-building under globalization. Global Environmental Change, 
16(1), 7-18.  
 
Eakin, H., & Lemos, M. C. (2010). Institutions and change: The challenge of building 
adaptive capacity in Latin America. Global Environmental Change, 20(1), 1-3.  
 
Eakin, H., Eriksen, S., Eikeland, P. O., & Øyen, C. (2011). Public sector reform and 
governance for adaptation: Implications of new public management for adaptive 
capacity in Mexico and Norway. Environmental Management, 47(3), 338-51.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants against globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.  
 
Eriksen, S., & Lind, J. (2009). Adaptation as a political process: Adjusting to drought and 
conflict in kenya's drylands. Environmental Management, 43(5), 817-35.  
 
Ferguson, B. C., Brown, R. R., Frantzeskaki, N., de Haan, F. J., & Deletic, A. (2013). 
The enabling institutional context for integrated water management: Lessons from 
Melbourne. Water Research, 47(20), 7300-14.  
 
Fjelde, H., & von Uexkull, N. (2012). Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies, vulnerability 
and communal conflict in sub-saharan africa. Political Geography, 31(7), 444-453.  
 
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological 
systems analyses. Global Environmental Change 16, 253–267. 
 
Frey, F.W. (1993). The political context of conflict and cooperation over international 
river basins. Water International 18(1), 54-68.  
 
Funder, M., Mweemba, C., Nyambe, I., van Koppen, B., & Ravnborg, H. M. (2010). 
Understanding local water conflict and cooperation: The case of namwala district, 
zambia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 35(13-14), 758-764.  
 
Gleick, P.H. (1998). The world’s water 1998-1999: Biennial report on freshwater 
resources. Island, Washington DC. 
 
	  
	  
311 
Gleick, P. H. (2003). Global freshwater resources: Soft-path solutions for the 21st 
century. Science, 302(5650), 1524-8.  
 
Gosnell, H. & Kelly, E.C. (2010). Peace on the river? Social-ecological restoration and 
large dam removal in the Klamath basin, USA. Water Alternatives, 3(2), 361-383.  
 
Gutiérrez, E.G., Gómez, F.G., & Guardiola, J. (2013). Water access in Sucre, Bolivia: a 
case of governance deficit. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
29(4), 636-649.  
 
Hauge, W., & Ellingsen, T. (1998). Beyond environmental scarcity: Causal pathways to 
conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 35(3), 299-317.  
 
Hendrix, C.S., & Salehyan, I. (2012). Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in 
Africa. Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 35-50.  
 
Herrera, H.M. (2009). Informe Final: Implicaciones del proyecto de ampliación del 
acueducto el Coco-Octal, Guanacaste, Conocido “Como Sardinal.” Universidad de 
Costa Rica, San José. 
 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. 
(2009). Adaptive water governance: Assessing the institutional prescriptions of 
adaptive (co-) management from a governance perspective and defining a research 
agenda. Ecology and Society, 14(1), 26.  
 
Huntjens, P., Lebel, L., Pahl-Wostl, C., Camkin, J., Schulze, R., & Kranz, N. (2012). 
Institutional design propositions for the governance of adaptation to climate change 
in the water sector. Global Environmental Change, 22(1), 67-81.  
 
INEC. (2011). Costa Rica Census. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa 
Rica. 
 
Kramer, A. (2004). Water and Conflict USAID Policy briefing. Adelphi Research, Center 
for International Forestry Research, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars.  
 
Kuzdas, C., Yglesias, M., & Warner, B. (2013). Governing Costa Rica’s Water 
Resources. Solutions Journal, 4(4).  
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2014b).  Integrated and 
participatory analysis of water governance regimes – The case of the Costa Rican dry 
tropics. School of Sustainability working paper, Arizona State University.  
 
	  
	  
312 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2014b).  Sustainability 
appraisal of water governance regimes – The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. 
Environmental Management forthcoming  
 
Lafragua, J., Sanchez, L.F., González, D., Bahena, A., & Garcia, I. (2008). Elaboración 
de balances hídricos por cuencas hidrográficas y propuesta de modernización de las 
redes de medición en Costa Rica.  Instituto Mexicano de Technología del Agua/ 
MINAET. San José, Costa Rica.  
 
Larson, K. L., White, D. D., Gober, P., Harlan, S., & Wutich, A. (2009). Divergent 
perspectives on water resource sustainability in a public--policy--science context. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 12(7), 1012-1023.  
 
Lemos, M. C., & Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 31(1), 297-325.  
 
Lewicki, R.J., Gray, B., & Elliot, M. (2003). Making sense of intractable environmental 
conflicts: Concepts and Cases. Island Press, Washington DC. 
 
Madrigal, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2011). Determinants of performance of 
community-based drinking water organizations. World Development, 39(9), 1663-
1675.  
 
Marshall, G. R. (2009). Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation 
practices under community-based governance. Ecological Economics, 68(5), 1507-
1520.  
 
McGinnis, M. D., editor. 2000. Polycentric games and institutions: readings from the 
workshop in political theory and policy analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan.  
 
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007). Beyond panaceas in water institutions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15200-15205.  
 
Molle, F., Wester, P., & Hirsch, P. (2007). River basin development and management. In 
Water for Food, Water for Life: A comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture. (pp585-625). Earthscan/ IWMA.  
 
Nagendra, H., & Ostrom, E. (2012). Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested 
landscapes. International Journal of the Commons, 6(2), 104-133.  
 
Neef, A. (2009). Transforming rural water governance: Towards deliberative and 
polycentric models. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 53-60.  
 
	  
	  
313 
Ohlsson, L. (2000). Livelihood conflicts: Linking poverty and environment as causes of 
conflict. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, Department of 
Natural Resources and the Environment.  
 
Olsson, P., Folke, C., & Hughes, T. P. (2008). Navigating the transition to ecosystem-
based management of the great barrier reef, australia. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 105(28), 9489-9494.  
 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 
environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550-557.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15181-15187. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Science, 325:419–422 
 
Ostrom, E. (2012). Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: Must we wait for 
global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? Economic 
Theory, 49(2), 353-369.  
 
O’Toole, K., Wallis, A., & Mitchell, B. (2009). Place-based knowledge networks: The 
case of water management in south-west victoria, Australia. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 
101-114.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2009). A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and 
multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global 
Environmental Change, 19(3), 354-365.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Sendzimir, J., Jeffrey, P., Aerts, J., Berkamp, G., & Cross, K. (2007). 
Managing change toward adaptive water management through social learning. 
Ecology and Society, 12(2), 30.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Vörösmarty, C., Bhaduri, A., Bogardi, J., Rockström, J., & Alcamo, J. 
(2013). Towards a sustainable water future: Shaping the next decade of global water 
research. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 5: 1-7. 
 
Persha, L. & Andersson, K. (2013). Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized 
forest governance regimes. Global Environmental Change  
 
Postel, S.L., & Wolf, A.T. (2001). Dehydrating conflict. Foreign Policy, (126), 60.  
 
	  
	  
314 
Poteete, A. R. (2012). Levels, scales, linkages, and other'multiples' affecting natural 
resources. International Journal of the Commons, 6(2), 134-150. 
 
Priscoli, J.D., & Wolf, A. (2009). Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts. 
Cambridge, London  
 
Rijke, J., Farrelly, M., Brown, R., & Zevenbergen, C. (2013). Configuring transformative 
governance to enhance resilient urban water systems. Environmental Science & 
Policy, 25, 62-72.  
 
Rogers, P. (2002). Water governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Draft for 
presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank’s Annual Meetings in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, March 7.  
 
Rogers, P., & Hall, A. W. (2003). Effective water governance (Vol. 7). Global Water 
Partnership Stockholm.  
 
Savage, J. (2000). Ethnography and health care. British Medical Journal, 321, 1400-
1402.  
 
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P. M., & Schilling, J. (2012). Climate 
change and violent conflict. Science, 336(6083), 869-71.  
 
Seligson, M. A. (2002). Trouble in paradise? The erosion of system support in Costa 
Rica, 1978-1999. Latin American Research Review, 160-185.  
 
Sneddon, C., Harris, L., Dimitrov, R., & Özesmi, U. (2002). Contested waters: Conflict, 
scale, and sustainability in aquatic socioecological systems. Society &Natural 
Resources, 15(8), 663-675.  
 
Soysa, I., & Gleditsch, N.P. (1999). To cultivate peace: Agriculture in a world of conflict. 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report 5, 15-25. 
 
Swatuk, L.A. (2008). A political economy of water in Southern Africa. Water 
Alternatives 1(1): 24-47.  
 
Tortajada, C. (2010). Water governance: Some critical issues. International Journal of 
Water Resources Development, 26(2), 297-307.  
 
Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., & McKelvey, B., (2007). Complexity leadership theory: 
shifting leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era. The Leadership 
Quarterly, 18, 298–318. 
 
van Herk, S., Zevenbergen, C., Ashley, R., & Rijke, J. (2011). Learning and Action 
Alliances for the integration of flood risk management into urban planning: a new 
	  
	  
315 
framework from empirical evidence from the Netherlands. Environmental Science 
and Policy, 14, 543–554. 
 
Vörösmarty, C. J., McIntyre, P. B., Gessner, M. O., Dudgeon, D., Prusevich, A., Green, 
P., . . . Davies, P. M. (2010). Global threats to human water security and river 
biodiversity. Nature, 467(7315), 555-61.  
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K. L. (2012). Water, people, and sustainability—A systems 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26(11), 3153-3171.  
 
Witsenburg, K.M. , & Adano, W.R. (2009). Of rain and raids: Violent livestock raiding in 
Northern  Kenya. Civil Wars 11(4), 514-538.  
 
Wondolleck, J.M., & Yaffee, S.L. (2000). Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from 
Innovation in Natural Resource Management. Island Press, Washington DC.  
 
Wolf, A. T. (2007). Shared waters: Conflict and cooperation. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 32, 241-269.  
 
Yin, R.K. (2013). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Edition. Sage, 
Thousand Oaks.  
 
Zeitoun, M., & Mirumachi, N. (2008). Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering 
conflict and cooperation. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics, 8(4), 297-316.  
 
Chapter 5 
Anderson, E. R., Cherrington, E. A., Flores, A. I., Pérez, J. B., Carrillo, R., & Sempris, E. 
(2008). Potential impacts of climate change on biodiversity in central america, 
mexico, and the dominican republic. CATHALAC/USAID, Panama City, 105.  
 
Ballestero, M., Reyes, V, & Astorga, Y. (2007). Groundwater in Central America: Its 
Importance, Development and Use, with Particular Reference to its Role in Irrigated 
Agriculture. In: The agricultural groundwater revolution: Opportunities and threats 
to development (pp. 100-128). CABI International.  
 
Biggs, E. M., Duncan, J. M., Atkinson, P. M., & Dash, J. (2013). Plenty of water, not 
enough strategy. Environmental Science & Policy, 33, 388-394.  
 
Biswas, A.K., Rached, E., & Tortajada, C. Eds. (2009). Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Latin America. Routledge: New York.  
 
	  
	  
316 
Booth, J.A., Wade, C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th edition. Westview, Boulder. 
 
Brooks, D. B., & Holtz, S. (2009). Water soft path analysis: From principles to practice. 
Water International, 34(2), 158-169.  
 
Calvo, J.C. (1990). Water resources development in Costa Rica 1970-2000. Hydrological 
Sciences - Journal - des Sciences Hydrologiques, 35(2), 185-196.  
 
 
Calvo-Alvarado, J., McLennan, B., Sánchez-Azofeifa, A., & Garvin, T. (2009). 
Deforestation and forest restoration in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Putting 
conservation policies in context. Forest Ecology and Management 258, 931-940.  
 
Cover, A. R. (2007). Conflictos socioambientales y recursos hídricos en guanacaste; una 
descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo (1997-2006). Anuario De 
Estudios Centroamericanos, 359-385.   
 
Dong, C., Schoups, G., & van de Giesen, N. (2013). Scenario development for water 
resource planning and management: A review. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 80(4), 749-761.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants against globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.  
 
Fuerth LS (2009) Foresight and anticipatory governance. Foresight, 11(4), 14–32 
 
Giordano, M., & Shah, T. (2014). From IWRM back to integrated water resources 
management. International Journal of Water Resources Development 
DOI:10.1080/07900627.2013.851521  
 
Gober, P., Kirkwood, C.W. 2010. Vulnerability assessment of climate-induced water 
shortage in Phoenix. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(50) 
 
Guston, D. H. (2008). Innovation policy: Not just a jumbo shrimp. Nature, 454(7207), 
940-941.  
 
Gutiérrez, E.G., Gómez, F.G., & Guardiola, J. (2013). Water access in Sucre, Bolivia: a 
case of governance deficit. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
29(4), 636-649.  
 
Haasnoot, M., & Middelkoop, H. (2012). A history of futures: A review of scenario use 
in water policy studies in the netherlands. Environ Sci Policy, 19-20(6), 108-120.  
 
	  
	  
317 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. 
(2009). Adaptive water governance: Assessing the institutional prescriptions of 
adaptive (co-) management from a governance perspective and defining a research 
agenda. Ecology and Society, 14(1), 26.  
 
Hulme, M., & Dessai, S. (2008). Negotiating future climates for public policy: A critical 
assessment of the development of climate scenarios for the UK. Environmental 
Science & Policy, 11(1), 54-70.  
 
INEC. (2011). Costa Rica Census. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa 
Rica. 
 
Kuzdas, C. 2012. Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.  
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2014a). Sustainability 
appraisal of water governance regimes - The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. 
Environmental Management, in press 
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., & Vignola, R. (2014b). Integrated and participatory 
analysis of regional water governance regimes – The case of the Costa Rican dry 
tropics.  School of Sustainability working paper, Arizona State University 
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Ygelsias, M., & Ramírez, A.C. (2014c). Identifying the potential 
of governance regimes to aggravate or mitigate water conflicts. School of 
Sustainability Working Paper, Arizona State University  
 
Kuzdas, C., Ygelsias, M., & Warner, B. (2013). Governing Costa Rica’s Water 
Resources. The Solutions Journal 4(4), 
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/23918   
 
Lubell, M., Leach, W., & Sabatier, P.A. (2008.) Collaborative watershed partnerships in 
the epoch of sustainability.In: Mazmanian D, Kraft ME (eds). (2008). Toward 
sustainable communities, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MIT, p 255–288.  
 
Madrigal, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2011). Determinants of performance of 
community-based drinking water organizations. World Development, 39(9), 1663-
1675.  
 
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007). Beyond panaceas in water institutions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15200-15205.  
 
MINAET. (2008). Plan Nacional de Gestión Integrada de los Recursos Hídricos. 
Ministerio de ambiente, Energía, y Telecomunicaciones. San José, Costa Rica. 
	  
	  
318 
 
Neef, A. (2009). Transforming rural water governance: Towards deliberative and 
polycentric models. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 53-60.  
 
Nelson, D. R., Adger, W. N., & Brown, K. (2007). Adaptation to environmental change: 
Contributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources, 32(1), 395.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of socio-ecological 
systems. Science, 325, 419-422.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 
environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550-557.  
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., & Kranz, N. (2010). Water governance in times of change. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 13(7), 567-570.  
 
Quay, R. (2010). Anticipatory governance. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 76(4), 496-511.  
 
Reed, P. M., & Kasprzyk, J. (2009). Water resources management: The myth, the wicked, 
and the future. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135(6), 411-
413.  
 
Rogers, P. (2002). Water governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Draft for 
presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank’s Annual Meetings in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, March 7.  
 
Schneider, F., & Homewood, C. (2013). Exploring water governance arrangements in the 
swiss alps from the perspective of adaptive capacity. Mountain Research and 
Development, 33(3), 225-233.  
 
Scholz, R.W., & Tietje, O. (2002). Embedded case study methods: Integrating 
quantitative and qualitative knowledge. Thousand Oaks, Sage.  
 
Seligson, M. A. (2002). Trouble in paradise? The erosion of system support in Costa 
Rica, 1978-1999. Latin American Research Review, 160-185.  
 
Shaw, A., Sheppard, S., Burch, S., Flanders, D., Wiek, A. et al. (2009). Making local 
futures tangible—synthesizing, downscaling, and visualizing climate change 
scenarios for participatory capacity building. Global Environmental Change, 19(4), 
447-463. 
 
	  
	  
319 
Sheppard, S. R., Shaw, A., Flanders, D., Burch, S., Wiek, A.,et al. (2011). Future 
visioning of local climate change: A framework for community engagement and 
planning with scenarios and visualisation. Futures, 43(4), 400-412.  
 
Swatuk, L.A. (2008). A political economy of water in Southern Africa. Water 
Alternatives 1(1): 24-47.  
 
Tietje, O. (2005). Identification of a small reliable and efficient set of consistent 
scenarios. European Journal of Operational Research, 162(2), 418–432.  
 
Uhlendahl, T., Salian, P., Casarotto, C., & Doetsch, J. (2011). Good water governance 
and IWRM in Zambia: Challenges and chances. Water Policy, 13(6), 845.  
 
von Wirth, T., Hayek, U.W., Kunze, A., Neuenschwander, N., Stauffacher, M. & Scholz, 
R.W. (2013). Identifying urban transformation dynamics: Functional use of scenario 
techniques to integrate knowledge from science and practice. Technological 
Forecasting & Social Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.08.030 
 
Walz, A., Braendle, J.M., Lang, D.J., Brand, F., Briner, S., Elkin, C., Hirschi, C., Huber, 
R., Lischke, H., & Schmatz, D.R. (2013). Experience from downscaling IPCC-SRES 
scenarios to specific national-level focus scenarios for ecosystem service 
management. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.08.014 
 
Wiek, A., in review. Transformational planning for sustainable cities. Journal of 
Landscape and Urban Planning. 
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K. L. (2012). Water, people, and sustainability—A systems 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26(11), 3153-3171.  
 
Wiek, A., & Walter, A. I. (2009). A transdisciplinary approach for formalized integrated 
planning and decision-making in complex systems. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 197(1), 360-370.  
 
Wiek, A., Binder, C., & Scholz, R. W. (2006). Functions of scenarios in transition 
processes. Futures, 38(7), 740-766.  
 
Wiek, A., Gasser, L., & Siegrist, M. (2009). Systemic scenarios of nanotechnology: 
Sustainable governance of emerging technologies. Futures, 41(5), 284-300.  
 
Wiek, A., Lang, D. J., & Siegrist, M. (2008). Qualitative system analysis as a means for 
sustainable governance of emerging technologies: The case of nanotechnology. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(8), 988-999.  
 
	  
	  
320 
Wiek, A., Keeler, L.W., Schweizer, V., & Lang, D.J. (2013).  Plausibility indications in 
future scenarios. International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, 9,133-147.  
 
Wright, G., Cairns, G., & Bradfield, R. (2013). Scenario methodology: New 
developments in theory and practice. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
80(4), 561-565.  
 
Chapter 6 
Allen, J., DuVander, J., Kubiszewski, I. & Ostrom, E. (2012). Institutions for managing 
ecosystem services. Solutions, 2(6), 44-49.  
 
Arias, K.A. (September 9, 2011).  New push for water law reform in Costa Rica. Tico 
Times (online). http://www.ticotimes.net/Current-Edition/Top-Story/News/New-
push-for-water-law-reform-in-Costa-Rica_Friday-September-09-2011 
 
Ballestero, M., Reyes, V. & Astorga, Y. (2007). Groundwater in Central America: Its 
importance, development and use with particular reference to its role in irrigated 
agriculture. 100-128. Giodorno, M & Villholth, KG. eds.  The Agricultural 
Revolution: Opportunities and Threats to Development. CAB International. 
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water management. Water security: Research challenges and 
opportunities. Science, 337(6097). 914-915. 
 
Bran, C. 800 vecinos de Nicoya sin agua ni par air al baño (MARCH 28, 2013). La 
Nación (online). http://www.nacion.com/2013-03-02/ElPais/800-vecinos-de-Nicoya-
sin-agua-ni-para-ir-al-bano.aspx 
 
Calvo, J.C. (1990). Water resources development in Costa Rica 1970-2000. Hydrological 
Sciences, 35(2), 185-196.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press.  
 
Kuzdas, C. (2012). Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.  
 
Kuzdas, C, Yglesias, M., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2012). 
Evaluación de Sostenibilidad del Sistema Regional de Agua y el Manejo de Agua en 
las Sub-Cuencas Potrero, Caimital, y Nosara Alta.  Comisión para el Manejo de las 
Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Nicoya, Guanacaste, Costa Rica.  
 
Loaiza, V.N. (March 18, 2013). Un pueblito nicoyana, varado en el tiempo, espera por el 
agua. La Nación (online). http://www.nacion.com/2013-03-18/ElPais/Un-pueblito-
	  
	  
321 
nicoyano--varado-en-el-tiempo--espera-por-agua.aspx?Page=1# 
 
Lubell, M., Leach, W., & Sabatier, P.A. (2008). Collaborative watershed partnerships in 
the epoch of sustainability. In: Mazmanian, D., & Kraft, M.E. Eds. Toward 
sustainable communities, 2nd edition. (pp255-288) MIT, Cambridge.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Science, 325:419–422 
 
Ramírez, A.C. (2007). Conflictos socio-ambientales y recursos hídricos en Guanacaste; 
Una descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo 1997-2006.Anuario de 
Estudios Centroamericanos 33-44.  
 
Chapter 7 
 
Abers, R.N. (2007). Organizing for governance: Building collaboration in Brazilian river 
basins. World Development, 35(8), 1450-1463. 
 
Atkinson-Palombo, C., & Gebremichael, M. (2012). Creating a learning organization to 
promote sustainable water resources management in Ethiopia. Journal of 
Sustainability Education, 3.  
 
Bakker, K. (2012). Water management. Water security: Research challenges and 
opportunities. Science, 337(6097), 914-5.  
  
Ballestero, M., Reyes, V, & Astorga, Y. (2007). Groundwater in Central America: Its 
Importance, Development and Use, with Particular Reference to its Role in Irrigated 
Agriculture. In: The agricultural groundwater revolution: Opportunities and threats 
to development (pp. 100-128). CABI International.  
 
Bebbington, A, (2005), Donor-NGO relations and representations of livelihood in 
nongovernmental aid chains. World Development, 33, 937–950.  
 
Biswas, A.K., Rached, E., & Tortajada, C. Eds. (2009). Integrated Water Resources 
Management in Latin America. Routledge: New York.  
 
Booth, J.A., Wade, C.J., & Walker, T.W. (2010). Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th edition. Westview, Boulder.  
 
Brooks, D. B., & Holtz, S. (2009). Water soft path analysis: From principles to practice. 
Water International, 34(2), 158-169.  
 
Calvo, J.C. (1990). Water resources development in Costa Rica 1970-2000. Hydrological 
Sciences - Journal - des Sciences Hydrologiques, 35(2), 185-196.  
 
	  
	  
322 
Calvo-Alvarado, J., McLennan, B., Sánchez-Azofeifa, A., & Garvin, T. (2009). 
Deforestation and forest restoration in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Putting 
conservation policies in context. Forest Ecology and Management 258, 931-940.  
 
Dickovick, J. T., & Eaton, K. H. (2013). Latin America’s resurgent centre: National 
government strategies after decentralisation. Journal of Development Studies, 
49(11), 1453-1466. 
 
Eakin, H., Eriksen, S., Eikeland, P.O., & Oyen, C. (2011). Public sector reform and 
governance for adaptation: Implications of New Public Management for adaptive 
capacity in Mexico and Norway. Environmental Management, 47, 338-351.  
 
Eakin, E., & Lemos, M.C. (2010). Institutions and change: The challenge of building 
adaptive capacity in Latin America. Global Environmental Change, 20, 1-3.  
 
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants against globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa 
Rica. Stanford University Press: Stanford.  
 
Engle, N.L., & Lemos, M.C. (2010). Unpacking governance: Building adaptive capacity 
to climate change of river basins in Brazil. Global Environmental Change, 20, 4-13. 
 
Funder, M., Mweemba, C., Nyambe, I., van Koppen, B., & Ravnborg, H. M. (2010). 
Understanding local water conflict and cooperation: The case of namwala district, 
zambia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 35(13-14), 758-764.  
 
Gleick, P. H. (2003). Global freshwater resources: Soft-path solutions for the 21st 
century. Science, 302(5650), 1524-8. 
 
Gober, P., Kirkwood, C.W. 2010. Vulnerability assessment of climate-induced water 
shortage in Phoenix. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(50) 
 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. 
(2009). Adaptive water governance: Assessing the institutional prescriptions of 
adaptive (co-) management from a governance perspective and defining a research 
agenda. Ecology and Society, 14(1), 26.  
 
Kuzdas, C. (2012). Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.  
 
Kuzdas, C., Yglesias, M., & Warner, B. (2013). Governing Costa Rica’s Water 
Resources. Solutions Journal, 4(4).  
 
	  
	  
323 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2014a).  Sustainability 
appraisal of water governance regimes – The case of Guanacaste, Costa Rica. 
Environmental Management forthcoming  
 
Kuzdas, C., Wiek, A., Warner, B., Vignola, R., & Morataya, R. (2014b).  Integrated and 
participatory analysis of water governance regimes – The case of the Costa Rican dry 
tropics. School of Sustainability working paper, Arizona State University.  
 
Lang, D.J., Wiek, A., Bergmann, M., Stauffacher, M., Martens, P., Moll, P., Swilling, M., 
Thomas, C. (2012). Transdisciplinary research in Sustainability Science – practice, 
principles, and challenges. Sustainability Science, 7(supplement), 25-43. 
 
Madrigal, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2011). Determinants of performance of 
community-based drinking water organizations. World Development, 39(9), 1663-
1675.  
 
Madrigal-Ballestero, R., Alpízar, F., & Schlüter, A. (2013). Public perceptions of the 
performance of community-based drinking water organizations in Costa Rica. Water 
Resources and Rural Development, 1-2, 43-56. Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999) 
 
Meinzen-Dick, R., & Knox, A. (1999). Collective action, property rights, and devolution 
of natural resource management: A conceptual framework. Workshop on collective 
action, property rights, and devolution of natural resource. Philippines.  
 
Meinzen-Dick, R., Raju, K. V., & Gulati, A. (2002). What affects organization and 
collective action for managing resources? Evidence from canal irrigation systems in 
India. World Development, 30(4), 649-666.  
 
Morataya, R. (2004). Plan de Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Comisión para 
el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero y Caimital. Nicoya, Costa Rica. 
 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Vörösmarty, C., Bhaduri, A., Bogardi, J., Rockström, J., & Alcamo, J. 
(2013). Towards a sustainable water future: Shaping the next decade of global water 
research. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability.  
 
Paniagua, F., & Stocks, G. (2008). Conflict in Sardinal: The case of Costa Rica’s first 
public-private partnership for water infrastructure development.  Bob Graham Center 
for Public Service, University of Florida. 
 
Persha, L. & Andersson, K. (2013). Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized 
forest governance regimes. Global Environmental Change  
 
Rogers, P. (2002). Water governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Draft for 
presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank’s Annual Meetings in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, March 7.  
	  
	  
324 
 
Reed, P.M., & Kaspryzk, J. (2009). Water resources management: the myth, the wicked, 
and the future. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135, 411-
413  
 
Sheppard, S. R., Shaw, A., Flanders, D., Burch, S., Wiek, et al. (2011). Future visioning 
of local climate change: A framework for community engagement and planning with 
scenarios and visualisation. Futures, 43(4), 400-412.  
 
von Wirth, T., Hayek, U.W., Kunze, A., Neuenschwander, N., Stauffacher, M. & Scholz, 
R.W. (2013). Identifying urban transformation dynamics: Functional use of scenario 
techniques to integrate knowledge from science and practice. Technological 
Forecasting & Social Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.08.030 
 
Walz, A., Braendle, J.M., Lang, D.J., Brand, F., Briner, S., Elkin, C., Hirschi, C., Huber, 
R., Lischke, H., & Schmatz, D.R. (2013). Experience from downscaling IPCC-SRES 
scenarios to specific national-level focus scenarios for ecosystem service 
management. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.08.014 
 
Wiek, A., in review. Transformational planning for sustainable cities. Journal of 
Landscape and Urban Planning. 
 
Wiek, A., & Walter, A. I. (2009). A transdisciplinary approach for formalized integrated 
planning and decision-making in complex systems. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 197(1), 360-370. 
 
Wiek, A. & Lang, D. (2011). Methodology for Transformational Sustainability Science. 
School of Sustainability, Arizona State University.  
 
Wiek, A., & Larson, K.L. (2012). Water systems, people, and sustainability – a 
framework for analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources 
Management, 26, 3153-3171.  
 
Wiek, A., Binder, C., & Scholz, R. W. (2006). Functions of scenarios in transition 
processes. Futures, 38(7), 740-766.  
 
Wiek, A., Ness, B., Brand, F.S., Schweizer-Ries, P., & Farioli, F. (2012). From complex 
systems analysis to transformational change: A comparative appraisal of 
sustainability science projects. Sustainability Science, 7, 5-24  
 
 
 
 
  
	  
	  
325 
APPENDIX A 
 
PERMISSION OF CO-AUTHORS TO PUBLISH WORK IN DISSERTATION 
 
  
	  
	  
326 
Arnim Wiek, Benjamin Warner, Raffaele Vignola, Mariel Yglesias, Ricardo Morataya, 
and Alonso Ramírez-Cover give permission to publish co-authored work in this 
dissertation.  
 
  
	  
	  
327 
APPENDIX B 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD RESEARCH APPROVALS 
  
	  
	  
328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
329 
 
  
	  
	  
330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
To: Arnim Wiek
GIOS Build
From: Mark Roosa, Chair
Soc Beh IRB
Date: 05/30/2012
Committee Action: Exemption Granted
IRB Action Date: 05/30/2012
IRB Protocol #: 1205007880
Study Title: Water governance and water disputes in Guanacaste, Costa Rica
The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the Institutional Review Board pursuant to
Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 46.101(b)(2) .
This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by investigators in such a manner that
subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.
	  
	  
331 
APPENDIX C 
 
2012 PROJECT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND REPORT FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
(SPANISH) 
 
  
	  
	  
332 
NOTE: DESIGNS AND LAYOUT IN THE FOLLOWING REPORT WERE ALTERED 
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El contexto y antecedentes del estudio 
El estudio abordado en este informe es el primero de tres estudios que forman parte del 
proyecto titulado: "Hacia el Manejo Sostenible de los Recursos Hídricos en Guanacaste, 
Costa Rica." El proyecto se inició en el año 2010 a través de un esfuerzo conjunto entre 
el Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE), en Turrialba, 
Costa Rica y la Facultad de Sostenibilidad de la Universidad Estatal de Arizona. El 
trabajo de campo y recopilación de datos para este informe se realizaron durante seis 
meses, desde septiembre del 2010 hasta febrero del 2011. 
En el transcurso del 2011, los datos recopilados se sintetizaron y analizaron en la 
Universidad Estatal de Arizona. Los resultados de este estudio se utilizarán como base 
para el diseño de los próximos dos estudios que se iniciarán a mediados del 2012. Los 
tres estudios del proyecto, "Hacia el Manejo Sostenible de los Recursos Hídricos en 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica,” se resumen a continuación: 
Estudio # 1: El objetivo del primer estudio, el cual es abordado en este informe, es 
comprender ¿qué tan bien está siendo manejada el agua en la actualidad? La gravedad de 
los agentes estresores en los sistemas hídricos, desde el cambio climático hasta las 
disputas social-ambientales, está determinada por lo bien que funciona el manejo regional 
del agua. Por lo tanto, antes de anticipar los impactos futuros y las consecuencias para el 
sistema de agua, identificamos cómo funciona su manejo regional actualmente. 
Adicionalmente, en este estudio también se describen los criterios generales de 
sostenibilidad, los cuales se utilizarán en los tres estudios.  
Estudios Futuros (2012 - 2013)  
Estudio # 2: El objetivo del segundo estudio es crear escenarios para anticipar la 
dinámica del sistema hídrico y sus estados del manejo a un plazo de 20 años. Los 
escenarios futuros incluirán evaluaciones del cumplimiento de los criterios de 
sostenibilidad.  Asimismo, incluirán las evaluaciones de dónde y cómo las disputas de 
recursos podrían surgir en el sistema hídrico. Los escenarios serán evaluados con los 
miembros de la Comisión y las partes interesadas para avanzar en la determinación de 
una visión compartida de sostenibilidad. 
Estudio # 3: El objetivo del tercer estudio es trabajar en estrecha colaboración con las 
partes interesadas para descubrir cuáles acciones viables, si se ejecutan hoy en día, 
aumentarían la capacidad del manejo regional de agua para mitigar y evitar los impactos 
negativos de los factores de estrés como cambio climático. Este paso incluye reforzar las 
funciones importantes que ya existen en el manejo regional de agua y la identificación de 
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funciones que todavía no existen pero que pero que serán importante en el futuro para 
mitigar las disputas social-ambientales y evitar estados futuros no deseados o no 
sostenibles del sistema hídrico regional. 
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Resumen ejecutivo 
El manejo sostenible de agua involucra a todas las partes interesadas en la coordinación 
del abastecimiento, la distribución, el uso, y la salida de agua de una manera  tal que 
garantice un nivel suficiente y equitativo de bienestar socioeconómico, sin comprometer 
la integridad de los ecosistemas de apoyo a través del tiempo. 
Los esfuerzos para lograr un manejo sostenible del agua en Nicoya y Hojancha, 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica, se enfrentan a obstáculos significativos. Estos obstáculos 
incluyen impactos esperados del cambio climático en un futuro próximo; posiblemente 
menos precipitación y, potencialmente, disputas perturbadoras de agua. La capacidad 
para una adaptación con éxito a los impactos climáticos y una mitigación  de las disputas 
de agua depende de qué tan bien - o qué tan sostenible - los recursos hídricos están siendo 
manejados. 
Los objetivos de este informe son (1) establecer los criterios de sostenibilidad con el fin 
de evaluar el sistema hídrico regional , (2) identificar las áreas críticas de desafío en el 
sistema hídrico donde la sostenibilidad se ve afectada negativamente, (3) explorar por 
qué estos desafíos existen en el sistema en estos momentos. Además, (4) presentamos una 
vista previa de las oportunidades y las estrategias de manejo de agua que  potencialmente 
podrían  remediar estos desafíos.  El desarrollo y evaluación de las estrategias de manejo 
sostenible de agua para la región se llevará a cabo con mucho más detalle a través de 
esfuerzos de investigación conjunta en las investigaciones #2 y #3, las cuales se llevarán 
a cabo en el periodo 2012-2013. 
Los resultados de la evaluación de sostenibilidad del sistema se triangularon con las 
percepciones de los agentes clave sobre los retos de manejo del agua en la región. 
Posteriormente, los retos fueron localizados en el sistema de agua a través de la 
elaboración de un mapa y revelaron cuatro áreas críticas que agrupan desafíos en el 
sistema de agua: 
• Falta de coordinación e intercambio de información entre comunidades sobre las 
extracciones de agua en el acuífero Potrero-Caimital. 
• Poca integración de las comunidades de la cuenca media y baja en la toma de 
decisiones regional, especialmente en el área de la costa Pacifica.  
• Ausencia de liderazgo institucional que coordine actividades para la educación 
del uso de agua y ausencia de un norte común en los esfuerzos de manejo. 
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• Reglas inadecuadas de regulación y monitoreo del uso del agua, especialmente 
después de que el agua ya ha sido utilizada. Tales reglas contribuyen a que exista 
un vacío de información compartida entre organizaciones clave en cuanto a la 
oferta y demanda de agua en la región. 
 
Los resultados también revelan componentes que potenciales soluciones podrían 
aprovechar para acelerar el proceso hacia una manejo sostenible: 
• La voluntad para establecer plataformas y alianzas transversales que permitan 
intercambiar información sobre las extracciones de agua. La importancia de tal 
componente está demostrada por los esfuerzos de la Universidad Nacional en 
Nicoya (UNA). UNA ha iniciado trabajo para organizar la información del agua 
extraída (del acuífero Potrero-Caimital) por parte de las ASADAs.  La 
oportunidad ya existe para usar y organizar cursos y grupos estudiantiles de 
trabajo los cuales podrán trabajar cerca de la Comisión para ejecutar proyectos 
que permitan avanzar hacia la sostenibilidad regional de agua.  
• Las organizaciones de base, como NicoyAgua, están bien posicionadas para 
aprovechar y aumentar la participación y colaboración de las comunidades y las 
ASADAs, así como estrechar las alianzas con el Instituto Costarricense de 
Aceuductos y Alcanterillados (AyA) y Minesterio de Ambiente, Energía, y 
Telecomunicaciones (MINAET) en Hojancha y Nicoya.  Aprovechar las 
organizaciones de base en los esfuerzos de manejo de agua a largo plazo, 
establecer metas, y tomar decisiones a nivel local es promisorio para lograr un 
manejo sostenible del agua. 
• Con un adecuado planeamiento estratégico, la coordinación y colaboración que 
solamente NicoyAgua y otras organizaciones de base pueden proveer, podría ser 
un modelo para organizaciones base de manejo de agua a través de la provincia de 
Guanacaste. Apuntar a este modelo de organización podría constituir una 
importante herramienta de visualización para esfuerzos de manejo locales y 
regionales. Los esfuerzos actuales para consolidar corredores biológicos son 
asimismo una plataforma que puede utilizarse para la cooperación en el manejo 
del agua y en el establecimiento de metas conjuntas.  
• El Plan de Manejo 2004 de la Cuenca Potrero-Caimital (Morataya 2004) ha 
establecido la necesidad de involucrar a todos los actores relevantes en el proceso 
de toma de decisiones, incluyendo al gran productor agrícola de la región. Una 
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vez reconocida la necesidad de un manejo participativo, se abre la oportunidad 
para formalmente desarrollar un proceso regional que se enfoque al consenso de 
objetivos de manejo, al monitoreo del progreso regional hacia el manejo 
sostenible del agua y al ajuste de estructuras de manejo a medida que sea 
necesario en el futuro.  
 
Informe 
1. Diseño del estudio1 
	  
El enfoque utilizado en este estudio para asesorar el sistema hídrico es un enfoque 
orientado hacia las actividades que llevan a cabo los diferentes actores del sistema. 
Principalmente nos interesa lo que las personas hacen dentro del sistema de agua, y como 
resultado de estas actividades, cómo entra el agua al sistema, cómo viaja a través, y cómo 
sale de la región. Se utiliza el término hacer, el cual involucra la extracción, distribución, 
uso y recarga del agua así como actividades que tengan influencia sobre el sistema, las 
cuales incluyen planificación, investigación, monitoreo, reportes y debates, promoción, 
regulación, advocación , entre otros. Hacer y manejar  están estrechamente relacionados 
en este enfoque, al utilizar manejo de agua para indicar la inclusión y  responsabilidad de 
todos los actores y las personas que están siendo afectadas por las decisiones y resultados 
dentro del sistema de agua. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  La material la que está presentada en Section 1 y 2 es replicada y adaptada de: Wiek A, 
Larson KL (under review) Water systems, people, and sustainability – a framework for 
analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources Management 
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Figura 1.1: Los tres pasos llevados a cabo para desarrollar la evaluación de 
sostenibilidad  de Potrero, Caimital, y la Cuenca Alta del Nosara. Los (I) límites que 
delinean el sistema  hídrico regional, el cual es posteriormente definido a través de	  (II)	  
actividades de manejo. (III) Seguidamente los principios de la sostenibilidad son 
aplicados para evaluar y describir el estado actual del sistema  hídrico regional. 
Analizando el sistema desde esta perpectiva, no se busca proveer un modelo perfecto de 
sistema  hídrico . Por el contrario, el estudio está estructurado de manera que la 
evaluación de sostenibilidad permita identificar potenciales puntos de intervención para 
mejorar el manejo regional del agua.  
	  
I  Límites del Sistema Hídrico Regional 
Los sistemas hídricos regionales son sistemas socio-ecológicos multi-dimensionales, los 
cuales pueden ser delineados de diversas maneras al identificar el área geográfica de 
interés. De esta manera, el enfoque podría ser un sistema socio-político particular como 
una ciudad, un área metropolitana o un estado. Alternativamente, los sistemas hídricos  
pueden definirse utilizando criterios biofísicos como cuencas hidrográficas. En este caso 
definimos los límites del sistema hídrico regional como Potrero, Caimital y la subcuenca 
alta del Nosara 
II Actividades de manejo 
Las actividades delinean los aspectos básicos de lo que las personas hacen con el agua. 
En este caso, el enfoque de tales actividades son las acciones y decisiones relacionadas 
con los recursos hídricos. Las cuatro actividades definidas se exponen a continuación: 
Abastecimiento de Agua 
Este ámbito de actividades incluye de dónde viene el agua, cómo se adquiere, acceso y 
maneja. Algunos ejemplos incluyen: 
• La búsqueda y extracción de los acuíferos y la construcción y mantenimiento de 
pozos. 
• El almacenamiento de agua, así como la construcción y mantenimiento de 
infraestructuras de almacenamiento. 
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• Recarga de acuíferos. 
• Distribución y administración de derechos y acceso a fuentes de agua, ya sea de 
manera legal o a través de redes sociales informales. 
• Evaluación , asesoramiento y planificación para las fuentes de abastecimiento de 
agua, incluyendo el monitoreo de niveles de agua y contaminantes, la anticipación 
de perturbaciones que afecten el abastecimiento y el manejo de estas fuentes. 
Distribución del agua 
Estas actividades incluyen la distribución de agua a los usuarios a través de sistemas que 
facilitan su consumo. Algunos ejemplos: 
• El bombeo y transporte del agua a través de estructuras como canales y tuberías, 
así como a través de estructuras naturales como canales de ríos. Se incluye la 
construcción y modificación de infraestructura y la alteración de estructuras 
naturales con el propósito de distribución.  
• La distribución y administración de derechos para suministrar agua, ya sean de 
manera legal o a través de redes sociales informales. 
• El tratamiento de agua con el fin de hacerla potable o permitir usos para el agua 
no potable (ver salidas del agua) 
• El monitoreo y manejo de la calidad tanto del agua distribuida así como de la 
infraestructura utilizada para tal distribución.  
Usos del agua 
Este ámbito de actividades incluye cómo las personas utilizan, consumen y conservan el 
agua para distintos propósitos de naturaleza humana, económica y ecológica, como por 
ejemplo: 
• El uso de agua para actividades agrícolas, residenciales y del hogar, industriales, 
comerciales y de uso público (por ejemplo producción y procesos industriales, 
agricultura, consumo del sector empresarial, saneamiento), así como construcción, 
mantenimiento y alteración de pozos e infraestructura para esto. 
• El uso de agua para propósitos ecológicos como flujos utilizados para pesca y 
vida silvestre, así como las demandas climáticas de evaporación. 
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• La conservación de agua por medio de la reducción del consumo y el aumento de 
la eficiencia de uso de agua a través de innovación tecnológica, cambio de 
actitudes y otros mecanismos.  
• El monitoreo, promoción, coordinación y regulación de los usos del agua, 
incluyendo la conservación del recurso y la instalación de tecnología e 
infraestructura que mejore la eficiencia de uso del agua. 
Salidas de agua 
Estas actividades incluyen el tratamiento del agua después de que ésta ha sido utilizada, y 
cómo se utilizan y manejan las aguas residuales y efluentes. Algunos ejemplos son: 
• Transporte y manipulación segura de aguas residuales , así como  la construcción, 
mantenimiento y alteración de pozos y e infraestructura para el transporte. 
• El tratamiento de aguas residuales (mecánico o biológico) , así como la construcción, 
mantenimiento y alteración los pozos y la infraestructura para el tratamiento. 
• La descarga de aguas residuales que han sido utilizadas al sistema hidro-ecológico 
(para la reutilización y la recarga hídrica). 
• Actividades que influyen sobre aquellas mencionadas anteriormente, como 
planeamiento, investigación, monitoreo, reporte y debate, negociación, promoción, 
advocación, regulación, entre otras. 
Actividades transversales 
Hay factores que influyen en varias de las actividades mencionadas anteriormente a 
través de: 
• Planificación, manejo, regulación, incentivos y control (políticas y 
administración). 
• Negociación y consideración de opciones (participación y compromisos) 
• Estudios, monitoreo, evaluación y suministro de información (investigación y 
evaluación). 
• Promoción y advocación  
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Tabla 1.2: Organizaciones entrevistadas en el estudio 
Organización clave 
entrevistada 
Descripción 
Instituto Costarricense de 
Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados (AyA) 
Agencia nacional de agua cuyo objetivo es abastecer a la 
población de agua potable. La oficina regional está 
localizada en Nicoya.  
Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Energía y 
Telecomunicaciones 
(MINAET)  
Ministerio Nacional de Ambiente. Es una organización 
sombrilla para el manejo del medio ambiente. Nicoya y 
Hojancha son manejadas como sub-regiones separadas. El 
departamento de agua se encuentra localizado en San 
José. 
Sistema Nacional de 
Aéreas de Conservación, 
Área de Conservación 
Tempisque (ACT)  
Las áreas protegidas son manejadas por el ACT, un brazo 
descentralizado de la división de ambiente de MINAET. 
El ACT también tiene una oficina de educación ambiental.  
Ministerio de Salud  
 El ministerio nacional tiene el objetivo de proteger la 
salud de la población. Las oficinas regionales se localizan 
en Nicoya y Hojancha.  
Asociaciones 
Administradoras de 
Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados 
(ASADAs)  
Grupo de comunidades rurales que manejan el 
abastecimiento y distribución de agua. Tienen el poder de 
establecer y colectar tarifas de uso de agua.  
Municipalidades (Nicoya 
y Hojancha) 
Gobierno municipal encargado de establecer y revisar los 
estándares y planes de desarrollo. 
Ministerio de Agricultura 
y Ganadería (MAG) 
Agencia nacional encargada de promover la 
competitividad del sector agrícola costarricense. Las 
oficinas regionales se localizan en Hojancha y Nicoya. 
Servicio Nacional de 
Aguas Subterráneas, 
Riego y Avenamiento 
(SENARA) 
Agencia nacional que tiene el objetivo de manejar aguas 
subterráneas e irrigación. Maneja grandes distritos de 
riego en el país. Las oficinas están localizadas en San 
José. 
Fundación NicoyAgua / 
Comisión del Manejo de 
Río Potrero 
Agrupación sin fines de lucro encargada de administrar la 
Comisión de Manejo de Cuenca Potrero-Caimital. Es a 
menudo la cara pública de la Comisión de Manejo.  
CoopePilangosta Cooperativa de productores de café 
Asociaciones de 
desarrollo rurales 
Organizaciones dedicadas al bienestar de las comunidades 
rurales 
Instituto Nacional de 
Aprendizaje  
Oficina de extensión agrícola encargada de educación y 
asistencia técnica. 
Costeña S.A. Melonera y negocio agrícola más grande  del area. 
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Universidad Nacional de 
Costa Rica (UNA) (Sede 
Chorotega) 
Universidad Nacional con un campus localizado en 
Nicoya. Tiene unidades de investigación de recursos 
hídricos y bosque seco tropical y desarrollo.  
Fundación Monte Alto 
Fundación sin fines de lucro cuyo objetivo es financiar la 
compra de tierras y proteger la Cuenca alta del Río Nosara 
Alta  
Comisiones Ganaderas 
Organizaciones dedicadas a la difusión de información y 
asistencia técnica y la promoción de intereses colectivos 
entre productores afiliados. 
Centro Agronómico 
Tropical de Investigación 
y Enseñanza (CATIE) 
Centro de educación superior con un brazo de 
investigación ubicado en Hojancha. Su objetivo en el area 
es consolidar los corredores biológicos de la Península de 
Nicoya. 
CoopeGuanacaste 
Proveedor regional de electricidad, administrado como 
una cooperativa que también maneja negocios localizados 
a lo largo de región.  
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2.  Principios de Sostenibilidad 
El tercer paso es la evaluación del sistema hídrico regional desde la perspectiva de la 
sostenibilidad. La pregunta guía es: ¿qué tan sostenible es el actual régimen de manejo 
del agua? Definimos el manejo sostenible del agua como el proceso que involucra a todos 
las partes interesadas en la coordinación del abastecimiento, distribución, uso y salidas de 
agua de  manera que garantice un nivel de bienestar social y económico suficiente y 
equitativo sin comprometer la viabilidad y la integridad de los hidro-ecosistemas a largo 
plazo (Rogers y Hall, 2003; Langsdale et al 2009; Reed y Kaspryzk de 2009). Para llevar 
a cabo dicha evaluación, desarrollamos un conjunto de principios de gobernanza 
sostenible con los que puede evaluarse el régimen actual.  
Nuestra recopilación se basa en el conjunto de criterios generales de sostenibilidad  
propuestos por Gibson (2006) así como en la integración de  propuestas de sostenibilidad 
de agua (por ejemplo, Newman, 2001; Alley y Leake 2004), manejo del agua (por 
ejemplo, Larsen y Gujer 1997, Pahl Wostl 2008; Muelle de 2010; Grigg 2010) y manejo 
de los recursos naturales (por ejemplo, Lockwood 2010). Adicionalmente, el desarrollo 
de estos principios fue acompañado por entrevistas conducidas durante el estudio.  
Los 7 principios son explicados a continuación: 
1. La integridad del sistema socio-ecológico.  
Este principio exige equilibrar las necesidades de los residentes locales, agricultura, 
industria y otros usuarios del agua tomando en cuenta  la viabilidad de los ecosistemas de 
soporte. Durante las últimas dos décadas, ha surgido el consenso de que el concepto 
convencional de caudal ecológico no es suficiente para un régimen de manejo de agua 
cuyo objetivo sea garantizar la viabilidad de los hidro-ecosistemas. Como resume 
Sophocleous (2000:41): "en el pasado, el volumen de recarga de un acuífero fue aceptado 
como la cantidad de agua que podría extraerse sobre una base sostenible, el llamado 
caudal ecológico. Ahora entendemos que para el rendimiento sostenible de un acuífero, la 
extracción debe ser considerablemente menor que la recarga, 
El principio de integridad del sistema socio-ecológico puede definirse en 4 partes: 
a. El mantenimiento de flujos mínimos de aguas superficiales para fauna y 
ecosistemas, así como recreación , educación y otros objetivos antropocéntricos. 
b. El mantenimiento o aumento de la calidad de los recursos hídricos a través de la 
eliminación, reducción o mitigación de la contaminación en cuerpos de agua.  
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c. Garantizar que los acuíferos no se sobrecarguen hasta puntos de inestabilidad, por 
ejemplo, creando fisuras y hundimientos del suelo debido al agotamiento de las 
aguas subterráneas o reduciendo corrientes de agua conectadas a aguas 
superficiales. 
d. Reconocer los límites naturales de la cuenca, coordinar la utilización de recursos 
hídricos y evaluar impactos tomando en cuenta las conexiones de agua 
subterránea y superficial a fin de asegurar la integridad del sistema socio-
ecológico. 
2. Eficiencia y mantenimiento de recursos 
El principio de eficiencia y mantenimiento de recursos se especifica a 
continuación: 
a. Reducir el consumo de agua o mejorar la eficiencia del uso de agua en prácticas 
agrícolas, industriales, comerciales y residenciales. Puntos de referencia comunes 
para este principio incluyen las tasas de consumo de agua per cápita, 
especialmente para el sector municipal, además del rendimientos de cultivos por 
cantidad de agua utilizada. 
b. Reutilizar agua o reciclar las aguas residuales para usos diversos, incluyendo el 
tratamiento  para usos no potables como la irrigación.  
c. Eliminar la pérdida de agua del sistema debida a demandas climáticas y fugas en 
la infraestructura. 
d. La tasa de extracción de aguas subterráneas no debe exceder la tasa de recarga y 
regeneración de las aguas subterráneas a largo plazo (comúnmente conocido 
como "caudal ecológico"), a fin de mantener los niveles del acuífero. El 
cumplimiento de este principio requiere aumentar la conservación, reducir las 
tasas de consumo y reutilizar el agua para múltiples propósitos a fin de reducir las 
exigencias sobre los recursos hídricos. Aunque la recarga de acuíferos con otras 
fuentes de agua es una opción, los crecientes costos económicos, políticos y 
ambientales de la adquisición de suministros de agua para hacerlo a menudo 
constituyen una limitación. 
3. Oportunidad y suficiencia de medios de vida 
Este principio asegura el acceso equitativo a suficiente cantidad y calidad del agua 
para las personas que dependen de ella para su subsistencia y actividades económicas.  
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Un manejo adecuado del agua debe específicamente asegurar: 
a. El acceso al agua en suficiente cantidad y calidad para actividades que sostienen 
los medios de vida de las personas y garantizan su bienestar. 
b. El acceso al agua en suficiente cantidad y calidad con el fin de perseguir 
oportunidades económicas. Por ejemplo agricultura, procesamiento de alimentos y 
turismo. Este sub-principio es contingente con el mencionado anteriormente. 
c. Una compensación para las partes afectadas en caso de tener un acceso 
insuficiente (e.g; agua contaminada, infraestructura deficiente).  
 
4. Civilidad socio-ecológica y el manejo democrático 
Este principio exige la participación y la colaboración entre todos los interesados en 
la toma de decisiones, considerando los intereses, necesidades y perspectivas de los 
actores locales y los que están conectados a los recursos a través de redes sociales y 
ambientales más amplias (como cuencas hidrográficas). Este principio alienta a los 
usuarios del agua, los reguladores, los administradores, y otros a desarrollar un 
entendimiento compartido y preciso del sistema regional de agua, reconociendo y 
respetando las funciones y perspectivas de los diversos actores del sistema. Exige 
también que todas las partes interesadas desarrollen responsabilidad personal e 
institucional para las prácticas sostenibles de agua. 
El principio de civilidad y manejo democrático se especifica a continuación: 
a. Involucrar a todas las personas o grupos que afectan o son afectados por los 
esfuerzos de manejo de agua, incluidos los usuarios del agua, proveedores, 
reguladores, gerentes, planificadores, científicos y ambientalistas en la toma de 
decisiones sobre cuestiones relativas al agua en la región (Ostrom, 2009). 
b. Considerar la completa gama de intereses y perspectivas a través de las diferentes 
etapas del manejo. Este proceso incluye desde debates y estudios hasta la toma de 
decisiones y su evaluación, así como una  documentación transparente de cómo 
tales intereses y perspectivas están siendo integradas o ignoradas en la toma de 
decisiones. 
c. Establecer esfuerzos colaborativos para el manejo de agua más allá de los límites 
físicos y políticos del sistema. 
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5.  Equidad inter e intrageneracional 
El principio asegura un acceso equitativo a la suficiente cantidad y calidad de agua 
para los residentes actuales y futuros. Esto implica proveer a las generaciones futuras 
con las mismas oportunidades que se brinda a la población actual, tanto en términos 
de actividades antropocéntricas y como del ecosistema. Generalmente, se hace 
hincapié en dos formas de equidad: justicia de distribución, donde se destaca una 
distribución justa de los impactos, beneficios y costos, y la justicia participativa, que 
hace hincapié en la participación equitativa de todas las partes en toma de decisiones.  
Este principio se define seguidamente:  
a. Asegurar el acceso al agua potable por parte de todos los residentes para fines de 
alimentación y saneamiento, es decir, como una necesidad humana básica y por lo 
tanto, un derecho humano. 
b. Definir e implementar un nivel suficiente de necesidades de agua más allá de 
"necesidades básicas", dando prioridad a las disputas entre partes interesadas . 
c. Asegurar una distribución justa de los beneficios y los costos entre todos los 
actores y los actores involucrados en el uso y manejo del agua. 
d. Facilitar participación entre diversas partes, las cuales deben ser representativas 
de todos los sectores interesados de la población.  
e. Asegurar la representación de las generaciones futuras en los procesos de manejo 
del agua. 
 
6. Interconectividad de escala local a global 
El principio asegura la asignación y manejo de los recursos hídricos en regiones 
ascendentes y descendentes de las cuencas hidrológicas. En otras palabras, porque el 
agua está conectada en la unidad biofísica de la cuencas, deben considerarse las 
decisiones tomadas en todas las unidades sociales o políticas involucradas y los 
efectos nocivos a otros deben mitigarse o ser compensados. 
Este principio se define a continuación:   
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a. Reducir o eliminar los efectos negativos (de extracción de agua, contaminación, 
etc.) en otras regiones, incluidas las comunidades de origen de extracción del agua 
y sus posteriores usuarios o actores. 
b. Planear el manejo de los recursos dentro de los límites del acuífero o cuenca 
hidrográfica.  
c. Reconocer y coordinar entre los actores locales y las partes interesadas a mayor 
escala, por ejemplo, el co-manejo de recursos a través de las cuencas 
transfronterizas y la negociación de tratados internacionales de agua. 
7. Precaución (mitigación) y adaptabilidad 
El manejo sostenible del agua requiere la anticipación de posibles problemas y la 
capacidad para mitigar así como responder a los impactos negativos sobre el sistema 
de agua. Se toman en cuenta tres ámbitos: 
a. Anticipación. Se prevé la posible escasez de agua y problemas de calidad, por lo 
que se desarrollan estrategias proactivas para evitarlos y administrarlos. Los 
factores estresores incluyen el clima y la variabilidad hidrológica, así como los 
cambios socioeconómicos, entre otros. Actividades clave de anticipación 
incluyen: monitoreo de condiciones hidrológicas y ambientales, del uso de agua y 
otros parámetros; y construir modelos dinámicos, escenarios futuros y estrategias 
de mitigación y adaptación. 
b. Mitigación. Implementación de planes y adopción de prácticas de manejo de agua 
que a largo plazo reducen la complejidad de los sistemas, aumentan la resiliencia 
y promueven la conservación del agua. Estas prácticas incluyen la prevención de 
perturbaciones por medio de la mitigación de estresores.  
c. Adaptación. En caso del fracaso de los esfuerzos de mitigación, adaptarse a las 
condiciones y necesidades cambiantes, asegurando que los actores involucrados 
son conscientes y capaces de tomar las medidas requeridas para la sostenibilidad. 
Esto exige flexibilidad para permitir el aprendizaje, la renegociación de los 
objetivos y modificación de estrategias según sea necesario. 
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Table 2.1: Resumen de los criterios de sostenibilidad; cada criterio corresponde a 
actividades de manejo 
Principio de 
Sostenibilidad Componentes Clave 
Actividades de 
manejo 
1. La integridad 
del sistema socio-
ecológico 
a. Mantener flujos mínimos en las aguas 
superficiales 
b. Mantener o aumentar la calidad de los 
recursos hídricos 
c. Asegurar que los acuíferos no sean 
sobrecargados hasta puntos de 
inestabilidad 
d. Reconocer y coordinar el uso de 
recursos y su impacto dentro de los 
límites del sistema hídrico 
Abastecimiento 
Transversal 
Abastecimiento 
Uso 
2. Eficiencia y 
mantenimiento de 
recursos 
a. Reducir el uso de agua o incrementar 
la eficiencia de uso   
b. Reusar agua o reciclar agua residual 
para usos varios  
c. Eliminar la pérdida de agua 
d. La extracción de agua subterránea no 
debe exceder la regeneración y tasa de 
recarga  
Uso 
Uso / Salidas de agua 
Abastecimiento/ 
Distribución 
Abastecimiento 
3. Oportunidad y 
suficiencia de 
medios de vida 
a. Todas las personas deben tener acceso 
a suficiente calidad  y cantidad de agua 
para sus medios de vida  
b. Todas las personas deben tener acceso 
a suficiente calidad y cantidad de agua 
para sus actividades económicas  
c. Una compensación justa para los 
actores que no tienen suficiente acceso  
Abastecimiento / Uso 
 
Abastecimiento / Uso 
 
Abastecimiento/ Uso 
4. Civilidad socio-
ecológica y 
manejo 
democrático 
a. Involucrar a todas las partes que 
afectan o se ven afectadas por la toma de 
decisiones de manejo de agua  
b. Considerar toda la gama de intereses y 
percepciones de en las diversas etapas 
del proceso de manejo  
c. Establecer alianzas colaborativas para 
el manejo de agua  
Transversal 
 
Transversal 
 
Abastecimiento / 
Distribución 
5. Equidad inter e 
intra-generacional 
a. Asegurar que todos los residentes 
tienen acceso a agua potable para 
alimentación y para propósitos de 
saneamiento  
b. Definir e implementar un nivel 
suficiente de agua más allá de las 
Abastecimiento 
 
Uso 
 
Transversal 
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necesidades básicas  
c. Asegurar una distribución justa de 
costos y beneficios con las partes 
interesadas  
d. Facilitar la participación entre diversas 
partes interesadas (dentro de la región) 
e. Incluir la representación de futuras 
generaciones  
Transversal 
 
Uso 
6. 
Interconectividad 
de escala local a 
global 
a. Reducir o eliminar impactos negativos 
sobre otras regiones 
b. Planear el manejo de los recursos 
dentro de los límites del acuífero o 
cuenca hidrográfica 
c. Reconocer y coordinar con actores 
locales y otras partes interesadas a mayor 
escala  
Abastecimiento/ 
Salida de agua 
Abastecimiento 
Abastecimiento 
7. Precaución 
(mitigación) y 
adaptabilidad 
a. Anticipar potencial escasez de agua y 
problemas de calidad 
b. Mitigar potencial escasez de agua y 
problemas de calidad   
c. Adaptarse a la  escasez de agua y 
problemas de calidad 
Abastecimiento 
Transversal / Uso 
Transversal 
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3.  Resultados de la Evaluación de Sostenibilidad 
	  
Principios de 
sostenibilidad 
Activ
idad 
Resultados | *=Incumle el principio / **= Incumple el 
principio, pero hay avances hacia la sostenibilidad /  
***=cumple con los requerimientos del principio 
1. La integridad del sistema socio-ecológico 
a 
Mantener 
flujo 
mínimo de 
agua 
superficial 
Abaste
cimien
to 
Aunque los datos son escasos, basado en cálculos iniciales en 
este esfuerzo de investigación (no presentados en este 
informe) no parece que el flujo de agua superficial está 
sobrecargado en la época lluviosa. Es urgente un estudio más 
cuidadoso de las corrientes de la estación seca y 
disponibilidad de suministro. ** 
b 
Mantenimi
ento o 
incremento 
de la 
calidad de 
los 
recursos 
hídricos  
Transv
ersal 
AyA y el Ministerio de salud monitorean regularmente la 
calidad del agua para el consumo humano. MINAET está 
encargado de vigilar la salud e integridad del ecosistema, sin 
embargo el monitoreo consistente de ecosistemas es un 
desafío prácticamente inexistente fuera de iniciativas 
voluntarias (como el programa de bandera azul). ** 
c 
Asegurar 
que los 
acuíferos 
no se 
sobrecargu
en hasta el 
punto de 
inestabilida
d  
Abaste
cimien
to 
No existe un estudio de las aguas subterráneas en la parte 
superior del Nosara. El acuífero de Potrero Caimital fue 
localizado en un mapa por primera vez en el 2003 por 
Costeña, el mayor usuario de aguas subterráneas en la región. 
Este estudio fue fundamental para los estudios posteriores de 
SENARA 2006 y 2008 sobre la vulnerabilidad de acuífero. 
Existe muy poca información fiable sobre el abastecimiento 
del recursos. * 
d 
Reconocer/ 
coordinar 
los usos e 
impactos 
dentro del 
sistema de 
agua   
Distrib
ución 
 Uso  
Las ASADAs no coordinan las extracciones del acuífero con 
Costeña u otras entidades que utilizan la misma fuente. 
Ningún actor juega el papel de facilitar el intercambio de 
información sobre el uso del agua entre comunidades o entre 
sectores que comparten la misma fuente. Las normas y 
reglamentos actuales no fomentan la coordinación e incluso 
obstaculizan la acumulación de información coherente de 
oferta/demanda. * 
2. Eficiencia y mantenimiento de recursos 
a 
Reducir el 
uso de agua 
o 
incrementar 
la eficiencia 
Uso 
Hay pocos esfuerzos de coordinación pública y educación. La 
ruptura de conocimiento entre grupos y comunidades 
convierte el establecimiento de un norte común, la 
cooperación, el monitoreo e identificación de objetivos en 
tareas difíciles. *  
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de uso  
b 
Reusar agua 
o reciclar 
agua 
residual 
para usos 
varios  
Salid
a de 
agua 
 Uso 
Los proyectos de reutilización y reciclaje están ganando 
interés, lo cual ha sido demostrado por talleres recientes 
realizados por UNA. Sin embargo la falta de coordinación y 
los vacíos (quién es responsable de hacer qué) han impedido 
la ejecución de los programas y obstaculizado esfuerzos de 
financiamiento. **  
c 
Eliminación 
de la 
pérdida de 
agua 
Supp
ly 
Deli
very 
La infraestructura generalmente tiene un mantenimiento 
adecuado por parte del AyA. Sin embargo, el financiamiento 
público se ha vuelto escaso. En la época lluviosa 2010 AyA 
enfrentó problemas de bajo presupuesto para dar 
mantenimiento, por lo que tuvo que optar por un préstamo. 
Los problemas de infraestructura periódicamente dejan a 
Hojancha sin agua potable tanto en época seca como lluviosa. 
** 
d 
La tasa de 
extracción 
de agua 
subterránea 
no debe 
exceder la 
tasa de 
recarga   
Abas
teci
mien
to 
Distr
ibuci
ón 
El conocimiento de reservas de suministro de acuífero es 
considerado por el gobierno uno de los problemas principales 
para la Provincia Guanacaste. A pesar de ser uno de los 
mejores recursos de agua dulce en la región, el Acuífero 
Potrero-Caimtial nunca ha sido suficientemente estudiado 
para identificar umbrales de caudal ecológico. * 
3. Oportunidad y suficiencia de medios de vida 
a 
Todas las 
personas 
deben tener 
acceso a 
suficiente 
calidad  y 
cantidad de 
agua para 
sus medios 
de vida 
Abas
teci
mien
to 
Uso 
Generalmente las redes de distribución de AyA y ASADAs 
(la mayoría) aseguran cantidad y calidad de suficientes. 
Legalmente todos los residentes tienen derecho a perforar 
pozos privados para fines domésticos. Sin embargo, los 
campesinos que dependen de pozos privados no tienen 
asegurada cantidad ni en calidad de agua y están vulnerables 
en la estación seca. ** 
b 
Todas las 
personas 
deben tener 
acceso a 
suficiente 
calidad y 
cantidad de 
agua para 
sus 
Abas
teci
mien
to 
Uso 
El tiempo de espera para la obtención de permisos de 
aprovechamiento puede ser exasperante. Como resultado, la 
extracción ilegal de agua es muy común y se especula que 
ocurre a menudo. Sin embargo, la creciente escasez, el poco 
conocimiento de cuánta agua está siendo utilizada y la 
debilidad institucional es una condición que puede 
potencialmente llevar a la disputa de recursos. **  
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actividades 
económicas 
c 
Una 
compensaci
ón justa para 
los actores 
que no 
tienen 
suficiente 
acceso 
Abas
teci
mien
to 
 Uso 
El Tribunal Ambiental resuelve la compensación de partes 
afectadas. Sin embargo, el volumen de casos en los últimos 
años y la lentitud de los procesos ha limitado el acceso local a 
la corte. Las comunidades de Guanacaste se relacionan 
estrechamente y tienen la capacidad de movilizarse cuando la 
compensación no está disponible y afecta los objetivos de la 
comunidad. Sin embargo, en el futuro ésto podría tener 
impactos negativos en las comunidades. **  
4. Civilidad socio-ecológica y manejo democrático 
a 
Involucrar a 
todas las 
partes que 
afectan o se 
ven 
afectadas 
por la toma 
de 
decisiones 
de manejo 
de agua 
Tran
svers
al 
Todos los sectores y grupos tienen la oportunidad de 
participar en el manejo. La inclusión de comunidades rurales 
y los usuarios grandes de agua es un desafío, sin embargo 
existen esfuerzos por parte de organizaciones de base para 
ampliar la participación de todos los actores. ** 
b 
Considerar 
toda la gama 
de intereses 
y 
percepcione
s en las 
diversas 
etapas del 
proceso de 
manejo 
Tran
svers
al 
Es necesario que las ASADAs participen en el manejo 
regional del agua- en realidad su acción está limitada al 
trabajo con asociaciones de desarrollo para buscar fondos y 
apoyo. A pesar de evidenciarse la necesidad de la incluir alas 
ASADAs y al sector privado en la elaboración del Plan de 
Manejo 2004, no se desarrollaron estrategias para lograr esto. 
Sin embargo, las organizaciones de base han ampliado el 
manejo para cubrir más intereses y perspectivas- aunque esto 
no está documentado. **  
c 
Establecer 
alianzas 
colaborativa
s para el 
manejo de 
agua 
Abas
teci
mien
to 
Distr
ibuci
ón 
La conectividad facilita la colaboración del sector ambiental, 
ampliamente motivado por la reforestación (i.e.: los proyectos 
de Corredor Biológico y Bosque Modelo). Sin embargo, la 
homogeneidad de sub-grupos y sectores interesados puede 
dificultar la inclusión de nuevas perspectivas, lo cual es 
crítico para desarrollar conocimiento necesario para tiempos 
de cambio. ** 
5. Equidad inter e intrageneracional 
a 
Asegurar 
que todos 
los 
Abas
teci
mien
Todos los residentes tienen acceso a agua potable para tomar. 
*** 
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residentes 
tienen 
acceso a 
agua potable 
para 
alimentació
n y para 
propósitos 
de 
saneamiento 
to 
b 
Definir e 
implementar 
un nivel 
suficiente de 
agua más 
allá de las 
necesidades 
básicas 
Uso 
Los actores centrales de toma de decisiones están en una 
posición para ser capaces de definir las necesidades de agua 
más allá de aquellas que son básicas. Sin embargo, datos mal 
organizados de cuánta agua va adónde y para qué objetivo y 
la corrupción reciente del gobierno para asignar permisos de 
desarrollo en la costa Pacífica (es decir, el caso de Papagayo) 
podría erosionar la legitimidad necesaria para una 
implementación eficaz. * 
c 
Asegurar 
una 
distribución 
justa de 
costos y 
beneficios 
con las 
partes 
interesadas 
Tran
svers
al 
Hojancha cobra tarifas de uso de agua ligeramente superiores 
para ayudar a cubrir los costos de transporte de agua. El 
acceso a agua potable es un derecho humano explícito en la 
ley costarricense, por lo que en teoría los costos no deberían 
sobrecargar a algunos grupos sobre otros. Sin embargo, las 
actuales leyes y regulaciones sobre salidas de agua permiten 
que algunas comunidades compartan costos 
desproporcionadamente en relación a su contaminación 
agrícola. **  
d 
Facilitar la 
participació
n entre 
diversas 
partes 
interesadas 
(dentro de la 
región) 
Tran
svers
al 
Las organizaciones de base han surgido en los últimos años 
facilitando la colaboración grupos y comunidades. 
Aprovechar estas organizaciones para fomentar el progreso 
hacia la sostenibilidad es vital, ya que la participación rural en 
procesos de manejo se encuentra limitada en otros espacios. 
** 
e 
Incluir la 
representaci
ón de 
futuras 
generacione
s 
Uso 
Un gran número de importantes organizaciones de base 
relacionadas a medio ambiente (financiadas por donantes 
internacionales en gran medida preocupados con la 
supervivencia de los bosques secos),en un área relativamente 
pequeña, que están bien integradas en el sector público en 
general velan porque las generaciones futuras tengan  voz en 
los procesos de manejo. *** 
 
6. Interconectividad de escala local a global 
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a 
Reducir o 
eliminar 
impactos 
negativos 
sobre otras 
regiones 
Abas
teci
mien
ti 
Salid
as de 
agua 
Fuera de las fuertes lluvias que durante la época lluviosa 
llenan los ríos que van hacia el océano, haciendo del nado una 
actividad poco salubre para turistas, las comunidades de las 
cuencas media y baja usualmente no observan impactos 
negativos. *** 
b 
Planear el 
manejo de 
los recursos 
dentro de 
los límites 
del acuífero 
o cuenca 
hidrográfica 
 
Abas
teci
mien
to  
Aunque la independencia de agua sigue siendo una prioridad 
en Hojancha, hay un vacío de liderazgo para direccionar 
esfuerzos de sostenibilidad en este sector , tomar decisiones y 
crear estrategias de implementación ** 
c 
Reconocer y 
coordinar 
con actores 
locales y 
otras partes 
interesadas 
a mayor 
escala 
Salid
as de 
agua 
Abas
teci
mien
to 
La integración del manejo de aguas costeras y de la cuenca 
baja es inexistente. Existe un vacío de roles de manejo que 
permitan la conexión con otras regiones. Las comunidades 
costeras dependen de grandes acuíferos costeros que están 
sujetos a aumentos de salinización, demanda por parte de la 
población y un futuro aumento del nivel del mar.  En el futuro 
será más eficiente el transporte de agua del interior que llevar 
a cabo procesos de desalinización, lo que hace de éste un 
sector crítico para la sostenibilidad. *  
7. Precaución (mitigación) y adaptabilidad 
a
  
Anticipar 
potencial 
escasez de 
agua y 
problemas 
de calidad 
Abas
teci
mien
to  
El manejo del agua es un proceso de mucha conexión e 
intercambio de información entre los actores. En este caso, la 
información sobre el sector forestal es la más prominente. El 
vacío de información de otros sectores (tales como 
abastecimiento de agua y demanda) limita la capacidad para 
anticipar y prepararse para futuros escenarios. ** 
b 
Mitigar 
potencial 
escasez de 
agua y 
problemas 
de calidad   
Tran
svers
al 
Uso 
Los planes de manejo de agua elaborados por actores locales 
están diseñados para ayudar a mitigar la escasez de agua, pero 
no son vinculantes y no están conectados directamente con 
grandes marcos reguladores de agua. Los planes de manejo de 
agua no se utilizan para organizar nueva información sobre 
los sistemas de agua a medida que ésta es producida. * 
c 
Adaptarse a 
la escasez 
de agua y 
problemas 
de calidad 
Tran
svers
al 
Alta densidad y cohesión en el suministro de agua permiten 
movilizar recursos y responder efectivamente al cambio en en 
contextos de reforestación. *** 
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Table 3.2 Percepción de desafíos en el manejo y su ubicación en el sistema de agua por 
parte de los actores. 
Cuáles son los mayores desafíos percibidos para el manejo de agua y dónde 
ocurren?  
Desafíos % Mencionado 
(n=96) 
Dónde? 
A Contaminación, calidad de 
agua, monitoreo y aplicación 
38 Salidas de agua 
B Demanda, crecimiento y 
deforestación sin regulaciones 
34 Uso (Ecosistema, 
Agricultura) 
C Cambio climático 9 Abastecimiento 
(Acuífero Potrero-
Caimital) 
D Falta de educación y conciencia  9 Uso 
E Escasez y sequía 6 Abastecimiento 
F Insuficiente protección de 
acuíferos 
5 Abastecimiento 
- Inequidades de distribución 1 Distribución (no 
incluido en el mapa 
abajo) 
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Table 3.3 Agrupaciones de desafíos para la sostenibilidad en el sistema de agua.  
Agrupación de 
desafíos 
Evaluación 
de desafíos 
Percepciones 
de actores Implicados 
Acuífero 
Potrero-
Caimital  
1c, 2d, 1d , 
7b 
E,F,C MINAET, AyA, ASADAs, SENARA, 
ACT, Dasociaciones de desarrollo, 
Costeña, NicoyAgua 
Instituciones 
reguladoras, 
marcos de 
manejo de agua 
5b, 7b,  B, A MINAET, AyA, Municipalidades, 
ASADAs, MAG, Ministerio de Salud, 
asociaciones de productores, empresas 
privadas (Costeña, CoopePilangosta) 
Educación de 
uso de agua/ 
establecimiento 
de objetivos 
2a D UNA, MINAET, ACT-Educación, 
MAG, INA, NGOs, NicoyAgua 
Integración de 
la cenca media 
y baja 
6c A Comunidades costeras, actores a nivel 
nacional, usuarios del acuífero Potrero-
Caimital 
Acuífero Potrero-Caimital  
La ley obliga a los organismos nacionales a coordinar, pero ésto ocurre de manera 
indefinida a nivel de cuencas hidrográficas. Esto constituye un reto para los esfuerzos que 
pretenden crear un cuerpo de conocimiento accesible y coherente sobre las cantidades de 
agua que se almacena, mueve y usa en el sistema. Sin este conocimiento base, 
autoridades y actores ven obstaculizado el desarrollo de planes de manejo adecuados. En 
la práctica, los esfuerzos del gobierno local no están estructurados según o sujetos a un 
modelo de manejo singular. Aunque esto proporciona oportunidades para las iniciativas 
innovadoras de manejo local, aún no se ha desarrollado un acuerdo de manejo vinculante 
para todas las partes. En consecuencia, no se está produciendo la acumulación sistemática 
del conocimiento de sistemas físicos de agua y nuevas estrategias para un manejo 
adecuado. Esto es especialmente crítico sobre el acuífero de Potrero-Caimital. Todo el 
conocimiento existente sobre este acuífero está basado en una encuesta privada que se 
realizó sobre las aguas subterráneas en el 2003. 
La participación de ASADAs y la conexión con procesos de manejo más amplios fuera 
de las respectivas comunidades son muy limitadas. ASADAs y asociaciones de desarrollo 
históricamente han jugado un papel fundamental, actuando como centros de acción 
colectiva rural y manifestándose cuando se perciben amenazas sobre los suministros. Una 
mejor incorporación de las ASADAs en el manejo permitirá ampliar las capacidades para 
la mitigación de conflictos. 
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Integración de la Cuenca Media y Baja  
Los esfuerzos de mitigación se verán impulsados al integrar en los procesos de manejo a 
las comunidades de la cuenca media y baja.  Eventualmente el transporte del agua hacia 
esta zona sera más rentable que resolver los problemas de salinización de la costa. Existe 
una posibilidad razonable de que en un futuro cercano las comunidades costeras busquen 
abastecerse con agua del interior. Si lo hacen, el acuífero de Potrero-Caimital sería una 
fuente atractiva. 
Instituciones reguladoras / Marcos de manejo de agua  
En el área de estudio, los actores centrales son organismos del Gobierno nacional, con la 
excepción de NicoyAgua. Los marcos institucionales y jurídicos que determinan cómo 
estos actores manejan el agua son muy vagos. Asimismo, las reglas permiten un traslape 
excesivo y la repetición de las responsabilidades de agencias gubernamentales. Como 
resultado, muchos actores gastan recursos haciendo cosas similares, tales como la 
reforestación. Sin embargo, cuando el agua sale del sistema, los actores carecen de 
recursos operativos para supervisar, monitorear y controlar la contaminación y la 
escorrentía en arroyos y ríos. 
En estas subcuencas de Guanacaste, el Plan de Manejo local está dirigido esencialmente a 
crear redes de actores, una tarea crítica, teniendo en cuenta los vacíos y traslapes en el 
sistema. NicoyAgua es el mejor vínculo en el régimen de comunidades  ASADA. El 
aprovechamiento de esta organización constituye un inicio prometedor para la integración 
y la coordinación necesaria para el manejo del agua a pesar de fallas institucionales a 
nivel nacional. 
Establecimiento participativo de un norte común/ Educación de uso de agua 
Los resultados muestran una ausencia de coordinación directa entre el sector educación 
(muy vagamente definido), el departamento de educación del ACT, la educación y 
asistencia técnica del MAG y otros esfuerzos de educación del uso del agua. Ningún 
actor tiene un papel de liderazgo para guiar los esfuerzos de educación pública hacia una 
dirección o conectando actores y sus respectivas actividades. Es necesario que el 
liderazgo provenga de las organizaciones comunales locales. Sin una visión clara para la 
administración de agua regional acordada por las diversas partes interesadas, es difícil 
coordinar todos las diversos y pertinentes programas de educación pública. 
MINAET es el actor principal en el sector del medio ambiente y controla los flujos y 
dispersión de información en el sistema de manejo.  AyA coopera con MINAET en 
proyectos de reforestación periódicamente, pero mantiene una posición independiente y 
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está más enfocado en las entregas de agua y proyectos de infraestructura. Fuera de la 
reforestación y la protección de cuencas hidrográficas, casi todas las actividades conexas 
al manejo se relacionan con la supervisión de calidad de agua por parte del Ministerio de 
salud, mientras que las ASADAs y asociaciones de desarrollo rural permanecen en la 
periferia. Además de conectar a las ASADAs con actores dentro de MINAET, las 
organizaciones no gubernamentales como NicoyAgua también son un vínculo entre AyA 
y MINAET. Permitir una mejor coordinación entre estos dos actores centrales a nivel de 
cuenca, podría ser un objetivo potencial de NicoyAgua con el fin de solventar los 
desafíos de la sostenibilidad. 
4. Estrategias de Manejo Potenciales  
El equipo de investigación considera las siguientes estrategias como posibles opciones 
estratégicas que aumentarían el cumplimiento de los principios de sostenibilidad. Los 
próximos pasos de la investigación (estudios 2 y 3) incluirán estrategias de desarrollo y 
evauación más detalladas- en conjunto con los actores locales y tomadores de decisiones. 
Las estrategias presentadas a continuación son una revisión de potenciales opciones que 
han surgido a partir de esta evaluación de sostenibilidad. Existen muchas más que deben 
descubrirse, aplicarse y evaluarse. 
Abastecimiento y distribución de agua 
Estrategia 1: Implementar procesos que tengan el objetivo de establecer un comité local 
que supervise el agua subterránea, contando con autoridad legal, con miembros de 
comunidades y corporaciones que compartan el acuífero Potrero-Caimital. Un sistema de 
reporte de extracciones de agua, conducido a partir de una alianza con la Universidad 
Nacional de Costa Rica, podría permitir la acumulación de conocimiento sobre cuánta 
agua para abastecimiento hay en el acuífero 
Estrategia 2: Desarrollar un plan a largo plazo que incluya a las ASADAs de Nicoya y 
Hojancha en los procesos de toma de decisiones. En un plazo de 10 años, este plan podría 
ser la base para establecer programas de construcción de capacidades, los cuales serían 
llevados a cabo en conjunto con las ASADAs de la región. Actualmente, NicoyAgua\la 
Comisión se encuentra en la mejor posición para coordinar con las comunidades 
ASADA.  
Uso de Agua 
Estrategia 3: Esfuerzos regulares de visualización con organizaciones y comunidades 
locales incrementarán la oportunidad de tener usos deseados para el agua en la región. 
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Esfuerzos de visualización colaborativos e inclusivos serán de utilidad para la 
priorización y la toma de decisiones.  
Salidas de agua 
Estrategia 4. La integración de las comunidades de las cuencas media y baja- 
especialmente aquellas en la costa Pacífica- en los procesos de manejo locales permitirá 
mitigar potenciales disputas a medida que los acuíferos costeros experimentan 
salinización. 
Transversal 
Estrategia 5. Aprovechar organizaciones de base como NicoyAgua es un inicio para la 
integración y coordinación del manejo de agua en la región. Asimismo, los esfuerzos para 
consolidar corredores biológicos podrían constituir una plataforma para el manejo.  
NicoyAgua actúa como un Puente entre AyA y MINAET. Facilitar la coordinación entre 
estos dos actores centrales a escala regional (Nicoya y Hojancha) podría ser un objetivo 
clave para organizaciones de base.  Con un apropiado planeamiento estratégico la 
colaboración que NicoyAgua está en posición de liderar podría ser un modelo para otras 
organizaciones de base en Guanacaste.
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NOTE: DESIGNS AND LAYOUT IN THE FOLLOWING REPORT WERE ALTERED 
FROM THE ORIGINAL IN ORDER TO FIT DISSERTATION FORMAT 
REQUIREMENTS. SOME IMAGES FROM THE OIGINAL REPORTS HAVE BEEN 
ALTERED OR REMOVED  IN ORDER TO REDUCE DOMEUNT SIZE. 
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El contexto y antecedentes del estudio 
El estudio abordado en este documento forma parte del proyecto titulado: "Hacia el 
Manejo Sostenible de los Recursos Hídricos en Guanacaste, Costa Rica." El proyecto se 
inició en el año 2010 a través de un esfuerzo conjunto entre el Centro Agronómico 
Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE), en Turrialba, Costa Rica y la Facultad 
de Sostenibilidad de la Universidad Estatal de Arizona.  En 2012 el equipo del trabajo 
creció para incluir a la Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital en 
Nicoya y la Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica en Nicoya.  
En 2013, este equipo realizó el primer taller colaborativo para la gobernanza sostenible 
de agua en Guanacaste. 46 participantes de 18 comunidades de Guanacaste participaron 
en el primer taller colaborativo de agua en la región. Los participantes incluyeron once 
administradores de acueductos rurales (ASADAS), seis organismos públicos, gobiernos 
regionales, el sector turismo, el sector agricultura, grupos comunitarios y grupos 
ecologistas. Las posiciones que los participantes sostuvieron en el sector público 
incluyeron desde directores de agencias hasta administradores del agua (a tiempo parcial) 
en sus comunidades con menos de 1.000 personas. Los participantes trabajaron juntos 
durante más de siete horas para construir cinco escenarios de futuro de la gobernanza del 
agua, evaluar la sostenibilidad de cada uno, determinar las prioridades de gobernanza del 
agua con el fin de determinar si un escenario es sostenible o no, y desarrollar estrategias 
para lograr los resultados deseados. Después del taller, el equipo de investigación 
comenzó a trabajar explorando diferentes estrategias para la efectiva y sostenible 
gobernanza de agua en la región.  Este informe incluye los resultados y las conclusiones 
de este taller y el trabajo que ha seguido el taller.  
Estamos muy agradecidos por su participación en este trabajo y esperamos que usted 
encuentre los contenidos de este informe útiles. Por favor, póngase en contacto con 
nosotros si tiene alguna pregunta.  
Sinceramente, 
 
Christopher Kuzdas        Mariel Yglesias 
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Fotos arriba: Alrededor de Guanacaste. Hacia la derecha a partir de la parte superior 
izquierda: (1) Estación seca cerca del Parque Nacional Palo Verde; (2) la estación lluviosa en el 
Parque Nacional Palo Verde; (3) campos irrigados de arroz en el Distrito de Riego Arenal-
Temipisque; (4) Guanacaste es reconocida por sus hermosas playas; (5) invernadero gestionado 
por estudiantes de secundaria – las comunidades Guanacastecas son conocidas por ser activas 
en su protección al medio ambiente. 
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Resumen Ejecutivo 
 
La gobernanza sostenible de agua involucra a todas las partes interesadas en la 
coordinación del abastecimiento, la distribución, el uso, y la salida de agua de una 
manera  tal que garantice un nivel suficiente y equitativo de bienestar socioeconómico, 
sin comprometer la integridad de los ecosistemas a través del tiempo. Los esfuerzos para 
lograr una gobernanza sostenible del agua en Guanacaste, Costa Rica, se enfrentan a 
obstáculos significativos. Estos obstáculos incluyen impactos esperados del cambio 
climático en un futuro próximo; posiblemente menos precipitación y, potencialmente, 
disputas perturbadoras de agua. Afrontar con éxito  los impactos climáticos y lograr una 
mitigación de las disputas de agua depende de qué tan bien - o qué tan sostenible - los 
recursos hídricos están siendo gobernados.  
 
El taller fue un esfuerzo para apoyar los procesos de la gobernanza sostenible de agua en 
Guanacaste. Este taller fue un ejercicio en el proceso de planificación participativa que se 
llama ‘Planificación Transformativa (Wiek y Lang 2011).’ La idea de este proceso es 
identificar los futuros o escenarios diferentes, para seleccionar los futuros más sostenibles 
o los objetivos, y elaborar estrategias para lograr los futuros más optimistas y para evitar 
los futuros menos optimistas.  Ocho conclusiones importantes del taller y del trabajo de 
investigación reciente se presentan abajo: 
1. Los participantes (y las partes interesadas en general) favorecen abrumadoramente 
los escenarios futuros de la gobernanza policéntrica del agua en Guanacaste. La 
gobernanza policéntrica es un tipo de gobernanza que está bien coordinado entre las 
organizaciones relevantes  que trabajan a escala local, regional y nacional. Sin 
embargo, la gobernanza actual del agua en Guanacaste es fragmentada - lo que 
significa que hay mucho margen para mejorar en cuanto a la coordinación, la 
cooperación, y la comunicación. Específicamente, hay una necesidad de fuertes 
líderes regionales y las organizaciones regionales capaces y motivadas en la 
provincia. La Comisión Potrero-Caimital, que ahora se está expandiendo para incluir 
el Rio Quirimán, puede ser un modelo de liderazgo regional en Guanacaste. Las 
ASADAs en la Mala Noche también podrían considerar algún tipo de comisión 
regional, así que también podrían ser un modelo en la provincia. 
 
2. Las partes coincidieron en cuanto a algunos de los fines que deberían tener la 
sostenibilidad y la gobernanza de agua (como la gobernanza bien coordinada  y la 
apertura de tomar de decisiones). También, hubo acuerdo sobre las situaciones que la 
gobernabilidad de agua en Guanacaste debe evitar - como esos futuros retratados en 
el Escenario 5 y el Escenario 2 (descripciones de escenarios se encuentran en la 
	   374 
Sección 2 de este informe). El estado actual de la gobernanza de agua se percibe 
como mediocre en términos de preferencia (en comparación con la gobernabilidad 
del agua en los escenarios) cuando se evaluó utilizando los mismos parámetros que 
los participantes utilizan para evaluar los escenarios. Esto indica que hay una 
necesidad de implementar estrategias y procesos concretos para mover el estado 
actual de la gobernanza de agua hacía condiciones más deseables y sostenibles y 
evitar activamente las características negativas que se encuentran en algunos de los 
escenarios. Ahora es la oportunidad de tomar acción. 
 
3. Hay una necesidad de una visión clara por la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste que 
se comparta entre ASADAs, gobiernos regionales, las agencias nacionales y las 
comunidades - ¿Cómo se ve el desarrollo en el futuro?  ¿Para que debería ser 
utilizada el agua o cuáles son las prioridades? La evaluación de los escenarios en el 
taller fue un inicio, pero se necesitan procesos continuos para especificar metas y los 
fines para la gobernanza de agua en la región - y para monitorear cómo se están 
realizando progresos hacia esos fines sobre el tiempo y para informar sobre los 
progresos en una manera abierta. 
 
4. Muchos de los recursos que se necesitan para inicialmente implementar estrategias 
ya están disponibles en las comunidades y las organizaciones en Guanacaste. Tomará 
un poco de la creatividad, formar nuevas alianzas y utilizar las conexiones de 
diferentes organizaciones y de diferentes sectores para obtener estos recursos, si no 
es que están disponibles. En el largo plazo, más recursos técnicos, financieros, y 
humanos se necesitarán, pero con el aumento de la coordinación y colaboración entre 
las organizaciones locales y regionales en la gobernanza de agua Guanacaste, los 
administradores locales podrían estar en posición de asegurar estos recursos de los 
organismos nacionales en San José en el futuro próximo. 
 
5. Había un fuerte consenso entre los participantes en el taller sobre la falta de un fuerte 
liderazgo regional y la falta de organización de los recursos a nivel regional. Una 
mejor coordinación y organización de la gobernanza de agua a un nivel regional será 
un esfuerzo importante y valioso para la buena gobernanza de agua en el futuro. Será 
importante que cualquier nueva institución regional tenga la autoridad para aplicar y 
hacer cumplir las leyes y reglamentos. ¿Cómo construir esa institución?  Esta 
pregunta puede ser el objeto de futuras deliberaciones en los procesos de la 
gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste. 
 
6. Hubo consenso que en cuanto a la falta de conexión entre la gobernanza de agua en 
Guanacaste y la gobernanza de agua a una escala nacional - y que esta falta de 
conexión hace que la implementación de una buena gobernanza de agua en 
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Guanacaste sea un desafío. Las estrategias clave en el futuro tendrán que afrontar 
cómo Guanacaste puede tener un mejor acceso y ser involucrado con la toma de 
decisiones sobre los recursos hídricos a nivel nacional (incluyendo las decisiones 
sobre la distribución de los recursos financieros, equipo, y los recursos humanos). 
Estas estrategias y los esfuerzos deberán ir más allá de la retórica política e ir hacia 
el diálogo constructivo y procesos entre los líderes nacionales y los líderes 
Guanacastecos.  
 
7. Las estrategias deben ser monitoreada y probadas si van a tener éxito. Las reuniones 
y los eventos regulares (por ejemplo, un taller anual) ofrecen a los participantes la 
oportunidad de informar y reportar sobre cómo está sucediendo la implementación 
de las  estrategias, lo que ha funcionado, lo que no ha funcionado, etc. La 
implementación de las estrategias, la evaluación de las estrategias, y el cambio de 
estrategias para satisfacer las condiciones cambiantes será un proceso importante que 
ayudará a la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste a avanzar en el tiempo. 
 
8. Debería haber más eventos regulares donde los ciudadanos que trabajan en el sector 
del agua pueden reunirse y compartir experiencias. Estos tipos de eventos, como 
talleres bien organizados, son valiosos y promueven el aprendizaje compartido a 
través de fronteras políticas y geográficas. Se necesita liderazgo para organizar estos 
eventos. 
 
Foto arriba: Miembros del sector agua de Guanacaste participan en las actividades del taller 
	   376 
1.  Introducción 
	  
La gobernanza efectiva y sostenible de agua es una prioridad para Costa Rica, y la 
necesidad se hace aún más aparente en la zona del trópico seco de la provincia de 
Guanacaste. Al menos 65 conflictos de agua (definidos por medio de acciones legales 
tomadas por una o más partes involucradas) entre 1997 y 2006 fueron documentados en 
Guanacaste (Ramírez 2008) — un conflicto por agua cada 56 días.   
 
Un marco institucional y normativo que no ha cambiado significativamente en más de 
medio siglo determina en gran medida la gestión del agua en Costa Rica. La columna 
vertebral legal de la gestión de los recursos hídricos, la Ley de Aguas, se ha mantenido 
prácticamente sin cambios desde 1942.  Esta Ley define el agua como un bien público y 
la Constitución protege los derechos de los ciudadanos a un medio ambiente sano y 
limpio. Sin embargo, las portillos legales (por ejemplo, el agua no se define como un 
derecho humano, a pesar de ser un bien público), la proliferación de organismos públicos, 
la confusión sobre las responsabilidades de las agencias, y sus roles mal definidos han 
creado un sistema fragmentado de gobernanza del agua. (Ballestero et al. 2007). El 
sistema es propenso a la corrupción, no responde a los ciudadanos y tiene una 
desconexión con los  administradores de recursos hídricos a nivel de cuenca y 
comunidad. Estos problemas se combinan para hacer que el sistema actual de gobernanza 
del agua esté pobremente equipado para manejar los desafíos urgentes y de múltiples 
facetas del siglo 21 (Calvo 1990; Kuzdas 2012). A pesar de los reiterados intentos de 
reforma en los últimos años, cada uno de ellos se ha estancado en la Asamblea 
Legislativa, quien toma las decisiones finales sobre los proyectos de reforma (Arias 
2011).  
 
Los esfuerzos para ayudar a crear un nuevo modelo de gobernanza del agua en 
Guanacaste están en marcha. A lo largo de este documento, presentamos los avances y 
perspectivas de uno de estos esfuerzos - un proyecto titulado: Hacia la gestión sostenible 
de los recursos hídricos en Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Este proyecto es administrado entre 
una colaboración con la Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital y el 
Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza se centra en la investigación 
de una gestión del agua que integre los ciudadanos y tomadores de decisiones y en la 
promoción de los resultados y el material para los administradores del agua, ciudadanos, 
científicos y legisladores del proyecto. Un esfuerzo importante del proyecto fue organizar 
y dirigir el primer taller colaborativo para ayudar a informar acciones con miras a la 
gobernabilidad sostenible del agua en Guanacaste. 
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El 14 de Marzo, 2013, 46 participantes de 18 comunidades de Guanacaste participaron en 
el primer taller colaborativo de agua en la región. Los participantes incluyeron once 
administradores de acueductos rurales (ASADAS), seis organismos públicos, gobiernos 
regionales, el sector turismo, el sector agricultura, grupos comunitarios y grupos 
ecologistas. Las posiciones que los participantes sostuvieron en el sector público 
incluyeron desde directores de agencias hasta administradores del agua (a tiempo parcial) 
en sus comunidades con menos de 1.000 personas. Los participantes trabajaron juntos 
durante más de siete horas para 
construir cinco escenarios de 
futuro de la gobernanza del agua, 
evaluar la sostenibilidad de cada 
uno determinar las prioridades de 
gobernanza del agua con el fin de 
determinar si un escenario es 
sostenible o no, y desarrollar 
estrategias para lograr los 
resultados deseados. 
	  
2.  Los escenarios 
	  
Los participantes colocaron notas adhesivas sobre pizarras blancas junto a cada póster de 
los escenarios para responder a las preguntas: ¿Qué falta en este escenario, e.g., otras 
historias, ideas, aspectos, etc.? Y, qué hace este escenario más tangible? Los participantes 
también utilizaron las notas adhesivas para comentar, criticar y añadir información a las 
partes diferentes de los pósteres de los escenarios - descripciones de escenarios, las 
páginas de los periódicos, y las historias “el día en la vida de...” Los escenarios que 
fueron presentados en el taller se desarrollaron a lo largo de un año, y se basan en un 
extenso análisis de la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste (Kuzdas et al. 2012) y sigue una 
método se llama la construcción formalizada de escenarios  (Wiek et al. 2009; Wiek y 
Walter 2009). Los escenarios fueron construidos inicialmente en colaboración con la 
Comisión para las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital y otras partes interesadas de la región antes 
de ser presentados en el taller. Para más detalles sobre cómo inicialmente se construyeron 
los escenarios (o si querría recibir los originales posters de los escenarios) por favor 
mande un correo electrónico a: ckuzdas@asu.edu y mariel_yglesias@yahoo.es.  
 
El objetivo de esta primera actividad en el taller era desafiar a los participantes para 
considerar y pensar lo que el futuro de la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste puede ser y 
Foto Arriba: Miembros de varias ASADAs discuten uno de 
los escenarios de gobernanza en el taller 
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cómo los tipos diferentes de gobernanza pueden resultar en futuros diferentes en la 
región.  Esta actividad sentó las bases para la identificación de objetivos para la 
gobernanza de agua en la región. Los escenarios se presentan a continuación. 
 
*** Los siguientes escenarios son descripciones de estados futuros alternativos en el año 
2037 - no son predicciones. En su conjunto los escenarios ofrecen una serie de opciones 
distintas de lo que el futuro pueda ser. El objetivo de estos escenarios es apoyar los 
procesos de planificación para la gobernanza de agua sostenible en Guanacaste e 
identificar - e iniciar las deliberaciones sobre - lo que la gente en Guanacaste quiere en el 
futuro y lo que la gente en Guanacaste no quiere que en el futuro *** 
	  
Escenario #1: Mandato para prepararse para la escasez de agua – año 2037 
Tema de Escenario #1: Cautela 
Gobernanza centralizada de agua y mitigación de arriba abajo 
 
Contexto Guanacasteco (Escenario 1): En 
los últimos 20 años, el gobierno ha 
enfatizado una diversificación económica 
muy controlada. Además se ha dado una 
agilización de la gestión de los recursos 
públicos como una estrategia para mitigar la escasez de agua prevista. Las organizaciones 
regionales y locales en el sector del agua, tales como las comisiones de cuencas y las 
ASADAs, se han unido en un esfuerzo para reducir la duplicación de responsabilidades y 
aumentar la eficiencia y control de gestión . Ahora el gobierno centra sus inversiones y 
estímulos económicos en fincas pequeñas y medianas, lo que ha provocado que muchas 
fincas grandes multinacionales salgan. Esta tendencia ha disminuido las hectáreas de 
riego totales en la región, y permitió que 
la calidad del agua se mantenga alta. Las 
decisiones de agua a veces involucran a 
los sectores fuera del gobierno. A veces 
hay participación de los ciudadanos y de 
los grupos comunitarios, y las decisiones 
a veces implican sectores fuera del 
gobierno. A pesar de la presencia dominante del sector público en todos los aspectos de 
los recursos naturales (incluso en la vida), hay un sentir que el sector público está 
trabajando por el bien colectivo.  No hay escasez de agua suficiente para probar los 
mecanismos de resolución de disputas de agua, pero la mayoría de la gente ya no 
considera la mitigación de conflictos del agua una prioridad. La reforma del agua sigue 
“Este (Escenario 1) no es un scenario 
deseable- ya hay suficiente burocracia 
en la gobernanza nacional de agua – 
Comentario de un participante del taller	  
“Es difícil pensar cómo un gobierno tan 
centralizado (como el Escenario 1) 
podría beneficiar comunidades locales” 
– Comentario de un participante del 
taller	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siendo un tópico de discusión, sin embargo la modificación de las políticas de agua puede 
ser un proceso lento si se inicia por los grupos fuera del sector público. 
La gobernanza de agua en Nicoya (Escenario 1) : Las ASADAs en la zona se han 
unificado bajo la estrecha supervisión de la oficina regional de AyA, que está dirigida por 
la Oficina del Valle Central de AyA. Todas las actividades locales de manejo del agua 
deben ser aprobadas por la oficina regional, quien debe obtener la aprobación de la 
oficina nacional si la actividad propuesta no está incluida en el ámbito legal de trabajo. 
La acción de trabajo dice - en detalle muy exacto - las pocas decisiones que los 
administradores locales y regionales de recursos naturales pueden tomar con autonomía. 
Los administradores del agua están entrenados , comenzando después de la escuela, en un 
programa especializado en San José. Los administradores de agua son capacitados, 
comenzando después de la escuela secundaria, en un programa especializado en San José. 
Después del programa, se asignan posiciones en el país en base de las necesidades de la 
agencia. La agricultura local se está yendo bien. Muchas turistas todavía pasan por la 
zona. Ha cambiado poco el uso de la tierra alrededor de Nicoya. La competencia por el 
agua ha permanecido mayormente baja. Sin embargo, algunos miembros de la comunidad 
son escépticos en cuanto a la capacidad y la voluntad del siempre-presente sector público 
para mantener la paz si la escasez de agua se convierte de nuevo en un problema. El 
sector público parece estar haciendo esfuerzos para asegurar que Nicoyanos tengan sus 
necesidades satisfechas.  
Escenario #2: Acuerdos a puerta cerrada – año 2037 
Tema de Escenario #2: Engaño 
Manejo de agua sin rendición de cuentas por parte de alianzas de intereses 
 
Contexto Guanacaste (Escenario 2 ) : Los 
primeros 50 años del estado moderno 
costarricense se caracterizaron por la 
democracia abierta, apoyo social fuerte, y 
alta confianza en el gobierno. Sin 
embargo, los próximos 50 años son más 
conocidos por acuerdos secretos entre las alianzas de gobierno, inversionistas y 
desarrolladores y una completa desconexión entre el liderazgo nacional, la política y las 
agencias con las comunidades locales, gobiernos locales,  y gerentes regionales de 
recursos. El mercado inmobiliario en Guanacaste está floreciendo’ y el turismo 
residencial es un gran parte de la producción económica en la región. La agricultura ya no 
es de gran importancia política en la región. Una buena parte de la tierra de riego está 
vacante y se está convirtiendo de nuevo en bosques secos y sabanas, lo que en realidad 
aumenta el atractivo de la región para los desarrolladores inmobiliarios y los 
“Este escenario (Escenario 2) ya parece 
real – es algo para evitar” – Comentario 
de un participante del taller	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inversionistas. Las protestas sobre la distribución de agua son comunes en las 
comunidades de Guanacaste. La zona costera está atravesada por tuberías que transportan 
agua a varios desarrollos. Cuando una fuente de agua se va, más tubos se construyen, a 
menudo bajo el manto de la oscuridad para evitar ser detectados por las comunidades 
preocupadas 
La gobernanza de agua en Nicoya 
(Escenario 2) : Los intentos de reforma de 
la política del agua pasan a veces, pero las 
nuevas iniciativas siempre son bloqueadas 
por los intereses más poderosos. Hace 10 
años la Comisión para el Manejo de 
Cuencas las Potrero-Caimital era líder abogando por la reforma. Pero esos intentos de 
reforma fueron infructuosos.  Miembros de la comunidad se han involucrado cada vez 
más con el apoyo a las comunidades que ilegalmente desvían el agua de los grandes 
proyectos de desarrollo. Con el fin de evitar la quiebra, ASADAs en la zona se han 
integrado con otros grupos comunitarios para aunar recursos y financiar proyectos de 
agua en la comunidad. Las ASADAs funcionan como "las plataformas de protesta", las 
que usan los ciudadanos para expresar insatisfacción de cómo se toman decisiones sobre 
los recursos naturales, la distribución injusta de agua, y el mal estado de la infraestructura 
de agua en las comunidades. El aumento de la cubierta forestal natural en el interior atrae 
a muchos visitantes quienes, después de observar las protestas de agua en la zona, apoyan 
a las comunidades locales con recursos personales, técnicos, y financieros para continuar 
la oposición. Los residentes están preocupados por el número creciente de los visitantes 
nacionales e internacionales que utilizan el área como una plataforma para promover sus 
propias prioridades políticas y radicales. 
 
Escenario #3: Cómo lo logró Costa Rica?! – año 2037 
Tema de Escenario #3: Innovación 
Gobernanza de agua enfatiza autonomía y coordinación 
 
Contexto Guanacaste (Escenario 3): 
Hace 20 años, uno de los más 
exhaustivos - e internacionalmente 
observados- períodos de reforma de la 
legislación medioambiental y de 
procesos de toma de decisiones ocurrió en Costa Rica. Líderes guanacastecos, como la 
Comisión Potrero-Caimital, se acreditan por propulsar la reforma. La autoridad para 
regular los recursos hídricos en el país se distribuyó gradualmente entre una red de 
“Ya no puede haber más acuerdos 
secretos sobre la distribución y 
alocación de agua en Guanacaste ” – 
Comentario de un participante del taller	  
“Este es el escenario (Escenario 3) por 
el que deberíamos estar trabajando” – 
Comentarios de un participante del taller	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nuevas organizaciones regionales de manejo del agua que se llaman "Institutos 
Regionales para la Sostenibilidad del 
Agua (IRSA), a través de enmiendas 
constitucionales. Un sistema nuevo y 
eficaz de controles y equilibrios, la 
responsabilidad, y la coordinación entre 
los organismos, empresas y grupos 
comunitarios eliminó la corrupción y los 
acuerdos secretos que eran comunes en los principios del siglo. La transparencia en la 
toma de decisiones en el sector de agua en Guanacaste es muy conocida. Expertos de 
todo el mundo vienen a observar y tomar lecciones para sus países. Sin embargo, la 
reforma llegó con algún costo: la economía luchaba inicialmente después de la reforma, 
las ventas internacionales de inmobiliario cayeron y las grandes empresas agrícolas 
multinacionales pasaron a otros países.  Capacitar a nuevos gerentes regionales de agua y 
ASADAs locales era costoso, por lo menos inicialmente. Pero las reformas valieron la 
pena. Recientemente el cambio climático ha obligado a tomar decisiones difíciles con 
respecto a las prioridades de desarrollo. Sin embargo tener varios centros del manejo de 
agua y difundir el poder de dirigir recursos a través de los grupos locales y regionales, ha 
dado lugar a decisiones que se toman en forma conjunta en todos los sectores y de una 
manera abierta. La agricultura y el desarrollo responsable del turismo siguen ocurriendo. 
Los Guanacastecos son ciudadanos sanos, felices y valorados ya que tienen poder real 
para manejar sus recursos. 
 
La gobernanza de agua en Nicoya (Escenario 3) : Después del período de la reforma del 
agua, la Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital fue elegida para 
dirigir y desarrollar el Instituto Regional para la Sostenibilidad del Agua (IRSA) para 
Guanacaste.  Aunque cada IRSA en Costa Rica es libre de administrar ASADAs locales 
en su región como mejor le parezca, el IRSA en Guanacaste eligió dar a las ASADAS 
autonomía e invertir en recursos y capacitación para ellas. Todos los ciudadanos tienen 
acceso a cantidades suficientes de agua limpia.  Hay un alto nivel de conocimientos sobre 
los abastecimientos y los usos de agua en la región y las prioridades del desarrollo y el 
uso de agua han sido negociadas públicamente. Mientras los bosques que están en las 
áreas protegidas son saludables, algunas áreas alrededor de Nicoya están empezando 
parecerse a sabanas o bosques templados más debido a las condiciones climáticas que 
están cambiando. Sin embargo los ciudadanos - involucrados y empoderados - se reúnen 
regularmente con las agencias y la industria para discutir el futuro de la zona y sus 
ecosistemas. Los agricultores tienen acceso fácil a la ciencia y a mejores prácticas, los 
líderes locales a menudo son consultados por los políticos electos, y los representantes de 
desarrolladoras consultan primero con líderes locales y regionales para considerar nuevos 
“La reconciliación y recuperación de la 
confianza entre comunidades y agencias 
será importante para que este escenario 
ocurra” – Comentario de un participante 
del taller	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proyectos. Los Nicoyanos son muy saludables, felices, dispuestos a colaborar con otros, y 
están seguros que superarán cualquier desafío de agua o sostenibilidad que lleva el futuro.  
 
Escenario #4: Prosperidad económica y riesgo ambiental - 2037 
Tema de Escenario #4: Apatía 
La gobernanza de agua se mantiene fuera del camino del desarrollo económico 
 
Contexto Guanacaste (Escenario 4) : ha 
estado siguiendo un modelo de 
competitividad económica, mercados 
abiertos, y el desarrollo con una 
velocidad vertiginosa durante más de 
veinte años. Los Guanacastecos son uno 
de los grupos más prósperos 
económicamente y ricos en Centroamérica. Las voces y los líderes de los movimientos 
ambientalistas viejos desaparecieron hace 10 años. La economía nacional disfruta alto 
crecimiento durante un período de tiempo sin precedentes. Acuerdos a puertas cerradas, 
la corrupción y la destrucción ambiental ilegal ya no son un problema como lo fueron en 
el cambio del siglo. Sin embargo, algunos dicen que el largo período de prosperidad 
económica en Guanacaste ha causado que los ciudadanos sean apáticos a los problemas 
del agua y del medio ambiente. Existen pocos ecosistemas en sus estados naturales en la 
región, pero los residentes son felices. El manejo del agua en Guanacaste principalmente 
funciona porque es un catalizador para el desarrollo económico. Las decisiones sobre los 
recursos hídricos se hacen sin la participación de los ciudadanos o las partes interesadas. 
Sin embargo, los administradores de agua argumentan que no hay suficiente interés de los 
ciudadanos para justificar la transparencia o la participación. Los administradores del 
agua dicen que si nadie está hablando sobre agua, significa entonces que ellos están 
haciendo su trabajo. Simplemente hay que mantener los grifos funcionando. 
 
La gobernanza de agua en Nicoya 
(Escenario 4) : Un sistema fue elaborado y 
diseñado para que  las tuberías de agua y 
las plantas de tratamiento estén ocultos 
desde la vista detrás de los cerros que 
rodean la comunidad de Nicoya. El sistema complejo de la infraestructura de agua 
protege a la mayoría de los ciudadanos de las consecuencias de las pocas regulaciones y  
rápido crecimiento económico. Hace diez años, muchas ASADAs ya no eran capaces 
manejar las necesidades de la infraestructura de agua cada vez más sofisticadas en la zona 
de Nicoya. La sucursal de AyA en Guanacaste asumió el control de toda la 
“Poca educación ambiental y conciencia 
pueden ser la causa de que este 
escenario suceda” – Comentario de un 
participante del taller	  
“¿Cómo “domesticaron” a las 
comunidades de este? No es un scenario 
deseable” – Comentario de un 
participante del taller	  
	   383 
infraestructura importante de agua en la zona.  Las ASADAs se enfocan en dirigir el agua 
a zonas menos importantes por la economía, que se encuentran en las tierras altas en la 
Península. Los bosques son pocos y distantes entre sí. El agua es cada vez más costosa de 
tratar, aunque la mayoría de los residentes tienen acceso regular al agua potable. Pocos 
residentes se recrean en el aire libre o están interesados en las áreas naturales. Mientras 
que muchos ciudadanos en los sectores de los servicios, la agricultura y profesionales son 
relativamente ricos, no todos se han beneficiado económicamente de la máquina 
económica de Guanacaste. Cómo el agua llega a Nicoya, o de dónde viene, es un misterio 
para los residentes. Sin embargo, para la mayoría de los residentes la vida es fácil. 
 
Escenario #5: El regreso del latifundio – año 2037 
Tema de Escenario #5: Desconexión 
La gobernanza fragmentada de agua permite el ascenso de una élite 
 
Contexto Guanacaste (Escenario 5): 
Muchas de las grandes haciendas y sus 
propietarios poderosos se encuentran en 
las tierras bajas. El estado era incapaz de 
cumplir con las obligaciones sociales, 
para mediar en conflictos por el agua, o 
para responder adecuadamente a las 
necesidades de los ciudadanos. Con un estado debilitado y un sistema electoral 
representativo superficial, los grandes productores agrícolas fueron capaces de aumentar 
considerablemente sus tenencias y recursos. Un gobierno fragmentado y los propietarios 
de élites muy poderosas en Guanacaste alarmaron a los inversionistas extranjeros y 
desarrolladores, que finalmente sacaron sus inversiones en la región. El turismo se ha 
reducido al mínimo. Sin competencia por el abandono del turismo, los grandes 
propietarios de tierra en Guanacaste pueden obtener grandes asignaciones de agua. AyA 
y SENARA ahora son organizaciones públicas-privadas, y muchas élites Guanacastecas 
tienen participación mayoritaria en ellas. 
La infraestructura está mal mantenida 
fuera  del centro de las tierras bajas de 
Guanacaste. Algunos dicen que el clima 
es mucho más seco de lo normal, pero 
nadie ha estudiado los sistemas de agua o 
los ecosistemas de la región en mucho tiempo. 
 
La gobernanza de agua en Nicoya (Escenario 5): Las tierras altas alrededor de Nicoya son 
un bastión de la oposición de los pequeños agricultores. ASADAs alrededor de Nicoya 
“Este escenario (escenario 5) debería 
discutir cómo la reforma de agua se 
discute de forma superficial en la 
Asamblea – como hoy. No podemos 
permitir que este escenario ocurra” – 
Comentario de un participante del taller	  
“El latinfundio actual no es de tierra;  
es sobre poder. Todavpia existe 
disfrazado en el Capitolio” – 
Comentario de uno de los participantes 
del taller	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están completamente fragmentadas del AyA. Las redes de distribución de agua que 
pertenecen a las ASADAs son un mosaico de tubos y bombas que se mantienen lo mejor 
que se puede. Numerosas peticiones han sido enviados a San José en un intento de llamar 
la atención de la desigualdad de la distribución del agua en Guanacaste. Pero el sistema 
del manejo de agua está demasiado fragmentado para sean tomadas acciones 
significativas. Muchas de las élites de tierra en Guanacaste tienen grandes inversiones en 
el sector público. Por lo tanto, los Nicoyanos dudan de que, incluso si las acciones o 
políticas nuevas se tomen, resolverían efectivamente los problemas del agua en la zona.  
Los Comentarios de los Participantes sobre los Escenarios 
 
La portada de periódico en el escenario # 1 contó la historia de una nueva torre de la 
oficina central para la apertura de la gestión del agua en el Capitolio. El nuevo edificio 
representa el último paso en la centralización del régimen futuro de la gobernanza del 
agua. Las historias sub-título contaron, por ejemplo, que un gran número de 
guanacastecos confían en el gobierno. Los participantes en el taller general comentó que, 
a pesar de este escenario parecía posible, era difícil de imaginar, debido a las recientes 
tendencias históricas de la desconexión entre las comunidades y los organismos 
nacionales. Un sistema de gobierno centralizado pero benevolente resultó ser sospechoso  
para los participantes y debe ser evitado. 
 
El escenario # 2 y el escenario # 5 representaron gran parte de la discusión entre los 
participantes. Ambos escenarios extienden acontecimientos históricos y actuales 
importantes hacia el futuro. Los titulares de los periódicos en el escenario # 2 contaban la 
historia de ASADAs en la región de Nicoya que organizan grandes protestas por la 
distribución del agua, lo que recuerda a muchos conflictos recientes, como Sardinal. En 
general los participantes comentaron que esta situación parecía muy real. El titular de un 
periódico de escenario # 5 habló de un imperio en expansión de caña de azúcar en las 
tierras bajas de Guanacaste y las desigualdades sociales crecientes que resultan de 
distribuciones de agua injustas. Los participantes comentaron que, si bien los resultados 
de este escenario fueron extremas, la política, la corrupción y la falta de conexión en el 
régimen de gobierno de hoy era una reminiscencia de la esfera política. No todos los 
participantes se sentían cómodos con escenario # 2, pero algunos lo encontraron 
identificable (basado en sus experiencias) y algunos consideraban que era retratar de 
cerca el estado actual de la gobernanza del agua en Guanacaste. Todos los participantes 
coincidieron en que tanto escenario # 2 y # 5 debían ser evitados. 
El escenario # 3 obtuvo respuestas positivas de los participantes. El título cuenta la 
historia de los líderes internacionales que vienen a Guanacaste para observar y tomar 
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lecciones de su modelo bien coordinado y de colaboración en la gobernabilidad del agua. 
Muchos de los participantes se mostraron interesados en la reconciliación y la 
construcción de confianza entre las comunidades y los organismos gubernamentales que 
se requieren en este escenario. Otros participantes se mostraron interesados en ver más 
detalles de un régimen de gobierno, tales como la definición de los procesos de toma de 
decisiones y la disposición de cómo funciona y quiénes están involucrados en qué 
momento. 
En general los participantes consideraron que el escenario # 4 tenía falta de información 
con respecto al lugar de donde el agua necesaria para el desarrollo del escenario vendría. 
El titular de primera plana en el Escenario # 4 contó la historia de tensión entre las 
agencias de agua que sugirieron reducir el consumo de agua y de los intereses 
comerciales de la región. Históricamente, las comunidades guanacastecas han sido 
ambientalmente activsa y bien organizadas. Los participantes expresaron su interés en ver 
más detalles acerca de la "domesticación" de estas comunidades en el escenario, 
específicamente se produjo el cambio de ser activos para luego volverse “domesticados”. 
En la siguiente tabla se destacan algunos de los comentarios de los participantes para 
cada uno de los cinco escenarios: 
Escenario #1 Escenario #2 Escenario #3 Escenario #4 Escenario #5 
Específicamente 
aborda el nivel de 
motivación de las 
comunidades 
Qué pasaría con 
los precios de la 
comida sin 
agricultura 
irrigada?  
Un buen escenario 
–pero necesita más 
detalles de cómo las 
comunidades están 
empoderadas   
Abordar de dónde 
viene el agua de 
los desarrollos 
Agregar una 
historia de un 
productor que 
encuentra su pozo 
seco a causa de 
una finca 
industrial  
Cómo puede una 
gobernanza muy 
centralizada 
corrsponder a las 
necesidades de 
diferentes zonas?  
Un escenario por 
evitar- 
necesitamos 
evitar que el 
sector privado 
domine  el 
manejo de agua  
Reconciliación y 
recuperación de la 
confianza entre 
comunidades y 
agencias 
Hablar de las 
diferencias de 
clases sociales  
Hablar de cómo 
este escenario 
puede ser el 
resultado de la 
manera en que se 
maneja la política 
hoy 
El gobierno 
actual no tendría 
que cambiar tanto 
para ser tan 
centralizado y no 
ser corrupto 
La actual falta de 
claridad sobre los 
objetivos de 
desarrollo 
contribuye a que 
nos acerquemos a 
este escenario 
Más descripción del 
proceso de toma de 
decisiones, quién 
está involucrado y 
cómo funciona 
Describir más 
cómo las 
comunidades 
fueron 
“domesticadas” en 
este escenario 
La finca grande de 
este escenario 
debería pertenecer 
a Pedro Arias 
(hermano del ex-
presidente Oscar 
Arias) 
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Este escenario 
parece fuera de 
contacto con la 
realidad–  las 
agencias a 
menudo no 
apoyan a las 
comunidades 
Conversar sobre 
la historia de un 
hogar en este 
escenario, cómo 
obtienen su agua? 
Explicar sus 
dificultades 
Más detalles en la 
creación de una 
base sostenible para 
la región 
Agregar una 
historia en el 
periódico de cómo 
el agua es un 
negocio 
Debemos mejorar 
nuestros esfuerzos 
para que esto no 
suceda 
Cómo utiliza la 
gente el agua en 
este escenario? 
Ser #1 en 
democracia debe 
ser un objetivo 
explícito   
Hablar se cómo la 
poca educación se 
relaciona con un 
futiro como este 
	  
	  
3.  Evaluación de los Escenarios 
	  
Después de revisar los escenarios, los participantes se dividieron en 7 grupos para evaluar 
la forma "sostenible" y deseable de cada escenario. Esta actividad fue diseñada para 
permitir a los participantes la oportunidad de analizar cada situación en un entorno con 
otros profesionales de diferentes sectores. El objetivo de esta actividad era utilizar los 
escenarios para identificar un conjunto de objetivos para la gestión del agua en la región, 
y para iniciar las discusiones sobre lo que un futuro sostenible para la gobernanza del 
agua en Guanacaste se vería y cómo se vería futuro insostenible de Guanacaste. 
 
Los participantes recibieron primero un conjunto de 15 indicadores (que corresponden a 
los principios de la gobernanza sostenible del agua - ver Anexo 1) para clasificar por 
orden de importancia para el logro de la gobernabilidad sostenible del agua en la región. 
Los participantes del taller coincidieron en cinco prioridades principales para lograr la 
sustentabilidad del agua en la región: la gobernanza debe estar bien coordinado entre los 
diferentes actores locales y regionales, las decisiones deben tomarse en arenas 
transparentes y abiertas, las políticas deben ser modificables según el cambio de las 
necesidades humanas y las condiciones ambientales, los recursos de agua subterránea 
deben asegurarse dentro de los límites naturales, y se necesitan compromisos de parte de 
organizaciones regionales a escala de cuenca. Estas prioridades se consideraron clave 
para lograr un modelo sostenible de gestión del agua en Guanacaste que apoye a las 
comunidades saludables, distribuya el agua con justicia, y ayuda a asegurar la integridad 
de los ecosistemas y la igualdad de oportunidades económicas. 
La posición final de los indicadores está abajo. El promedio (la columna en el extremo 
derecho) es la suma de la posición de cada uno de los 46 participantes, luego se divide 
por el número de participantes. Valores más bajos (más cerca de ser el número 1) indica 
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mayor importancia para lograr una gobernanza sostenible del agua en Guanacaste de 
acuerdo con los participantes del taller. 
 
Indicador Posición Promedio 
La coordinación de la gestión y la planificación de los recursos hídricos #1 3.44 
La apertura y la transparencia de la toma de decisiones para los recursos 
hídricos #2 4.00 
Balanza de extracción de aguas subterráneas y la recarga #3 4.23 
La facilidad de modificar las políticas de agua y el proceso de 
planificación para satisfacer las necesidades y las prioridades que 
cambian #4 5.64 
La efectividad y la pertinencia de la escala de cuenca y la escala regional 
para la gobernanza de agua #5 6.14 
Condición del hábitat terrestre (% de cobertura forestal nativa) #6 7.19 
Condición del hábitat acuático y las especies acuáticas #7 8.06 
Los riesgos para la calidad del agua #8 8.26 
La distribución de los beneficios, costos, y riesgos entre de los partes 
interesadas #9 8.65 
Las decisiones se toman basado en el largo plazo (20+ años) #10 9.08 
La eficiencia de todas de las tipas de infraestructura de agua #10 9.08 
Mezcla de fincas pequeñas y grandes (industrial) #12 10.76 
Hectáreas de la agricultura de riego #13 10.88 
Una economía basada en turismo #14 12.40 
El mercado del inmobiliario turístico #15 12.71 
 
Luego, los participantes deliberaron en grupos sobre los valores actuales y los deseados 
(sostenibles) para cada uno de los 15 indicadores. El objetivo de este ejercicio era 
facilitar el debate entre los diferentes sectores y grupos de interés sobre lo que los 
objetivos que deben ser priorizados para la gobernabilidad sostenible del agua en 
Guanacaste, qué tan cerca o lejos está la gobernabilidad del agua de alcanzar esos 
objetivos, y para comenzar las discusiones sobre qué tan deseable era cada uno de los 
escenarios. 
 
A continuación hemos resumido lo que los participantes ven como "sostenible" o el valor 
deseable (o nivel) de cada uno de los 15 indicadores:  
 
Indicador  Objetivo sostenible 
#1 - La coordinación de la gestión y la planificación de los 
recursos hídricos Policéntrica 
#2 - La apertura y la transparencia de la toma de decisiones 
para los recursos hídricos Abierto 
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#3 - Balanza de extracción de aguas subterráneas y la recarga Recarga excede la extracción 
#4 - La facilidad de modificar las políticas de agua y el 
proceso de planificación para satisfacer las necesidades y las 
prioridades que cambian Bastante fácil 
#5 - La efectividad y la pertinencia de la escala de cuenca y la 
escala regional para la gobernanza de agua Efectivo 
#6 - Condición del hábitat terrestre (% de cobertura forestal 
nativa) Alrededor del 50% 
#7 - Condición del hábitat acuático y las especies acuáticas Saludables o Muy Saludables 
#8 - Los riesgos para la calidad del agua Bajo riesgo 
#9 - La distribución de los beneficios, costos, y riesgos entre 
de los partes interesadas Justa 
#10 - Las decisiones se toman basado en el largo plazo (20+ 
años) Muchas decisiones 
#11 - La eficiencia de todas de las tipas de infraestructura de 
agua Muy eficiente / mínimo desperdicio  
#12 - Mezcla de fincas pequeñas y grandes (industrial) 
Más fincas pequeñas que grandes/ buen 
balance 
#13 - Hectáreas de la agricultura de riego --- 
#14 - Una economía basada en turismo Importante para una economía diversa 
#15 - El mercado del inmobiliario turístico --- 
 
Hemos dejado # 13 y # 15 en blanco - el objetivo de deliberar sobre qué 'objetivos' podría 
haber para las hectáreas de riego y venta de bienes raíces era desafiar a los participantes a 
pensar en lo que el futuro podría ser si alguno de estos indicadores tuviera valores 
diferentes. Se necesitará más deliberación abierta y trabajo para definir metas para estos 
indicadores y medir su desempeño a través del tiempo. 
 
Utilizando el rango de los indicadores y las metas de sostenibilidad, el equipo de 
investigación calculó la preferencia general de cada uno de los escenarios después del 
taller. El objetivo de este cálculo fue identificar cómo los participantes del taller (en su 
conjunto) vieron cada escenario en términos de su conveniencia y sostenibilidad. Aunque 
no hubo un escenario perfecto, el Escenario # 3 obtuvo el puntaje más alto en términos de 
preferencia y la sostenibilidad. A continuación se muestra un resumen de la calificación 
de cada escenario. Cuanto mayor sea el valor el escenario fue más deseable para los 
participantes del taller en comparación con los otros escenarios (los valores oscilan entre 
0 y 1).  
 
Posición Escenario Calificación 
#1 Escenario 3: Cómo lo logró Costa Rica?! .62 
#2 Escenario 1: Mandato para prepararse para la escasez de agua .52 
#3 Escenario 4: Prosperidad económica y riesgo ambiental .29 
#4 Escenario 2: Acuerdos a puerta cerrada .22 
#5 Escenario 5: El regreso del latifundio .10 
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Con base en los análisis anteriores de la gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste, el 
equipo de investigación llevó a cabo la misma evaluación del estado actual de la 
gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste. Se utilizaron los mismos 15 indicadores y 
valores asignados de los indicadores, evaluados en la actualidad, basado en amplios 
análisis de la gobernabilidad del agua en la región. A continuación se muestra la 
calificación del estado actual (hoy) de la gobernabilidad del agua en comparación con los 
cinco escenarios: 
Estado Actual de la Gobernanza de Agua Calificación: .29 
 
La puntuación de la situación actual de la gestión del agua (0,29) pondría el actual estado 
en el medio de los cinco escenarios (el estado actual de la gobernabilidad del agua actual 
obtuvo la misma calificación (0,29) que el escenario 4). Este resultado demuestra que: 
1) Hubo algunos objetivos claros, metas de sostenibilidad y futuros hacia los que la 
gobernabilidad del agua debe trabajar (en especial algunas de esas características en 
el escenario 3, como gobernanza policéntrica, bien coordinada y toma de decisiones 
abierta para la gestión del agua); 
 
2) Había cosas claras que la gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste debe evitar - como 
esos futuros retratados en el escenario 5 o en el escenario 2; y 
 
3) El estado actual de la gestión del agua es mediocre en términos de rendimiento (con 
respecto a la gestión del agua en los escenarios) cuando se evaluó utilizando los 
mismos parámetros de evaluación que los participantes utilizan para evaluar los 
escenarios en el taller. Esto indica que hay una fuerte necesidad de implementar 
estrategias y procesos concretos de moverse activamente y deliberadamente hacia 
condiciones más deseables y sostenibles (como el escenario 3), y de manera activa y 
deliberadamente evitar las características que se encuentran en escenarios negativos 
(como los escenarios 2 y 5). 
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Foto arriba: Participantes del taller traban en grupos inicialmete para evaluar los escenarios 
 
Este tipo de evaluación puede ayudar a manejadores a identificar recursos para trabajar 
hacia ciertas metas y evitar ciertas otras cuando se regula el agua en Guanacaste. Esta 
evaluación también puede ayudar a iniciar - y ser una base - para proseguir los debates y 
colaboraciones para ayudar a la gobernabilidad del agua a movilizarse hacia un futuro 
más sostenible. Esto fue sólo un primer paso - aún queda mucho trabajo para identificar 
aún más, medir y evaluar los indicadores que los administradores del agua y otros pueden 
utilizar en Guanacaste. 
 
Lecciones claves del desarrollo y la evaluación de los escenarios:  
 
1. Estos cinco escenarios podrían ser utilizados para futuras actividades de 
planificación de base comunitaria en Guanacaste - especialmente con ASADAs 
que comparten las mismas cuencas. Estos escenarios pueden ayudar a gestores del 
agua y políticos a identificar las metas locales y fomentar la colaboración a través 
de fronteras políticas. Las comunidades y otras partes interesadas deberían 
modificar los escenarios como mejor les parezca con el tiempo. 
 
2. Hay una necesidad de una clara visión y metas en Guanacaste que se compartan 
entre ASADAs locales, gobiernos regionales, los organismos y las comunidades – 
cómo se ve el desarrollo en el futuro? Cuáles son las prioridades de uso de agua? 
La evaluación de escenario fue un comienzo, pero se necesitan más esfuerzos para 
especificar metas y objetivos para la gestión del agua en la región - y para 
monitorear cómo se están haciendo progresos hacia esas metas en el tiempo. 
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3. Deben  ser programados con mayor regularidad eventos donde los ciudadanos que 
trabajan en el sector del agua pueden reunirse y compartir experiencias. Tales 
eventos como este taller son valiosos y fomentan el aprendizaje compartido a 
través de fronteras políticas y geográficas. Se necesita liderazgo para ayudar a 
organizar estos eventos. 
 
4. Los participantes estuvieron a favor de los futuros escenarios de la gobernanza del 
agua policéntrica en Guanacaste. La gobernanza policéntrica es un tipo de 
gobierno que está bien coordinado entre las organizaciones que trabajan a escala 
local, regional y nacional. Sin embargo, el gobierno actual del agua en 
Guanacaste es fragmentado - lo que significa que hay mucho margen de mejora 
en cuanto a la coordinación. En concreto, hay una necesidad de fuertes líderes 
regionales y organizaciones regionales capaces en la Provincia. La Comisión 
Potrero-Caimital, que ahora se está expandiendo para incluir el Rio Quiriman, 
podría tratar de convertirse en un modelo de liderazgo regional para la 
gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste. Los ASADAs en la Mala Noche podrían 
considerar algún tipo de comité o de la comisión regional. 
 
 
5. Los 15 indicadores podrían ser un punto de partida para que los líderes locales y 
regionales evalúen regularmente qué tan bien va la gobernabilidad del agua en 
Guanacaste, en Nicoya, o en sus cuencas. Definición de objetivos, evaluación de 
los progresos y la aplicación de estrategias para alcanzar las metas debe ser un 
proceso continuo que está abierto a todos los interesados en la región. Nicoya 
podría ser modelo de buena gobernanza del agua para otras zonas de Guanacaste. 
 
6. Los escenarios no representan necesariamente la visión. Una visión es un 
escenario o futuro, que es el mejor de los casos, el más sostenible, el más positivo. 
Un ejercicio útil en el futuro, podría ser el desarrollo de una visión coherente para 
la gobernanza del agua en Guanacaste. Esto ayudaría aún más a las metas 
articuladas para la gobernabilidad sostenible del agua en la región. 
4.  Las Estrategias 
 
Hemos explorado diferentes opciones de cómo el futuro se podría ver (en el ejercicio para 
desarrollar los escenarios) y hemos evaluado cuáles de esos futuros son los más 
sostenibles y cuáles de los fines para la gobernanza de agua son las claves para llegar a 
un futuro sostenible. Ahora, comenzamos trabajar en la elaboración de estrategias con el 
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fin de movilizar la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste hacia estos escenarios deseables y 
evitar los escenarios negativos. 
 
Los participantes en el taller trabajaron en grupos para elaborar estrategias a base de los 5 
indicadores prioritarios de la actividad de evaluación de escenarios. Los participantes 
fueron instruidos para elaborar una estrategia que ayude a mover el indicador de su 
estado actual al estado más sostenible en el tiempo. Los cinco indicadores, sus estados 
actuales, y sus valores sostenibles (los fines) son los siguientes: 
 
Indicador  Objetivo sostenible 
#1 - La coordinación de la gestión y la planificación de los 
recursos hídricos Policéntrica 
#2 - La apertura y la transparencia de la toma de decisiones 
para los recursos hídricos Abierto 
#3 - Balanza de extracción de aguas subterráneas y la recarga Recarga excede la extracción 
#4 - La facilidad de modificar las políticas de agua y el 
proceso de planificación para satisfacer las necesidades y las 
prioridades que cambian Bastante fácil 
#5 - La efectividad y la pertinencia de la escala de cuenca y la 
escala regional para la gobernanza de agua Efectivo 
#6 - Condición del hábitat terrestre (% de cobertura forestal 
nativa) Alrededor del 50% 
#7 - Condición del hábitat acuático y las especies acuáticas Saludables o Muy Saludables 
#8 - Los riesgos para la calidad del agua Bajo riesgo 
#9 - La distribución de los beneficios, costos, y riesgos entre 
de los partes interesadas Justa 
#10 - Las decisiones se toman basado en el largo plazo (20+ 
años) Muchas decisiones 
#11 - La eficiencia de todas de las tipas de infraestructura de 
agua Muy eficiente / mínimo desperdicio  
#12 - Mezcla de fincas pequeñas y grandes (industrial) 
Más fincas pequeñas que grandes/ buen 
balance 
#13 - Hectáreas de la agricultura de riego --- 
#14 - Una economía basada en turismo Importante para una economía diversa 
#15 - El mercado del inmobiliario turístico --- 
 
El objetivo del ejercicio de crear estrategias fue explorar cómo el proceso de elaboración 
de estrategias puede funcionar en Guanacaste. La actividad fue preliminar y queda mucho 
trabajo por hacer en la elaboración de estrategias para lograr la gobernabilidad sostenible 
del agua en Guanacaste. 
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Fotos arriba: Participantes presentan y discuten sus estrategias en el taller 
 
En la página siguiente, se resumen las seis estrategias que los participantes desarrollaron 
en este parte del taller. La estructura  de las estrategias y las preguntas en la parte 
izquierda de la tabla pueden ser utilizados como un guía para elaborar otras estrategias o 
para cambiar estrategias sobre tiempo. Mande un correo electrónico a ckuzdas@asu.edu 
para recibir la plantilla que se utilizó para elaborar estrategias el taller.  
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 Estrategia #1 Estrategia #2 
¿Cuál es el nombre de 
su estrategia? 
Tomar de decisiones participativas e 
integradas (con información 
científica) 
El plan regional para el 
abastecimiento sostenible de agua 
Describa la acción(es) 
principal por tomar  
1.) Talleres técnicos y científicos para 
informar a todos los interesados en el 
proceso de toma de decisiones 2.) 
Talleres para la toma de decisiones y 
la búsqueda de acuerdos que son 
vinculantes para con el gobierno 
regional 3.) Comité eficiente para el 
mandato de establecer las prioridades 
para el gobierno 4. ) Establecer un 
presupuesto para garantizar el 
seguimiento a través de las decisiones 
participativas 5.) Mantener un sistema 
de auto-evaluación, seguimiento y 
retroalimentación de las partes 
interesadas 6.) Incorporar este tema 
en la educación formal e informal 
Recopilar y sistematizar la 
información (las extracciones; la 
cantidad de lluvia; las concesiones; la 
balanza de agua); identificar la 
información faltante; crear un 
inventario del estado de los 
suministros de agua (calidad y 
cantidad). Crear un instituto regional 
de agua para Guanacaste (el líder).  
La capacitación (para iniciar cambios 
radicales en la cultura con respecto al 
uso del agua) 
¿Quién debe ser el 
líder y ser responsable 
para tomar esta 
acción? 
Las organizaciones civiles con el 
poder para auditar y las 
organizaciones públicas y privadas 
Una versión ampliada de la CCCI 
(Las ASADAs deberían ser 
representadas). MIDEPLAN 
(Ministerio de Desarrollo y 
Planificación) 
¿Cuáles recursos 
necesitan para tomar 
esta acción 
(personales, técnicos, 
financieros, otros)? 
Financieros, técnicos, personales, y 
transporte 
Recursos humanos especializados 
que son permanentes (toma de 
decisiones, análisis de los datos, y el 
monitoreo), computadoras, equipo de 
monitoreo (estaciones 
meteorológicas, medidores de caudal 
de los ríos, y el equipo de la calidad 
de agua) 
¿Están disponibles 
estos recursos ahora? 
Sí, pero algunos de los recursos 
existentes están limitados 
Sí 
¿Si ‘sí’, quién tiene los 
recursos y cuáles 
acciones tomarían para 
obtenerlos? 
Los gobiernos locales y las 
instituciones públicas y privadas 
SENARA, AyA, MAG, ICE, 
MINAET, MEP - sector privado 
(desarrolladores, hoteles, el sector 
agrícola);  solicitar préstamos que 
pueden ser pagados con los 
impuestos / cargos agua (canon 
hídrico), el apoyo de las 
organizaciones internacionales y el 
sector privado 
¿Si ‘no’, cuales 
acciones deben ser 
tomadas – y de quién – 
para crear estos 
recursos? 
  
Ahora, está listo para 
implementar su 
estrategia ‘jalar.’  
¿Cuáles obstáculos 
espera? 
Alguna resistencia natural de las 
partes interesadas cuando las 
decisiones afectan potencialmente los 
intereses políticos y privados; la 
burocracia 
Resistencia a aplicar restricciones o 
medidas correctivas, el choque 
cultural 
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¿Cuáles acciones 
adicionales deben ser 
tomadas para superar 
los obstáculos 
mencionados  arriba? 
Informar a (por ejemplo, talleres 
educativos) las partes interesadas 
sobre los cambios necesarios para el 
desarrollo sostenible local y regional, 
con énfasis en los sacrificios y 
beneficios (‘trade-offs’) 
Incluir todos los sectores para crear 
dicho Plan, educación, campañas, 
conferencias, estudios 
 
¿Quién(es) debe tomar 
las acciones 
mencionadas arriba y 
cuáles recursos 
necesitan para ser 
exitosos? 
Los gobiernos locales por decretos, y 
la creación de un auditor autónomo 
regional que coordina y supervisa las 
acciones de la gobernanza. El auditor 
deberá no ser político 
El CCCI / MIDEPLAN; también 
tiene que haber un compromiso por 
parte de los recursos humanos, cada 
institución debe establecer las tareas 
que contribuyen a objetivos más 
grandes para la región 
	  
	  
 Estrategia #3 Estrategia #4 Estrategia #5 Estrategia #6 
¿Cuál es el 
nombre de su 
estrategia? 
Tomar de 
decisiones que 
beneficia la 
comunidad en 
general 
Apoyar la 
administración de 
las ASADAs 
La promoción de 
participación activa 
y mejorar la 
accesibilidad de los 
procesos de tomar 
decisiones para 
recursos hídricos 
El manejo integral 
de agua 
Describa la 
acción(es) 
principal para 
tomar  
Reuniones con la 
comunidad para 
informar 
decisiones de la 
gobernanza de 
agua; crear una 
nueva comisión 
que monitorea el 
uso de agua en la 
zona; obtener 
mejor equipo para 
controlar y 
monitorear niveles 
de los pozos 
 
 
Crear las 
herramientas 
apoyadas por los 
aspectos legales, 
técnicos, y 
administrativos de 
las ASADAs; crear 
un nuevo 
Ministerio de Agua 
Regional para 
Guanacaste que 
tiene la autoridad y 
la autonomía 
adecuadas para 
supervisar el 
manejo de agua en 
las zonas de 
Guanacaste 
Coordinar la 
participación de las 
partes interesadas en 
los procesos 
diferentes de la 
gobernanza de agua 
en la zona; elaborar 
planes para la 
participación de los 
sectores diferentes 
de modo que pueden 
ser informados sobre 
cambios, políticos, 
condiciones 
naturales, 
suministros de agua 
etc.  
1. Los procesos de 
coordinación; 2. 
La capacitación; 
3. Definir y 
elaborar los fines 
y los objetivos; 4. 
Crear un plan de 
trabajo – todo de 
esto es un proceso 
permanente 
¿Quién debe 
ser el líder y 
ser responsable 
para tomar esta 
acción? 
Los presidentes de 
las ASADAs y las 
juntas directivas 
de las ASADAs 
El Ministerio de 
Agua (mencionado 
arriba) 
El Comité de Agua  
(que aún se necesita 
ser creado ) incluye 
AyA, las ASADAs, 
SENARA, las 
Universidades, ICE 
y MINAET 
Una nueva 
comisión que está 
formada por los 
sectores 
involucradas en la 
gobernanza de 
agua en 
Guanacaste (el 
gobierno, las 
empresas, y las 
comunidades) 
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¿Cuáles 
recursos 
necesita para 
tomar esta 
acción 
(personales, 
técnicos, 
financieros, 
otros)? 
Recursos 
financieros, un 
electricista, y un 
fontanero  
La elaboración de 
las leyes nuevas 
para mejorar el 
sistema de manejo 
regional de las 
ASADAs y la 
estructura del 
apoyo de las 
ASADAs 
Recursos humanos – 
se necesita un 
equipo de apoyo; se 
necesitan recursos 
técnicos y 
financieros que se 
dan por todas las 
organizaciones 
involucradas 
Recursos 
humanos, 
técnicos, y 
financieros – pero 
cada organización 
necesita 
considerar 
primero cómo 
obtener estos 
recursos de sus 
propios 
presupuestos 
¿Están 
disponibles 
estos recursos 
ahora? 
Sí Sí – los recursos 
están disponibles 
de AyA, MINAET, 
y la Asamblea 
Sí Sí 
¿Si ‘sí’, quién 
tiene los 
recursos y 
cuáles acciones 
tomarían para 
obtenerlos? 
Las ASADAs en 
Guanacaste deben 
ser pagadas por los 
servicios de agua; 
también las 
ASADAs 
necesitan formas 
de pago eficientes 
 
 
Los recursos están 
definidos por ley, 
entonces 
necesitamos 
obtener los 
recursos por el 
nuevo ministerio 
de agua en 
Guanacaste 
(mencionado en las 
cajas arribas) 
Las universidades, 
AyA, SENARA, 
MINAET, 
ASADAs, 
Municipalidades, 
Comunidades, ICE.   
Necesita una nueva 
forma ágil para 
comunicar las 
necesidades de 
recursos entre las 
organizaciones y la 
obtención de 
autorizaciones para 
distribuirlos  
Los recursos 
humanos ya 
existen y están en 
cada organización 
involucrada 
¿Si ‘no’, cuales 
acciones deben 
ser tomadas – y 
de quién – para 
crear estos 
recursos? 
   No hay muchos 
recursos 
financieros, 
entonces cada 
organización tiene 
que contribuir 
Ahora, está 
listo para 
implementar su 
estrategia.  
¿Cuáles 
obstáculos 
espera? 
Gente que no paga 
a las ASADAs por 
los servicios de 
agua; y la buena 
administración de 
los recursos 
financieros en la 
parte de las 
ASADAs 
La voluntad 
política y la 
Asamblea 
Nacional  
La voluntad política; 
los compromisos de 
las partes 
interesadas; recursos 
técnicos están 
limitados ahora  
Los intereses 
especiales y 
políticos son 
obstáculos 
 
¿Cuáles 
acciones 
adicionales 
deben ser 
tomadas para 
superar los 
obstáculos 
mencionados  
Mantener el 
servicio de agua 
eficiente, buscar 
financiación con 
otras instituciones 
como IMAS; hacer 
nuevas 
asociaciones 
Las ASADAs y las 
comunidades 
pueden aplicar la 
presión política; 
continuar con los 
procesos de 
capacitación para 
aplicar mas presión  
La sensibilización 
de las partes 
involucradas; 
enfocarse en hacer 
que las partes 
interesadas se 
relacionen más con 
el problema de agua 
Segura 
participación 
ciudadana y 
procesos 
transparentes 
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arriba? en Guanacaste 
¿Quién(es) 
debe tomar las 
acciones 
mencionadas 
arriba y cuáles 
recursos 
necesitan para 
ser exitosos? 
La junta directiva 
de las ASADAs, 
líderes de las 
comunidades, 
líderes de otras 
organizaciones 
involucradas; ellos 
necesitan apoyo y  
financiamiento 
Movimiento de 
base – las 
comunidades, las 
ASADAs, grupos 
ambientales, las 
universidades 
El nuevo comité 
regional de agua 
(mencionado en las 
cajas arriba) 
La capacitación y 
los recursos 
financieros en los 
procesos 
mencionados en 
las cajas arriba; y 
también la 
infraestructura  
 
 
Lecciones claves de la Actividad de las Estrategias 
	  
1. Muchos de los recursos que se necesitan para probar e implementar las estrategias 
con éxito ya están disponibles en las comunidades de Guanacaste y en las 
organizaciones que trabajan en Guanacaste. Puede tomar un poco de la creatividad, la 
creación de asociaciones nuevas, y la utilización de conexiones en diferentes 
organizaciones y en diferentes sectores - pero muchos recursos ya están disponibles 
para el uso por administradores de recursos hídricos. En el largo plazo, más recursos 
técnicos, financieros y de personal se necesitarán. Con el aumento de la coordinación 
y la colaboración entre la gobernanza local y regional de agua en Guanacaste – los 
administradores locales pueden estar en una posición para asegurar estos recursos de 
los organismos nacionales en San José, en un futuro. 
 
2. Hubo un fuerte consenso entre los participantes durante la actividad de estrategias que 
había una falta de un fuerte liderazgo regional y una falta de la organización social a 
nivel regional. Una mejor coordinación y organización de la gobernanza del agua 
regional será un esfuerzo importante para una eficiente y buena gobernanza de agua 
en el futuro.  Muchos de los participantes estuvieron de acuerdo que necesitan una 
nueva organización regional para la gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste. Será 
importante que cualquier nueva institución regional tenga la autoridad para aplicar y 
hacer cumplir las leyes y reglamentos. Cómo construir esa institución sobre tiempo - 
podría ser un objeto de deliberaciones futuras por la gobernanza de agua Guanacaste.  
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3. También hubo consenso en cuanto de la falta de conexión entre la gobernanza de 
agua en la región de Guanacaste y la gobernanza de agua en la escala nacional, y que 
esta desconexión hace que el logro de una buena gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste 
sea un desafío. Las estrategias claves en el futuro se necesitarán para hacer frente a 
cómo Guanacaste puede accesar e involucrarse en la toma de decisiones sobre los 
recursos hídricos a nivel nacional. Dichas estrategias y esfuerzos deberán ir más allá 
de la retórica política e ir hacia el diálogo constructivo y procesos abiertos entre los 
líderes a nivel nacional y Guanacaste. 
 
4. Las estrategias deben ser monitoreados y 'probadas' para tener éxito. Debe haber 
reuniones regulares y eventos (por ejemplo, un taller anual) que ofrecen a los 
participantes información sobre cómo está sucediendo la implementación de las 
estrategias, lo que ha funcionado, y lo qué no ha funcionado, etc.  La implementación 
de las estrategias, la evaluación de las estrategias, y su cambio sobre tiempo para 
satisfacer condiciones cambiantes serán procesos importantes que ayudan a avanzar la 
gobernanza de agua en Guanacaste.  
 
 
5.  Un plan de acción 
	  
**Este sección fue publicada originalmente por Kuzdas et al. (2013).  Haga clic el link 
en Las Referencias para leer el original (en español y ingles)**  
 
Después del taller, el equipo de investigación y los socios de la Comisión para el Manejo 
de las Cuencas Potrero-Caimital sintetizaron el siguiente plan de acción sistemático que 
incorpora las estrategias desarrolladas por los participantes del taller y los conocimientos 
obtenidos a partir de las discusiones del grupo que siguieron a cada presentación de la 
estrategia. El Plan de Acción identifica cuatro elementos de acción, las barreras 
potenciales y las formas de superar esas barreras. 
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Foto arriba: La coordinadora del proyecto Mariel Yglesias habla por el radio en Nicoya durante 
el Día Mundial de Agua (22 de Marzo 2013) sobre el plan de acción presentado a continuación 
abajo. El equipo de proyecto coleccionó firmas durante el Día Mundial de Agua y luego mandó 
el plan y las firmas a los políticos y tomadores de decisión nacionales. Para obtener una copia 
de lo que fue mandado, escriba un correo electrónico a ckuzdas@asu.edu y 
mariel_yglesias@yahoo.es.  
 
(1) La inversión en el capital humano alrededor de la gobernabilidad del agua. El 
progreso hacia la gestión del agua sostenible y eficaz depende de la inversión en recursos 
humanos. Hay por lo menos dos oportunidades de inversión en el aspecto humano de la 
gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste. Equipo de comunicaciones: La coordinación 
requiere una comunicación efectiva. Muchas ASADAs carecen de equipos de 
comunicación básica en Guanacaste. La gobernabilidad del agua en Guanacaste sería 
muy diferente si cada ASADA pudiera contactar (y ser contactada) a través de correo 
electrónico, teléfono, o medios de comunicación social. El liderazgo nacional debe 
considerar la inversión en equipos de comunicación para ASADAs en Guanacaste. 
Espacios de cooperación: La coordinación requiere una cooperación efectiva y la 
cooperación efectiva requiere relaciones profesionales y de trabajo saludables. El taller 
que se realizó podría ser replicado por menos de $ 1,000. El costo podría ser dividido 
entre las organizaciones participantes y llevarse a cabo anualmente por los actores 
regionales y la comunidad. El evento podría ayudar a los participantes a perfeccionar las 
estrategias de comunicación y la cooperación,  informar sobre la implementación de la 
estrategia, y solidificar las relaciones de trabajo. 
Ciertamente el uso de algunos equipos de comunicaciones, en particular Internet, correo 
electrónico y redes sociales puede ser un reto para el personal de la ASADA que no está 
acostumbrado a ello. Pero la comunicación efectiva es un importante precursor de nuevos 
espacios de cooperación. 
Un inicio para abordar las barreras de comunicación puede ser, por ejemplo, el uso de 
pasantes para la oficina / asistentes profesionales para las ASADAs mientras que el 
nuevo equipo de comunicaciones se integra en las prácticas de gestión. Los pasantes 
podrían aprender valiosas habilidades profesionales, así como ciencia, y quizás también 
ganar créditos de clase. Con el tiempo estas prácticas pueden convertirse en 
oportunidades de aprendizaje altamente competitivas y deseadas por los ciudadanos 
jóvenes. Hasta que una plataforma específica haya sido institucionalizada para el manejo 
de agua en la región, la nueva plataforma de coordinación del sector público en Nicoya, 
liderada por la oficina del alcalde, podría funcionar como un espacio de cooperación para 
este sector. 
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(2) La inversión en equipos de monitoreo de pequeña escala. A pesar de que discutir y 
negociar con eficacia las necesidades de agua es fundamental para la cooperación a 
escala de la cuenca en Guanacaste, esto es muy difícil de hacer sin saber cuánta agua va 
adónde y con qué propósito. El liderazgo nacional y regional debe financiar y distribuir 
medidores de agua para ASADAs y abiertamente compartir información con la 
comunidad y los líderes regionales sobre la cantidad de agua que se está destinado al 
turismo y la agricultura. 
Un obstáculo fundamental es probablemente una débil voluntad política en las 
organizaciones nacionales para financiar los equipos de monitoreo de la gestión del agua 
a pequeña escala en las zonas rurales. El intercambio abierto de información del uso del 
agua con comunidades puede también ser visto como un riesgo político a la luz de los 
recientes conflictos entre los grandes usuarios del agua y de las comunidades. Sin 
embargo, una voz unificada de ASADAs sería políticamente difícil de ignorar. 
Inicialmente, para superar los obstáculos relacionados con la falta de voluntad política, 
las oficinas regionales a menudo tienen equipos que están disponibles para uso 
compartido. Asimismo, las ASADAs dentro de una cuenca o sub-cuenca podrían juntar 
recursos para comprar medidores de agua compartidos. Datos sobre el uso del agua para 
el turismo a gran escala y la agricultura existen, pero no en un solo lugar. Compartir esta 
información en tiempo real requeriría que las ASADAs tengan acceso a una base de datos 
abierta y a Internet. Para ayudar a sufragar la inversión en infraestructura de 
comunicaciones, un grupo de trabajo regional podría ayudar a localizar nuevas 
oportunidades de ingresos, como reestructuración de los impuestos a nivel municipal o  
penas más severas para las personas que no pagan las facturas de agua. 
(3) Compromiso legal para la planificación de recursos hídricos a escala de cuenca. Si la 
gente en Guanacaste gobierna sus recursos hídricos de manera sostenible, deben tener el 
respaldo legal y la autoridad para hacerlo. El liderazgo nacional debe embarcarse en un 
proceso transparente que involucre explícitamente a líderes del sector del agua en 
Guanacaste con el fin de delinear más autoridad y recursos para los gestores del agua a 
escala regional y de cuenca. 
Un cambio de leyes a escala nacional con frecuencia requiere tratar con corrupción, la 
influencia de poderosos grupos de interés, y un papeleo burocrático significativo. 
Asimismo, delinear autoridad o figuras de poder a escala cuenca puede parecer una 
amenaza para aquellos que se benefician políticamente o económicamente de gestión 
débil nivel de cuenca. 
Las municipalidades, muchas veces aliadas con ASADAs y grupos comunitarios, podrían 
modificar el objetivo y el proceso de ejecución de los planes reguladores regionales que 
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ya están operando y someterlos a actualizaciones periódicas. Tales acciones podrían 
ayudar a evitar los obstáculos relacionados con la burocracia a nivel nacional y poderosos 
intereses políticos. Con algunas adaptaciones legales, estos planes podrían utilizarse para 
comenzar a sentar las bases iniciales para la planificación de los recursos hídricos a 
escala de cuenca. Aliados nacionales, como el Programa de Gestión Integral del Recurso 
Hídrico, han estado presionando para la planificación a escala de cuenca en Costa Rica y 
podrían ser llamados a apoyar estos esfuerzos en Guanacaste. 
(4) La inversión en un proyecto piloto que incorpora los tres puntos ya mencionados en 
Nicoya. Un proyecto piloto en Nicoya sería barato y proporcionaría información valiosa 
sobre la implementación exitosa de estas acciones en Guanacaste. 
Sin embargo, un proyecto piloto que se enfrentaría a ciertas barreras de implementación. 
La incertidumbre acerca de la capacidad de comunicar, coordinar y difundir los 
resultados de este proyecto podría inhibir el compromiso de algunos actores que todavía 
no pueden confiar en los procesos de gobierno. Intereses potencialmente divididos dentro 
de la región también podrían menoscabar la voluntad de los actores locales a invertir su 
esfuerzo, tiempo y recursos en estos proyectos de colaboración. 
Para superar estas barreras a la confianza y el compromiso, las comunidades podrían 
identificar los equipos de liderazgo para unir sus recursos. Podrían empezar poco a poco, 
y luego desarrollar un sistema de rendición de cuentas y expectativas, como asistir a las 
reuniones con regularidad, cumplir con los compromisos adquiridos, y ver la capacidad 
de respuesta, con el fin de garantizar el pleno compromiso de las partes interesadas. La 
Alcaldía de Nicoya recientemente implementó un nuevo sistema de rendición de cuentas 
para asegurar la participación en las reuniones regionales. Esto podría servir de modelo. 
La inversión en infraestructura de comunicaciones es una acción sinérgica clave para 
ayudar a mejorar la confianza de los potenciales participantes y el compromiso con los 
procesos que rigen nuevos y experimentos. 
 
El progreso es ya evidente en Guanacaste. Los recientes esfuerzos en Guanacaste son 
pasos positivos hacia la reconfiguración de la gobernanza del agua en la región. Sin 
embargo, aún queda mucho trabajo y la iniciativa de presión para la reforma del agua en 
Costa Rica aún no es coherente. Algunas medidas de reforma compiten entre sí en el 
ámbito nacional, y muchas de las ASADAS altamente desfinanciadas abogan por 
diferentes cosas en diferentes momentos. Un paso clave para avanzar será el de unificar, 
en cierta medida, los esfuerzos de la reforma del agua, tanto a escala regional 
(Guanacaste) y nacional.  
 
Para ayudar a impulsar este paso, nuestro equipo distribuyó un documento que resume los 
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cuatro elementos de acción a los participantes del taller, a los líderes nacionales del sector 
del agua, y a los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Nuestro equipo también ha 
distribuido material basado en nuestra investigación a una variedad de grupos a través de 
fax, periódico, radio, correo electrónico, redes sociales y eventos en la comunidad, en 
estrecha colaboración con los líderes de la región. Estos esfuerzos han arrojado luz sobre 
las consideraciones clave para el liderazgo en la región, que tendrá la responsabilidad de: 
 
(1) Balancear la necesidad de crear nuevas organizaciones e instituciones en un sector 
público ya saturado y complejo. La creación de nuevas organizaciones que sean 
eficaces puede requerir una reducción inicial o una consolidación de algunas 
organizaciones existentes. 
 
(2) Asegurar  procesos que identifiquen los recursos (financieros, de personal y 
técnicos) ya existentes en la región. Los recursos existentes y las oportunidades para 
asegurar nuevos recursos deben quedar claras para aquellos encabezando la acción 
sobre las cuestiones antes mencionadas. 
 
(3) Hacer un esfuerzo conjunto para presionar por una reforma de la Constitución que 
defina el agua como un derecho humano universal. Definir el agua como un derecho 
humano de manera explícita a menudo ha sido la piedra angular de los esfuerzos de 
reforma de agua que no prosperan. Por lo tanto, son necesarios pasos preliminares 
antes de que una enmienda constitucional se pueda lograr con éxito. 
 
(4) Establecer procesos para definir los objetivos de desarrollo a escala regional o local. 
Las comunidades, especialmente aquellas a lo largo de la costa del Pacífico en 
Guanacaste, deben comenzar debates colectivos antes que el mercado inmobiliario 
comience a crecer de nuevo y ponga una presión adicional sobre la gobernanza del 
agua en la región. 
 
(5) Documentar, evaluar y modificar los planes y estrategias de acción, según sea 
necesario. Asociaciones con universidades pueden potencialmente proveer 
oportunidades para desarrollar planes de acción y evaluar estrategias. 
 
Los líderes de Guanacaste y las comunidades están en condiciones de hacer un esfuerzo 
unificado para la reforma nacional del agua, mientras a la vez se da la implementación de 
medidas para promover la sostenibilidad del agua desde el interior de la región. Aunque 
todavía existen barreras, Guanacaste puede avanzar a pesar de la inhabilidad de los 
legisladores nacionales para modificar las políticas del agua en función de las 
necesidades de los ciudadanos. Cuando la reforma del agua ocurra-y una vez que haya 
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suficiente impulso-Guanacaste estará en condiciones de capitalizar los actuales esfuerzos 
para la sostenibilidad del agua.  
Se resumen el Plan de Acción: 
Acción #1 
La inversión en el 
elemento humano de la 
gobernanza (equipo de 
comunicaciones y 
espacios de 
cooperación) de agua 
Acción #2 
La inversión en 
equipos de monitoreo 
pequeña escala 
Acción #3 
Compromiso legal de 
planificación a escala de 
cuenca  
Acción #4 
La inversión en un 
proyecto piloto (evaluar 
# 1-3) en Nicoya 
Barrera: Bajas 
expectativas 
profesionales de 
comunicación; cultura 
de falta de 
comunicación, poca 
experiencia con modos 
de comunicación más 
recientes 
Barrera: Poca 
voluntad política para 
financiamiento, la 
percepción de riesgo 
político al compartir la 
información del uso de 
agua 
Barrera: Corrupción; 
poderosas influencias de 
grupos de interés, 
dificultad de penetrar 
burocracias a nivel 
nacional 
Barrera: Intereses 
divididos dentro de la 
región y la 
incertidumbre acerca de 
la capacidad de difundir 
/ comunicar los 
resultados 
Para superar barrera: 
Programa de pasantías 
de ASADA, talleres 
regulares financiados 
por las organizaciones 
participantes, el uso de 
una nueva Plataforma 
de Coordinación 
Para superar 
barrera: Aliados en 
las sucursales de la 
agencia; agrupación de 
recursos; grupo de 
trabajo para definir 
nuevas fuentes de 
ingresos para 
ASADAs 
Para superar barrera: 
Modificar el propósito y 
proceso de 
implementación de 
Planes Reguladores 
regionales para eludir el 
tiempo de espera 
mientras cambia la 
política nacional del 
agua 
Para superar barrera: 
Identificar y 
comprometerse 
plenamente con el 
equipo de liderazgo 
regional; aunar recursos, 
invertir en equipos de 
comunicaciones 
Recursos existentes: 
Plataforma de 
Coordinación Nicoya, 
Nueva liderazgo 
ASADAs, aliados 
políticos regionales 
(alcaldes) 
Recursos existentes: 
Infraestructura de 
información de la 
Universidad, los 
aliados de la 
Asociación de 
Desarrollo  
Recursos existentes: 
Aliados en medios de 
comunicación (presión 
política), el 
financiamiento de 
planes reguladores, 
aliados políticos 
regionales (alcaldes), 
aliados nacionales 
Recursos existentes: La 
nuevo liderazgo de 
ASADA, Plataforma de 
Coordinación Nicoya  
 
Consideraciones claves/ responsabilidades para líderes locales y regionales  
• Equilibrar la creación de nuevas organizaciones con la necesidad de reducir/ consolidar la 
complejidad institucional  
• Identificar los recursos de la región y canalizar esos recursos hacia actividades prioritarias 
• Detectar el momento adecuado para impulsar los esfuerzos que tienen como objetivo definir 
explícitamente el agua como un derecho humano Constitucional 
• Establecer procesos que definen y redefinen las metas para el desarrollo a escala regional 
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• La asociación con organizaciones de investigación para documentar, evaluar, modificar las 
estrategias en tiempo real 
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Apéndice 1 –Principios para la Gobernanza Sostenible de Agua  
 
El manejo sostenible de agua se define como el proceso que involucra a todas las partes 
en la coordinación del abastecimiento, distribución, uso y salidas de agua de manera que 
se garantice el bienestar que no comprometa la integridad de los hidro-sistemas en el 
futuro (Wiek y Larson 2012). Para evaluar el sistema de agua actual establecimos una 
serie de principios de sostenibilidad basado en varios autores y en entrevistas con actores 
clave del sistema en Guanacaste. Estos mismos principios son los que serán utilizados 
para evaluar los escenarios a futuro en el taller y son importantes para la gobernanza 
sostenible de agua en Guanacaste.  A continuación se presentan los principios: 
 
#1. La integridad del sistema socio-ecológico: Exige equilibrar las necesidades de los 
residentes locales, agricultura, industria y otros usuarios del agua tomando en cuenta la 
viabilidad de los ecosistemas de soporte 
 
#2. Eficiencia y manejo de los recursos: Exige reducir consumo de agua, mejorar 
eficiencia, reutilizar agua, eliminar fugas, que la tasa de extracción no supere la tasa de 
recarga 
 
#3. Oportunidad y suficiencia de medios de vida: Implica acceso equitativo a 
suficiente calidad y cantidad de agua para las personas que dependen de ella para su 
subsistencia y actividades económicas 
 
#4. Civilidad socio-ecológica y manejo democrático: Es la participación  y 
colaboración de los interesados en la toma de decisiones tomando en cuenta a todos los 
que están conectados con el recurso 
 
#5. Equidad Inter e Intra-generacional: Es el acceso equitativo a suficiente cantidad de 
agua para residentes actuales y futuros 
 
#6. Interconectividad de escala local a global: Es asegurar la asignación y el manejo de 
los recursos en regiones ascendentes y descendentes de las cuencas hidrográficas 
 
#7. Precaución (mitigación) y adaptabilidad: El manejo sostenible de agua requiere la 
anticipación de posibles problemas y la capacidad de mitigar así como de responder a 
impactos negativos  
	   406 
 
Referencias 
 
Arias, KA.  New push for water law reform in Costa Rica. Tico Times (online) 
(September 9, 2011). http://www.ticotimes.net/Current-Edition/Top-
Story/News/New-push-for-water-law-reform-in-Costa-Rica_Friday-September-09-
2011 
 
Ballestero, M, Reyes, V & Astorga, Y. Groundwater in Central America: Its importance, 
development and use with particular reference to its role in irrigated agriculture. 100-
128. Giodorno, M & Villholth, KG. eds.  The Agricultural Revolution: Opportunities 
and Threats to Development. CAB International (2007). 
 
Calvo, JC. Water resources development in Costa Rica 1970-2000. Hydrological 
Sciences 35(2), 185-196 (1990).  
 
Kuzdas, C (2012). Unpacking water conflict in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Why some 
conflicts escalate, why some remain intractable, and why we can be optimistic about 
the future.  GWF Discussion Paper 1242, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia 
URL: http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/10/16/unpacking-water-conflict-in- 
guanacaste-costa-rica/ 
 
Kuzdas C, Yglesias M, Wiek A, Vignola R, Morataya R (2012). Evaluación de 
Sostenibilidad del Sistema Regional de Agua y el Manejo de Agua en las Sub-
Cuencas Potrero, Caimital, y Nosara Alta.  Comisión para el Manejo de las Cuencas 
Potrero y Caimital. Nicoya, Guanacaste, Costa Rica.   
 
Kuzdas, C, Yglesias M, Warner B (2013).  Governing Costa Rica’s Water Resources. 
Soltuions 4(4).  URL: http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/23918  
 
 
Ramírez, A (2007). Conflictos socio-ambientales y recursos hídricos en Guanacaste; Una 
descripción desde el cambio en el estilo de desarrollo 1997-2006.Anuario de 
Estudios Centroamericanos 33-44.  
 
Wiek A, Walter A (2009). A transdisciplinary approach for formalized integrated 
planning and decision-making in complex systems. European Journal of 
Operational Research 197, 360–370.  
 
Wiek A, Gasser L, Siegrist M (2009). Systemic scenarios of nanotechnology – 
Sustainable governance of emerging technologies. Futures 41, 284-300.  
 
Wiek A, Lang D (2011). Transformational Research for Sustainability: A Practical 
	   407 
Methodology. Arizona State University, Tempe.  
 
Wiek A, Larson KL (2012). Water systems, people, and sustainability – a framework for 
analyzing and assessing water governance regimes. Water Resources Management 
26, 3153-3171.  
 
 
Agradecimientos 
 
Estamos muy agradecidos a nuestros socios y amigos en Guanacaste que están liderando 
los esfuerzos para crear un nuevo modelo sostenible de gobernanza del agua en la región. 
La Fundación Nacional de Ciencias (2012-2013), el programa Fulbright (2013-14) de los 
EE.UU. y diversos programas de la Universidad Estatal de Arizona, proporcionaron 
apoyo para este proyecto. Las opiniones, resultados y conclusiones o recomendaciones 
expresadas en este material son las de los autores y no reflejan necesariamente las 
opiniones de la Fundación Nacional de Ciencias  ni otras organizaciones que han 
apoyado del proyecto.  
	   408 
APPENDIX E 
SCENARIO MULTI CRITERIA EVALUATION ACTIVITY SUMMARY – 
IDENTIFYING SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVES, LESS SUSTAINABLE 
ALTERANTIVES, AND INITIAL GOALS IN GUANACASTE 
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Scenario Multi Criteria Evaluation Methods and Activity Summary 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with further details on some 
activities involved in the overall project in Guanacaste that played a role in meeting 
dissertation objectives.  Accordingly, research efforts that identify and distinguish 
sustainable alternatives to current water governance in a participatory way played a key 
role. This role supported collective efforts to develop transition strategies to ‘go’ one 
direction and avoid other, less sustainable alternatives.  
 
Integration of the scenario evaluation with the overall project 
 
The scenario/ alternative water governance evaluation forms part of the integrated 
research to understanding and transforming water governance regimes that struggle to 
address complex sustainability problems including harmful water conflicts. According to 
the dissertation introduction, the project has focused on systematizing new knowledge 
across three temporal domains: current-state, alternative states, and developing transition 
(Wiek, under review).  In this dissertation, we developed a small set of alternative 
governance scenarios (detailed in Chapter 5) based on extensive current-state analyses of 
water governance in the region (Chapter 2-4). This current-state work included, for 
example, a sustainability appraisal of the water governance regime (Chapter 3), which 
determined qualitatively how well current water governance complied with agreed-upon 
sustainability criteria. This normative current-state assessment emphasized stakeholder 
participation and the communication of results to a variety of groups, which afforded a 
large degree of familiarity and broad interaction with the process described below.  
 
Current-state research, especially the sustainability appraisal, streamlined the 
selection of an understandable set of indicators (below) that would form the basis for 
scenario evaluation. Note these variables are different from the variables used to 
construct the scenarios (in Chapter 4). Members of the Comisión para el Manejo de las 
Cuencas Potrero-Caimital (e.g., PC Commission) were already familiar (and using) the 
general set of sustainable governance principles, which greatly facilitated the process. 
With the analytical scenarios mostly constructed (with narratives, illustrative photos, 
newspaper stories, and day in the life of stories), the iterative process of assigning 
indicator values between researchers and the PC Commission that reflected each 
scenario’s unique content was straightforward. For example, discussions addressed 
questions such as, ‘in this scenario a reasonable or expected value of indicator 1A would 
be w while in Scenarios 3,4,and 5 due to these conditions it would by x,y, and z.” The 
previous analytical scenario development process utilized a constructive approach that 
emphasized systemic accuracy and consistency. Thus, having analytical scenarios already 
virtually built, increased the reliability that indicator values assigned to each scenario 
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correctly reflect what was actually happening and were consistent with the systemic 
features of those scenarios (Wiek et al., 2009; Chapter 5). We note that, while there is 
overlap with the variable used to build the scenarios and variables used to evaluate the 
scenarios, the variable sets are distinct from each other.  The variables used in the 
evaluation are necessarily more precise and their selection was meant to elicit substantive 
discussion and deliberation over sustainability thresholds and levels of a variety of 
relevant features.  
 
Indicator selection and specification across the scenarios 
 
The research team and members of the PC Commission identified and justified 15 
indicators for water governance in Guanacaste and linked each indicator to general 
principles for sustainable water governance (same principles used in Chapter 3) through 
two working group meetings in early 2013. The guiding sustainability principles, 
developed in Wiek and Larson (2012), were already employed to assess the current state 
of water governance in the Nicoya region of Guanacaste (Kuzdas et al., 2014). 
Importantly, the normative principles also facilitated the initial identification of the ‘best’ 
or most sustainable value for each indicator. The indicators were important ‘information 
points’ that helped to communicate the scenarios and ensured that each scenario was 
specified to the point where they could be collectively evaluated in a workshop setting. 
Indicator values for each scenario and the current-state were also assigned in the iterative 
process with the PC Commission. This was important to help compare, in a very 
streamlined way, how current water governance in the region lined up with the scenarios, 
which is an important link between the integrated scenario evaluation and strategy 
crafting process that immediately followed the evaluation.   
 
Multi criteria analysis  
 
The multi criteria analysis (MCA) approach that I employed evaluates how well 
each alternative state performs based on ‘distances’ between ideal indicator values, which 
I term sustainability thresholds, and the indicators actual performance in a given 
(alternative or current) state. We use the term sustainability threshold to refer to a point, 
beyond which, could be considered a ‘sustainable state’ in Guanacaste based on evidence 
accumulated in the project activities since 2009, sustainability principles, and stakeholder 
preferences. We found this framing to help facilitate discussions among diverse groups of 
where water governance should be headed and the sustainability effects of alternative 
water governance schemes. MCA methods that are based on compromise programing 
algorithms assume that preferences for a given state are determined by distances from the 
most ideal values of a set of indicators. The resulting utility scores of the evaluation then 
reflect how close each alternative state is to a set of ideal or sustainable indicator values. 
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This suite of MCA techniques is well suited for a sustainability evaluation. It potentially 
allows for relatively simple visual comparison of evaluated scenarios (which was 
important for participatory processes), and it couples well with crafting governing 
strategies that seek to transition governance regimes toward alternative, more sustainable 
futures while avoiding others.  
 
We used the MCA equation developed by Straton et al. (2011) who slightly modified 
another compromise programming algorithm from Zeleny (1973), so that a resulting 
utility score closer to 1 indicates better performance (with closer to 0 indicating worse 
performance).  The MCA equation from Straton et al. (2011) is:   
 
𝑢!   = 𝑤𝑖!!!! 1 −    𝑓!! −   𝑓!"𝑓!! −   𝑓!! !   
! !
 
Where,  
fij is the value of indicator i in alternative j; 
 
fi+ is the best value (or sustainability threshold) for indicator i; 
 
fi− is the worst (or value farthest from the sustainability threshold) for indicator i; 
 
wi is the weight for indicator i and is based on rank of indicator importance, highest 
possible weight (dependent on the number of indicators being used) and a normalized 
value of c; 
 
m is the number of indicators;  
 
c is a parameter that reflects the importance of the distance from the sustainability 
threshold (which in this case we left at 1 for all indicators, so that all deviations from the 
most sustainable values are weighted equally); and 
 
uj  is the resulting utility score of an alternative state j 
 
Participatory evaluation process 
 
In March 2013, 46 participants convened for a workshop in Nicoya, Guanacaste.  
Participants represented local governments, national agencies, agriculture, tourism, 
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universities, community groups, and environmental groups. Over 30 organizations and 18 
Guanacaste communities were represented at the workshop. Participants were invited in 
order to account for the fragmented parts of the current regional water governance regime 
and to include organizations that had been involved in conflicts with each other. The all-
day workshop was organized into three modules that fed into one another. The interactive 
modules were designed to mirror potential collaborative governing processes in the 
region. The first module developed and refined the set of systemic water governance 
scenarios in order to identify where Guanacaste water governance could be headed 
(Chapter 5). The second module, which I very briefly explore here, evaluated those 
scenarios in order to deliberate and identify where Guanacaste water governance should 
be headed and began framing a process to craft transition strategies to get there over time.  
The third module implemented and tested a collective process of crafting governance 
strategies to get to where the group determined water governance in Guanacaste should 
go and avoid where it should not go. The first module, where participants interacted with 
‘scenario stations’ to contribute to scenario content and design, prompted participants to 
begin thinking about water governance alternatives and what the consequences of those 
alternatives could be for the region. The format of the first module allowed participants to 
meet each other (many of whom had not worked with each other before) and become 
accustomed to the deliberative and constructive nature of the workshop prior to the 
(second) evaluation module.  
 
As a first step in the evaluation module, workshop participants individually 
ranked the set of indicators based on their perceived importance for sustainable water 
governance in Guanacaste. Although many participants were familiar with the broader 
project and its results, at the beginning of the workshop the research team took the time 
to review the concept and definition of sustainable water governance that was being used 
in the broader project and during the workshop.  The rich concept of sustainable water 
governance is defined at length in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
 
The resulting average rank helped determine the weight of each indicator in the 
evaluation. This step occurred immediately after the first module so that the alternative 
governance scenarios and their similarities and differences were fresh in participant’s 
minds. 
 
While rankings were being tabulated, participants broke up into seven sub-groups 
of 6-7 people in order to identify and justify the sustainability thresholds of each 
indicator. Participants were divided into sub-groups in order to ensure maximum 
diversity. A facilitator and note-taker led each group, while two additional facilitators 
roamed and offered support when needed.  The sub-groups also discussed and modified 
the initial list of indicator values and justifications for the current state of water 
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governance in Guanacaste.  While some MCA studies focus on exploring differences in 
the weighting of indicators (and how this effects utility scores of alternatives), in this 
study we focused more on identifying the sustainability thresholds in a broad 
participatory setting, which afforded a more goal-oriented approach to the MCA used in 
the workshop. We chose this approach due to, among other determinants, the large 
number of workshop participants that included very diverse groups (comparing weights 
typically occurs in a smaller, expert-driven setting due to the technical requirements) and 
the extremely early stage at which collaborative water resource (or even development in 
general) planning is at in Guanacaste. Allowing such a large group to participate in the 
evaluation (and overall workshop) was deemed critical by the Comisión and the research 
team in light of recent conflicts over water that often involve marginalized groups and 
stakeholders who are left out (sometimes intentionally) of planning processes for water 
resources. In this sense, this study offers a unique perspective on an MCA approach that 
effectively involved a large number of diverse participants.   
 
Following small group work, the larger group re-convened to discuss, identify, and 
justify the sustainability thresholds to be used in the evaluation. The average rankings of 
the indicators were then presented to the larger group, followed by additional discussion 
and finalization of the indicator rank – focusing on the top five indicators. After a break, 
the evaluated scenarios – including the ‘evaluated’ current state - were presented to the 
group using a simple visualization tool that facilitated comparing alternatives.  Here we 
explored the sustainability of each scenario (and how they compare to the current state) 
and identified key aspects of the governance regime that systemically influenced whether 
or not alternative states met sustainability thresholds or not. The second module was 
concluded by initially exploring and discussing a process to craft governance strategies 
utilizing the evaluation results. The module after the evaluation exercises tested that 
process to craft governing strategies.  
 
Selected indicators and their ranking 
 
Final indicators (Table 1 in this appendix) and their assigned values for each 
scenario (Table 2 in this appendix) aim to adequately capture the complexity of water 
governance in Guanacaste while still maintaining their accessibility to the diverse 
stakeholder groups involved in the early stages of organized and participatory planning 
for water resources. The set of indicators accounts for the general condition(s) of water 
governance and its outcomes in Guanacaste as a Province, rather than one specific area 
(important considering the diversity of groups and communities represented at the 
workshop). 
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Table 1 (APPENDIX E): Sustainability principles, associated indicators, their 
definitions, and value ranges. Primary sources/ previous use of each indicator are 
indicated by a + (formative scenario building in Chapter 5); * (sustainability appraisal of 
water governance in the Nicoya region Chapter 3); and a ^ (analyses of water conflict 
cases in Guanacaste in Chapter 4).  
 
Principle Indicator Range of indicator values 
Principle #1 
Socio-
ecological 
system 
integrity 
1
A 
Condition and quality 
of freshwater habitat 
and species*^ 
1 to 5 (5=unaltered; 3= healthy; 1= completely 
degraded) 
1
B 
Condition and quality 
of terrestrial habitat (% 
native forest cover)+* 1 - 100% of land covered by natural forest 
1
C 
Risks to water quantity 
and quality+*^ 
1 to 3 (1 =low risk, 2=medium risk, 3=high 
risk) 
Principle #2: 
Resource 
efficiency and 
maintenance 
2
A 
Efficiency of water 
infrastructure+* 1 to 5 (5 = most efficient, 1 = least efficient) 
2
B 
Balance of extraction 
and recharge of 
groundwater+* 
1 to 3 (3 = recharge exceeds extraction; 2 = 
extraction exceeds recharge; 1 = unknown)  
Principle #3: 
Livelihood 
sufficiency 
and 
opportunity 
3
A 
Hectares of irrigated 
agriculture+^ 0 – 100,000 Ha 
3
B 
Mix of small and large 
(industrial) farms*^ 
1 to 4 (4 = balanced and competitive mix; 3 = 
substantially more small farms than large or 
industrial farms; 2 = mixed, but small farms 
find it difficult to compete with larger farms; 1 
= nearly all farms are large or industrial) 
3
C 
State of tourism real 
estate market^ 
0 - $100 million in foreign real estate purchases 
(residential tourism only) 
3
D 
An economy based on 
tourism^  
1 to 3 (3 = important for a diverse economy; 2 
= very important, the economy is dependent on 
tourism; 1 = not important) 
Principle #4: 
Socio-
ecological 
4
A 
The accessibility and 
transparency of 
decision-making for 
1 to 3 (3 = open; 2 = sometimes open; 1 = 
closed) 
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civility and 
democratic 
governance 
water resources+*^ 
4
B 
The extent of 
coordination in the 
management and 
planning of water 
resources+*^ 
1 to 3 (3 = polycentric; 2 = centralized; 1 = 
fragmented) 
Principle #5 
Inter/ intra-
generational 
equity 
5
A 
The distribution of 
benefits, costs, and 
risks among 
stakeholders+*^ 1 a 3 (3 = fair, 2 = sometimes fair; 1 = unfair) 
Principle #6: 
Interconnecti
vity from 
local to 
global scales 
6
A 
The effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the basin 
and regional scale of 
water governance+*^ 
1 a 3 (3 = effective; 2 = somewhat effective; 1 
= ineffective) 
Principle #7: 
Precaution 
(mitigation) 
and 
adaptability 
7
A 
Decisions based on 
long-term (20+ years) 
planning horizons*^ 
1 a 3 (3 = Many decisions; 2 = some decisions; 
1 = no decisions) 
7
B 
The ease of modifying 
water policy and 
planning processes to 
meet changing needs 
and priorities+*^ 
1 a 5 (5 = very easy 1 = nearly impossible) 
	  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (APPENDIX E): Assigned indicator values in each scenario and summary of 
key differences between scenario (from Chapter 5) 
 Scenario #1 Scenario #2 Scenario 
#3:  
Scenario #4 Scenario #5 
Scenario title Mandated to 
prepare 
Closed-door 
alliances 
Responsive 
and engaged 
Unnoticed in 
the background 
Overwhelmed 
and out of 
touch 
Scenario 
theme 
Cautious Deception Innovation Apathy Disconnectio
n 
How water 
governance 
operates 
Agency-led 
and top-down 
implemented 
mandate to 
Governance 
is dominated 
by closed and 
unaccountabl
Responsive 
governance 
emphasizes 
autonomy, 
Governance 
weathers 
apathy and 
environmenta
Overwhelme
d governance 
is out of 
touch with 
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prepare for 
water scarcity 
and secure 
rural, 
potentially 
vulnerable 
communities  
 
e alliances 
and back-
door dealings  
 
coordination
, and 
regional-fit 
 
l risk while 
staying out of 
the way of 
economic 
prosperity 
 
regional 
challenges 
while elites 
multiply 
landholdings 
 
Distinguishin
g systemic 
features  
A highly 
controlled 
governance 
schemes that 
has the trust of 
local 
communities 
avoid conflicts 
due to more 
accommodatin
g contexts 
where scarcity, 
water access, 
and 
competition 
are not 
prevalent  
Negative 
reinforcing 
feedback 
loops among 
governance 
drivers and 
mediating 
features allow 
for 
governance 
schemes that 
cater to 
interest-based 
alliances that 
tend to 
circumvent 
due processes  
Positive 
reinforcing 
feedback 
loops 
between 
governance 
drivers and 
mediating 
features in 
spite of 
challenging 
contexts  
Efficient 
water 
management 
buffers 
potential risks 
while less 
active 
leadership 
allows 
governance to 
operate 
without 
public 
interest 
Challenging 
governing 
contexts 
overwhelm 
governance 
schemes that 
are poorly 
adapted to 
regional 
contexts and 
disconnected 
from local 
constituencie
s 
Interpreted 
scenario 
components 
The ever 
present nature 
of central 
government  
Organized 
community 
opposition, 
resistance 
Problem- 
solving, 
confidence, 
trying new 
ideas 
Progress, 
technical 
water 
management, 
failed 
demand 
management  
The return of 
the 
Latifundio, 
power 
imbalances, 
power 
politics  
Indicators      
1A 4 (very 
healthy) 2 (degraded) 3 (healthy) 2 (degraded) 2 (degraded) 
1B 30% natural 
forest cover 
40% natural 
forest cover 
30% natural 
forest cover 
20% natural 
forest cover 
10% natural 
forest cover 
1C 
1 (low risk) 
2 (medium 
risk) 1 (low risk) 
2 (medium 
risk) 3 (high risk) 
2A 4 (very 
efficient) 
2 (inefficient 
for many) 3 (efficient) 
4 (very 
efficient) 
2 (inefficient 
for many) 
2B 3 (recharge 
exceeds 
extraction) 1 (unknown) 
3 (recharge 
exceeds 
extraction) 
2 (extraction 
exceeds 
recharge) 
2 (extraction 
exceeds 
recharge) 
3A 40,000 Ha 35,000 Ha 50,000 Ha 70,000 Ha 90,000 Ha 
3B 
4 (balanced 
mix) 
3 (more small 
farms than 
industrial 
farms) 
4 (balanced 
mix) 
2 (mixed, but 
small farms 
find it 
difficult to 
1 (nearly all 
farms are 
industrial 
farms) 
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compete) 
3C $35 million $80 million $25 million $40 million $7 million 
3D 
3 (important 
for a diverse 
economy) 
2 (the 
economy 
depends on 
tourism) 
3 (important 
for a diverse 
economy) 
3 (important 
for a diverse 
economy) 
1 (tourism is 
not 
important) 
4A 2 (sometimes 
open) 1 (closed) 3 (open) 
2 (sometimes 
open) 1 (closed) 
4B 
2 (centralized) 
2 
(centralized) 
3 
(polycentric) 
1 
(fragmented) 
1 
(fragmented) 
5A 
3 (fair) 1 (unfair) 3 (fair) 
2 (sometimes 
fair) 1 (unfair) 
6A 2 (somewhat 
effective) 
1 
(ineffective) 3 (effective) 
2 (somewhat 
effective) 
1 
(ineffective) 
7A 3 (many 
decisions) 
1 (no 
decisions) 
3 (many 
decisions) 
1 (no 
decisions) 
1 (no 
decisions) 
7B 3 (somewhat 
easy for some) 2 (difficult) 
4 (easy 
enough) 2 (difficult)  
1 (nearly 
impossible) 
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For Principle #1: Socio-ecological system integrity, three indicators (1A-1C) were 
selected that capture the general quality of natural systems and acceptable risks to the 
well being of those systems. The ability to easily compare forestation levels (Indicator 
1C) in the scenarios was deemed important for the evaluation process by local 
administrators. Forest cover is a historically major environmental concern for the 
Province. All indicators in Principle #3: Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity, address 
agriculture and tourism – the two most important economic drivers in Guanacaste. After 
debate, Indicators 3A – 3D were determined to best represent the general composition of 
agriculture and tourism in the Province in an understandable way (that easily compared 
across scenarios) and that would spur deliberation about what Guanacaste should look 
like in a workshop setting that aimed to promote learning and interaction. Principle #2: 
Resource efficiency and maintenance included indicators (2A-2B) related to the 
efficiency of water infrastructure and the quality of groundwater reserves. Both measures 
are high priorities for Guanacaste water managers that often face poorly maintained 
infrastructure and have access to very limited groundwater monitoring resources. 
Principle #4: Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance includes two indicators 
(4A-4B) related to open, accessible decision-making processes and coordination. Water 
allocation decisions made without community input are often the norm in Guanacaste, 
which has spurred intense water conflicts and eroded community trust in prevailing 
political institutions.  Coordination is a major concern for water managers who are 
helping lead very new organized efforts to collaboratively manage water resources. 
Principle #5: Inter/ intra-generational equity includes an indicator of the fairness in the 
distribution benefits, risks, and costs of water allocation and use.  Developing mediators 
between community-scale actors and national agencies is an important recent effort in the 
region, thus one indicator in Principle #6: Interconnectivity from local to global scales 
focuses on the effectiveness and legitimacy of this mediating regional or basin-scale role.  
Principle #7: Precaution (mitigation) and adaptation include two indicators that relevant 
to recent efforts in Guanacaste. Long-term planning (Indicator 7A) is still a very new 
practice (or it is not practiced) in the Province, and is a current focus (and thus very 
relevant for mitigation capacities of regional water governance) of new leaders in the 
region.  Many current decisions do not factor in long-term considerations, especially 
considerations related to development impacts on hydro-ecosystems. Many new water 
governing efforts in Guanacaste (such as promoting long-term planning practices) have 
found that modifying water policy can be impossibly difficult. Thus Indicator 7B was 
chosen as a relevant and understandable gauge that helps reflect the collective ability to 
adapt to meet changing conditions and needs.  
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Table 3 (APPENDIX E) Descriptive results from the indicator ranking activity  
 
Indicator Rank Weight 
(wi) 
Mean 
rank 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
1A: Condition and quality of freshwater 
habitat and species 9 0.037 8.06 3.73 9 
1B: Condition and quality of terrestrial 
habitat (% native forest cover) 6 0.042 7.19 3.28 7.5 
1C: Risks to water quantity and quality 7 0.036 8.26 4.45 7.5 
2A: Efficiency of water infrastructure 10 0.033 9.08 3.56 9.5 
2B: Balance of extraction and recharge of 
groundwater 3 0.071 4.23 3.53 3 
3A: Hectares of irrigated agriculture 13 0.028 10.88 2.88 11 
3B: Mix of small and large (industrial) 
farms 12 0.028 10.76 3.05 12 
3C: State of tourism real estate market 15 0.024 12.71 3.20 15 
3D: An economy based on tourism  14 0.024 12.40 2.42 13 
4A: The accessibility and transparency of 
decision-making for water resources 2 0.075 4.00 3.10 3 
4B: The extent of coordination in the 
management and planning of water 
resources 
1 0.087 3.44 2.76 2.5 
5A: The distribution of benefits, costs, 
and risks among stakeholders 8 0.035 8.65 3.07 9.5 
6A: The effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the basin and regional scale of water 
governance 
5 0.049 6.14 2.75 6 
7A: Decisions based on long-term (20+ 
years) planning horizons 10 0.033 9.08 4.04 10  
7B: The ease of modifying water policy 
and planning processes to meet changing 
needs and priorities 
4 0.053 5.64 3.64 5 
 
Identified sustainability thresholds  
For some indicators, there was little disagreement within or between groups on 
the identified sustainability thresholds although justifications varied slightly depending 
on the composition of the group. For other  ‘more difficult’ indicators that were 
purposely selected to challenge participants, there was much more discussion. This 
discussion was an important primer for deliberations on what different levels of some 
indicators might mean for the region. For example, some participants (starting with the 
scenarios) discussed what Guanacaste might look like with a certain amount of irrigation 
or level of tourism, then discussed the regional implications, made a judgment on those 
regional implications (using the evaluation criteria), and then identified a sustainability 
threshold.  Table 4 in this appendix compares the identified sustainability thresholds with 
the values of indicators in the current state.  
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Table 4 (APPENDIX E): Synthesis of current state values and sustainability thresholds 
identified at the workshop 
Indicator 
Current-state 
Sustainability 
threshold 
Summary of justifications from the 
workshop activity 
1A: Condition 
and quality of 
freshwater 
habitat and 
species 
Degraded in 
many places; 
healthy in others  
(2 or 3) 
Healthy (3) 
Freshwater ecosystems must be 
healthy in order to provide a 
sufficient quality and quantity of 
water.  Many places in Guanacaste 
are still recovering from virtually 
complete deforestation in past 
decades  
1B: Condition 
and quality of 
terrestrial habitat 
(% native forest 
cover) 
25% (officially 
protected areas) 40%  
25% of the province is currently 
under official protection; but there is 
still a significant lack of protection 
for known groundwater reserves 
1C: Risks to 
water quantity 
and quality Medium risk (2) Low risk (1)  
High risks to water quality could have 
negative impacts on the health of 
people and ecosystems 
2A: Efficiency 
of water 
infrastructure 
Some efficiency 
(2) 
Very efficient 
(4) 
More efficient infrastructure allows 
for less water that is lost or wasted 
during sourcing, delivery, use, and 
post-use 
2B: Balance of 
extraction and 
recharge of 
groundwater 
Unknown in 
many places (1) 
Recharge 
exceeds 
extraction (3) 
Stable groundwater reserves are 
important for maintaining sufficient 
levels of water security, health, and 
quality environments  
3A: Hectares of 
irrigated 
agriculture 
40,000 Ha 
(DRAT + 
Filadelfia + a 
little more) 
35,000 Ha 
In December 2012, the irrigation 
system in the DRAT (28,000 
Hectares) demand exceeded delivery 
capacity. No further hectares could be 
serviced.  Conflicts and tension 
resulted.  
3B: Mix of small 
and large 
(industrial) 
farms Mixed, but small farms 
cannot compete 
(2) 
Substantially 
more small 
farms than 
large or 
industrial 
farms (3) 
A balanced mix of small, medium, 
and large farms allow economic 
opportunities for diverse people. 
Culturally, agricultural landscapes 
that contain substantially more small 
farms are preferred by most residents. 
The original purpose of the DRAT 
was to promote small farmer 
livelihoods and economic opportunity  
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3C: State of 
tourism real 
estate market $50 million in foreign real 
estate purchases 
(2005) 
No more than 
$25 million in 
foreign real 
estate 
purchases 
2005 was during the real estate boom 
in Guanacaste, during which many 
water conflicts occurred. Residential 
tourism is not the preferred tourism of 
many local communities, although it 
has been promoted by the national 
government.  
3D: An economy 
based on tourism  Very important, 
many 
Guanacaste 
economies 
depend on it (2) 
Important for a 
diverse 
economy (3) 
An economy that is entirely based on 
one sector could prove vulnerable to 
shocks. Coastal areas that depended 
heavily on visitor and residential 
tourism felt very difficult economic 
impacts during the 2008 collapse of 
the real estate market.  Situations like 
that should be avoided in the future. 
4A: The 
accessibility and 
transparency of 
decision-making 
for water 
resources 
Sometimes 
open, but often 
closed (2) 
Open (3) 
An open process that is used to take 
decisions (and accordingly is 
accessible to rural communities and 
attentive to their needs) is a necessary 
part of governance that can help to 
avoid water conflicts and to create 
collective goals for water governance 
and sustainable development in the 
region.   
 
4B: The extent 
of coordination 
in the 
management and 
planning of 
water resources 
Centralized and 
often 
fragmented (2) 
Polycentric (3) 
Multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-
organization coordination within 
water resources planning and 
management can play a role in 
allowing different stakeholders in 
different places to provide meaningful 
input (i.e., monitoring, info sharing, 
perspective sharing into governing 
processes 
5A: The 
distribution of 
benefits, costs, 
and risks among 
stakeholders 
Sometimes just, 
sometimes not 
(2) 
Just (3) 
A few people should not benefit at the 
cost of many without fair and just 
compensation and processes to 
determine appropriate risks, 
compensation, and benefit 
distribution 
6A: The 
effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the 
basin and 
regional scale of 
water 
governance 
Some 
effectiveness (2) Effective (3) 
Different places, such as basins and 
regions, require different governance 
focuses and efforts that are based on 
local needs and conditions. This is 
especially important in unique 
tropical dry regions that lie outside 
the experiences of prevailing 
governing institutions.  
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7A: Decisions 
based on long-
term (20+ years) 
planning 
horizons	   Some decisions 
(2) 
Many 
decisions (3) 
Decisions that anticipate future 
opportunities and impacts could 
support collective efforts to avoid 
negative un-sustainable water 
resource development and make 
progress toward more sustainable 
futures.  This approach is important 
considering the high uncertainty and 
potential for high impact climate 
change in the region.   
7B: The ease of 
modifying water 
policy and 
planning 
processes to 
meet changing 
needs and 
priorities	  
Difficult (2) Easy enough (4) 
If the climate or other conditions/ 
contexts (i.e., political economy) 
changes, new water policies could be 
required to meet community needs 
and secure environmental quality 
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Sustainability performance of evaluated alternatives 
 
Below shows visually the differences of governance alternatives in terms of their 
evaluated sustainability effects/ performances.  In this short appendix, I do not discuss 
each evaluated alternative and do not go into detail of the evaluation results.  The only 
purpose here in this appendix is to show how the project evaluated alternatives (and 
compared them with the current state) in order to identify sustainable water governance 
alternatives and less sustainable alternatives.  This was a key step for developing the 
governance transition strategies (using the base template in Appendix F) presented in 
Chapter 6 in the sense that participants collectively understood (1) what the transition 
strategies were meant to achieve; (2) what the transition strategies were meant to avoid; 
and, (3) where these strategies needed to start from (e.g., current state).  
 
Table 5 (APPENDIX E): Resulting utility scores of water governance scenarios/ 
alternatives and the current state of water governance in Guanacaste from the multi 
criteria evaluation 
Position Scenario/ Governance Alternative Utility 
score 
#1 Scenario 3: Responsive and engaged .62 
#2 Scenario 1: Mandated to prepare .52 
#3 Scenario 4: Unnoticed in the background .29 
#4 Scenario 2: Closed-door alliances .22 
#5 Scenario 5: Overwhelmed and out of touch .10 
Current state of water governance Score: .29 
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Figure 1 (APPENDIX E): Visualization of the evaluated scenarios, based on measured 
distance from identified sustainability thresholds. Scale (-0.10 to 1.00) indicates relative 
distance from identified sustainability threshold for each criterion (1A to 7B). Note: I 
include the value -0.10 in order to display values that would be equivalent to zero, which 
would otherwise not be visible in the diagram.  
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Figure 2 (APPENDIX E):  Comparing the evaluated performance of the current-state 
with the performance of the evaluated scenarios. Scale (-0.10 to 1.00) is the same as Fig. 
2 and indicates the relative distance from sustainability threshold for each criterion  (1A 
to 7B) in comparison to the evaluated current state.   
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APPENDIX F 
TEMPLATE FOR INITIALLY BUILDING A GOVERNANCE TRANSITION  
STRATEGY (SPANISH AND ENGLISH)   
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NOTE: FOR HIGH RESOLTUION 42X36 INCH POSTER IMAGES OF THE 
FOLLOWING TEMPLATES THAT ARE SUITABLE FOR PRINTING PLEASE 
SEND EMAIL TO: CHRISOPHER.KUZDAS@GMAIL.COM
	   429  
	   430  
